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Doctor în Filosofie

Les **Summulae logicales** *de Pierre d'Espagne et la théorie de la supposition*
(Peter of Spain's **Summulae logicales** *and the theory of supposition)*

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Résumé

Mots-clés : Pierre d'Espagne, supposition, logique terministe, interprétations contemporaines

Dans un effort pour offrir une compréhension globale de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne développée dans les *Summulae logicales* (*SL.*), notre étude propose une enquête sur la phénoménalité historique de la *suppositio*, suivie par la lentille focale du concept de « formalité ». De cette façon, notre travail confrontera la théorie de Pierre avec : ses sources lointaines et proches, avec la tradition des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles de la logique terministe et avec ses interprétations post-frégéennes. Notre but ultime est de combler le fossé entre deux méthodologies différentes de traitement des constructions logiques médiévales présentes dans la recherche actuelle et identifiées par Catarina Dutilh Novaes : l'approche historique et l'approche systématique. Notre thèse est que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre peut être mieux comprise, d'une part, en mettant en évidence ses limites doctrinales, et d'autre part, en expliquant ses incompatibilités formelles avec d'autres versions plus matures de la théorie de la supposition et avec leurs interprétations contemporaines, qui considère le construit médiévale de supposition comme une théorie de : référence, quantification, inférence, herméneutique computationnelle et notation conceptuelle.

Nous proposons une argumentation dépliée en trois sections principales. La première section est une analyse historique et doctrinale qui présente la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne dans le cadre imposé par son contexte et son contenu. Premièrement, les problèmes liés à l'identité de l'auteur de *SL.*, son contexte et ses œuvres sont étudiés. Ensuite, la relation entre la théorie de la supposition et les autres traités de *SL.* est pris en compte. Finalement, les origines de la théorie de la supposition et ses différentes versions des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles sont discutés. La deuxième section est une analyse systématique qui tente d'évaluer la théorie de la supposition et ses interprétations contemporaines. Premièrement, le concept de « formel » est discuté. Deuxièmement, le problème de la formalité générique dans les théories médiévales de la supposition est abordé. Ensuite, les cinq interprétations contemporaines de la théorie de la supposition sont prises en compte. La troisième section est une combinaison synthétique des deux analyses précédentes appliquées au cas de Pierre. Dans la première partie, la théorie de la supposition de Pierre est reconsidérée et une tentative de formuler une réponse concernant sa nature et son utilisation est proposée. La seconde comprend une brève discussion sur l'orientation doctrinale de Pierre traçable dans sa théorie de la supposition. La troisième partie traite de la formalité spécifique de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne et du degré de compatibilité avec les interprétations contemporaines de la supposition.

Summary

Keywords: Peter of Spain, supposition, terminist logic, contemporary interpretations

In an effort to offer an overarching understanding of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition developed in *Summulae logicales (SL.)*, our study proposes a survey on the historical phenomenality of *suppositio*, tracked through the focal lens of the 'formality' concept. In this way, we confront Peter's theory with: its distant and proximate sources, with the 13th and 14th century tradition of terminist logic and with its post-Fregean interpretations. Our ultimate end is to bridge the gap between two different methodologies of dealing with medieval logical constructs, present in the current scholarship and identified by Catarina Dutilh Novaes: the historical and the systematic approach. Our thesis is that Peter's supposition theory can be better understood, on the one hand, by highlighting its doctrinal limitations, and, on the other, by explaining its formal incompatibilities with other more mature versions of supposition theory and with their contemporary interpretations, which considers the medieval supposition construct a theory of: reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation.

We propose an argumentation unfolded in three main sections. The first section is a historical and doctrinal analysis which presents Peter of Spain's theory of supposition within the framework imposed by its context and content. First, problems related to the identity of the author of *SL.,* his context and works are studied. Then, the relation between the supposition theory and the other tracts of *SL.* is taken into account. Finally, the origins of supposition theory and its different 13th and 14th century versions are discussed. The second section is a systematic analysis which tries to evaluate the theory of supposition and its contemporary understandings. First, the concept of 'formal' is discussed. Secondly, the problem of generic formality in the medieval supposition theories is addressed. Then, the five contemporary interpretations of the supposition theory are taken into account. The third section is a synthetic combination of the previous two analyses applied on Peter's case. In the first part, Peter's theory of supposition is reconsidered and an attempt to formulate an answer regarding its nature and use is offered. The second one comprises a short discussion on Peter's doctrinal orientation traceable in his theory of supposition. The third part discusses the specific formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory and the degree of compatibility with the contemporary interpretations of supposition.

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Peter of Spain's Summulae logicales *and the theory of supposition*

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Introduction

When we are put in front of the task of studying, explaining and rendering in a modern language an ancient or medieval philosophical doctrine, which enjoyed a long and varied tradition of interpretation, we are forced to address a series of questions and problems which concerns the very core of the history of philosophy. Questions regarding the methods we can use and the conceptual tools we can employ are all legitimate if not necessary. If we ask ourselves, how are we to travel the long distance between us and the object of our inquiry, the answer must not be an immediate one. The most appropriate reaction would be to reflect on the variety of methods and conceptual tools used by the scholarship to explore a particular theoretical object. The medieval theory of supposition makes no exception from this state of affair, but on the contrary, can be considered an illustrious example of the different ways a theory can be understood and rendered throughout the history.

Our main and *general investigation topic* will be some particular theories of supposition that were developed throughout the 13th and 14th century. Our *specific research topic* will be Peter of Spain's theory of supposition developed throughout his logical work *Tractatus,* which was called afterwards *Summulae logicales*[1].

But why such an inquiry should be made in the first place, given that since the revival of 19th-20th century interest in medieval logic the works of medieval logicians have been critically edited, translated, commented, studied and reconstructed in many ways and forms? We will try to offer a justification for our endeavor by answering a few questions and by giving a short survey on the current status of the scholarship.

Why Peter of Spain? If in the case of some medieval authors we have explicit information about their life, academic activity and written works, and in the case of others we do not have even a name to be attributed, in the case of Peter of Spain the situation is a little bit different, fact which makes him an intriguing personality. Almost every biographical description of Peter of Spain available in the specialized literature, with a possible exception of that which simply attributes him the *Tractatus* work of logic, is problematic, since is made by subscribing to one of the three major

[1] In our work we will use the two names of Peter of Spain's work interchangeably or with an appropriate abbreviation *SL.* = DE RIJK (ed.), *Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis): Tractatus. Called afterwards Summule logicales. First critical edition from the manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk.*, (1972).

theses regarding the identity of our author. Thus, because of the lack of explicit early testimonies he was considered in turn: a Latin translator of a Byzantine treatise of logic, the famous Pope John XXI or a member of the Dominican order. Thereby, we are put in front of a situation in which we have to choose from a set of possible properties attributed to the author of *Summulae logicales*, each of them supported by different arguments with different degrees of plausibility but which are never stated with a complete certainty. Thus, the controversies over the authorship and identity of Peter of Spain, even if our purpose will not be to solve them, can represent in themselves a motivation for studying the *Tractatus*.

Why Summulae logicales? Perhaps independent of the author's personality, *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* is an important text that enjoyed a remarkable interest in the Middle Ages. Being a medieval handbook or, as the titles suggests, a group of small summaries[2] of logic which, on the one hand, comprises doctrines and problems from *logica antiqua* and *logica nova*, and, on the other hand, from *logica modernorum*, *Tractatus* managed to continue one tradition of commentaries and to give birth to another. Since the first part of the book concerns with subjects that pertain to the Aristotelian-Boethian logic, the work fits in the tradition of commentaries and paraphrases on this classical corpus of logical texts. Since *Tractatus* itself will start to be commented since the 13th century, it will beget a new tradition of commentaries that will start with authors like Simon of Faversham, Robertus Anglicus, Guillelmus Arnaldi and other anonymous commentators[3]. Beginning with the southern France and northern Spain, continuing with the northern Italy and Paris, in order that, in the end, in the 14th century, to arrive at the German universities, *Tractatus* has enjoyed a wide diffusion in the Middle Ages[4]. Although, as stated by Lambertus Marie de Rijk[5], he did not leave a firm footprint on English universities, so one can speak of two different traditions of terminist logic, one in Paris and another in Oxford[6], starting with the 14th century *Tractatus* became one of the most famous texts of logic. The work is preserved in over 300 manuscripts distributed in Europe's libraries and in nearly 200 printed editions dating from 1474-1639[7]. The lack of a translation into Romanian language of this textbook

[2] See the definition of *summa* in TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages* (2003), p. 337-338.
[3] Cf. DE RIJK, *SL.*, p. XCV.
[4] Cf. *SL.*, p. XCVIII.
[5] Cf. *SL.*, p. XCIX.
[6] See DE LIBERA, 'The Oxford and Paris traditions in logic' in KRETZMANN, KENNY, PINBORG, STUMP (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (2008).
[7] See *SL.*, p. C; DE RIJK (1968a), p. 1

of medieval logic, but also the absence of extensive discussions regarding it and its doctrines, is an additional reason to approach the topic proposed by us.

Beyond its importance due to its circulation and diffusion, the logical work of Peter of Spain deserves to be studied for its doctrines of terminist logic. Considering that *Tractatus* will be commented and use in the university milieu over the next few centuries since its composition, the clarification of its theses is necessary. But the study of this treatise must not be seen as having only a relevance for the researcher of the Middle Ages' philosophy due to the fact that it offers a systematic exposition of the Aristotelian-Boethian and terminist logic. On the contrary, due to its general interrogated problems, the treatise falls under the interest of the contemporary researcher of ontology, logic and philosophy of language. Similarities between the theories presented in *Tractatus*, that is, the theory of terms and especially the theory of supposition, and the post-Fregean theories of language, are successfully the object of many researches undertaken with the tools of contemporary analytical philosophy.

Why the theory of supposition? In contrast with *logica antiquorum*, the theory of supposition is characterized by the contemporary literature as being an original creation of medieval Latin thinking. Having a threefold root, that is, logic, grammar and theology, the theory of supposition starts to emerge in the 12th century[8] and reaches a terminological and conceptual maturity between the 13th and 14th century, at the beginning of which period *Tractatus* is written. In general, the theory of supposition offers explanations for the way in which a word, usually situated in the context of a proposition, can stand (*supponit*) for or in the place of something. Although, the way this process actually happens, the terminology in use and the particular taxonomy of the modes of supposition differ from one author and period to another, there is a common point: the theory of supposition can present an explanation of the way in which the language functions in relation to the world. Being as such, the theory of supposition and the general theory of properties of terms starts to be use beyond the domain of logic and becomes a general instrument of propositional analysis, thus being instrumentalized in hermeneutical practices like the theological commentaries on the *Sentences* of Petrus Lombardus. However, within Peter of Spain's terminist logic developed through the VI, VII-XII treatises of *Tractatus*, that is, the logic that preoccupies itself with the categorematic properties of terms, supposition is the most important property; this fact applies to other works from 13th and 14th century of the same logical *Summulist* tradition. It is in respect to

[8] EBBESEN, "Early Supposition Theory II" in *Vivarium* vol. 51 (2013).

the theory of supposition, that all the other properties of terms as *ampliatio*, *restrictio*, *appellatio* and *distributio* are defined. Thus, in order to understand Peter of Spain's logic and especially his terminist logic, the study of the theory of supposition is a necessity.

The theory of supposition from *Tractatus* is also important since it enters in direct dialog with the contemporary theories of language, ontology and logic. Since *suppositio* is defined as "*taking in place of something the very term that already signifies a thing*"[9] or as "*taking a substantive term in place of something*"[10], it takes into account the relations between linguistic and extralinguistic entities and thus can be assessed by and compared with the contemporary theories of reference and signification. To the extent that we question the status of these linguistic and extralinguistic entities, the theory of supposition falls under the incidence of linguistic and general ontology. Regarding to the last aspect, the theory of supposition is an indicator for Peter of Spain's degree of ontological commitment that can be analyzed in models of thinking about the reality that are traditionally called *nominalism*, *conceptualism* and *realism*.

Regarding the *recent studies* on the theory of supposition, we can state that the field of medieval semantics and logical studies is a relatively new aria of inquiry that has been able to developed in the second part of 20th century with the emergence of new critical editions. In *Formalizing medieval logical theories*[11] Catarina Dutilh Novaes makes a distinction between two types of approaches regarding the study of medieval logical theories. The first, is the historical one which deals with: establishing of critical editions, the paternity and sources of the text, the tradition to which a certain text belongs and the ideas that will be taken over by the those who will follow the author in question. We can say that this kind of approach belongs usually to the historian of medieval philosophy, which, according to the same author, is rather interested in the intellectual universe of the author since it evaluates the studied texts from within without a critical eye[12]. The second approach is the systematical one[13], which considers that some theories and ideas developed by medieval authors can successfully be applied to some particular problems from contemporary philosophy of language and logic, or – we can add – some medieval theories or ideas could be

[9] COPENHAVER, NORMORE, PARSONS (eds., transl.), *Peter of Spain: Summaries of logic* (2014), VI, 3, p. 241. (Reference abbreviated with *CNP*); *SL*, VI. 3, p. 80, l. 10-11: "suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo";
[10] *CNP*, p. 241; *SL*, VI. 3, p. 80, l. 8-9: "suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo".
[11] DUTILH, *Formalizing medieval logical theories* (2007a), p. 9.
[12] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 10.
[13] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 9

successfully transposed through the conceptual tools of the contemporary philosophy of language and logic. In both cases, the systematic approach will deal with a critical assessment of the medieval theories and ideas and has to address the problem of anachronism[14]. The aforementioned distinction can successfully be applied both to the way in which the contemporary exegesis relates in general to the topic of supposition or to the 13th century logic, and to the specific topic of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition.

Consequently, regarding our specific topic of study, on one part, we can identify the main lines of the historical approach. In 1944 Joseph Patrick Mullally[15] offers a first, although uncomplete, modern edition and translation of *Summulae logicales* text based on some printed editions, thus on some late textual witnesses. This particular edition is considered by L. M. de Rijk an uncritical one, since Peter's text is often interpolated with texts of different commentators[16]. In 1947 Józef Maria Bocheński publishes a complete addition of Peter's summaries of logic based on the codex Vatican Library, Reg. Lat. 1205. Even this edition is considered by De Rijk as impracticable inasmuch as is it abounds in errors[17]. In 1972 L. M. de Rijk finally offers the first critical edition of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales.* After the first critical edition, translations in modern languages like English, Spanish, Italian and German began to appear naturally[18].

Besides the aspects related to critical editions, translations and expositive descriptions, in the historical approach we can find discussions on: the identity of Peter of Spain, the authorship and the date of composition of *Tractatus*, its sources and other related topics. For the first, we can mention the existence of three main theses regarding the authorship of *Tractatus* and Peter of Spain's identity, as discussed by L. M. de Rijk, Angel D`Ors, Simon Tugwell, José Meirinhos, Joke Spruyt and others[19]. The first is called the *Byzantine thesis* which has its origin in Elias

[14] See idem.
[15] MULLALLY (ed., transl.), *The "Summulae Logicales" of Peter of Spain* (1945).
[16] Cf. *SL*., p. C.
[17] Cf. *SL*., p. C; BOCHENSKI (ed.), *Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, quas a manu scripto Reg. Lat. 1205* edidit Iuri M. Bochenski (1947).
[18] BEUCHOT (transl.), Pedro Hispano, (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), *Tractatus, llamados después Summule logicales, primera edición crítica basada en los manuscritos e introducción de L.M. de Rijk* (1986); DINNEN (transl.), *Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute. An English Translation of Peter of Spain's Tractatus Called Afterwards Summulae Logicales on the basis of the Critical Edition Established by L.M. De Rijk* (1990); PONZIO (transl.), *Pietro Ispano, Trattati di lógica. Summule logicales* (2004); DEGEN-PABST (übers.), *Summulae Logicales – Logische Abhandlungen*, Übersetzt und mit einer Einführung versehen, (2006); CNP.
[19] DE RIJK, *SL*; "On the genuine text of Peter of Spain's Summule Logicales" in *Vivarium* vol. 6 (1968) p. 1-34; "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales II Simon of Faversham (+ 1306) as a Commentator of the

Ehinger[20] who affirms that *Tractatus* is a translation from Greek into Latin of a treatises attributed to Michael Psellos. The second thesis, the *Papalist* one, is identifying Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*, with Pope John XXI. The third thesis, the *Dominican* one, identifies Peter of Spain the author of *Tractatus* with a member of the Dominican order. This particular attribution is made with different degrees of precision leading to a threefold division of the Dominican thesis according to its generality. This debate surrounding the authorship of *Tractatus*, is supplement by a research directed towards the Petrine Corpus[21]. On the basis of the different sets of works attributed to Peter of Spain, José Meirinhos established different personalities which bared this name[22].

Regarding the discussion on the possible sources of supposition theory, De Rijk identifies two traditions, one of commentaries to Aristotle's *Sophistical refutations*, and the other of commentaries to the 6th century grammar of Priscian[23]. But to these two sources could be added a third, as Ebbesen suggests, the theological one which has its sources in Gilbertus of Poitiers[24]. As Luisa Valente and Alain de Libera[25] suggest, a number of authors and texts from the Porretan

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Tracts I-V of the Summule" in *Vivarium* vol. 6 (1968), p. 69-101; "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales. III. Two Redactions of a Commentary upon the Summule by Robertus Anglicus" in *Vivarium* vol. 7 (1969); p. 8-61; "On the genuine text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales IV", in *Vivarium* vol. 7 (1969) p. 120-162; D'ORS, "Petrus Hispanus O.P., auctor summularum" in *Vivarium* vol. 35 (1997), p. 21-71; "Petrus Hispanus O. P., Auctor Summularum (II): further documents and problems" in *Vivarium* vol. 39 (2001), p. 209-254; "Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (III). "Petrus Alfonsi" or "Petrus Ferrandi"?" in *Vivarium* vol. 41 (2003), p. 249-303; TUGWELL, "Petrus Hispanus: comments on some proposed identifications" in *Vivarium* vol. 37 (1999), p. 103-113; "Auctor "Summularum", Petrus Hispanus OP Stellensis?" in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* vol. 76 (2006), p. 103-115; MEIRINHOS, "Pedro Hispano Portugalense? Elementos para una diferenciaÇao de autores" in *Revista española de filosofía medieval* vol. 3 (1996) p. 51-76; "Giovanni XXI" in *Enciclopedia dei papi* (2021); "Pedro Hispano e a lógica Pedro" in Calafate (org.): *História do pensamento filosófico português* (2002), p. 331-375; *Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Hispani* (2011), "Petrus Hispanus' Attributed Works: Searching for New Interpretations" in *Enrahonar*, Supplement Issue (2018), p. 355-363; SPRUYT, "Peter of Spain" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/peter-spain/; The introductory studies of: CNP, PONZIO (2010); DINNEEN (1990) and DEGEN-PABST (2006); LONGEWAY, "Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus) (circa 1205-1277)" in *Medieval Philosophers (DLB)* (1992), p. 315-325.

[20] Cf. *SL*, p. LXI.

[21] MEIRINHOS (2011).

[22] See for example MEIRINHOS (2018).

[23] See DUTILH, "Supposition Theory" in *Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500* (2011b), p. 1231; RIJK, *Logica modernorum: A contribution to the history of early terminist logic. Bd. 1: On the 12th century theories of fallacy. Bd. 2: The origin and early development of the theory of supposition*, vol. I and II, (1962-1967).

[24] Cf. DUTILH (2011b), p. 1231.

[25] See EBBESEN (2013); see also VALENTE, *Logique et théologie: les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (2008); "Supposition Theory and Porretan Theology: Summa Zwettlensis and Dialogus Ratii et Everardi" in *Vivarium* vol. 51 (2013), p. 119-144. JOLIVET, DE LIBERA (eds), *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum. Actes du Septième Symposium Europeen d'Histoire de la Logique et de la Semantique Medievales ; Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisatione Médiévale de Poitiers ; Poitiers 17 - 22 juin 1985* (1987)

school propose a program of studying divine predication with a similar conceptual framework as that found in the logical tradition after the second half of the 12th century.

Up to this point we made a short survey on what we could call the historical-descriptive approach. In what follows we will try to sketch the second approach that could be identified in the literature, namely the systematic one. A general characteristic of this particular line of thinking is that it identifies the property of supposition with a certain element or theory of contemporary philosophy of language or logic. As Catarina Dutilh Novaes shows us, Thomas Peter Gech in *Reference and Generality: An examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories* was probably the first who initiated this tradition by identifying the medieval property of supposition with the property of reference[26]. Since then, many researchers have subscribed, partially or not and explicitly or implicitly, to his, let's call it, "*reference*" thesis. Of those, we can list Paul Vincent Spade[27], Peter King[28], Claude Panaccio[29], Gyula Klima[30] and many more. This interpretation has been contested on at least two levels. At the level of the theoretical content, Dutilh[31] argues for an understanding of supposition as a theory of propositional meaning in the particular sense of a hermeneutical theory, especially if the supposition theory is put in direct connection with the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*. At the second level, the critique of the reference interpretation is made in respect to the etymology, signification and function of

[26] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 11; GEACH, *Reference and generality. An examination of some medieval and modern theories* (1962), p 84.
[27] See for example: SPADE, *Thoughts, Words and Things: An introduction to Late mediaeval logic and semantic theory* (2002), p. 245: "To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call 'reference.'"; "Ockham's rule of supposition: two conflicts in his theory" in *Vivarium* vol. 12 (1974), p. 63: "William of Sherwood enunciates the following principle 'Subjects are of such sorts as their predicates may have allowed'. That is, the kind of supposition or refence a term has in a given sentence depends at least in part on what kind of a term the predicate is."
[28] For example, BURIDAN, *Jean Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition, The Treatise on Consequences. A Translation from the Latin with a Philosophical Introduction*, translation by Peter King (1985), p. 35: "The theory of supposition should not be assimilated to formal logic, but to the philosophy of logic; it is the mediaeval theory of reference", p. 36: "Supposition theory is a theory of reference. It is a unified theory, which has as its goal to specify what a term is used to talk about in a given sentence".
[29] See for example PANACCIO, PERINI, "Guillaume d'Ockham et la suppositio materialis" in *Vivarium* vol. 42 (2004), p. 202: "La théorie de façon générale, essaie de thématiser dans un jeu complexe de distinct règles les variations de la fonction référentielle d'un terme pris en contexte, par rapport à ce que l'on appellerait aujourd'hui son extension, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble de toutes les choses présentes, passées, même seulement possibles auxquelles le terme s'applique."
[30] For example, see KLIMA, "Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic" in HIEKE, MORSCHER (eds.), *New Essays in Free Logic* (2001), p. 197: "In this paper I am going to give a brief, primarily systematic (as opposed to primarily historical) account of how it was possible for medieval logicians to maintain Aristotle's theory of the four categoricals and to dispense with these existential assumptions in the framework of their theory of reference, the theory of supposition."
[31] Cf. DUTILH (2007a), p. 30

the terms used by Latins in the making of supposition theory. As Alain de Libera points out, the *supposition*-terms cannot be equated with reference, denotation, signification or other post-Fregean terms[32]. But the systematic approach does not limit itself to the identification of supposition theory with the theory of reference, although is one of the most widespread option endorsed by the contemporary exegetes. In fact, we can state that the theory of supposition was considered to be[33]: a theory of reference[34], a theory related to conceptual notation[35], a hermeneutical theory or a theory of propositional meaning[36], a theory of inference[37] and a theory of quantification[38]. Thus, the answer offered by the scholarship for the question "what is the theory of supposition?" varies greatly and a response regarding any particular theory of supposition must critically take into account all the options available today. Our endeavor of analyzing Peter of Spain's theory of supposition in relation to those particular modern interpretations will be even more justified, since a great part of them are taking into account more mature theories of supposition as those of William Ockham and John Buridan, which are more prone to such treatments.

Regarding our own academic milieu, that is, the Romanian scholarship, we can state that there is only a small contribution to this domain of research, and even this contribution mostly

[32] Cf. DE LIBERA, "Supposition" in CASSIN (ed.), *Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon* (2014), pp. 1097-1102. Almost the same point is argued by Bocheński, see BOCHEŃSKI, *A history of formal logic* (1961), on the basis of the differences in the language employed by the theory of supposition and the theory of reference.

[33] See ILE, "The Formality of Peter of Spain's Theory of Supposition" in *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai-Philosophia* 63 (3), (2018), p. 12, for a similar list of interpretations.

[34] For the interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of reference, see for example: GEACH (1962), SPADE (2002), (1974); PANACCIO, PERINI (2004), KLIMA (2001).

[35] For the interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of conceptual notation, see: PERREIAH, "Approaches to supposition theory" in *The New Scholasticism*, XLV, 3 (1971), p. 381-408; "Supposition theory: A new approach" in *The New Scholasticism*, LX, 2 (1986), p. 213-231.

[36] For the specific interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of computational or algorithmic hermeneutics or a theory of propositional meaning, see: DUTILH (2007a); DUTILH, "Theory of Supposition vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham" in *Vivarium*, Vol. 45, No. 2/3 (2007), pp. 343-359. DUTILH, "Ockham's Supposition Theory as Formal Semantics" in KANN, LOEWE, RODE, UCKELMAN (eds.) *Modern views of medieval logic* (2018), p. 85-110.

[37] For the interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of inference, see for example: KARGER, "Modes of personal supposition: the purpose and usefulness of the doctrine within Ockham's logic" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 44, *William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue* Part I (1984), pp. 87-106; "Consequences et inconsequences de la supposition vide dans la logique d'Ockham" in *Vivarium*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1978), pp. 46-55; MATTHEWS, "A note on Ockham's theory of the modes of common personal supposition" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 44, *William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue*, Part I (1984), pp. 81-86

[38] For the interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of quantification, see for example: BÖHNER, *Medieval logic. An Outline of its Development from 1250 to 1400* (1952); "Ockham's theory of supposition and the notion of truth" in *Franciscan Studies* Ser. NS, vol. 6 (1946), pp. 261-292; PRIEST, READ, "The formalization of Ockham's theory of supposition" in *Mind* vol. 86 (1977) pp. 109-113; PRIEST, READ, "Merely Confused Supposition: A Theoretical Advance or a Mere Confusion?" in *Franciscan Studies*, Volume 40, 1980, pp. 265-297; PARSONS, "Supposition as Quantification versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect" in *Topoi* 16 (1997), pp. 41–63.

belongs only to the historical approach. Although we do not have yet a translation of *Tractatus* in Romanian language – an objective that we will try to accomplish in the appendix – we can find in Anton Dumitriu's *History of logic*[39] a mere expositive description of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. Also, in another handbook of history, but this time of philosophy of language, Eugen Coșeriu[40] offers an exposition of some general aspects of supposition theory from a linguistic point of view. Another worthy mention is Valerius Streinu's article *Teoria supoziției*[41]*,* which delivers a general history of the supposition theory and an exposition of the way this particular property of terms works. A more recent intervention connected to our subject is that of Alexander Baumgarten. In *Le lexique philosophique roumain. L'exemple de la suppositio*[42] he puts into question the way in which the terms involved in the vocabulary of *suppositio* can be translated, by qualifying them in all the three registers of their origin: theology, logic and grammar. Opting for the triplet obtained from the linguistic calque: *supoziție*, *suponent* and *supozit*, the concept of *suppositio* receives a different translation from that given by Dumitriu, that is, of '*supleanță',* term borrowed from Jacques Maritain's French term '*suppléance*'.

Seeing the rich scholarship that has developed in two different branches of reflecting upon the theory of supposition, our main objective will be to explore both of them in relation to Peter of Spain's logic, in order to clarify the status of his theory. For that main purpose we propose de following objectives of research: (1.) to offer a general description of Peter of Spain's logic by integrating it in the 13th century context; (2.) to analyze Peter of Spain's theory of supposition according to its own text and to make explicit its main points of articulation; (3.) to analyze Peter of Spain's logic as a whole and its particular relation with the theory of supposition; (4.) to establish differences and similarities with other 13th and 14th century supposition theories, in order to formulate a better image of the development of this theory in the medieval period; (5.) to answer the question "what is Peter of Spain supposition theory according to historical approach?"; (6.) to expose each type of contemporary interpretation on supposition theory; (7.) to critical asses every identified contemporary type of explanation in order to establish their legitimacy; (8.) to apply each particular type of contemporary interpretation to Peter of Spain's supposition theory; (9.) to

[39] DUMITRIU, *History of Logic* (1977) translated in English from Dumitriu, *Istoria logicii* (1969).
[40] COȘERIU, *Istoria Filozofiei Limbajului* (2011).
[41] STREINU, "Teoria supoziției" in *Probleme de logică* vol 5 (1973), pp. 111-131.
[42] See BAUMGARTEN, "Le lexique philosophique roumain. L'exemple de la suppositio" in CASSIN (ed.), *Philosopher en langues, Les intraduisibles en traduction* (2014), pp. 185-199.

answer the question "what is Peter of Spain supposition theory according to systematic approach?"; (10.) to offer an explanation for the general mechanics of contemporary interpretations of the theory of supposition.

Seeing that our research is mainly oriented towards a specific text – Peters of Spain's *Tractatus* – on a specific problem – the relation of supposition theory with its sources, Peter of Spain's logic, other 13th and 14th century supposition theories and their contemporary interpretations – we can state that the *character of our research* is an applied one. To the extent that the theory can address some fundamental problems, like the way in which the language functions in relation with the world and the ontological consequences of this functioning model, our *research can be considered as fundamental*.

As any research, our endeavor is built on some *theoretical hypothesis* that will be confirmed or infirmed throughout our study. Our hypotheses are: (t1.) Peter of Spain develops in *Tractatus* an unitary and coherent consideration of supposition that allows us to qualify it as a theory, distinguishable from other 13th and 14th century supposition doctrines; (t2.) there is a fundamental difference between medieval logic and contemporary logic and language theories; (t3.) although there are principal differences between medieval and contemporary logic and language theories we can identify principle resemblances, (t4.) supposition theory is not a theory of: inference, reference, quantification, conceptual notation or hermeneutics/propositional meaning, but a specific theory that has many stages of development and that differs from its modern interpretations.

By taking into account both the contemporary studies and I. M. Bocheński's idea that between medieval and contemporary logic that has been passed through a stage of mathematization there is a fundamental difference, that is, the first expresses with a natural, common and intuitive language what the second expresses in a formal way, through the specialized signs of an artificial language[43], we can arrive of our main work hypothesis.

Our *main work hypothesis* is that a better understanding of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be attained by showing its differences in relation to other 13th and 14th century

[43] See BOCHEŃSKI (1961), p. 173: "The most notable difference between the doctrine of supposition and the corresponding modern theories lies in the fact that while contemporary logic as far as possible has one sign for one function, e.g. a sign for a word, another for the word's name, one for the word in personal, another for it in simple supposition, the Scholastics took equiform signs and determine their functions by establishing their supposition. And this brings us back to the fundamental difference already remarked on between the two forms of formal logic; scholastic logic dealt with ordinary language, contemporary logic develops an artificial one."

supposition theories and their contemporary interpretation. These differences will show that we cannot put an equivalence sign between (a.) the theories of supposition articulated by different medieval logicians and between (b.) specific theories of supposition and contemporary theories of language and logic according to which the formers are interpreted. Peter of Spain's theory of supposition is not a theory of signification, inference, reference, conceptual notation, hermeneutics or quantification, but a consideration upon a particular property of terms which must be understood, on the one way, in the proper dynamic of the Latin medieval language and on the other, in the fixed framework of medieval logic.

Thus, our *thesis* is that the answer to the question "what is Peter of Spain's theory of supposition?" will be acquired only if we take into account two different aspects:

1. The medieval property of supposition and implicitly Peter of Spain's treatment is a theory that has developed through different stages to the extent that we can speak about a tendency of formalization, that is, a tendency of objectivization and terminological maturity or rigor of the logical discourse. In this particular sense, Bocheński's thesis for a medieval logic expressed in a natural and common language is partially infirmed.
2. The medieval supposition theory has an intuitive sense directly connected to the way in which *suppositio*-terms are functioning in medieval Latin. Consequently, in this particular sense Bocheński's thesis still remains.

Our *thesis*, the existence in Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* of a supposition theory that can be expressed and understood in its own terms, without being equated with its contemporary interpretations or with other medieval supposition-theory constructs, and which suffers a tendency of formalization through terminological development but which presents in the same time an intuitive content, will be argued on the basis of a specific notion of *formality*. In our view, the concept of formality is the key notion that will help us to observe the way in which supposition theory has evolved from its beginning until our own time. Although our key concept remains to be qualified in our study, it will be responsible for showing the structural differences between Peter of Spain's theory of supposition and other 13th and 14th century theories of supposition and their modern interpretations. In this way, we will show that the degree of formalism involved in Peter of Spain's theory is much lower than that employed in other medieval and contemporary theoretical articulations regarding supposition.

At the basis of our research stands a *methodology* inspired in great part by Catarina Dutilh Novaes distinction between two approaches of dealing with medieval logical theories, that is, the historical approach and the systematic approach[44]. Since the first one could be accused of not relating supposition theory to contemporary logic or language theories and thus not making it more up-to-date or relevant to our own problems, and the second could be accused of anachronism, in as much as its action of interpreting the medieval supposition theory produces a change in the degree of formalism and thus a distortion of the original doctrine, we will try to overpass those two problems by taking a middle ground. Based on the synthesis between the two aforementioned approaches, by employing content and terminological analysis we will establish the status of Peter of Spain's supposition theory in relation to: its sources, the whole logic from *Tractatus* and the 13th and 14th century terminist doctrines. Through historical and comparative analysis with Peter's proximate precursors and posteriority we will be able to assess the evolution of supposition theory and its tendency towards formality. Through critical and comparative analysis, we will be able to show the difference in formality between Peter of Spain's doctrine of *suppositio* and the contemporary interpretations.

Although our work intends to make a significant contribution to the important debated surrounding the status of supposition theory in Middle Ages, by using a clear methodology that hopes to bridge the gap between two different interpretative traditions, it still presents some shortcomings, limitations and risks. First, the time and resources limitations did not allow us to be involved in studies on unedited texts related to our topic. In order to proper explain the origins of the supposition theory, the early tradition of commentaries to Peter's logical work and the tradition that follows in the centuries to come, work with unedited texts is required[45]. Thus, regarding certain topics we tend to rely on the current scholarship. Second, the vast amount of secondary literature devoted to the relation between medieval and modern or contemporary logic and even the one devoted to the different ways of interpreting supposition theory makes an exhaustive study of those problems almost impossible. Thus, we only tried to cover its main points of articulation. Some parts devoted to the contemporary interpretations of supposition theory were not considered in their final and full implications and in the formality presupposed by the contemporary logics.

[44] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 9

[45] For example, there could be a new edition of the early commentators of *SL*. De Rijk, in a number of articles, has edited some of their texts with a debatable result.

Third, by supplementing, adapting and transforming Catarina Dutilh Novaes' account on the history of dealing with supposition in a full-developed methodology, in the light of the aforementioned shortcomings and limitations, we may face a major risk. This risk can be explained in the following way: we intend to find a middle ground between the historical tradition and the systematic one, by offering: a historical and doctrinal analysis, a systematic analysis and, finally, an assessment of supposition theory that is places at the intersection of the previous two types of analysis; but by doing so, we risk to not properly commit neither to a proper historical analysis, nor to a systematic one, like the one a proper historian of medieval philosophy and a contemporary logician would make. In conclusion, by trying to bridge the gap between the two interpretative traditions, we risk to fall between them.

However, we still believe that our study goes over the current state of the art in what concerns the study of supposition theory. Thus far, with the exception found in the case of Catarina Dutilh Novaes[46], no study has seriously put the meta-logical and methodological question of how we should approach the interpretation of supposition theory, on the basis of the relation between medieval and modern or contemporary logic or theories of language. No recent study has tried to offer an exhaustive and comprehensive account of the various ways in which supposition theory was interpreted in the contemporary scholarship[47]. The main focus of the scholars in what concerns the theory of supposition was the more mature versions articulated in the 14th century and not Peter of Spain's doctrine from *Tractatus* or *Summule logicales*. Although, we can find withing the systematic tradition a vivid debate around the proper interpretation of supposition theory which often uses arguments from the historical tradition, no real bridging between the two interpretative poles was tried, and especially not regarding Peter of Spain's theory. Accordingly, the proper understanding of the terminist property named '*suppositio*' remains a much-debated subject that needs a study with an adequate methodology.

In order to address the problems that are insufficiently treated by the current scholarship, with the purpose of defending our main thesis, according to the aforementioned methodology, we propose an argumentation unfolded in three main sections: *Section 1: The historical and doctrinal*

[46] The only exception seems to be Catarina Dutilh Novaes. However, her systematic analysis takes into account only the 14th century theories of supposition and only the contemporary interpretation of supposition as a theory of reference.

[47] PERREIAH (1971) offers an evaluation of all the interpretative positions taken up to that time. However, since then, the scholarship has changed and new approaches of supposition have emerged.

analysis, *Section 2: The systematic analysis* and *Section 3: Assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition*.

The first section of our work, as the names suggests, will make a historical and doctrinal analysis of theory of supposition. Its main purpose is to establish an understanding of the theory of supposition void of any contemporary theoretical presuppositions, or, in another words, to understand the theory of supposition within its own historical and contextual framework. To attain this goal, a fist chapter will deal with problems related to the author of *Tractatus*, to the corpus of texts attributed to him and his general context. A second chapter will make a doctrinal analysis of the twelve tracts comprised in *SL*. The third and final chapter of the first section will discuss the relation between medieval logic and the theory of supposition.

The first part of the first chapter will have as main topic the problem of authorship. On the basis of the scholarship, we will show how the author of *Tractatus* was identified first with a Byzantine scholar, then with Pope John XXI, and finally with a series of Dominican friars. The works of L. M. de Rijk, Angel D`Ors and Simon Tugwell bare witness for the history of those identifications.

In the second part of the first chapter, the works attributed to Peter of Spain will be discussed. In a first step, we will show José Meirinhos' contribution to the authorship debate, by his studies of the Petrine Corpus of texts, as reflected in his catalog *Bibliotheca Manuscripta Petri Hispani* and other works. In a second step, a short discussion on the debate surrounding the place and date of composition of *Tractatus* will be made.

The third part of the first chapter puts *Tractatus* into perspective. In a first sub-section an analysis of the title, genre, structure, content and doctrinal character is made. The following two sub-sections try to explain the diffusion and reception of this work starting with the Middle Ages and arriving at the modern critical editions and translations.

The second chapter offers an explanatory exposition of the twelve tracts of logic contained by Peter's work. Each part of this chapter will deal with a specific tract while trying to show the unity of the entire work of logic and the central role the theory of supposition plays in it.

The third and final chapter of the first section will have as purpose the examination of the relation between the theory of supposition and Medieval logic, in an attempt to sketch the historical evolution of the *suppositio* conceptual framework. First, by taking an important number of studies into account, we will examine the debate regarding the origins of the supposition theory. The three

already existing theses (logical, grammatical and theological) will be discussed. To those, a fourth one will be considered, usually neglected by the current scholarship, that places the origin of supposition in the proximity of the Roman law and the regimented version of the common Latin language that it uses. Secondly, in addition to Peter of Spain doctrine, the third chapter will analyze other four versions of supposition theory that pertain to the Oxford and Parisian traditions. The first two sub-parts are preoccupied with the theories of supposition developed by Lambertus of Lagny in *Logica* or *Summa Lamberti* and by William of Sherwood in *Introductiones in Logicam*, both being representative for the 13th century. The last two will examine two version of supposition from the 14th century within the nominalist tradition: Buridan's version from *Summulae de dialectica* and Ockham's version from *Summa logicae*.

The second section is dedicated to the systematic analysis of the supposition theory. It has a threefold purpose according to the three chapters it contains. The first tries to study the concept of 'formality' and to obtain the necessary tools for an assessment of the supposition theory according to the systematic line of thinking. The second is preoccupied with the generic formality of the medieval logic and Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. The third deals with the different interpretations of supposition theory traceable in the modern scholarship.

The first chapter of the second section will be focused on the notion of 'formality'. Resorting to the works of John Gordon MacFarlane, Sven Ove Hansson, Catarina Dutilh Novaes and others[48], in a first step, the origins of the notion of 'formality' will be discussed. Then, relying on the last two aforementioned authors, two functioning models of understanding how formalization works will be discussed. Finally, the last sub-chapter will show the different types of formality identified by Dutilh and MacFarlane and the way in which both can be reduced to a series of theoretical characteristics than can be more easily applied to our object of study.

The second chapter of the second section will be an inquiry of the formal elements that can be traced, at a generic level, in the medieval theories of supposition. In a first sub-chapter, we will discuss how the scholarship understands the relation between medieval and contemporary logic in terms of formality. Starting with Father Philotheus Boehner and ending with Laurent Cesalli and

[48] For example, MACFARLANE, *What does it mean to say that logic is formal?* (2000); DUTILH (2007a); (2007b); DUTILH, "The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) formal" in *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 32:4 (2011a); HANSSON, "Formalization in Philosophy" in *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000).

Terence Parsons[49], different positions will be taken into account, in order to argue for a double 'nature' of medieval logic that includes both formal and non-formal characteristics. The second sub-chapter is an attempt of putting Peter of Spain's theory of supposition into a new perspective, in order to highlight its formal elements. First, a syntactical formality will be argued on the basis of his *scientia sermocinalis* that enables him a certain type of language analysis. Secondly, the entire theory of supposition as proposed in *SL* will be analyzed and described as a series of semantical and syntactical conditions. This endeavor will enable us to evaluate its generic formality. In order to better understand the degree of formality implied by his theory, in the third sub-chapter a comparative analysis with William of Ockham's version will be done. By showing the way in which the supposition theory applies to the simple categorical propositional forms in these two cases, a better understanding of their formality will be obtained.

The third and final chapter of second section is dedicated to the contemporary interpretations of supposition theories. Each sub-chapter will be preoccupied with a specific type of interpretation and its corresponding theoretical problems. Thus, first, the interpretation of supposition as a theory of reference will be analyzed, according to the tradition initiated by Peter Geach. Secondly, we will discuss the debate surrounding the interpretation of supposition as a quantification theory, by appealing to a series of works written by Philotheus Boehner, Gareth B. Matthews, John J. Swiniarski and others. Thirdly, we will discuss Catarina Dutilh Novae's interpretation of supposition as a theory of propositional meaning or computational hermeneutics. In a fourth sub-chapter we will discuss the thesis according to which the theory of supposition is considered to be a theory of inference, as has been proposed by Elizabeth Karger. The last sub-chapter will analyze the interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of conceptual notation, position prosed and defended by Alan R. Perreiah.

The *third and final section* of our work tries to combine the previous two sections in an applied assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. The purpose of this section is to offer a better understanding of the nature, purpose and status of Peter's theoretical construct. This will be done, one the one hand, with the aid of doctrinal knowledge obtained from the historical and doctrinal analysis and, on the other, with the aid of the formal tools and contemporary interpretative devices explored in the systematic analysis.

[49] BÖHNER (1952); CESALLI, "What is Medieval Logic After All? Towards a Scientific Use of Natural Language" in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* (2010); PARSONS, *Articulating medieval logic* (2014).

In a first chapter, a new analysis of the Peter's account on supposition will be made. As a first step, we will try to address the problem of the multiplicity of meaning of the *suppositio*-terms in *SL*, in relation with their use in both the old and the terminist logic. As a second step, our work will try to understand what supposition theory really is, by connecting it with three different portions of Peter's logic: the theory of signification, the theory of fallacies and the theory of places. By doing this, we will see to what extent the problems already identified in Peter's supposition theory can be solved.

The second chapter of the third section tries to address the problem of Peter's ontological commitment. In this short part we will discuss the doctrinal elements which will allow us to establish a certain doctrinal orientation towards realism or conceptualism.

The third and last chapter of our work will be concerned with the specific formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory and the possibility of understanding it in the conceptual frameworks developed by the contemporary scholarship. The first sub-chapter will try to determine the differences in formality within the cluster formed by the 13th century authors, though a comparative analysis of the supposition theories articulated by Peter of Spain, Lambert and Sherwood. The second sub-chapter will argue for a specific formality of Peter's theory. It will try to established the degree in which the types of formality identified in the second section can be applied to Peter of Spain's supposition theory; this step will help us in the final endeavor of our work. In the last sub-chapter we will assess how the contemporary solutions regarding the understanding of supposition theory can be applied to Peter's case. Thus, we will test if Peter's supposition theory can be understood as a theory of reference, quantification, computational hermeneutics, inference and conceptual notation, as the scholarship suggests.

1. Section I: The historical and doctrinal analysis

The "historical line" of investigation was originally identified by Catarina Dutilh Novaes as a way of the modern scholarship of approaching the medieval logical texts. This approach seems to be characterized, according to her, on the one hand, by an interest in a limited kind of subjects as establishing critical editions of texts and finding doctrinal connections between different medieval logicians and, on the other hand, by a method: analyzing the texts from within and with a non-critical eye[50]. It is true that, Dutilh's understanding of the "historical line" has its limitations since is made in contrast with the "systematic line" and with the purpose of showing its shortcomings regarding the understanding of supposition as reference[51]. However, we consider that the "historical line" understood as a specific type of analyzing the logical texts has at its foundation an idea that is worth exploring. Besides its debatable conclusions regarding what supposition theory is, the historical line has or should have a unitary and comprehensive method of dealing with theoretical constructs. Whether this is the case or not with the actual scholarship, does not have a great importance. What is important is the idea of an historical method of approaching the medieval logical texts and the possibility to implement it in our current work.

The purpose of a historical method of analyzing a text should be that of following a principle of interpretative accuracy, fidelity and objectivity. This will mean that the medieval theoretical construct will be interpreted within its own limitations or the limitations imposed by its proximate context. In this way the historical and doctrinal analysis wishes to establish in a descriptive but not uncritically manner, the origins of a theoretical construct, its articulations or structure, its content and its influence. It is important that in applying a method as such, no less or more contemporary theories will be applied in order to interpret the medieval theoretical construct. From Dutilh's perspective, the "historical line" has failed specifically at this task, since it has interpreted the theory of supposition as a theory of reference[52]. However, the historical and doctrinal analysis should not be considered as an independent and sufficient method of studying a medieval logical theory on its own. In fact, it should be used as a preliminary stage of analyzing upon which other systematic and comparative approaches should be made. This is particularly the reason for which we established an historical and doctrinal analysis of Peter of Spain and his theory of supposition for the first section of our study.

[50] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 8-9
[51] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 9.
[52] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 9.

The first section of our work, which will employ the method of the historical and doctrinal analysis, is composed of three parts. The first part will be dedicated to the problems related to the author of *Tractatus*, his works and context. First, the problem of the authorship will be addressed, in an analysis of the three main theses (Byzantine, Papalist and Dominican) proposed thus far by the scholarship. Second, additional information regarding the context and the author of the logical handbook will be given, by discussing the corpus of works attributed to him. Third, the work of *Tractatus* will be analyzed by reveling its genre, structure, content and stile of writing. This part will also take into account its diffusion and reception both in Middle Ages and in contemporary scholarship by means of critical editions and translations.

The second part of the first section is dedicated to the description and doctrinal analysis of Peter of Spain's logical handbook. By exploring each of its twelve tracts, we will establish the main doctrinal articulations of his logical considerations. Our purpose is not only to resume Peter's account, but to show that his endeavor presupposes a unitary approach towards logic. The new theories of *logica moderna* seem to be integrated harmoniously in the old Aristotelian-Boethian corpus of logic. By trying to argue for this point, we will show the importance of the supposition theory and its relations with the doctrines developed in the other eleven tracts of *Tractatus*.

The third part of the first section is composed of two sub-parts and takes into account the relation between Medieval logic and the theory of supposition. First, the sources and origins of the supposition theory will be taken into account. On the basis of the studies accomplished by De Rijk, Ebbesen, De Libera, Valente and others, we will show that the origin of supposition theory was placed in the logical, grammatical or theological traditions. However, we will propose another explanation, by highlighting that at basis of all those traditions, there is a common and intuitive understanding of '*suppositio*'. This understanding was then, in the course of centuries, regimented according to different disciplines until it arrived at the articulation present in the medieval terminist tradition. Second, we will argue that, when speaking about the medieval theory of supposition, we have to deal with a multiplicity of theoretical constructs. In order to show how different medieval logicians considered the property of '*suppositio*', on the one hand, we will explore two 13th century accounts; one developed in *Summa lamberti* by Lambertus of Lagny and, the other, in *Introductiones ad logicam*, by William of Sherwood; on the other hand, two 14th century accounts will be considered. The first, of Johannes Buridanus in *Summulae de dialectica*, while the second, of William Ockham in *Summa logicae*.

The proposed endeavor will hopefully represent a first step for a better understanding of Peter of Spain's supposition theory within its own historical, contextual and doctrinal limits. Only on the basis of an analysis as such, the problems related to the contemporary interpretation of supposition may be addressed.

1.1 The author, his context and works

The first part of our study is dedicated to certain introductory topics related to the biographical studies on Peter of Spain that we have at our disposal, the corpus of texts that is attributed to him and the date of composition of his main work *Summulae logicales*. Although these first considerations could be conceived as being of a secondary importance, since our main purpose is the assessment of the supposition theory, they can be considered a prerequisite in any extensive research related to Peter of Spain. As we will see below, both the abundance of information related to those topics and their frequent unreliable sources are factors that could make the contextual study of Peter of Spain and his work a proper inquiry on its own.

1.1.1. The problem of authorship

Regarding the author of *Tractatus*, work known afterwards as *Summulae logicales*, the scholarship has not been able thus far to point out who Peter of Spain really was. However, the abundance of different testimonies that start right from the 13th century, the presupposed period of the composition of his logical text, has enable many researchers to formulate different thesis and hypothesis about the identification of *auctor summularum*. Starting with the 19th century, the point that marks the revival of interest in Peter of Spain, the author has successively been identified with different degrees of commitment with a Byzantine scholar, the famous pope John XXI and a series of Dominican friars. Although some of those personalities have been already ruled out by more recent works from the list of possible identifications, the problem of authorship still remain. In fact, Petrus Hispanus was a very common name in the Middle Ages. Medieval registers of students, masters and friars are mentioning dozens of persons named Petrus that originate from the Iberian Peninsula. In this way, the name Petrus Hispanus risks to be a proper name void of any explicit reference, a true medieval John Doe, or, in Gyula Klima's words "simply an abbreviation of the definite description 'the author of the *Summulae*'"[53].

[53] KLIMA, "Peter of Spain" in GRACIA, NOONE (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (2005), p. 526.

A very short sketch regarding the debate concerning the authorship of *Tractatus* can be found in Joke Spruyt's online encyclopedia entry on Peter of Spain where the three main theses are given[54]. However, in order to clarify the problem of authorship, that is, to make explicit the most probable identification of the author of *Summulae logicales* from the point of view of modern exegesis, in the following subsections we will discuss all the main thesis and hypothesis that we were able to find related to this particular topic.

1.1.1.1. The Byzantine thesis

A short but comprehensive cartography of the so-called 'Byzantine thesis' alongside with a decisive refutation of it can be found in Lambertus Marie de Rijk's 1972 introductory study[55] of his critical edition of *Summulae logicales.* According to L. M. de Rijk, the starting point of the Byzantine thesis is marked by the publication in 1597 by Elias Ehinger of a Greek compendium named *Synopsis Organi Aristotelis Michaele Psello auctore greco-latina*. The work was published on the basis of a 15th century manuscript; according to De Rijk and as the title suggests, a later hand present in only one of the 13 manuscripts available, made the attribution to the one of the most important figures of the Byzantine Middle Ages, Michael Psellos (1018–1078). Ehinger has thus maintained the thesis that the Greek compendium is the original work and the Latin *Summulae logicales* is a mere translation from Greek[56]. Although the majority of treatises of *logica modernorum* are missing from the presupposed original Greek work, in the following centuries writers like Bartholomäus Keckermann, Johann Jakob Brucker and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann[57] have embraced Edinger's thesis.

In the 19th century the Byzantine thesis has found both their adversaries and supporters. Carl Prantl is advocating for the Byzantine origin of the *Summulae logicales* and additionally sustains that all the elements of the so called *logica modernorum* can be traced back to it. William Hamilton, Charles Thurot, Valentin Rose and Richard Stapper were scholars that in the same period refuted the Byzantine thesis and, the last three especially, Carl Prantl's view point. The truth regarding the Greek origin is entirely reversed: *Summulae logicales* or *Tractatus* is the

[54] See SPRUYT (2019).
[55] See *SL*., p. LXI-LXXXVIII.
[56] Cf. *SL*, p. LXI.
[57] For the full references to their work see *SL*., p. LXII, note 2.

original work made by a certain Peter of Spain and the Greek compendium is a translation from Latin made by the 15th century Giorgios or Gennadios Scholarios[58].

Although from an historiographical point of view this thesis could be considered dead at the end of 19th century, L. M. de Rijk makes a series of arguments that rejects it once and for all. From the analysis of the manuscripts, de Rijk concludes that the Greek text is indeed a translation. Moreover, in 12 out of the 13 manuscripts of the work, the direct attribution is made to Peter of Spain. Scholarios is indeed the author of the *Synopsis* and he worked on a later and interpolated version of *Tractatus* that only comprised the first five tracts. From a linguistic perspective, both the Byzantine thesis and Psellos authorship are to be rejected. As we ourselves will see in the chapter devoted to the sources of *Summulae logicales* and its conceptual apparatus[59], the authors employed by Peter's text and those usually used by Psellos differ greatly; moreover, the terminology of *logica modernorum* is a purely Latin creation which offers no evident signs for terminological borrowings from another language[60]. A final series of arguments from doctrinal content are devoted by de Rijk to the rejection of the Byzantine origin. As we will see again in the following sections of our study, there is no way in which the wide spread terminist logic of Middle Ages could have its source in the Byzantine milieu. De Rijk argues in various works[61] for a Latin origin of medieval terminist logic with a source placed at the intersection between logical commentaries on fallacies and early medieval grammatical doctrines.

1.1.1.2 The Papalist or traditional thesis

The next thesis regarding the authorship of the *Summulae logicales* is that according to which Peter of Spain is identified with Petrus Juliani the future Pope John XXI[62]. This particular attribution can be found even in more contemporary literature[63] and it was usually regarded as being the traditional one, especially after the de Rijk has explicitly endorsed it in his 1972 introduction and even in his 1992 critical edition of *Syncategoreumata*[64].

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[58] In addition to the introductory study from *SL*, see also SPADE (2002), p. 42; *LM*, I, p. 18.
[59] See 1.3.1. *Sources and origin of supposition theory*.
[60] See *SL*., p. 65.
[61] See for example *LM*, I, pp. 18-23.
[62] As it is well known, there was an error in the numbering of popes when Peter was elected. He should have been Pope John XX and not XXI.
[63] See PONZIO (2010), p. X; DINEEN (1990), p. XVIII; DEGEN-PABST (2006), p. IX-XIII, LONGEWAY (1992), p. 316. Their discussions are mainly based on de Rijk's argumentation from the 1972 edition of *SL*.
[64] See PETR. HISP., *Syn.* (ed. De Rijk, transl. J. Spruyt, 1992), p. 9.

The tradition of identifying the *auctor summularum* with pope John XXI starts as early as the end of 13th century and is closely related to the histories of Roman pontiffs. In those narratives the pope John is described as a well cultivated man, deeply preoccupied by philosophy, natural sciences and medicine, almost to the degree of neglecting his official duties[65]. For example, at the same end of the 13th century, the Franciscan Salimbene of Parma refers in his *Cronica* to the future pope John XXI as being a great sophist, logician, disputator and theologian[66]. In the same tradition, as de Rijk explains[67], in 1297, Riccobaldus of Ferra, a chronicler of roman pontiffs, writes in his work *Historia Pontificum Romanorum* the following words which have been considered as a main evidence for the papalist thesis:

> "John XXI, of nation Hispanus, seated 8 months, 1 day and left the seat vacant 7 months and 7 days. He was elected Cardinal by Gregory X. This great master found more pleasure in sciences than in all other duties. His name was Magister Petrus Hispanus who composed in logic the *Tractatus*."[68]

Here both the authorship of *Tractatus* and the fact that Petrus Hispanus was called *magister* are directly linked to pope John XXI. As is already known, pope John XXI did not take part in his lifetime in any religious order. The fact that in most of the earliest manuscripts and historical chronicles he is called '*magister*' and not '*frater*' is taken as evidence for the papalist thesis.

The identification of Petrus Hispanus *auctor summularum* with Pope John XXI offers us the following biographic narrative[69]. The author of *Tractatus* was born in Lisbon between 1205-1215. If the earlier date is to be considered, he arrived at Paris in order to study at the Faculty of Arts in 1220, after a previous education taken probably at Lisbon Cathedral School. After six years, the presupposed period for finishing his Arts studies, he allegedly went to study theology in the same University. Afterwards, as a result of 1229 conflicts between the members of university and the secular power, Peter is said to leave Paris, possibly for the Northern Spain, although the neighboring area of France, that is, Toulouse and Montpellier, is taken into account for the same 1230 period. In fact, those two regions, Northern Spain and Southern France are the first places

[65] See for example LAURENT, "Maître Pierre d'Espagne fut-il Dominicain?" in *Divus Thomas* Vol. 39 (1936), pp. 39-42.
[66] See MEIRINHOS (1996), p. 63.
[67] See *SL*., p. XIII-XIV.
[68] *SL*, p. XIII: "Johannes XXI, natione Hispanus, sedit Menses VIII, dies 1, et cessavit menses VII, dies VII. Hic electus fuit Cardinalis a Gregorio X. Hoc magnus Magister in scientiis plus delectabatur quam omnibus reliquis in negotiis. Cui nomen fuit Magister Petrus Hispanus qui Tractatus in logica composuit."
[69] This narrative can be seen in *SL*., p. XXIV; DEGEN-PABST (2006); LONGEWAY (1992). Where the biographical information differs, I preferred the considerations of De Rijk since he is the main advocate of the papalist thesis.

where *Tractatus* will be diffused and commented. Thus, according to the Papalist thesis, the renowned work of logic could have been written in the years of 1230's, in one of those two regions. Around 1235 he is considered to have studied medicine at Salerno or Montpellier. In the period between 1245 and 1250, Peter was in the region of Siena, Italy, where between 1246-1248 is considered to have taught medicine. In the next period, that between 1250-1264 his activity is closely connected with Portugal. The stay in his natal country was only interrupted by short visits in Italy in Agnani (1260), Viterbo (1261) and Orvieto (1263-1264). In Portugal he occupied different offices: first, he subscribed to the position of dean of Lisbon and archdeacon of Vermoim in the North-West of Portugal, in the name of King Alfonso III; in 1257 the same king gave him the function of prior of Santa Maria Guimaraes; in 1263 Peter was appointed *magister scholarium* at the Cathedral School of Lisbon[70]. Information regarding the next period, 1264-1272 are lacking, but the tradition is telling us that in 1272 Peter was made by Pope Gregory X his physician at the court of Viterbo. Sometime in this period Peter is considered to have written the work *Thesaurus Pauperum*, a handbook of medicine. In the next year, 1273, he was elected Archbishop of Braga and serves under this title until 1275; before 5 June the Pope named him Cardinal-Bishop of Tusculum. On 15 September 1276 Peter was elected Pope under the name John XXI. Although his occupation of the papal seat was very short, his actions can be considered significant. On 18 January 1277 the new pope emits the bull *Relatio nimis implacida* addressed to Étienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, to investigate certain errors at the Paris University. As an effect, which can be considered an overreaction or an overextension of his power, Tempier condemned on 7th of March the teaching of the now famous 219 propositions containing, between heterodox doctrines of an Aristotelianism with Averroistic influences, propositions from Thomas of Aquinas. On 28 April of the same year, in the bull *Flumen aquae vivae*, the Pope demanded further information about the errors of the Parisian masters. On 20 May 1277 Peters pontificate came to an end. He died from the wounds suffered from the collapse of the ceiling in his private apartment in Viterbo on 14 May, where is said that he frequently devoted himself to studies.

The Papalist thesis has the advantage of filling up the missing information of the author of *Tractatus* with those of Pope John XXI, by overlapping the two persons. But this fact can have undesirable consequences as D'Ors and Meirinhos show. The first is that a modification of the Pope date of birth is made. Usually, the years 1210-1220 are considered as possible dates for his

[70] See *SL*, p. XXXVIII-XXXIX.

birth. In order to make his years of study at Paris in 1220 and his date of composition of *Tractatus* in the years of 1230's possible, the antedate of his birth in 1205 is necessary[71]. Another undesirable result, that we will treat in the section dedicated to the works attributed to Peter of Spain, is that of inflating his corpus of texts. Logic, medicine, natural philosophy, theology, alchemy are supposedly subjects explored by Pope John XXI in dozens of works in a small period of 20 years[72]. Those consequences are rendering the Papalist thesis more and more difficult to support. In fact, further evidence from the early manuscripts of *Tractatus* regarding this particular thesis is nowhere to be found. As Meirinhos states, none of the oldest manuscripts of the *Tractatus* mentions its author as Petrus Juliani. This identification can be found only in late manuscripts and printed editions[73]. Moreover, this fact can be seen in the series of five articles[74] published by De Rijk before the appearance of his critical edition on *Tractatus*. The earliest sources and commentaries discussed in those papers gives us no information to support the papalist thesis. In the best-case scenario, we meet the name Petrus Hispanus together with the appellative *magister*. In fact, even the oldest attribution of authorship known by Rijk, that of Riccobaldus de Ferra is not trustworthy. The 1726 L. A. Muratori edition of his *Historia* does indeed contain the attribution, but the older editions and manuscripts of it does not, as Angel D'Ors shows[75]. The same scholar argues that the earliest clear attribution of identity which links *auctor summularum* with Pope John XXI is to be found in 1545, much later that De Rijk considered, in the *Bibliotheca Universalis* of Konrad Gessner[76]. Gessner's work is thus considered "one of the principal channels through which the erroneous attribution of the *Tractatus* to Pope John XXI spread around bibliographers"[77]. In fact, in the editorial note of D'Ors intervention[78] it is specified that De Rijk "was fully convinced of the correctness of the author's thesis". Thus, the Papalist thesis can be considered at this point very problematic if not totally refutable.

[71] See D'ORS (1997), p. 24.
[72] For this particular problem see MEIRINHOS (1996).
[73] Cf. MEIRINHOS (1996), p. 63; see also D'ORS (1997), p. 64.
[74] De RIJK (1968a), (1968b), (1969a), (1969b), (1970).
[75] See. D'ORS (1997), p. 59.
[76] See D'ORS (1997), p. 60. Surely this is not the only attribution. D'Ors, on the basis of Mullally's work, identifies a tradition in the incunabula writings of identifying Pope John XXI with the author of the *Tractatus*. Iodocus Trutvetter in his *Explanatio in nonnulla Petri Burdigalensis* written at the beginning of 16th century, was one of the first to suggest such an identification.
[77] Idem.
[78] See D'ORS (1997), p. 71.

For the sake of the historiography, we can make a final remark. It can be said that the supporters of the Papalist thesis and especially De Rijk, have constructed their account not for its own purpose but for refuting a version of an old Dominican thesis revived by H.-D. Simonin in 1930's. Relying on *Tabula scriptorum ordinis praedicatorum* or Stams catalogues published by Heinrich Denifle in 1886, Simonin identifies the author of *Tractatus* with a black friar named Petrus Alfonsi closely connected to the Convent of Estella in Navarra, Spain, and dates the composition of his work on logic at the end of 13th century or beginning of 14th century[79]. The efforts of de Rijk are directed towards rejecting this thesis by showing that: the author was a secular master; he was never called '*frater*' or 'Petrus Afonsi' in spite of some 1280 specification in which the author appears as '*magister Petrus Hispanus de ordine praedicatorum*'; for De Rijk, Stams catalogues are unreliable, since they seem to be concluded in 1311, and the Estella region and period of composition does not fit with the already existing information.

In what follows we will try to explore and analyze the contemporary Dominican thesis regarding the authorship of Peter of Spain.

1.1.1.3. The Dominican thesis

The most recent problem on the topic of Peter of Spain's identity is discussed within the Dominican thesis, the point of view according to which the *auctor summularum* is identified with a member of the Dominican order. The most valuable contribution to this topic is represented by Angel D'Ors, who writes between 1997 and 2003 a series of three extensive articles[80], and by the interventions and reactions to them made by Simon Tugwell[81].

In a first part of his analysis, D'Ors is reviewing four traditions of thinking related to the problem of Peter of Spain's identity. The first one is focused on the *Tractatus* and its commentaries; the second, is related to Dante's *Divine Comedy* and its commentators; the third, concerns the historians of the Dominican order and Spanish writers; and the fourth is focused on the Portuguese historians[82].

Regarding the first, D'Ors show that we have stronger arguments to maintain the Dominican thesis rather than the Papalist one. On the one hand, many manuscripts and

[79] See *SL*, p. IX-X.
[80] D'ORS (1997), (2001), (2003).
[81] TUGWELL (1999), (2006).
[82] See D'ORS (1997), p. 25-26.

commentaries[83] are attesting the tradition of considering the *auctor summularum* as a member of the Dominican order; on the other, the most important 13th century manuscript that attributes the *Tractatus* to Pope John XXI, has the attribution written with a second later hand and followed by: "*ab aliquibus dictus est* - it was said by some"[84]. In fact, as we mentioned in the previous section, the tradition of early manuscripts and commentaries is of little help for the identification of the author's identity. Event in the printed editions of the work we can find a variation in the attribution of authorship. From 51 editions identified by Mullally[85], seven attributed the text to Pope John XXI and two to a member of the Dominican Order[86].

The second tradition originates in the fact that Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), in his work, *Divina Comedia*, finished around 1320, in *Paradiso,* Canto 12, verses 134-135, makes the following mention: "e Pietro Spano, lo qual giù luce in dodici libelli - Peter of Spain, who, with his twelve books, glows on earth below"[87]. Although Dante adds no further information about the identity of Peter of Spain, the passage from the *Divine Comedy* has been used both for and against the Dominican Thesis. De Rijk argues that, since Peter of Spain is mentioned only with his name and not with a specified appellative to denote his membership to a religious order, like in the case of Thomas Aquinas where Dante uses '*fra'*, he cannot be identified with a member of the Dominican order[88]. But in the same time Peter is not mentioned by Dante in the quality of being the Pope John XXI either. In fact, the tradition that follows after Dante seems to support the Dominican thesis. A first possible argument is made through the image made by Giovanni di Paolo around 1445, where the entire scene from Dante's Canto 12 is reproduced. Here in the central place can be found Thomas Aquinas and at his right a person with friar like garments and tonsure which has a book in his hands. This person is identified with Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*[89]. Moreover, the study of the tradition of the *Divine Comedy* comments made by D'Ors[90], show that

[83] See D'ORS (1997), p. 32-33.
[84] Cf. D'ORS (1997), p. 64.
[85] See MULLALLY (1945), p. 133-138.
[86] Cf. D'ORS (1997), p. 64.
[87] Ed. Griorgio Petrochi with English translation by Allen Mandelbaum, available online at www.worldofdante.org/comedy/dante/paradise.xml/3.12.
[88] See *SL*, p. XVIII.
[89] See D'ORS (1997), p. 28-29; CNP., p. 4-6. For the actual image of Giovanni di Paolo representation see the reference to CNP.
[90] See D'ORS (1997), p. 27-28 and D'ORS (2001), p. 225-228 with no major discovery since the first article.

starting from the 14th century the Petrus Hispanus from Canto 12 is identified with a black friar. Benvenuto da Imola is an example in this sense, calling Peter of Spain "brother Preacher"[91].

Among the historians of the Dominican Order and Spanish writers, there was a tendency of considering Pope John XXI the author of *Tractatus* since: Peter of Spain is often called *magister* and not *frater*; the early chronicles of the order is lacking references to the author of *Tractatus*; the existence of some problems regarding the connection of the author with the convent of Estella, connection defended by Simonin, as we have shown; and the possible misidentifications with other members of the Order[92]. D'Ors tries to refute all those arguments. Regarding the name, it is pointed out that the use of *magister* in place of *frater* was in common use and was not only an academic title but signified also a position within the Order. The General Chapter from 1256 and 1321 tried to change this practice by recommending only the use of *frater*[93]. Insofar as the lack of early mentioning of *Tractatus*' author in the histories of the Order is concerned, D'Ors offers justifications. In general, the lack of reference in late 13th and early 14th century works as those of Gerard de Frachet, Etienne de Salagnac and Bernard Guy is put on the account of their particular character and lack of an exhaustive account[94]. But although they lack content about *Tractatus*, they include several persons named 'Peter of Spain'. According to D'Ors, an explanation for the lack of connections between a Black Friar named 'Peter of Spain' and the work of logic can be made since in the moment that the work was composed by Peter, he was not yet a member of the Order. This explanation can work in the case of the early manuscripts of the work. Regarding the Estella problem, D'Ors identifies an entire tradition that started in 16th century that puts the Estella convent in direct connection to Peter of Spain. The tradition is founded on the existence of a tomb, now untraceable, at the Convent of Saint Dominic in Estella with the inscription: "Hic iacet reverendus pater magister fr. Petrus Hispanus, auctor Summularum - here lies the venerable father, master, brother, Peter of Spain, the author of Summaries"[95]. The possibility for Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*, of being a member of the convent is small and thus refuted by D'Ors, especially since the Dominican establishment was founded between 1258-1264 and the date of the flourishing of the author of *Tractatus* was before 1250, as reported by the Estella tradition[96]. But, as the same

[91] See D'ORS (1997), p. 27.
[92] See D'ORS (1997), p. 29-30.
[93] See D'ORS (1997), p. 30-31.
[94] See D'ORS (1997), p. 35-36.
[95] D'ORS (1997), p. 43-44.
[96] See D'ORS (1997), p. 45.

author states, Francisco Diago, an author of 17th century, erroneously postponed the 1250 date and Simonin took it in the 20th century as an argument for his thesis. Regarding the so-called misidentifications of Peter of Spain with various members of the Order, D'Ors does not advocate for their rejection but to their rethinking. Stams, Pignon and Saint Ann Catalogues[97] are identifying the author of Tractatus with a certain Black Friar Petrus Alfonsi of whom there is no further extensive information. Luis de Valladoid in the 15th century attributes a Historia of Saint Dominic to Peter of Spain, fact which possible equates to the identification of Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*, with Pedro Ferrando, a Spanish Dominican who died in Zamora in the year of 1259[98]. A frequent argument for this last fact is the geographical reference from *Tractatus*, tract V, *On places*, used in the explanation of the logical notion of exemplum: "Legionenses pugnare contra Astoricenses est malum; Ergo Astoricenses pugnare contra Zamorenses est malum"[99].

Regarding the Portuguese historians, they all tend to subscribe to the Papalist thesis. The origin of this point of view has been already pointed out in the section 1.1.1.2. What we could add is the causes of this identification. D'Ors point three: the large number of works attribute to Peter of Spain from different and variate domains, the lack of information about the authors of these works and the intellectual renown of Pope John XXI in all those fields of knowledge[100].

From Angel D'Ors' study we can ultimately extract seven candidates for the authorship of Tractatus:

1. Pedro Ferrando
2. Petrus Alfonsi
3. Petrus Hispanus conversus[101]
4. Magister Petrus witness in Rome 25 November 1220[102]
5. Magister Petrus which in 1238 was *rector scholarum Burdegalis*[103]

[97] See D'ORS (1977), p. 49 with 70, 71, 72 notes.
[98] Cf. D'ORS (1977), p. 50-51. Another possibility speculated by D'Ors is that if the two persons cannot be identical, Pedro Ferrando can be the translator of Peter of Spain's *Historia* into Castilian.
[99] *SL*., V.3, p. 58.
[100] Cf. D'ORS (1977), p. 53-54.
[101] He is mentioned in *Annales ordinis Praedicatorum* (1756) and is considered an acquaintance of Saint Dominic. It is told that he accompanied Juan of Navarra to Bologna in 1218. The author interprets *conversus* as a person converted to Christianism from another religion Cf. D'ORS (1997), p. 69.
[102] Cf. D'ORS (1977), p. 68.
[103] Described by Gerarld of Frachet in *Vitae fratrum* composed around the middle of 13th century see D'ORS (1977), p. 68-69.

6. a Petrus *natione Gallus in Francia Prior provincialis* in the 13th century[104]

In his response to D'Ors, Simon Tugwell shows that the hypothesis regarding Pedro Ferrando, Petrus Hispanus *conversus* and the two different *magister* are hard to maintain. Regarding the first, he argues that Pedro Ferrando, of Galician origins, dead in Zamora no later than 1258, was indeed the author of the second approved Latin *Legenda* of Saint Dominic, while the Spanish version of this work referred by D'Ors as Ferrando's work, was only one of its sources[105]. Regarding the second, Tugwell argues that *conversus* must be interpreted as 'lay brother' and not a person converted to Christianism. He was a socius of Saint Dominic who had nothing to do with logic, who accompanied him to Rome and who was send in Bologne and Milan[106]. Also, in the case of the two magisters there are some problems. For the first one, the witness of a deed in the abbess of Santa Maria in Tempulo, there is no evidence of this Peter being a Dominican brother nor a *magister*. For the second, Tugwell concludes that *rector scholarum Burdegalis* is not a Dominican title. Thus, Tugwell remarks try to eliminate the four persons from the list of the Dominican thesis.

In his 2001 paper, Angel D'Ors continues his argumentation basically on the same scheme as in the previous article. One of the contributions presented here is related to the so-called 'Estella tradition'. D'Ors point out that, at the basis of this tradition, there could be a possible misidentification between Peter of Spain the author of *Tractatus* and Pedro Vitoria, a master of logic from 14th century, who may be buried in the convent of Estella[107]. Regarding the Zamora tradition and implicitly the Pedro Ferrando sub-thesis, D'Ors argues that cannot be reconciled with the Estella tradition, and so, Pedro Ferrando and Petrus Alfonsi cannot be one and the same person[108]. Along multiple clarifications and possibilities surrounding the identities and historical witnesses of the candidates, D'Ors offers two "fresh lines of studies". One regarding the geographical references from *Tractatus* and the other from the *Cantigas* of Alfonso X the Wise, king of Castile between 1252-1284. For the first, D'Ors considers that Peter of Spain's example from *De locis*, is referring to the three Spanish cities of León, Astorga and Zamora and describes a real historical conflict around 1230 in the succession to the Kingdom of León, that between supporters of Ferdinand III (León, Astorga) and the supporters of the two daughters of Alfonso

[104] See D'ORS (1977), p. 70.
[105] See TUGWELL (1999), p. 104-112. This possibility is ultimately ruled out by D'Ors.
[106] See TUGWELL (1999), p. 113.
[107] See D'ORS (2001), p. 231-232.
[108] See D'ORS (2001), p. 235-234, 240.

IX, Sancha and Dulce (Zamora)[109]. Thus, a new connection between the court of Ferdinand III and Peter of Spain can be exploited. Regarding the second one, the *Cantigas* written by the son of Ferdinand III in the context of Reconquest, there is a mention of a name: Pero d'Espanha. Although this recurrence of name can give no direct connection with the identification with Petrus Alfonsi, Pedro Ferrando and *auctor summularum*, it is an argument for the possible connection of the author of *Tractatus* with the court of Alphonso X and his father.

D'Ors analysis goes further in his 2003 paper, *Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (III) "Petrus Alfonsi" or "Petrus Ferrandi"?*. Regarding Petrus Alfonsi thesis, the analysis of the early printed editions of the *Tractatus* seems to sustain it, although no further information about Petrus Alfonsi is given. However, at the basis of this identification could be a confusion between the author of the logical work and a Jewish convert from 12th century[110]. Regarding Pedro Ferrando, D'Ors is arguing that he could be the writer of a lost *Legenda* of Saint Dominic on the basis of which the other *Legendas* were made and the translation of which is preserved in the Castellan version[111]. But in the same time, on the one hand, we have a Petrus Hispanus to whom is attributed a *Legenda* by the 13th century *Regensburg Lectionary*. D'Ors concludes that this *legenda* could only be the official approved one, namely the *Legenda prima*[112]. On the other hand, a *Vita beati Dominici* is attributed to Petrus Ferrandi[113]; this one can be the same as the one attributed to Peter of Spain by the *Regensburg Lectionary*, and thus the identities of Peter of Spain and Pedro Ferrandi could be obtained[114]. However, there is not direct pinpoint of the identity of the author of the *Tractatus*. D'Ors conclusions remain at the level of speculation and rune as follows:

> "In my opinion, future investigations will confirm that '*Petrus Hispanus, auctor Summularum*' was from Estella; that he was linked to the collegiate church of Roncesvalles and its dependency of St Maria della Mascarella in Bolonia; that he was received into the Order of Preachers in a moment close to its foundation, and also that later he went back to Spain, where he was connected to the court

[109] For those considerations see D'ORS (2001), p. 243-248.
[110] Cf. D'ORS (2003), p. 253-254. The editions mentioned by the author are: a presupposed first edition of incunabula published in Aalst on 26 May 1474 and a second one 12 years later both by Johannes de Westfalia Paderbonensis and Theodoricus Marti.
[111] See. D'ORS (2003), p. 268-286.
[112] Cf. D'ORS (2003), p. 265-266.
[113] Attribution sustained by Giles of Portugal or Giles of Santarem (c. 1184/1190-1265) Cf. D'ORS (2003), p. 268.
[114] Cf. D'ORS (2003), p. 286-287.

> of the kings of Castile and Leon, and where he eventually died (The '*auctor Summularum*' will probably be found to be the same as, firstly, the 'Petrus' (P.) at the head of the list of those who represented the Dominican Order at the Roman Curia in 1216; secondly, the '*Petrus Hispanus*' who was mistaken for the '*conversus*' sent by St Dominic to Bolonia in 1218; and thirdly, the '*Magister Petrus*' who signed as a witness in Rome in 1220). Additionally, it will be confirmed that '*Petrus Ferrandi*' was the author of a '*Legenda Sancti Dominici*', but that his activity was not limited to the borders of Spain […]. However, I do not know whether the existence of '*Petrus Alfonsi*' will be confirmed (although I am inclined to think it will), and of two old 'Legendae' written by unidentified authors, both referred to as '*Petrus Hispanus*' (and this I regard as possible, although perhaps not too likely), or of only one, the '*Legenda Prima*', by '*Petrus Ferrandi*'. On these future investigations depends the reliability of the testimonies of the Catalogues of Stams, Pignon, Saint Ann, and Luis de Valladolid, and whether we must conclude that the '*auctor Summularum*' is '*Petrus Alfonsi*' or '*Petrus Ferrandi*'"[115]

Against the Estella tradition of the Dominican thesis, that is, the point of view according to which the author of *Tractatus* probably worked and was buried in Estella, Simonin Tugwell makes some further remarks in his 2006 paper. First, he identifies the connection between Peter of Spain and the convent of Estella in the work of Baltasar Sorio *De viris illustribus provinciae Aragoniae*, composed between 1516-1522[116]. Sorio talks about the fact that Peter of Spain edited his *Tractatus Summularum Dialectice* in Estella where he is also buried[117]. A late 17th century apostolic notary describes the tomb and his epitaph, is the same way it was shown a few pages earlier. Tugwell points out that the honorific titles attributed to Peter of Spain in the epitaph do not belong to 13th century. '*Reverndus pater frater*' begins to be used at the end of 15th century and prevail in the latter half of 16th century[118]. Regarding the composition of *Tractatus* in Estella, this cannot be sustained if the date must be put before 1260 as almost the entire exegesis will confirm. As Tugwell mentions, the Estella convent was established around 1260[119]. Moreover, in the same 17th century Juan López makes again a reference to the epitaph but this time with the following text: "*Hic facit reverendus pater frater Petrus Hispanus*"[120]. Tugwell comes with a solution for

[115] Cf. D'ORS (2003), p. 302-303.
[116] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 103. As Tugwell shows, this author is not reliable since he frequently changes the information provided by his sources.
[117] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 108.
[118] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 111.
[119] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 112-113.
[120] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 109.

the difference that exists in the rendering of the epitaph: the original text was "*hoc fecit magister Petrus - this was made by master Petrus*" referring to an architect or master builder who probably erected a building of the convent[121]. This original text was probable damaged in the course of time, making it illegible. Thus, is very possible that the text "*reverendus pater frater*" is a later addition, that was followed with a complete remaking of the epitaph[122].

The latest contribution in the debate regarding the identity of the author of *Tractatus* is made by Bruno Figliuolo. In his short 2010 article *A further Note on 'Peter of Spain'*[123], he mentions a patent letter written in November 1238 by Bertoldo of Andechs, Pariarch of Aquila, Italy, which testifies a donation of a *magister Petrus Yspanus*, canon of Cividale and Aquileia. This magister left his house situated across the Natisone river to the poor[124]. The author suggests the identification of this Magister Petrus with Petrus Sapiens "a man of great reputation among his confreres, who used to ask him for juridical advice"[125] and who died before September 8, 1269 and who was present in the same town, in the same period since the documents mentions him for the first time in April 26 1228. Moreover, Figliuolo suggest a connection with the Magister Petrus witness in Rome 25 November 1220 mentioned by D'Ors 1997 article.

We did not manage to find further information about any Petrus Sapiens. The only Petrus Sapiens from the first half of 13th century we could find was, according to Mundy, a so-called "manager" of a hospital on the Pont de Cardonniers over the Hers River in France, connected to the abbot of Saint-Serin of Toulouse. He is mentioned along with a frater Gauffrenus under the formula "frater Petrus qui vocatur Sapiens" in a 1232 document[126]. Taking into account the various sources invoked by scholarship in the last 30 years, this identification is highly unlikely. We did not find any explicit attribution of *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* to a Petrus Sapiens in any tradition presented so far by the scholarship.

[121] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 114.
[122] See TUGWELL (2006), p. 115.
[123] FIGLIUOLO, "A further Note on 'Peter of Spain'" in *Vivarium* 48 (2010), pp. 368-369.
[124] Cf. FIGLIUOLO (2010), p. 368.
[125] Cf. FIGLIUOLO (2010), p. 368.
[126] See MUNDY, "Village, Town, and City in the Region of Toulouse" in RAFTIS (ed.), *Pathways to Medieval Peasants* (1981), p. 160 and 180 n. 48.

Conclusion

In this section we explored the three main theses advanced by the scholarship regarding the identity of *auctor summularum*. The first one, the Byzantine thesis, identifies Peter of Spain with a simple translator of a Greek original work of logic attributed initially to Michael Psellos. Originated at the end of 16th century, this thesis has been proven by the scholarship to be false. The presupposed original Greek work is in fact a translation made in 15th century by Gennadius Scholarius from a Latin interpolated and partial version of *Tractatus*.

The second one, the Papalist thesis, identifies Peter of Spain with Petrus Juliani or Pope John XXI. This thesis enjoyed (and for some still enjoys) a widespread endorsement and was considered to be the tradition one. Defended by De Rijk himself, which identifies its origins at the end of 13th century, this thesis has proven to be at least problematic if not false, after the interventions of D'Ors and Meirinhos. According to their studies, this thesis has a much later origin, in 16th century and has no stable foundation in the early manuscript tradition. Moreover, it forces the modification of the known biography of Pope John XXI and produces an inflation of the works attributed to him.

The third thesis, the Dominican one, identifies Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*, with a member of a Dominican order. The entire effort of D'Ors in advocating for this thesis is directed towards exploring at least six different possible identifications. The two most important candidates for the authorship of *Tractatus* are Petrus Alfonsi and Pedro Ferrando. The first is a Black Friar who at least worked at the Convent of Estella which was founded around the middle of the 13th century; the thesis was revived initially by H.-D. Simonin and was traced to some of the 14th century catalogues. The second is a Black friar who died in the middle of 13th century in Zamora, credited to be the writer of a *Legenda* of Saint Dominic. This thesis seems to have its origins in the 15th century considerations of Luis de Valladoid. D'Ors and especially Tugwell show that these two identifications are rising some problems both in themselves and in connection with other possible identifications within the Dominican thesis. This fact opens, on the one hand, the possibility for rethinking the classical Estella and Zamora traditions in connection with other Dominican Peters, and, on the other, highlights the need of more reliable sources for the identification of the exact authorship.

As a final conclusion, it can be states that the modern scholarship has been able thus far to offer some convincing arguments for the rejection of the Byzantine and Papalist thesis. Although

the Dominican thesis cannot offer a precise response with irrefutable arguments regarding who the author of *Tractatus* really was, it succeeded in rejecting the previous thesis and in offering some further lines of study.

1.1.2. *Tractatus* and the works attributed to Peter of Spain

If in the previous section we tried to sketch and analyze the current problems surrounding the identity of our author by showing the main thesis, hypothesis and their sources, in this section we will focus on the recent scholarship regarding the works attributed to him and especially regarding his main work of logic *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales*. For the first purpose, this particular kind of endeavor is made possible mainly due to the work done in the last 20 years by José Meirinhos. Until his intervention the main methodological approach regarding the identity of Petrus Hispanus was based on rejecting a thesis (Byzantine, Papalist or Dominican) and finding more probable arguments for an opposing one. Certainly, as we have seen, this fact implies bringing forward arguments based on historical sources whether they are related to the Papal seat or to the Dominican order, to the tradition of *Divina comedia* or to the comments, manuscripts and printed editions of *Tractatus*. Those studies have shown us a multitude of persons named *Petrus Hispanus* that could be the authors of *Tractatus*. The shortcoming of those approaches is that from the very beginning of their inquiry, those studies are thinking within the boundaries of an already existing thesis, and they often try to force the limits of the trustworthy information that they have at their disposal. We consider that it is the merit of José Meirinhos for clarifying a few aspects regarding the problem of the identity of Peter of Spain, by adopting a new methodology of study. Starting from the works attributed to Peter of Spain and not from the attributions of identity, Meirinhos delimits different personalities named "Petrus Hispanus" that cannot converge into one single individual. For the second purpose, that is, the recent scholarship on the contextual aspects of *Tractatus*, we can say that any study regarding them must take into account a dialectical movement between the specific identity thesis of *auctor summularum* and the problems related to the date and place of composition of *Tractatus*. Surely, other contextual aspects regarding the logical work, like its importance, content and source, remain unaffected by the identity issue. Thus, in what follows, in a first part we will discuss on the basis of Meirinhos research the content of the Petrinic corpus of texts and the manner in which it can shed some light on the authorship problem. In the second part we will discuss some contextual aspects regarding the Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* but without entering in content details.

1.1.2.1. The Corpus Petrinicus

In addition to the multiplicity of 13th authors called "Petrus Hispanus" that the current scholarship manage to point out, there is also a multiplicity of works from different domains of

knowledge that are attributed to one or more persons who bares this name. The information regarding those works have been gathered and published by José Meirinhos under the name *Bibliotheca Manuscripta Petri Hispani*[127], in a catalog that comprises 1033 codices. There are around 67 titles variating under different forms, some of them misattributed through the time, that can be considered as pertaining to logic, natural philosophy, theology or apologetics and medicine. All of them are connected to the authorship of Peter of Spain[128]. Meirinhos[129] and to certain extend D'Ors[130] are pointing out that under the Papalist thesis, the thesis that identifies the author of *Tractatus* with Pedro Juliani or Pope John XXI, the majority of those works, if not all of them, are attributed to a single person. It is against this unity that Meirinhos is arguing through his works. In doing so, he distinguishes between at least three persons named 'Petrus Hispanus' whose biographical information could not be merged under one individual.

The first is Petrus Hispanus O.P. author of the two works of logic, *Tractatus* and *Syncategoreumata*. Taking into account its dependence to the Dominican Order, he could be also the author of certain *Sermones* and commentaries on the work of Pseudo-Dionysius. Its origin is trace to the region of the Northern Spain.

The second is Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, the author of *Liber de morte et vita et de causis longitudinis ac brevitatis vite*[131] and *Scientia libri de anima;* it's also possible that the work *Expositio librorum beati Dionysii*[132] could also be attributed to him. He is considered to be born in Portugal and to have written these works in the first half of 13th century, near 1240.

The third is Petrus Hispanus Medicus author of medical commentaries and of the Madrid comment on *De animalibus*[133]. Meirinhos points out that there are some doubts if the prescriptive work of medicine, *Thesaurus Pauperum,* pertains also this author. Moreover, although in his 1996 articles he left some space for interpretation whether this author is the same as Pope John XXI[134],

[127] MEIRINHOS (2011).
[128] See MEIRINHOS (2018), p. 356-358; for a list of those works see MEIRINHOS (2011), p. XXXVIII-XL.
[129] MEIRINHOS (1996).
[130] D'ORS (1997), (2001).
[131] This work is edited by M. Alonso PETRUS HISPANUS, *Liber de morte et vita et de causis longitudinis ac brevitatis vite* (1952), see MEIRINHOS (2018).
[132] See MEIRINHOS (2018), p. 357: "*Expositio librorum Beati Dionysii* (ed. M. Alonso, 1957), includes: *Expositio in librum de angelica hierarchia*; *Expositio in librum de ecclasiastica hierarchia*; *Expositio in librum de divinis nominibus*; *Expositio in librum de mystica teologia*; *Expositio in epistolas I-VI Dionysii"*
[133] For an edition of Peter of Spain's *De animalibus*: PETER OF SPAIN, *Questiones super libro 'De animalibus' aristotelis*, ed. Francisca Navarro Sánchez (2019).
[134] For a biography of Pope John XXI, see MEIRINHOS (2001).

in his introduction to the catalog of Petrine works he rejects this possibility[135]. About the physician named Petrus Hispanus is known that he was connected to the Italian city of Siena where he had teaching activities around 1250[136]. Although the works mentioned above have been attributed to a specific Peter of Spain, there are many more works left from the Petrine corpus that are waiting for the identification of their author.

Regarding the problem of clarifying the identity of *auctor summularum*, Meirinhos' contribution seems to bear the same result with the same limitations as D'Ors research: Peter of Spain's identity could not be established exactify, it is expected to be of a Dominican milieu and must be differentiated from several other authors with the same name. However, his merit consists mainly in arguing on the basis of a large corpus of texts against the unity thesis by identifying several authors of works from different domains of study that have been called 'Peter of Spain'. In the next subsection we will discuss some aspects regarding the date of composition of *Tractatus*.

1.1.2.2. Tractatus known as Summulae logicales: date and place of composition

Although we do not know exactly who he really was, two works of logic can be attributed with certainty to a particular Petrus Hispanus *magister* of arts in the 13th century, that is, *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* and *Syncategoreumata*. About these two works, we know that the latter was written after *Tractatus*. This succession of works and the paternity to Peter of Spain *auctor summularum* is testified by numerous references to *Tractatus*, implicit or explicit, and doctrinal similarities that we can find throughout the *Syncategoreumata* work[137]. But what we exactly know about the place and date of composition of *Tractatus*? In order to give an answer, in the next passages we will explore the different positions taken by the modern scholarship regarding this particular topic.

In the introductory study offered by De Rijk in 1972, the date and location of the composition of *Tractatus* given by Grabmann, Mullally, J. M. da Cruz Pontes and Richard Stapper[138] were all rejection for another possibility. De Rijk's dating is based on two early gloss-commentaries of *Tractatus*, that of Robertus Anglicus and Guillelmus Arnaldi. There are two

[135] For this threefold distinction see MEIRINHOS (2011), p. XXIV-XV; (1996), p. 75-76.
[136] See MEIRINHOS (1996), p. 55-56.
[137] See for example PETR. HISP., *Syn*. (ed. De Rijk, transl. J. Spruyt, 1992), V, 10, p. 204-205; VII, 11, p. 288-289; VIII, 50, p. 352-353; 84, p. 384-385.
[138] See *SL*., p. LVI; Grabmann and Mullaly-Paris, near 1246; Cruz Pontes in Paris; Richard Stapper, Siena, Italy between 1245-1250.

different redactions of Robertus Anglicus' commentary, the first one, *Compilatio super tractatus* dating form the end of 13th century or beginning of the 14th century[139], and the second, *Glosule composite a magistro Roberto Anglico* from the 13th century[140]. The author is identified with the same Robertus Anglicus that wrote *Tractatus quadrantis* and a commentary on *De sphaera* of Iohannes de Sacrobosco[141] and who taught in the southern France at Montpellier[142]. The date of composition for his commentary on *Tractatus* is establish before 1270, probably between 1240 and 1270[143]. Regarding Guillelmus Arnaldi, he was a master at Toulouse between 1235-1244 and he composed a commentary on *Tractatus* under the name *Lectura Tractatuum* preserved in different copies, many from 13th century[144]. Thus, taking into account Arnaldi's period of teaching activity when his commentary on *Tractatus* would have been written, De Rijk concludes that Robertus Anglicus' commentary is probably written in the same period of 1240's and that the *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* is written no later than the years of 1230's[145]. Regarding the place of composition, De Rijk presupposes the Spanish city of León, by taking into account the centrality of the city, the examples offered in *Tractatus*[146] and the relatively close proximity with the Southern France, the place of the earliest commentary of Peter's work[147].

The argumentation of De Rijk regarding the place of composition has been contested numerous times as we have seen in the previous sub-section, and depends to a certain extent to the accepted thesis regarding Peter of Spain's identity. Regarding the date of composition, we must mention a certain critique made by René Antoine Gauthier in his introductory study to *Expositio libri peryermeneias* of Thomas Aquinas, and mentioned by Meirinhos and D'Ors works. According to Gauthier, Guillelmus Arnaldi's commentary on *Tractatus* contains a quotation from Thomas Aquinas commentary on *Peri hermeneias*, facts that makes Arnaldi's commentary a work written at the end of 13th century. Moreover, following the same critical lines, D'Ors mentions the

[139] Preserved in the Vatican library, Vat. Lat. 3049, see DE RIJK (1969a), p. 9.
[140] Biblioteca Comunale Todi, Bibl. comunale, cod. 52, see DE RIJK (1969a), p. 16.
[141] For the edition and English translation of this work see THORNDIKE, *The* Sphere *of Sacrobosco and Its Commentators* (1949), pp. 143-247.
[142] See DE RIJK (1969a), p. 34.
[143] See DE RIJK (1969a), p. 40.
[144] See DE RIJK (1969a), p. 40, p. 120-125.
[145] See *SL.,* p. LVII.
[146] *SL.*, V.3, p. 58. De Rijk's interpretation of the famous *exemplum* from *Tractatus* is entirely different from that offered by Angel D'Ors throughout his articles.
[147] See *SL.*, p. LVII-LXI.

study of Sten Ebbesen and Irène Rosier-Catach, where the comments attributed to Robertus Anglicus have the *terminus post quem* of composition 1250 and the *terminus ante quem* 1270[148].

Thus, if we take into account those two commentaries, the dating of the *Tractatus* will more probably be put somewhere in the 1240's, with a decade later than De Rijk presupposed. Regarding the dating presented in the latest modern translation of *Tractatus*, Brian P. Copenhaver, Calvin Normore and Terence Parsons, in their 2014 introductory study, conclude as a "best guess" based on the same scholarship that "the Summaries is a product of the second quarter of the thirteenth century"[149]. This period is indeed quite wide and, taking into account the considerations we exposed, its extremes are highly improbable dates of composition. In fact, the situation still seems to be the same as Sten Ebbesen states in his 2013 article: "we simply have neither a terminus ante quem nor a terminus post quem for Peter of Spain's *Summulae*. The 1230's are still possible, but so are the 40s, even the 50s—or the 20s."[150]

Conclusion

In this short sub-section, we tried to show on the one hand, Meirinhos' contribution to the problem of the Petrinic corpus, and on the other, the current debate concerning the date and place of *Tractatus*' composition. For the first, by distinguishing between different types of works attributed to Peter of Spain, we can distinguish different persons. While to the *auctor summularum* O.P. we can ascribe, besides the two works of logic, some *Sermones* and commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius' works, the works on medicine and natural philosophy should be ascribed to different persons. This fact contributes to the rejection of the Papalist thesis and implicitly to the limitation of the number of works attributed to the author of *Tractatus*. For the second, it is clear that the date and place of composition depends in a certain degree on the possible identity of the author. However, if for the place of composition Southern France or Northern Spain can be considered, for the time, we have a later date than De Rijk anticipated. Since the first commentaries of

[148] See MEIRINHOS (1996), p. 54-55; D'ORS (2001), p. 244-245, note 66 although D'Ors brings references against De Rijk's argumentation, he seems to agree with him regarding the date of *Tractatus'* composition; EBBESEN & ROSIER-CATACH, "Robertus Anglicus on Peter of Spain" in *Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain (Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval logic and Semantics Pamplona 26-30 May 1997)*, ed. by I. Angelelli and P. Pérez-Ilzarbe (2000), 68-70.
[149] *CNP*, p. 9.
[150] EBBESEN (2013), p. 69.

Tractatus are composed much later, the date of composition seems to be between 1240 and 1270 if not the end of the 13th century.

1.1.3. *Tractatus*, content and context

Regarding the general context of *Tractatus,* the period of 13th century represents, on the one hand, the continuation and consolidation of certain institutions and practices that appeared in the previous century, and, on the other hand, the emergence of new phenomena. The process of the recovery of the Aristotelian corpus of texts continues and the content of its doctrinal assimilation is reflected in the teaching activities conducted at the relatively newly founded corporations of students and masters called universities. Moreover, the Dominican and Franciscan Orders, newly founded mendicant movements by Dominic de Guzmán and Francis of Assisi, are starting to get proportions and their members begin to play a major role in the intellectual life of Middle Ages. Inasmuch as logic is concerned, although it was probably thought in the pre-university institutions as cathedral and monastic schools as well, the proper place to acquire it was the University and more exactly the Faculty of Arts. Within this faculty, logic was study among other six disciplines that formed the so-called liberal arts. The seven liberal arts were composed of *trivium* which comprised grammar, rhetoric and logic and *quadrivium* comprised of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music to which could be added natural philosophy. Student between 15 and 21 years old will enroll to this basic and primary form of higher education to obtain the Bachelor of Arts title. At first, the logical corpus of texts was composed of *logica vetus* which, on the one hand, comprised three works translated by Boethius: Aristotle's *Categories* and *On interpretation* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and, on the other, Boethius commentaries on them along with his following works: *De syllogismis categoricis, De syllogismis hypoteticis, De divisione, De topicis differentiis.* To them we could add the work *De decem categoriae*, a summary of Aristotle's categories wrongly attributed to Augustine, and the work *De sex principiis*, wrongly attributed to Gilbertus Porretanus. From 1120, Boethius translation of *Prior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistical refutations* started to be recovered, to which is added James of Venice's translation of *Posterior analytics* probably between 1125-1150. Those works came in contrast with *logica vetus* and were called *logica nova*. Already in the 13th century, the works included under *logica vetus* and *logica nova* were considered as forming the *logica antiqua* or *logica antiquorum* since a new type of logic emerged (partially) from them. This new logic originates in the Latin medieval thinking and is called '*logica modernorum*'[151]. It is in this last tradition of logic that Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*

[151] See LAGERLUND, "The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic Up to the Later Thirteenth Century" in Gabbay, Woods (eds), *Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 2 Medieval and renaissance logic* (2008), p. 282-283; EBBESEN, "Ancient scholastic logic as the source of medieval scholastic logic" in *The Cambridge History of Later*

was written. Before entering into details about the theories developed in *logica modernorum* and reflected in Peter's tract of logic, we will discuss certain aspects about the character, context and content of *Tractatus*.

1.1.3.1. Title, genre, structure, content and character

Regarding Peter of Spain's main work of logic, De Rijk pointed out in his introductory study[152] that, in the cases where a title is given, the name used in the earliest manuscripts and commentaries is '*Tractatus'*. Only starting with 15th century, the logical work is named with the simple '*Summule*', not exclusively, but in parallel with the name '*Tractatus'*. The same parallel usage goes true for the name '*Summule logicales*', which started to be used around 16th century. We think it could be assumed that Peter of Spain's work was known under both denominations earlier than 15th century. In fact, as early as the first half of 14th century we can see that both names *Tractatus* and *Summulae* were used. In his *Summulae de dialectica*, a work written after 1325 but no later than 1360[153] and intended to be a commentary on Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*, Jean Buridan uses both names to refer to it:

> "Propter quod de logica tota volens sine nimis exquisita perscrutatione discere quaedam communia, elegi specialiter descendere ad illum logicae tractatum brevem quem venerandus doctor magister Petrus Hispanus dudum composuit exponendum et supplendum, immo etiam et aliter aliquando quam ipse dixerit et scripserit dicendum et scribendum, prout mihi videbitur oportunum."[154]

> "Deinde notandum est circa totum capitulum quod auctor Summularum hic tractat de propositionibus modalibus valde breviter et incomplete. Ideo, ad complendum tractatum, ego non sequar textum ipsius, sed ponam textum alium, prout mihi videbitur expedire."[155]

Medieval Philosophy (1982), p. 101-126; DOD, "Aristoteles latinus" in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (1982), p. 45-79; MAIERÙ, *University Training in Medieval Europe* (1994), p. 11; *LM*, I, 14-15.

[152] See *SL,* pp. XLIII-XLVI.

[153] Cf. HALL, "John Buridan: On Aristotle' s Categories" in Newton (ed), *Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Categories* (2008), p. 302.

[154] BURIDAN, *Summulae de dialectica,* 1, Klima (2001), p. 4: "Therefore, wishing to learn something in general about logic in its entirety without an excessively detailed investigation, I have chosen to deal in particular with that short treatise of logic which the venerable professor, master Peter of Spain, composed a while ago, by commenting on and supplementing it; indeed, occasionally I am going to have to say and write things that differ from what he has said and written, whenever it appears to me suitable to do so."

[155] BURIDAN, *Summulae de dialectica*, 1.8.1, Klima (2001), p. 67: "Next we should note with respect to the entire chapter that the author of the *Summulae* discusses modal propositions very briefly and incompletely. Therefore, to complete the treatise, I will not follow his text but provide a different text, to such an extent as will seem to me to be useful."

Moreover, a great number of works that can be put under the umbrella of *logica modernorum*, from 13th and 14th, century appear under the name of '*summa*' or *'summulae'*, fact that denotes a genre of writing on its own that is applied to the domain of logic as well. *Summa*, as Teeuwen explains, is a "handbooks of authoritative material, systematically ordered and produced to fulfil the need for systematic expositions of large corpora of material"[156]. The works written within this genre are not simple collections or anthologies of texts taken word by word, like florilegia for example, but rather "summarizing descriptions [or] paraphrases of authoritative material"[157]. The same is pointed out by the title '*Summulae logicales*' which contains the diminutive plural form of the noun *summa*, *summae* and the plural adjective *logicales*, title which is translated *ad litteram* as *Small summaries of logic*. In the next lines we will see what does Peter of Spain work actually summarize by showing its structure.

Inasmuch as the structure is concern, the *Summulae logicales* is composed of twelve tracts, six of which are dedicated to the subject that belongs to the so-called 'old logic', while the other six belong to the 'logic of moderns'. De Rijk has pointed out that although the order and sometimes even the number of tracts can vary throughout the different manuscripts and commentaries, Peter of Spain's work should have the structure established in the 1972 edition[158]. The twelve sections and their respective content are ordered in the following way:

Tractatus I *De introductionibus - On the introductory notions*. The first tract starts with the definitions of logic or dialectic[159] and then begins the exposition of its primitive notions. Peter starts from the most basic entities of language the *sonus* and its *vox*, in order to arrive at the most complex ones, that is, categorical and modal propositions and their relations. Its main remote sources are Boethius' translations of: *Topics, On interpretation, Prior analytics,* Porphyry's *Isagoge*, alongside with Boethius' works: *On the categorical syllogism*, *On the hypothetical commentaries*, the first and second commentary of *On interpretation*, *On topical differences*.

Tractatus II *De predicabilibus - On predicables*. The second tract deals with the five predicables, that is, the entities that can be said or predicated of many, which are the genus, differences, species, the *proprium* and the accident. Obviously, the main remote source will be here Boethius' translation of *On interpretations* and his commentaries on it.

[156] TEEUWEN (2003), p. 338.
[157] TEEUWEN (2003), p. 338.
[158] See *SL.,* pp. XLVI-LV.
[159] We will discuss the difference in the following sections.

Tractatus III *De predicamentis - On predicaments.* This section is a reworked version of Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *Categories*. The tract begins with the three ways of predicating: equivocally, univocally and denominatively. After that, Peter is discussing the ways something can *be-in* (*esse in*) another and the notion of *being said about something*. They are combined in the classical distinction of the four classes of entities obtained by the negation and affirmation of those two properties. What follows is a discussion of predicaments or categories accompanied in the end by an exposition of post-predicaments: opposition, priority, simultaneity, having and changing.

Tractatus IV *De syllogismis - On syllogisms*. This tract summarizes Aristotle's theory of syllogism developed throughout his *Prior analytics* and filtered by the work *On categorical syllogism* written by Boethius. He divides the types of syllogisms by moods and forms, offering examples and rules, both for their validity and deduction. At the end of this tract, he offers a mnemotechnic for his entire theoretical construct.

Tractatus V *De locis - On places.* In the section on places Peter is discussing the remaining forms of argumentation. The induction, enthymeme and example are forms of argumentation that need a place to confirm them. The entire tract that is based on Boethius' *Topical differences* deals with the classification and exposition of the different forms of places.

Tractatus VI *De suppositionibus - On suppositions*. The tract on *supposition* is the first tract that belongs to the *logica modernorum*. Here Peter offers first a brief definition of signification in contrast to that of supposition. Supposition in conceived as the main property of a propositional entity called 'term'. After defining it, Peter makes a division of the different ways in which a term can stand in the relation of supposition. Starting from the chapter 11 until the end of the tract we can find a *dubia*, a presupposed personal intervention of Peter of Spain where he rejects the *opinio antiquorum*.

Tractatus VII *De fallaciis - On fallacies*. Peter's discussion of fallacies is based on Aristotle's *Sophistical refutations.* The tract distinguishes at first between four types of disputations, that is, four types of accomplishing an argumentative act between an opponent and a respondent according to a specific purpose. From the doctrinal, dialectical, testing and sophistical disputations, only the latter ones will be taken into account. They have the purpose of obtaining an apparent, not real, wisdom by using fallacious reasoning. Through this treatise Peter will study

and classify different type of fallacious arguments that can be found within and outside the language.

Tractatus VIII *De relativis - On relatives.* The section on relatives studies the effects and properties that the relative pronouns have within the propositional context.

Tractatus IX *De ampliationibus - On ampliations*. Ampliation is a property of propositional terms that enlarges the domain of a supposition. Ampliation can be caused by the nature of the verb, by its temporal aspect and even by other parts of the proposition. Rules are given to determine the ampliative effects in a propositional context.

Tractatus X *De appellationibus - On appellations*. The shortest treatise of *Summulae logicales* contains the definition, classification and exemplification of a property of terms similar to supposition, property that is called 'appellation'. Appellation will be defined as a kind of supposition for existing objects.

Tractatus XI *De restrictionibus - On restrictions*. In the eleventh treatise we find a discussion of the opposed property of ampliation. The restriction is a property according to which the domain of supposition that a term can have is restricted or limited by the propositional context.

Tractatus XII *De distributionibus - On distributions*. The last section of the *Summaries* studies how certain logical signs or syncategorematic terms can produce a distribution of a common term. Different classification and applied studies of sophisms are given in this particular part.

As we can see from the above description, and as we will show in the following sections of our analyze, the work integrates the *logica antiquorum* within the study of properties of terms developed in the *logica modernorum*. The peculiar place occupied by the section on supposition - that between the first 5 treatises of *logica antiqua* and the tract on fallacies which is followed by 5 treatises of *logica modernorum* - can be explained, in general, by the central role that supposition theory occupies within Peter of Spain's logic, and, in particular, by the theoretical function that supposition fulfils within the analysis of sophisms. Moreover, the other properties of terms presented in last treatises can be consider either specific aspects of supposition theory or separate properties but directly dependent on it.

Before moving on to the reception of the *Summulae logicales*, we must point out some aspects regarding the character of the work. Being basically a handbook of logic used by young

students, the work has a predominant descriptive character and with a few exceptions[160] is void of *quaestio*-type problematizations. The orientations towards defining, exemplifying and offering rules of logic, along with an explicit system of mnemotechnics, are aspects which testify the educational character of the work.

Regarding the notion of 'originality', it can be considered anachronic for the 13th century. In Middle Ages the writing of a work is based on methods like copying, compiling and paraphrasing without necessary specifying the source. Moreover, the practice of taking someone else's writing as a working model without mention[161] and the fact that in the field of logic some doctrines would be considered common knowledge, are two point that make the question of originality almost irrelevant. However, an important aspect must be noted. De Rijk points out[162] that in London, British Museum, there is an anonym tract called *De proprietatibus terminorum*[163] dating from the first half of 13th century, before the composition of the *Summulae logicales*, which contains, beside some omission and a reordering of chapters, the entire text on the properties of terms presented in Peter's work. Some portions of texts, especially the sections *De appellationibus* and *De ampliationibus* are found in Peter's work almost *verbatim*. The fact that Peter's text on supposition goes in parallel with the text found in *Summule antiquorum* until the point of his *Dubia* introduced by *"sed ego credo impossibile"*[164], makes De Rijk to believe that *Summule antiquorum* is the main source of Peter's work regarding the properties of terms[165]. This fact makes Meirinhos to state that "de imediato lhe retira qualquer originalidade - immediately removes any originality"[166]. This judgement is considered by us a little too harsh giving the method of writing in this epoch. However, if the dating establish for *Summa antiquorum* is correct, *Summulae logicales* will not obtain its fame from the originality of its doctrines, but from the way it succeeds to systematically synthesize the entire corpus of logic. Related to the receptivity of the Latin milieu and implicitly to the success of Peter's work, Meirinhos has another remark: "a cuidadosa eliminação de qualquer posição doutrinal garantiu ao *Tratactus* uma difusão sem precedentes, mas

[160] See for example *SL*., VI, 10 and the discussions around certain sophisms that appear in the second part of the work.
[161] On the notion of originality and plagiarism in relation to the methods of writing in the Middle Ages see BRÎNZEI, "Plagium" in Atucha, Calma, König-Pralong, Zavattero (eds.), *Mots médiévaux Ruedi Imbach*, pp. 559-568.
[162] See DE RIJK (1968a), p. 5-24.
[163] Royal MSS. 8 A VI, ff. 47ra-48rb; 51ra- 52rb, called by De Rijk '*Summule antiquorum*'.
[164] *SL.,* VI. 13, p. 84.
[165] Another option taken into consideration by the same author is that *Summule antiquorum* is a *proto-Tractatus*, a preliminary version or draft of the *Summulae logicales*.
[166] MEIRINHOS (2002), p. 349.

retirou-lhe toda a carga crítica e construtiva que a lógica tem em outros autores, como por exemplo em Guilherme de Ockham - the careful elimination of any doctrinal position guaranteed *Tratactus* an unprecedented diffusion, but removed all the critical and constructive load that logic has on other authors, such as William of Ockham"[167]. Although Peter's text does not have a highly dubitative character and possibly represents a text taken in big parts from another source, its doctrinal neutrality is hard to be maintained. In fact, passages from Peter's considerations on predicables, signification and supposition suggest a realist approach on logic that has nothing to do with a doctrinal neutrality. This aspect is confirmed by Gyula Klima's study *Two summulae, two ways of doing logic* where, referring to the theory of supposition presented in *Summaries*, he states that "Peter's realism may appear to be very close to the theoretical position of 'extremely extreme realism'" [168]. In an opposite view, Pieter A. Verburg in its *Language and its functions* considers that Peter's view on language is a non-realist one[169]. The particular way in which Peter's thesis is articulated and how exactly we can qualify it will be shown in other sections of our work. For the moment, we can state confidently that the only doctrinal neutrality that can be attributed to Peter's tracts is that according to the subject of theology. Indeed, Peter does not discuss directly any theological problems at all, although in a very small part of his examples he seems to allude to some theological problems[170].

1.1.3.2. Diffusion and reception of Tractatus

In the Middle Ages, *Tractatus* was one of the most widespread and studied textbook of logic. Today, in the European libraries are persevered over 300 manuscripts along with 200

[167] MEIRINHOS (2002), p. 337.
[168] KLIMA, "Two Summulae, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of Spain's 'Realism' and John Buridan's 'Nominalism'" in CAMERON, MARENBON (eds.), *Methods and methodologies. Aristotelian logic East and West*, 500 - 1500 (2011), p. 120.
[169] VERBURG, *Language and its functions* (1998), pp. 74-82; p. 75: "The basic theme here is not a reflection or representation of reality within the human mode of understanding and mode of signifying, but the service which language gives to predication and the expression of thought, in which the only requirement is a constant application of suppositions in order to arrive at predications which are correct in themselves, and therefore reach correct conclusions. The truth value in the real world of what has been thought and named can thus be disregarded."; p. 80 "Terministic logic has a latent tendency to construct an autarkic deductive epistemology independent of a reality which lies outside the mind or a metaphysics which invokes such a reality."
[170] See for example *SL*., VII.159, p. 172, l. 1-5, the example of the fallacy of consequence where an apparent syllogism regarding the eternity of the world is given.

incunabula[171] dating from the period 1474-1639[172]. The early diffusion of the handbook is documented by De Rijk on the basis of the presupposed 13th century commentaries. Among the earliest, he mentions the commentary of Robertus Anglicus, Guillelmus Arnaldi and Simmon of Faversham[173]. To those are added some anonymous glosses from 13th century as well: *Cum a facilioribus*, *Omnes homines*, the Ivrea gloss and *Glose Salamantine*[174]. Since all those productions originate in the Southern France and Northern Spain, the early diffusion of the *Tractatus* should be establish in this region[175]. Although it is possible that this early assimilation of the logical textbook to be delayed with a few years if we take into account the critical remarks mentioned in section 1.1.2.2 of the current research, the geographical area of Southern France and Northern Spain remains. From the region of Southern France, the diffusion spread around 1260-1270 to Paris. In this sense we can mention Adenulph of Agnani who taught in Paris around 1270 and left a copy of *Tractatus* and *Syncategoreumata* to the College of Sorbonne after his death[176].

The diffusion of *Tractatus* in the 13th century can be traced also to Italy, from where originates some of the oldest manuscripts[177]. Within this Italian tradition, the *Tractus* circulated in an abbreviated form, including only the first five or six treatises, which were accompanied by the work *De fallaciis* attributed to Thomas Aquinas. This work on fallacies substituted the longer seventh tract of Peter's work[178]. Although it's certain that this tradition arises in 13th century and continue in 14th century[179], at the beginning of 15th century we can find proof that *Tractatus* was prescribe for the students of the Faculty of Arts in Bologna. In the 1405 statues of the University of Medicine and Arts at Bologna it is stipulated that each master that teaches logic must read first the *Tractatus* with the following chapters: the first on modals, the second on predicables, the third on predicaments, the fourth on syllogism, the fifth on places, the sixth on supposition and the seventh the Fallacies of Saint Thomas[180].

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[171] For a list of editions with and without a commentary see MULLALLY (1945), p. 133-158. Other lists can be found in those offered by Manuel Alonso, João Ferreira and Wilhelm Risse; for their references, see *SL*., p. C, notes 2, 3, 4.
[172] See *SL.*, p. C; DE RIJK (1968a), p. 1.
[173] For Simmon of Faversham end of 13th century, beginning of 14th century.
[174] *Cum a facilioribus* (second half of 13th century; De Rijk establishes its date of composition in the 1240's on the basis of the commentary composed by Arnaldi), *Omnes homines* (second half of 13th century), the Ivrea gloss (13th century) and *Glose Salamantine* (13th century) see De Rijk (1970).
[175] See *SL.,* p. XCV-XCVI.
[176] See *SL.,* XCVI; De Rijk (1970), p. 38.
[177] See *SL.*, XCVII.
[178] See MAIERÙ (1994), p. 96.
[179] For some commentaries of Bolognese origin see MAIERÙ (1994), p. 99-104.
[180] See MAIERÙ (1994), p. 114.

Regarding the German countries, the diffusion of *Tractatus* took place a little bit later but developed an important tradition. Starting from the middle of 14th century the work of logic began to be very influential[181]. In the 15th century Peter of Spain's tract played an important role in the so called *Wegestreit* or *quarrel of the ways* between *antiqui*, term that in this century designates the realist authors, and *moderni*, the nominalist thinkers. In the context of this dispute, *Summulae logicales* was extensively and mainly commented by authors of the first orientation, whether they were Thomists or Albertists. In this sense, one of the most important centers was Cologne, where a predominant realist orientation was adopted. Gerard of Harderwijck is one of the main commentators of this period and region[182].

Moreover, the reception and diffusion of *Tractatus* was closely connected to the educational activities of the religious orders. Since liberal arts, especially logic, were considered in the medicant orders auxiliary to theology, they were studied not for themselves but only as a tool or instrument for theology[183], throughout different *studia* organized as pre-university schools inside the orders. The Dominicans make no exception from this state of affair, but on contrary, are one of the earliest mendicant orders which promoted this system of education. In this sense, the Dominican order is responsible for the early stage of the diffusion of *Tractatus*. The reading of Peter's handbook, either as a preparatory material for the Aristotelian logic or as a complementary treatise, was regulated within different provincial chapters: Lombardy 1279, Rome 1291, 1305 and 1340, Spain 1299, Toulouse 1320[184]. The same trend was followed some years later by Augustinians and Carmelites. According to Maierù, the Augustinian adopted *Tractatus* in the General Chapter of 1338, while the Carmelites in their constitution of 1324[185].

In fact, as De Rijk points out, Perter of Spain's *Tractatus* had such a success that was commented by Thomists, Albertists, Scotists and even by "moderate nominalists"[186]. Taking into

[181] Cf. *SL*., XCVIII.
[182] For an analysis of the Cologne philosophical school from the point of view of the commentaries on Peter of Spain, see BRAAKHUIS, "School philosophy and philosophical schools. The semantic-ontological views in the Cologne commentaries on Peter of Spain and the "Wegestreit"" in ZIMMERMANN (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter* (1989), pp. 1-18.
[183] See MAIERÙ (1994), p. 5.
[184] See MAIERÙ (1994), p. 12, note 58.
[185] Idem.
[186] *SL*., XCIX. De Rijk is mentioning John Versor, Lambert of Heerenberg (Thomists), Gerard of Harderwijk and Arnold of Tongeren (Albertists), Nicholas de Orbellis and Peter Tartareus, Johannes de Magistris (Scotists) and John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen (nominalists). We would refrain from calling positions like that found in Buridan as "moderate nominalism".

account the great number of commentaries on Peter's work, a full list of its authors and philosophical orientation will overpass our imposed thematic limits and must be postponed for a different study. Moreover, Peter's manual of logic has transgressed the boundaries imposed by the Latin language and culture. As we have mentioned, in 15th century the reception in the Byzantine milieu is attested by the partial translation of the work by Gennadios Scholarios. Another cultural place of assimilation is the Jewish one. *Tractatus* was transposed in Hebrew eight times in totally, in Provence, Italy and possibly Spain, in different forms: literal, summary and commentaries[187]. Probably the first gloss-commentary written in Hebrew was authored by Hezekiah bar Halafta, also known as Bonenfant de Millau, a Jewish philosopher from Provence, in 1320[188].

While the reception sketched above took place in the scholastic tradition and the doctrines exposed in *Tractatus* were assimilated critically only by the representants of opposed philosophical orientation like nominalists, this time, a different kind of reception must be mentioned. Starting with 15th century a new orientation in logic appeared that continue in the centuries to come. Lorenzo Valla and Rodolphus Agricola were two of the representants that have reconfigured the importance of rhetoric in logic. As Woods points out, they preferred Cicero in the place of Aristotle and a non-deductive logical approach instead of the so-called 'formal techniques' that can be usually found in the medieval logic[189]. The authors of this particular orientation are called humanists. Their new approach on logic is often accompanied by a critique of the most important figures of logical scholasticism. In this sense, the humanist Juan Luis Vives, to give an example, launches in 16th century, in his work *In Pseudo-Dialecticos*, an attack on Peter of Spain:

> "But from what authors do ignorant men seek this quality [referring to the rigor of the language]? Not from Cicero, or from Quintilian, not even from Boethius, the Latin writers in whom trust should be reposed in matters of Latin, but from Peter of Spain, or whoever preceded him - for I find it very little established who invented for us these suppositions, ampliations, restrictions, appellations, exponibilia, from which, as from the Trojan horse, sprang the torch and destruction of all speech and all the liberal arts. Ah! poor Cicero, poor Quintilian, poor Boethius and poor Capella, if Peter the Spaniard knows the meaning of the Latin language better than they!" [190]

[187] ZONTA, "Structure and Sources of The Hebrew Commentary on Petrus Hispanus's Summulae Logicales by Hezekiah Bar Halafta, Alias Bonenfant De Millau" in Schumann (ed.), *Judaic Logic* (2010), p. 78, 81 note 33.
[188] For a study of the structure and sources of this commentary, see ZONTA (2010).
[189] Cf. GABBAY, WOODS (2008), p. 631.
[190] VERBURG (1998), p. 157; see Vives., *The Attack on the Pseudodialecticians*, p. 49, 70: "At hunc abs quibus auctoribus petunt homines ignari? Non a Cicerone, non a Quintiliano, non etiam a Boetio, hominibus latinis, quibus credi latinis in rebus oportet, sed a Petro Hispano, seu si quis fuit alius ante ipsum, nam de hoc parum video constare,

According to Juan Luis Vives, Peter is considering himself above Cicero and Quintilian in respect to the knowledge of Latin language, sine he had the audacity to imposed without any legitimacy new laws on language. We will not study here the humanism criticism on the scholastic formalism and on the scholastic logic in general, but it must be mentioned that Peter of Spain had such an importance for the logic of the Middle Ages that he was seen by the posteriority as one of its main representatives.

1.1.3.3. Critical editions and translations

Before concluding the first sub-section of the current study, a few additional words are needed regarding the critical editions and modern translations of *Tractatus*. In what follows we will list chronologically these two types of renderings of Peter's work and try to offer for each of them a short description.

In 1945 Joseph P. Mullally published a first "practical edition" of *Summulae logicales* that is accompanied by an English translation of the text[191]. His purpose is not to offer a critical edition but a rendering of Peter's work for the use of historians of medieval philosophy and modern logicians[192]. In this sense, the first six treatises of the work are left aside and only those pertaining to *parva logicalia* are taken into account. Thus, Mullaly's work consists only of the seventh treatise, that which, in the late sources used by him, is dedicated to the properties of terms. This treatise in divided in the following parts: *Tractatus suppositionum, Tractatus relativorum, Tractatus ampliationum, Tractatus appellationum, Tractatus restrictionum, Tractatus distributionum* and *Tractatus exponibilium*[193]. The sources used for his text are two. The first and the main one, a Scotistic commentary on Peter of Spain made by Nicholas de Orbellis and printed in 1500. The second, a Thomistic commentary that originates in the teaching activity of the masters from Bursa Montis of Cologne University and which dates probably from the end of 15th century or beginning of 16th century[194]. If we take into account the possible date of composition of

qui confinxit eis suppositiones, ampliationes, restrictiones, appellationes, exponibilia, ex quibus rebus, tamquam ex equo Troiano, totius sermonis et omnium bonarum artium incendium atque ruina exorta sunt. O miserum Ciceronem! miserum Quintilianum! miserum Boetium! miserum Capellam! si vim sermonis latini melius novit Petrus Hispanus quam ipsi omnes!".

[191] MULLALLY (1945).
[192] See MULLALLY (1945), p. CI.
[193] See MULLALLY (1945), p. VII.
[194] See MULLALLY (1945), p. CII-CIV.

Tractatus and its early diffusion, Mullally's sources are actually quite late textual witnesses. As De Rijk states[195], and as can be seen even from the content of Mullaly's work, the presence of late interpolations estranges the reconstructed text from the original one.

A few years later, in 1947, Józef Maria Bocheński published an edition[196] of the complete text of Peter's work on the basis of a late 13th century manuscript *Reg. Lat 1205*, preserved in the Vatican Library. As De Rijk shows in his paper[197], in comparation with the earliest text witnesses identified by him, the source used by Bocheński presents consistent interpolations.

In 1972, Lambertus Marie de Rijk published a proper critical edition of *Tractatus*[198] with an extensive introductory study. This edition is mainly made on the basis of 6 manuscripts from 13th century that present the lowest number of interpolations[199]. De Rijk's work has now become the standard reference edition for Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* and soon after its appearance a number of translations in modern languages began to emerge.

In 1986 a Spanish translation of Peter of Spain's text accompanied by the translation of De Rijk's introduction is made by Mauricio Beuchot[200]. In the same year, an Italian version is made by Augusto Ponzio[201] which will be reedited in 2004 and 2010. This bilingual edition is accompanied by an original introduction and commentaries made by the same author. In 1990, Francis P. Dinneen offers an English translation of the *Summulae logicales*[202] with and unique analysis on Peter of Spain's language theory. After that, in 2006, a German translation is offered by Wolfgang Degen and Bernhard Pabst[203]. An analysis of the content of *Tractatus* and of the problems regarding the identification of its author is also provided. The latest translation in a modern language is offered by Brian P. Copenhaver, Calvin Normore and Terence Parsons, in 2014[204]. Their English bilingual edition of the *Tractatus* is of a particular importance for the following reasons. First, in their introduction, beside the usual analysis of authorship, place of composition source and content of Peter's work, they also offered a contemporary view of its

[195] *SL*., p. C.
[196] BOCHEŃSKI (1947).
[197] DE RIJK (1968a); see also DE RIJK (1969a), p. 30, note 5.
[198] *SL*.
[199] See *SL*., p. C-CX. In the process of *Tractatus'* diffusion, the interpolations appeared very early, even starting with 13th century.
[200] BEUCHOT (1986).
[201] PONZIO (2010).
[202] DINNEEN (199a).
[203] DEGEN-PABST (2006).
[204] *CNP* (2014).

logical doctrines. Secondly, this edition has the most developed apparatus of sources and explanatory notes that could be found. Thirdly, in a few passages where the text established by De Rijk presents certain difficulties, they proposed emendations of the Latin version.

The translation of *Tractatus* in modern languages surely has an important value since it makes Peter's text available to every reader and researcher and makes possible an historical assessment of certain contemporary theories of logic and language. But besides this, the endeavor of rendering a medieval Latin theory of logic in a modern language has a particular philosophical importance. As it will be developed in the section dedicated to this particular subject, the theory of *supposition* has an original and specific conceptual apparatus that often puts the translator in front of a series of problems[205]. The particular way in which the theory of supposition is rendered within a translation shows both the limits of the modern languages and the philosophical commitment of the translator. For the reasons presented above, in the appendix of the current research we will offer the first Romanian complete translation of Peter of Spain's work.

Conclusion

The current sub-section tried to described Peter's work of logic both according to its own features and to its assimilation throughout the time. The analysis of the title, genre, structure and content showed that *Tractatus* is a handbook designed towards the systematic assimilation of logical doctrines. Being composed of tracts pertaining to old logic (I-V, VII) and tracts pertaining to the modern one (VI, VIII-XII), *Tractatus* represents a synthesis of old and new logical teachings. Besides the realist commitment and some sections dedicated to *quaestiones* or *sophismata*, the work renders the logical doctrines in a neutral way without many "original" interventions, thus in a descriptive and paraphrastic manner. It can be argued that its relative brevity, systematization and concise character contributed to its wide diffusion. In the period between its composition and 17th century, the *Tractatus* circulated in the regions of France, Italy, Spain and Germany, it passed through cathedral schools, monastic schools and universities, being often prescribed as mandatory teaching material at the most fundamental level. Being transmitted first by manuscripts and then by incunabula, *Tractatus* influence overpassed the Medieval Latin scholars, and arrived at the Byzantine and Jews intellectuals; in the Latin culture, it was commented by scholars of different orientations (for example, Thomists, Albertists, Scotists) and faced the hard criticism of the

[205] See LIBERA (2014).

humanism. Starting with the second half of 20th century, the *Tractatus* received a new life through the editions made by Mullally and Bocheński. In 1972 the critical edition of De Rijk appeared, fact which made possible a series of translations and studies in different modern languages. Although we are far from an exhaustive account of the role *Tractatus* played throughout its history, the current description is sufficient to highlight its great importance in the Middle Ages.

1.2. Summulae logicales and the theory of supposition

After we have tried to explore in the previous sub-section of the current analysis some of the main contextual problems related to the person who composed *Tractatus*, the structure, diffusion and content of Peter's work, this particular section will be dedicated to the further analysis of the doctrinal content comprised in the 12 treatises of logic. Our approach will be confined, as the name of this first part suggests, to an historical, doctrinal and, if necessary, philological analysis. We will try to offer an understanding of Peter of Spain's logical considerations by resorting only to its text, its possible source and other medieval works that can bring further clarifications. Thus, in this stage of the research, we will try to not make use of any interpretations of terminist and non-terminist logic that were born within different contemporary theories of language and logic and that have started to emerge since the beginning of 20th century. Although a short analysis of this sort was made in the 2014 English translation of *Tractatus*[206], we believe that it was not carried out to its fully deserved extent.

In what follows we will try to analyze each individual tract of logic in the standard order offered by De Rijk's edition. Beside presenting the different logical considerations from Peter's work, our purpose will be to show how exactly does the supposition, the main property of terms, related on the one hand, to the logical elements of *logica antiquorum*, and, on the other hand, to the other properties of terms that appear within Peter's terminist logic. Accordingly, in the first part, we will examine the introductory notions of logic. The second will be dedicated to the five predicables. The third will study Peter's account on predicaments or categories. The fourth part will be devoted to the study of the syllogism. The fifth will consider the dialectical places, while the seventh is concerned with the fallacious reasoning. The sixth subchapter is devoted to our main property of terms, supposition. The eighth will consider the relatives. The remaining four parts, the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth, will summarize Peter's considerations about the properties of ampliation, appellation, restriction and distribution.

[206] See *CNP*., p. 21-79; also, a shorter analysis of Peter of Spain's logic can be found in MEIRINHOS (2002).

1.2.1 Tractatus 1 *De introductionibus*

De introductionibus is the first treatise of *logica antiqua* from *Tractatus* and, as the title suggests, it comprises introductory concepts, notions or elements of logic[207]. The fact of beginning a logical *summa* with a chapter devoted to the introductory notions of logic was a common practice, although variations of name and degree of content detail can be attested. Peter of Spain approach goes from simple to complex, that is, starts with the simplest elements and arrives at the most complex ones, using definitions accompanied by examples. His analysis begins with a definition of dialectics and then advances to the simple notions of *sonus*, *vox*, *nomen* and *verbum*. After dealing with the composed entities called *oratio* and *propositio*, the treatises analysis the categorical propositions and their relations in the square of opposition. Rules for equipollence and conversion are also offered. Next, the hypothetical proposition is taken into account along with the requirements for its truth. The last part of the tract is dedicated to the modal propositions. Regarding them, remarks on the notion of *modus* and on the relation of equipollence and opposition are given.

1.2.1.1 The definition of logic. Logic, dialectics and scientia sermocinalis

The first tract of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* begins abruptly with the following definition of dialectics, without offering any auctorial considerations regarding the purpose or intention of the treatise: "Dialectica est ars ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens - Dialectic is the art that has the path to the principles of all methods"[208]. This particular definition originates in Aristotle's *Topics* translated by Boethius: "Hoc autem proprium vel maxime conveniens est dialecticae. Cum enim sit inquisitiva ad omnium methodorum principia viam habet - But this is the proprium or that which is appropriate in the greatest extent to dialectic. For, since it is inquisitive, it has the path to the principles of all methods."[209] Regarding this particular definition, it can be said that it illustrates already a difference within Aristotle's logical consideration, that between the art of dialectic and its theory of demonstration or its analytics: "Demonstratio ergo est quando ex veris et primis syllogismus erit, aut ex talibus quae per aliqua prima et vera eius quae

[207] In this sense, we think that the translation of the first chapter title given by DINNEEN (1990), PONZIO (2010), BEUCHOT (1986) which include the word: notions/concetti/elementos is more appropriate than the translation adopted by CNP (2014), that is, *On introductions.*
[208] *SL.,* I, 1, p. 1; *CNP*., p. 101.
[209] ARIST. LAT., *Top.*, p. 7, l. 20, 101b 3-4.

circa ipsa est cognitionis principium sumpserint. Dialecticus autem syllogismus qui ex probabilius est syllogizatus."[210] This specific difference between dialectical and demonstrative syllogism can be successful expended to the entire logical corpus of Aristotle. As James Allan points out, Aristotle's *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, works that deal with the demonstrative or scientific logical reasoning, are contrasted with the arts of dialectic and rhetoric; the first is an art of argumentation developed in *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, while the second, is an art of persuasive speech developed in *Rhetoric*[211]. But between analytic and dialectic there is no relation of opposition but a fruitful interplay. On the one hand, the discipline of analytic or apodictic uses syllogisms that start from necessary true and primary premises, that is, premises known by themselves which cannot be demonstrate but from which the demonstration begins; on the other hand, dialectical reasoning has as object the forms of argumentation that start from premises whose truth is not necessary but probable or accepted by the authority, majority or the most competent ones. Thus, analytics will offer forms of argumentation to dialectic; dialectic, inasmuch as analytic or apodictic cannot establish in a fundamental manner its own principles, will be considered a method of inquiry by which those principles can be obtained[212]. Moreover, the distinction between those two parts of logic can be explained according to every particular science. Analytics offer the demonstrative or scientific form of reasoning for each individual discipline, form that makes the particular discipline a science which reasons from universal and necessary principles to conclusions. Dialectic is the discursive art that inquires the principles of each individual science. Thus, Aristotle's logic will include both a specialize science preoccupied with the forms of valid demonstrative reasoning and an art (*techne*) that argues from probable premises.

If the brief considerations mentioned above can be considered a proper description of Aristotle's science of logic, two questions can be formulated. One, whether the medieval terminist logician was aware of it or not. The other, whether Peter of Spain applies this distinction between logic and dialectic in its *Tractatus.* For the affirmative answer of the first question, we can give an example. The 13th century *Summa lamberti* presents in a certain degree

[210] ARIST. LAT., *Top.*, p. 6, l. 10-14, 100a 24-100b. Translation mine unless otherwise specified: "Thus, a demonstration will take place, when from the true and primary [premises] a syllogism will take place, or from those that obtain the principle of knowledge that is about them from those primary and true [premises]. But the dialectical syllogism is obtained from probable [premises]."
[211] ALLAN, "Aristotle on the Disciplines of Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Analytic" in *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2007), p. 89.
[212] See ALLAN (2007); *CNP.*, p. 101; Cf. ARIST., TOP., 100a-101b.

a similar doctrinal content with that of *Tractatus*. In respect to its first tract, we can find a richer content. In fact, it directly addresses the difference between logic and dialectic:

> "Logica est scientia discernendi verum a falso per argumentationem. […] Tunc queritur que sit differentia inter logicam et dialecticam. Ad hoc dicendum est quod logica secundum quod est ars et secundum quod est scientia superior est ad dialecticam. Logica enim scientia est de omni sillogismo docens, dialectica de sillogismo dialectico vel apparenti dialectico. Similiter logica ars omni sillogismo utitur, dialectica vero dialectico solum vel apparenti dialectico. Unde logica traditur in omnibus libris logice, qui sunt sex, scilicet liber *Predicamentorum*, liber *Peryermeneias* qui nunc dicuntur vetus logica, libri *Priorum*, *Posteriorum*, *Thopicorum* et *Elenchorum*, qui quatuor dicuntur nova logica. Dialectica vero traditur in libro *Thopicorum* et *Elenchorum* solum. Et sciendum quod scientia et ars differunt. Scientia enim illud quod dicit nominat absolute; ars vero dicit relationem ad opus. Unde dialectica dicitur scientia secundum quod docet sillogismum dialecticum construere ex suis principiis; dicitur autem ars secundum quod utitur sillogismo dialectico ad aliquam conclusionem terminandam."[213]

The above passage shows us that logic, taken in a large sense, includes dialectic and thus, in a specific sense, dialectic can be called logic but logic cannot be equated in its entirety with dialectic. Dialectic preoccupies itself only with dialectical reasoning and is developed in specific books. In its own construction it can be considered a science or a *logica docens*, a logic that teaches the rules of dialectical reasoning. In its use, that is, in the way it can be applied to other domains of knowledge, is considered an art that needs practice in order to be assimilated. Therefore, *Summa lamberti* seems to follow, at least partially, the distinction of logic that can be made inside the Aristotelian corpus.

Inasmuch as Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* is concerned, the situation is not so straightforward. As we will see in the rest of the analysis, Peter is focused mainly on the notion

[213] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, p. 4-5; LAMBERT, *Logica* (transl. Maloney, 2015), p. 5-6: "Logic is the science of discerning the true from the false by means of argumentation. […] Then one asks what the difference is between logic and dialectic. One should reply to this that logic as an art and as a science is superior to dialectic. Logic is the science that teaches about every kind of syllogism, [whereas] dialectic [teaches] about dialectical syllogism or about apparently dialectical [syllogism]. Likewise, logic as an art employs every kind of syllogism, whereas dialectic uses only the dialectical one or the apparently dialectical one. So, logic is handed down in all the books of logic, which are six, namely, in the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, which are now called the old logic, and in the *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, which four are called the new logic. Dialectic, on the other hand, is conveyed only in the *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations*. One should know that science and art are different. Science gives a name without qualification to what it treats, whereas art involves a relation to a task. Hence, dialectic is called a science inasmuch as it teaches one how to construct a dialectical syllogism on the basis of its own principles; it is called an art to the extent that it employs dialectical syllogism to arrive at a conclusion."

of 'dialectic' with one specific exception when 'logic' is taken in a large sense. Despite this, he is very aware of the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning as it will be seen in the seventh tract *De fallaciis*. There, when discussing the four types of disputationes, he gives the definition of demonstrative syllogism offered by Boethius, as an instrument for the doctrinal disputation which comes in contrast with the other three types of disputations[214]. Regarding the use of 'logic', we can find only two synonymous occurrences which mark that the term is taken in a wide sense. Those appear in the sixth treatise, that of supposition, in the section that contains the solution to the *dubia*[215] and which, as was shown, is considered to be Peter's own original intervention. First, the notion of logic is used adverbially in the expression "*logice loquendo - speaking logically*" and then in the expression "*secundum viam logicae - according to the way of logic*". Both expressions are used with the purpose of contrasting logic with natural philosophy in a discussion regarding the role of accidents and universals in theory of supposition. Although the results of this contrast will be addressed later, for now it suffices to state that for Peter, logic taken in the large sense is a discipline that deals with concepts and words without yet specifying the relation between them.

Although no further definition of logic or description of the relation between logic and dialectic is given, Peter offers a brief division of science in his third treatise, *De praedicamentis*. By offering an example of *differentia* he states that "differentie autem scientie sunt naturale et morale et sermocinale, dividitur enim scientia per has differentias: scientiarum alia naturalis, alia moralis, alia sermocinalis"[216]. In this division of science, knowledge or philosophy, the science preoccupied with words, discourse or language, that is, *scientia sermocinalis*, is put in contrast with two other sciences: one preoccupied with the human actions and the other, with

[214] See *SL.*, VII, 4-6, p. 90: "4. Disputationis autem quatuor sunt species. Alia namque est doctrinalis, alia dialetica, alia temptativa, alia sophistica. 5. Doctrinalis est que sillogizat ex propriis principiis uniuscuiusque discipline et non ex hiis que videntur respondenti. Et huius disputationis instrumentum est demonstrativus sillogismus. Demonstrativus sillogismus est quando ex veris et primis est sillogizatus aut ex talibus que per aliqua vera et prima sue cognitionis principium sumpserunt. Et contra istum sumitur alius, qui nominatur *'falsigrafus'* et est ex eisdem principiis falso modo sumptis. 6. Dialetica disputatio est que ex probabilibus est collectiva contradictionum. Et huius instrumentum est dialeticus sillogismus. Dialeticus autem sillogismus est qui ex probabilibus est sillogizatus."

[215] See *SL.,* VI, 12, p. 86, l. 22-23; p. 87, l. 24.

[216] Translation mine if not specified. See *SL*, III, 4, p. 29, l. 14-16; cf. DINNEEN (1990), p. 27; Cf. *CNP*, p. 151: "but the differences of science are the natural, moral and linguistic, for science is divided by these differences: among sciences, one is natural, another is moral and another linguistic" (contrary to CNP, in the translation we opted for 'science' in place of 'knowledge'). Since *scientia sermocinalis* cannot be adequately rendered in English, the modern English translations of *Tractatus* have adopted the term *linguistic science* to denote a science that has its main object the discourse or the language.

actions external to them that pertain to nature. A similar division can be traced back to Isidor of Sevilla but without calling the third science '*sermocinalis*'. In his work on *Etymologies* Isidor identifies three parts of philosophy:

> "Philosophiae species tripertita est: una naturalis, quae Graece Physica appellatur, in qua de naturae inquisitione disseritur: altera moralis, quae Graece Ethica dicitur, in qua de moribus agitur: tertia rationalis, quae Graeco vocabulo Logica appellatur, in qua disputatur quemadmodum in rerum causis vel vitae moribus veritas ipsa quaeratur."[217]

But one may wonder what is a *scientia sermocinalis*? A source for its definition ca be found in 12th-century work named *Didascalicon* of Hugh of Saint Victor. Here, regarding logic, the following are stated:

> "Logica dicitur a Greaco logos, quod nomen geminam habet interpretationem. Dicitur enim logos sermo sive ratio et inde logica sermocinalis sive rationalis scientia dici potest. Logica rationalis, quae dissertiva dicitur, continet dialecticam et rhetorica. Logicam sermocinalis genus est ad grammaticam, dialecticam atque rhetoricam et continet sub se dissertivam. Et haec est logica sermocinalis quam quartam post theoricam, practicam, mechanicam annumeramus."[218]

In Hugo's point of view, it is *scientia sermocinalis* or linguistic science the one that comprises under it the three classical arts considered under trivium and especially the part of logic preoccupied with argumentative reasoning. Accordingly, the *scientia sermocinalis* become equivalent with logic taken in its most general sense. It can be stated that in 13th century this particular perspective was largely accepted with different variations. For instance, Albert the Great considers philosophy as being composed of real philosophy, moral philosophy and *sermocinalis/rationalis* philosophy[219]. Although, for him, the *sermocinalis* part of philosophy can be considered logic only accidently, in so far as logic has its main purpose of study the

[217] ISID., *Ethym*., II, 23, 3; ISID., *Ethym*., transl. S. A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, O. Berghof (2006), p. 79: "There are three kinds of philosophy: one natural (naturalis), which in Greek is 'physics' (physica), in which one discusses the investigation of nature; a second moral (moralis), which is called 'ethics' (ethica) in Greek, in which moral behavior is treated; a third rational (rationalis), which is named with the Greek term 'logic' (logica), in which there is disputation concerning how in the causes of things and in moral behavior the truth itself may be investigated."
[218] HUGH., *Didasc.* (ed. Buttimer, 1939), p. 20, l. 28-p. 21, l. 7; HUGH., *Didasc.* (transl. J. Taylor, 1961), p. 59: "Logic is so called from Greek word logos, which has a double sense. For logos means either word (*sermo*) or reason, and hence logic can be called either a linguistic (*sermocinalis*) or a rational science. Rational logic, which is called argumentative contains dialectic and rhetoric. Linguistic logic stands as a genus to grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, thus containing argumentative logic as a subdivision. It is linguistic logic that we put fourth after the theoretical, practical and mechanical."
[219] See ALB., *Post. An.*, I, tract. 1, ch. 1, p. 2 b; *De int.,* I, tract. 1, ch. 1, p. 375.

intentions or the content of the intellect.[220] The same stays for Bonaventura, who, in his *On the reduction of arts to theology*, calls the third part of philosophy '*sermocinalis sive rationalis*' and includes under it grammar, logic and rhetoric[221].

The understanding of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis* can be attested in the 13th-century terminist tradition also. On the one hand, *Summa lamberti* considers that each art from trivium relates in different manner to the word or discourse (*sermo*): grammar considers what is correct or incorrect, logic what is true or false and rhetoric what is ornated or not[222]. On the other, the work of William of Sherwood states that the *scientia sermocinalis* concerns about the operations through which the human soul, initially void of science, obtains it. Although logic, is primary concerned with syllogistic reasoning, to arrive at its study, terms and propositions must be studied first[223].

From these considerations, it may be stated that the science of discourse, words or language becomes a general science of logic or a general science of the arts considered under the *trivium*. In fact, as it will be seen, logic understood as a science of language will use different elements and notions from trivium, especially from grammar, in both its practical tools and conceptual framework.

As it was stated before, Peter of Spain does not develop a proper distinction and definition of logic. But it may be stated that the same *logica* contrasted with *scientia naturalis* in his sixth treatise is in fact a *scientia sermocinalis*, a general science of logic that comprises demonstrative and dialectical reasoning, constructed on an analysis of language made with the

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[220] See. TKACZ, "Albert the Great on Logic, Knowledge, and Science" in Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great* (2013), p. 511

[221] BONAVEN., *On the reduction.*, Lat.-Eng. Z. Hayes, 1996, p. 42, 43: "Et quoniam tripliciter potest aliquis per sermonem exprimere quod habet apud se, ut scilicet notum faciat mentis suae conceptum, vel ut amplius moveat ad credendum, vel ut moveat ad amorem, vel odium: ideo sermocinalis sive rationalis philosophia triplicatur, scilicet in grammaticam, logicam et rhetoricam; quarum prima est ad exprimendum, secunda ad docendum, tertia ad movendum. Prima respicit rationem ut apprehensivam; secunda, ut iudicativam; tertia, ut motivam. Et quia ratio apprehendit per sermonem congruum, iudicat per verum, movet per sermonem ornatum: hinc est, quod haec triplex scientia has tres passiones circa sermonem considerat."

[222] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, p. 3: "et dicuntur trivium quasi tres vie in unum, scilicet in sermonem. Omnes enim triviales sunt de sermone sed differenter, quia grammatica circa sermonem considerat congruum et incongruum, ut congruum eligat et incongruum fugiat; logica vero circa sermonem considerat verum et falsum, ut verum eligat et falsum fugiat, sed rethorica circa sermonem considerat ornatum et inornatum, ut ornatum eligat et inornatum fugiat"

[223] SHERWOOD., *Introductiones*, ed. Lohr, p. 222: "Quasdam autem facit operationes, per quas deveniat in scientiam. Et de his est *sermocinalis scientia.* Haec autem tres habet partes: *grammaticam,* quae docet recte loqui, et *rhetoricam,* quae docet ornate loqui, et *logicam,* quae docet vere loqui. 1.0. Haec autem est de syllogismo principaliter, ad cuius cognitionem necesse est cognoscere propositionem, et quia omnis propositio est ex terminis, necessaria est termini cognitio."

logical and grammatical tools specific for terminist logicians. Nevertheless, Peter is not talking in the first paragraph of his work about logic, but dialectic taken in the narrow sense: "Dialetica est ars ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Et ideo in acquisitione scientiarum dialetica debet esse prior. Dicitur autem dialetica a dia, quod est duo, et logos, quod est sermo, vel a lexis, quod est ratio, quasi duorum sermo vel ratio - scilicet opponentis et respondentis disputando."[224] In this definition, dialectic is understood as a discipline used as an instrument for obtaining principles that pertain to different domain of knowledge. Inasmuch as other particular sciences are relaying on the discovery of those principles, dialectic must be learned first. Moreover, dialectic is understood as an art that requires practice. This practice is usually made within an act of disputation between an *opponens* and *respondens*, which will be defined more extensively by Peter in the first paragraph of his seventh tract *On fallacies*.

The importance of dialectic among other disciplines or even sciences is an aspect on which latter interpolated versions of *Tractatus* are insisting: "Dialectica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola enim dialectica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum artium et ideo in acquisitione scientiarum dialetica debet esse prior"[225]. The aforementioned interpolation is important since is clarifying the primary status of dialectic in front of all other sciences. Although the fact of highlighting the importance of a science under study is in Middle Ages a common place, such that we can speak of a rhetorical figure, since almost each science can be said to be the most importance one according to a specific criterion, it is not the case in Peter's text. The primary position of dialectic is made on methodological grounds, since is understood as a condition *sine qua non* other disciplines cannot be grounded as sciences.

In conclusion, it may be stated that Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* is mainly concern about dialectic, the art of debating in contrary. But this art is part of a science of language or *scientia sermocinalis* that can be equated with logic taken in its most broad sense. It is this science of

[224] SL., I, 1, p. 1; see CNP, p. 101: "Dialectic is the art that has a path to the principles of all methods. And therefore, in the acquisition of the sciences, dialectic must come first. But it is called 'dialectic' from *dia*, which is 'two', and logos, which is 'talking,' or *lexis*, which is 'reasoning,' as if it were the talking or reasoning of two people-namely, the opponent and respondent in a disputation"

[225] BOCHEŃSKI (1947), 1.01. p. 1. "Dialectic is the art of arts the science of sciences that has a path to the principles of all methods. For only dialectic disputes in a probable way about the principles of all the other arts and therefore, in the acquisition of sciences dialect must be studied first.".

language that will teach how the instruments developed in the terminist logic can be applied on different types of argumentative reasonings from the old logic and other disciplines.

1.2.1.2 Constitutive parts of language. Simple or uncomposed elements

As presented above, the main object of dialectic is the act of reasoning between two opponents who take part in a disputation. But since this act is made through the mediation of speech or discussion (*sermo*), Peter states that an analysis of its constituent parts is needed.[226] His analysis is made through a process of division and definition, that begins with the simplest entity of speech, namely that of the sound (*sonus*). Its distant sources could be found in Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle's book *On interpretation*, a work that deals generally with the types of *vox* that signify something by themselves whether they are taken in composition or not[227]. Peter defines the sound as something that is perceived by hearing and it comprises two types, one that is vocal (*vox*) and another which is non-vocal (*non-vox*). The non-vocal sound is that produced by the interaction or collision of non-animated object. The example given by Peter, the shattering of trees and the stomping of feet, are not relevant enough to conclude whether it is important or not that the source of the sound presupposes or not an intention, that is whether the sounds are made by accident or by a specific purpose or even art. Peter does not talk about the possibility of non-vocal sound to signify something. What matters for him is that the non-vocal sounds are different from vocal ones which can be named vocalizations. The latter are produced from the phonatory apparatus of an animal composed of "lips, teeth, tongue, palate, throat and lungs"[228]. Further, the sound articulated by the mouth is divided according to the capacity of signifying something, that is, of producing a representation to the hearer.[229] *Vox* can thus be significative (*significativa*) or non-significative (*non-significativa*). Those that are non-significative, seem to be a simple concatenation of sounds, as in the word "buba" which in Latin has no signification and bears no

[226] *SL.*, I, p. 1, l. 9-12: "Sed quia disputatio non potest haberi nisi mediante sermone, nec sermo nisi mediante voce, omnis autem vox est sonus, - ideo a sono tamquam a priori inchoandum est".
[227] See BOETH., *Comm. I De Inter.*, p. 294-295
[228] See *SL.*, I, 2, p. 1, l. 16-19: "Sonus igitur est quicquid auditu proprie percipitur; *'proprie'* autem dico, quia licet homo vel campana audiatur, hoc non est nisi per sonum. Sonorum alius vox, alius non-vox. Vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, naturalibus instrumentis formatus. Naturalis instrumenta dicuntur quibus vox formatur: labia, dentes, lingua, palatum, guttur et pulmo. Sonus non-vox est ille qui generatur ex collisione corporum inanimatorum, ut frangor arborum, strepitus pedum."
[229] See *SL.*, I, 3, p. 1, l. 23 - p. 2, l. 4: "Vocum alia significativa, alia non-significativa. Vox significativa est illa que auditui aliquid representat, ut 'homo', vel gemitus infirmorum. Vox non-significativa est illa que auditui nichil representat, ut 'buba'. Vocum significativarum alia significativa ad placitum, alia naturaliter."

semantic content. The significative vocalization is further divided according to the way it produces a signification to the hearer. The vocalization that signifies naturally (*naturaliter*) is that which has the same meaning for everyone, that is, which brings to each hearer the same representations. The examples offered by Peter are the moaning of sick people and the barking of dogs. Those are universally understood in the same manner by everyone as signifying in the first case pain and in the second one anger or joy[230]. But we may wonder why Peter has chosen those two examples since both the barking and the moaning are vocalizations rendered in the Latin language with interjections, while the example for the undifferentiated *vox significativa* is a word like 'homo' or 'man'. Moreover, Peter those not discuss whether an intention of signifying something is needed for the one who emits a natural significative voice or if an intention is only attributed to the emitter in the head of the hearer.

Regarding the other way, a significative vocalization can represent something by convention (*ad placitum*). Accordingly, a significative vocalization that signifies by convention is "that which represents something according to the will of the one who institutes it"[231]. The example offered by Peter is again the word '*homo*'. In his definition, the word *instituentis* which is synonymous with that of *imponentis* plays a central role. A brief history of this concept is worth sketching. These two terms designate the one who establishes names for objects through words with the assistance of the human will. With the same sense, we can find the substantive *positio* with its corresponding verbal form in Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and *On interpretation*:

> "non naturaliter vero significativae voces sunt, quas secundum positionem esse dicimus. Secundum positionem vero sunt; quas sibi ipsi homines posuerunt, ut cum dixit aliquis: primus qui rebus nomina condidit, haec substantia dicatur aurum, hic lapis, haec aqua, et alia similia. Tales igitur voces secundum positionem sunt. Et ita secundum positionem, quemadmodum ipsis hominibus placuit, a quibus nomina illa formata sunt. Huiusmodi ergo voces quae secundum positionem sunt, secundum ponentium placitum sunt".[232]

[230] Cf. Buridan's understanding of Peter's text, *Summulae de dialectica*, 1.1.4, p. 9; LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, p. 7.
[231] *SL*., I, 3, p. 2, l. 7-8: "Vox significativa ad placitum est illa que ad voluntatem instituentis aliquid representat, ut 'homo'"
[232] BOETH., *Comm. I Inter.,* 301C-D. "The significative vocalizations but not those that signify naturally are those that we utter according to their position. But according to position are those that humans themselves have established, as when someone said, the first who put names for objects: 'let this substance be named gold, and this one stone, and this one water' and so on. Therefore, those vocalizations are according to the position. And thus, according to position, as the humans wanted, from which those names were formed. Thus, in this way, the vocalizations that are according to position are according to the convention of those who establish them".

> "ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram: et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designaretur"[233]

It is the sense of the first (im)position that Peter assimilates in his definition of *vox significativa ad placitum*. Uses of this notion can be attested also in the grammatical tradition. It can be found in Varro with the same meaning, used in the study of etymologies. Here from the moment of the institution or imposition of a word until its use can pass a significant amount of time so that the true signification of the word can suffer modifications or can even perish[234]. Moreover, a similar concept can be found in Priscian, in his account on *vox*: "there are four differences of vocalizations: articulated, unarticulated, literate, aliterate. Articulated is the one which is uttered when is restricted, that is joined with certain meaning of the speaker's mind"[235]. In the works of Albert the Great[236] and Thomas Aquinas[237] the first *impositor* is Adam which institutes names to objects in virtue of its privilege status that he has with the creation before the falling into sin. Another specific sense of the notion of imposition is one that can be found after Peter of Spain, in the works of terminist logic. For example, Buridan gives the following additional explanation regarding the passage from *Tractatus*:

> "Haec quinta pars in tribus clausulis dividitur, quae quasi nulla indigent expositione, nisi quod vox significativa ad placitum aliquando est eiusdem significationis in uno toto magno idiomate, ut 'homo' vel 'asinus' apud omnes latinos, aliquando autem pro aliquo pauco tempore imponitur ad aliquam determinatam significationem, ex conventu et concordia disputantium, ut cum dicimus quod A sit homo, B lapis, C animal et huius modi, sicut saepe faciunt doctores et disputantes"[238]

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[233] BOETH. *Comm. Cat.*, p. 159 C. "The first position of a name was made according to the signification of the word, while the second one according to its figure: an there is a first position, inasmuch as names are imposed to objects, but there is a second one, inasmuch as names themselves are designated by other names"

[234] See KENT (ed. transl.), *De lingua latina* (1983), V, 3; VII, 32; VIII, 1, 1 apud DINU, "Varro on Lexical Creation in Latin" in *Studii si Cercetari de Onomastica si Lexicologie* Vol. 10 Issue 1/2 (2017), pp. 102-117; KELLY, *The Mirror of Grammar: Theology, philosophy and the Modistae* (2002), p. 17

[235] PRISCIANUS, *Institutiones grammaticae*, I, 1, 5-7, p. 5: "vocis autem differentiae sunt quattuor: articulata, inarticulata, literata, illiterata. Articulata est quae coartata, hoc est copulata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius qui loquitur profertur"

[236] For example, ALB., *De homine*, ed. Cologne, p. 577, l. 66-69: "Serpens enim fuit ibi ad exercitium virtutis, cetera vero animalia, quibus nomen imposuit Adam, ad exercitium sapientiae. Nomina enim secundum proprietatem naturae imponere exercitium sapientiae est"

[237] For example, THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologica*, I, q. 94 ad 3 *apud* CAMERON, "Meaning: Foundational and semantic theories" in MARENBON (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy* (2012), p. 346

[238] BURIDAN, *Summulae de dialectica*, transl. Klima, p. 10; BURIDANUS., *Summulae de dialectica*, 1.1.5: "The fifth part is divided into three sections, which need almost no exposition, except to add that a conventionally significative utterance sometimes has the same signification throughout an entire language, as 'homo' [man] or 'asinus' [donkey] does for every Latin [speaker], but sometimes it is imposed for a short time with some determinate signification, by

Obviously enough, Peter does not use the metalinguistic acceptance of *imposition* as found in Boethius' commentary on *Categories*, that is, names designated by other names, nor the one in which *imposition* is a tool of conceptual notation, as found in Buridan, nor it adds any theological implications like in the case of Thomas Aquinas or Albert. In fact, Peter of Spain's use of institution with the sense of imposition denotes generally an act of conventional naming without other specifications.

Before advancing to the next stage of Peter's analysis, we must mention an important aspect. Peter seems to offer his considerations about discourse or speech (*sermo*) focusing mainly only on the spoken language which will presuppose the written one. But Aristotle, at the beginning of his *On interpretation*, and especially Boethius, in his translation and commentaries of the same work, are both careful enough to give an account of language which implies the spoken, the written and the mental dimension:

> "Cum igitur haec sint quatuor, res, intellectus, vox, littera; rem concipit intellectus, intellectum vero voces designant, ipsas vero voces litterae significant. Intellectus vero animae quaedam passio est. Nisi enim quamdam similitudinem rei quam quis intelligit in animae ratione patiatur, nullus est intellectus. Cum enim video orbem vel quadratum, figuram eius mente concipio, et eius mihi similitudo in anime ratione formatur, patiturque anima rei intellectae similitudinem, unde fit in intellectus, et similitudo sit rei, et animae passio. Horum autem rursus quatuor, duae sunt naturales, duae secundum hominum positionem. Voces namque et literrae secundum hominum positionem sunt. Intellectus autem et res naturaliter. Hoc illo approbatur, quod apud diversas gentes diversis vocibus utuntur et litteris. Idcirco quoniam ipsi sibi voces, quibus uterentur, et litteras quibus scriberent composuerunt. Intellectus autem et res nullus posuit, sed naturaliter sunt"[239]

In this fragment, Boethius offers a clear perspective of how different entities relate in order for a vocalization to signify something. The thing (*res*) or external object, an independent reality

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the convention and agreement of disputants, as when we say that A should stand for man, B for stone, C for animal, etc., as professors and disputants often do"

[239] BOETH., *Comm. I Inter.,* 297B-D: "Since there are these four: the thing, the understanding, the voice and the letter, the understanding grasps the thing, but the voices designate the understanding, but the voices themselves signify letters. But the understanding is a certain affection of the soul. For there is no understanding, unless he who understands a certain likeness of a thing is affected in the soul's reasons. For, when I see a circle or a square, I conceive with the mind its form, and its likeness is formed for me in the soul's reasons, and the soul is affected by the likeness of the thing which is understood: for that reasons happens as an understanding, and the likeness pertains to the thing, and the affection to the soul. But again, of those four, two are natural, two according to human's imposition. For voices and letters are according to human's imposition. Understanding and things are in a natural way. This fact is proved there, since at different nations different voices and letters are used. This is because their voices that they use and their letters that they write are composed by them. But the understanding and the things are not imposed by anyone but are in a natural way."

of us, is grasped by the soul to form an understanding. The soul does not obtain the object itself but its likeness (*similitudo*) or concept. The words when uttered designate directly a mental contented, which is the likeness of the external object, and only indirectly it designates the external objects. The same uttered words signify the words of the written language. Only the written and uttered parts of language are established through human imposition. According to this imposition made by human convention, they signify firstly the mental content and ultimately the external objects. Peter of Spain is far from giving such elaborate distinctions and lets us wonder if this specific relation between things, concepts, uttered and written words is presupposed or rejected tacitly by him. We will analysis those problems latter in our work.

Regarding the further distinction of *vox significativa ad placitum* from the first treatise, Peter continues with the Aristotelian and Boethian observations[240]. A vocalization that signifies according to the convention can be simple or complex. The simple vocalizations are the noun (*nomen*) and the verb (*verbum*) while the complex one is a grouping of words or a phrase (*oratio*)[241]. The definitions of the simple vocalizations go in parallel with those of Aristotle and Boethius, since Peter states: "Nomen est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars significat separata finita recta"[242] and "Verbum est vox significativa ad placitum cum tempore, cuius nulla pars significat separata finita recta"[243]. The name and the verb are describe as being the minimal parts of speech that signify something by convention, and thus cannot be further divided in significative components. The difference between them is the presence or absence of tense or temporal aspects. However, according to dialecticians (*dialecticos*), not all names and verbs enter into the study of logic, but only those that are determinate (*finita*) and straight (*recta*). In the case of the name, this means that the undetermined name like 'non-homo', 'non-man', which would signify all the entities that are not man, and the names that are put at all the other grammatical cases except the nominative one, are excluded from the study; in the case of the verb, this means that verbs formed with a negation before them and those that are not at the present time and indicative mood will be excluded from the logical

[240] ARIST., *Inter.*, 16b 26-17a 8; Arist. Lat., *Inter.*, p. 7-8; BOETH., *Syll. cat.,* 796C-97B;
[241] See *SL*, I.3, p. 2, l. 8-10: "Vocum significativarum ad placitum alia simplex sive incomplexa, ut nomen et verbum, alia composita sive complexa, ut oratio"
[242] *SL.*, I.4, l. 12-13: "A name is a significative vocalization by convention, without tense of which no separate part signifies, which is determinate and is at a straight case"
[243] *SL.*, I.5, l. 26-27: "A verb is a significative vocalization by convention, with tense of which no separate part signifies, which is determinate and is at a straight mood"

consideration[244]. As we will see, especially in the case of the verb, those restrictions are not always respected, fact which will lead to the appearance of certain problems regarding how the application of terminist logic should be made. However, the name and the verb as defined above will be considered the two minimal parts which will enter in composition of the complex vocalizations.

1.2.1.3 Constitutive parts of language. Composed elements: definition and types of propositions

Before discussing the composed parts of speech, we must pay attention to a distinction made by Peter in his last sentence of his fifth paragraph where he states: "Et sciendum est quod dialeticus ponit duas partes orationis tantum, scilicet nomen et verbum, alias vero partes appellat sincathegoremata, idest consignificativa"[245]. Almost the same distinction can be found in Priscian's *Institutiones grammatice* which uses the same two concepts of *sincategorematic* or consignificative parts of speech[246]. According to this distinction, the noun and verb are two constitutive parts of an elementary proposition (*oratio*). In the intra-propositional context, these two parts of speech become subject and predicate or categorematic parts of proposition. The term *categorematic* comes, as Peter himself states[247], from the Greek word that designates the act of predication, that is the act of saying something (predicate) about something else (subject). The categorematic words have in themselves (*per se*) the capacity to signify something, independent from other components of the proposition. The sincategorematic or consignificative words do not signify something independently but only by being added to a categorematic word. Sincategorematic words are particular and universal signs, conjunctions, disjunctions, negations, exclusive signs and so on. Although they lack the capacity to signify something on themselves, Peter seems to offer them some kind of semantical content, since they signify an intra-propositional state of affair, namely the disposition (*disposition*) of the categorematic elements: the disposition

[244] See *SL.*, 4-5, p. 2-3.
[245] *SL.*, I.5, p. 3, l. 6-9: "And it must be known that the dialectician establishes only two parts of speech, namely noun and verb, while he calls the other pars '*sincategorematics*', that is consignificative".
[246] PRIS., *Inst.*, II, 15, p. 54, l. 5-7: „Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes 'syncategoremata', hoc est consignificata, appellabant".
[247] *SL.*, I.7, p. 4, l. 2-3: "Et dicitur *'cathegorica'* a *'cathegorizo, -zas'*, quod idem est quod *'predico, -cas'*. Subiectum est de quo aliquid dicitur; predicatum est quod de altero dicitur"

of the subject and predicate[248]. The role of sincategorematic words is confirmed more clearly in Peter work entitled *Syncategoreumata*:

> "Therefore, syncategorematic words signify something or other. Now they do not signify things that are capable of functioning as subjects or as predicates. Therefore, they signify things that are dispositions of things capable of functioning as subjects or as predicates, for there is nothing in a true or false proposition except the subject, the predicate and their dispositions"[249]

Thus, the distinction between categorematic and sincategorematic words is a distinction between words having a signification by themselves and playing a constitutive role inside a predicative context and words that do not have those functions. How the signification actually takes place in each case, will be study with the occasion of the sixth treatise of *Tractatus*.

Returning to Peter's classification of complex significative vocalizations according to convention, the first one is an enunciation (*oratio*), a grouping of words in which the parts signify something separately[250]. The combination of words inside an *oratio* can be complete or incomplete, depending on the complete or incomplete meaning, which equals to the thought or understanding that the enunciation makes in the mind of the hearer. A complete enunciation, like "*homo est albus*", will be composed of subject, predicate and copula and vary according to the modalities of expression: indicative, imperative, optative and subjunctive. Only the indicative one will be properly taken into account by the dialectician for further considerations.

On the definition of indicative *oratio*, an additional property will be added in order that a grouping of subject and predicate to be named '*propositio*': the property of signifying something true or false.[251] After establishing the definition of proposition, the rest of Peter's first tract will unfold with the study of the three types of propositions (categorical, hypothetical and modal) and their truth, conversion, equipollence and relation of opposition.

In a first step, each proposition can be either categorical, either hypothetical. The difference between those two is their constitutive parts. The categorical proposition has the subject and the predicate as its constitutive parts, while hypothetical propositions have other categorical propositions as their constitutive parts. Hypothetical propositions can be conditional, disjunctive

[248] See *SL*., XII. 5-7, p. 210-212.
[249] PETR. HISP., *Syn.* (ed. De Rijk, transl. J. Spruyt, 1992), p. 39
[250] *SL*., I.6, p. 3, l. 10-13: "Oratio est vox significativa ad placitum cuius partes significant separate. *'Cuius partes etc.'*- hoc totum ponitur ibi ad differentiam nominis et verbi; reliqua omnia ponuntur ibi eadem ratione qua in nomine et verbo."
[251] *SL*., I.7, p. 3, l. 22-23 "Harum autem omnium sola indicativa oratio dicitur propositio. Propositio est oratio verum vel falsum significans."

or copulative.[252] The conditional hypothetical proposition is formed by an antecedent introduced by the conditional conjunction '*si*' and a consequent, both being categorical propositions. For the truth of the entire conditional is required that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent. For its falsity, it is sufficient that the antecedent can be without the consequent, as in the proposition '*si Sortes est, album est*'. The copulative hypothetical proposition is formed by two categorical propositions connected by the coordinated conjunction '*et*'. The copulative propositions are true when both parts are true and false when at least one of its parts is false. The disjunctive hypothetical proposition is formed by two categorical propositions connected by the disjunction '*vel*'. For the truth of the disjunctive propositions is sufficient that one member of the disjunction to be true. For its falsity, is required that both members to be false.[253]

The difference between categorical and hypothetical propositions is, according to Peter, a difference according to substance. But the differences between different types categorical propositions are according to the quantity and quality[254]. According to quality, the categorical proposition can be affirmative or negative. The affirmative one is defined as that in which the predicate is affirmed about the subject, while the negative one as the one in which the predicate is removed from the subject by the negation *non* put in front of the copula.[255]

According to quantity, there are four different types of propositions: universal, particular, indefinite and singular. The source of this division can be obviously traced back to Aristotle. In *Prior Analytics*[256] he distinguishes between universal, particular and indefinite propositions (*protasis*) while in *On interpretation*[257] he seems to make allusions about a singular proposition. As Gisela Striker points out in her commented translation of *Analytics*[258], Aristotle does not explicitly include singular propositions in his list, but gives different examples throughout his logical works which include them. As far as Boethius is concerned, we find in his work *On hypothetical syllogisms* the division in full length, containing all four types of propositions with examples[259]. Despite the Aristotelian-Boethian origin of Peter of Spain's division, a difference

[252] See *SL*., I.6, p. 8, l. 25-p. 9, l. 13.
[253] See *SL*, I.17, p. 9-10.
[254] Peter offers three kinds of questions to establish the three differences of propositions: *que?* (What?) - difference of substance, *quails?* (What kind?) - difference of quality, *quanta?* (How many?) - difference of quantity. By responding to those questions, Peter offers mnemotechnies in order to be easier retained by students. See *SL.,* I.10, p. 5, l. 10.
[255] *SL*, I.9, p. 5.
[256] ARIST., *Anal. pr.*, 24a 15-20.
[257] ARIST., *De intr.*, 17b 1-2.
[258] See STRIKER, *Aristotle's Prior Analytics Book I: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary* (2009), p. 76.
[259] BOETH., *De syll. hyp*., 841B.

must be highlighted. While Aristotle and after him Boethius define those types of propositions according to the relation of predication or belonging, that is, according to the fact that the predicate belongs (lat. *inesse* or gr. *huparhein*) to a subject, Peter of Spain does something more. He defines each type of proposition according to the types of terms and signs they contain. Accordingly, we have the following definitions:

> "Propositio universalis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis determinatus signo universali […] Propositio particularis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo particulari determinatus […] Indefinita est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo […] Propositio singularis est illa in qua subicitur terminus singularis vel terminus communis iunctus cum pronomine demonstrative"[260]

The universal signs (*omnis, nullus, nihil* etc.) and the particular ones (*aliquis, quidam, alter* etc.) are sincategorematic words which seem to function as quantifiers for the subject term of the proposition. Peter does not state anything about a determination of signs related to the predicate terms. As we know, regarding the latter aspect, Aristotle seems to reject a quantification of predicate terms in *On interpretation*[261].

A common term (*terminus communis*) is defined by Peter as the one which "is naturally suited to be predicated of many"[262] as *homo* is predicable of each individual man and *animal* of each individual animal. The common term is put in contrast with the singular term (*terminus singularis*) which is defined as that which "is naturally suited to be predicated of just one"[263]. The examples for singular terms will be proper names like '*Socrates*' or '*Sortes*', '*Plato*' etc. According to their capacity to be predicated of only one individual, proper names are equivalent with a construction formed by a demonstrative pronoun and a common term, for example, '*iste homo*' or 'this man' which implies an ostension, a fixation of a particular individual. In the sixth tract of *Tractatus*, *De suppositionibus*, Peter calls both linguistic entities that fall under the category of singular terms, that is, proper names and the construction formed by a demonstrative

[260] SL., I.8, p. 4. CNP., I.8, p. 107, 109: "A universal proposition is one in which a common term determined by a universal sign is made the subject […] A particular proposition is one in which a common term determined by a particular sign is made the subject. […] An indefinite proposition is one in which a common term without a sign is made the subject. […] A singular proposition is one in which a singular term, or a common term joined with a demonstrative pronoun, is made the subject."

[261] ARIST. LAT., *De intr.*, 17b 13-16: "nulla enim adfirmatio erit, in qua de universaliter praedicato universale praedicetur, ut 'omnis homo omne animal'".

[262] CNP., I.8, p. 107; *SL.,* I.8, p. 4, l. 13-14: "Terminus communis est qui est aptus natus de pluribus predicari, ut *'homo'* de Sorte et de Platone et de unoquoque aliorum hominum"

[263] CNP., I.8, p. 109; I.8, p. 5, l. 1-2: "Terminus singularis est qui est aptus natus de uno solo predicari."

pronoun and a common term, 'discrete term' (*terminus discretus*)[264]. Although Peter offers here the definitions of categorical propositions and presents their variation according to quantity and quality, he does not give here the A, E, I, O notations. This notation will be presented in in the fourth tract dedicated to syllogisms[265], where a mnemotechnic for valid syllogistic modes is offered.

In the categorical proposition, the predication of something about something else is not only a grammatical or linguistical relationship between propositional entities named 'subject' and 'predicate'. To the extent that words signify things, propositions express ontological[266] relationships between extra-propositional and extra-mental entities. This fact is confirmed by Peter of Spain's division of categorical propositions according to their matter[267]. Natural matter (*materia naturalis*) is that in which the predicate tells something about the being (*esse*) of the subject. For example, '*animal'* or '*risibilis'* is predicated about the subject '*homo*'. They are not mere accidental characteristics of man, but the former is the *genus* that enters in the definition of man along with the specific differences while the latter is its proprium. The natural matter enters in contrast first with the contingent and then with the remote one. A categorical proposition has contingent matter (*materia contingens*) when the object represented by the subject term has or has not the attribute predicated by the predicate term. '*Homo est albus'* and '*homo non est albus'* are examples in this sense. The fact of having or not having the white color is only an accidental property of the ontological subject and does not enter in its definition. The last type of proposition is that which has a remote matter (*materia remota*). Here the entities represented by the subject and the predicate are incompatible, such that the predicate or inherence cannot be stated about the subject. An example of such case is *'homo est asinus'*.

The last type of proposition analyzed by Peter is the modal one. The mode is a determination that is added to the object and takes place by an adjective (*adiectivum*, the Greek *epithetikón*). The understanding of the adjective as the one which is being added, is suggested by its etymology: *adiectivum* seems to be originated in the construction *ad+iac/iic* that will give

[264] *SL*., VI.4, p. 80, l. 20-22: "Suppositio discreta est que fit per terminum discretum, ut *'Sortes'* vel *'iste homo'*"
[265] See *SL*, IV.13, p. 52.
[266] The sense of the terms 'ontological' and 'ontology' in our work must be taken contextually, since they can denote both something pertaining to the extramental/extralinguistic world and the way the logical/mental, linguistic and external entities relate. In the last particular sense, we can speak about an ontology of language, of thought and of reality.
[267] See *SL*., 1.13, p. 7, l. 1-9.

adiicio, *adiiccere* (to add). Peter distinguishes between an adjective of noun and an adjective of verb which is also called 'adverb', a distinction that also originates in Priscian[268]. Although adverbs can be classified in various ways[269], de modal propositions will use only the modes that regard the composition, that is, those that tell us the modality of composition of the subject with the predicate. Those modes are six: truth, false, possible, contingent, necessary, impossible. A modal proposition is formed in the following way: a categorical proposition is rendered with an accusative + infinitive construction like '*Sortem currere*' which will be put as subject; the copula *est* and a mode from the aforementioned six, expressed in a nominal way, is added as predicate; the final modal proposition will have the form *Acc.+inf. est Mode*, for example, '*Sortem currere est impossibile*'[270]. Although, the categorical propositions will be studied further in the treatise on syllogisms, for the hypothetical and modal propositions the current exposition suffices.

1.2.1.4 Opposition, conversion and equipollence

In the last part of the first treatise, paragraphs 8-25, Peter talks systematically about categorical, hypothetical and modal propositions. After defining and classifying each type of proposition, in the case of categorical and modal propositions, opposition, conversion and equipollence are discussed, while in the case of hypothetical propositions, truth is taken into account as was already seen.

Regarding categorical propositions a further distinction is made according to *participatio*, a relation which denotes the term or terms that two categorical propositions share or have in common. Accordingly, two categorical propositions can participle by or have in common two, one or none of their terms. For the former case, the participation of two terms can take place according to the same order or to a reverse one.[271] Although those distinction may be considered obvious or redundant, they are important, since the particular way in which two categorical propositions participate or share their terms allows the logician to arrive at the topics of opposition, conversion, equipollence and even syllogistic reasoning. Categorical propositions that participate according to both of their terms and according to the same order are considered contrary, subcontrary,

[268] See PRIS., *Inst.*, II, 16, p. 54, l. 10-12.
[269] See *SL.*, I.19, p. 12, l. 1-5.
[270] See *SL.*, I.21, p. 12, l. 17-14.
[271] *SL.*, I.11, p. 5, l. 18-25.

contradictory and subalternate[272]. The relation between them is that of opposition and are studied within the square with the same name. Equipollence is also taken into account in the same type of propositions which participate with both their terms according to the same order. Conversion takes place between two categorical propositions that participate according to both their terms but in a reverse mode. The syllogism, through its premises, puts in relations two categorical propositions that participate according to one of their terms, the middle term of the syllogism.

The relations of opposition between categorical propositions with the same terms in the same order are the following:

Contrary - between a universal affirmative and a universal negative; for example, '*omnis homo est animal*' - '*nullus homo est animal*'

Subcontrary-between a particular affirmative and a particular negative; for example, '*quidam homo est animal*' - '*quidam homo non est animal*'

Contradictory - between a universal affirmative proposition and a particular negative proposition; between a universal negative proposition and a particular affirmative proposition; for example, '*omnis homo est animal*' - '*quidam homo non est animal*' and '*nullus homo est animal*' - '*quidam homo est animal*'.

Subalternate - between a universal affirmative and a particular affirmative; between a universal negative and a particular negative; '*omnis homo est animal*' - '*quidam homo est animal*' and '*nullus homo est animal*' - '*quidam homo non est animal*'.[273] As we know, Aristotle already offers in *On interpretation*[274] a primitive square of opposition which includes the contraries and contradictories.[275] The rest of the content that Peter offers is implicitly presented in Aristotle and explicitly put in Boethius` commentaries on *De interpretatione*.

Regarding the equipollence of categorical propositions there are two different paragraphs which in De Rijk edition appear under the name, '*De equipollentiis earum*': one after the square of opposition, the other after discussing the hypothetical proposition. In those two paragraphs Peter uses the verb *aequipolleo, aequipollere* which means in a common language the fact of being of equal power. In his Italian translation of *Tractatus*, Ponzio points out that the term *aequipollentia*

[272] *SL.,* I.12, p. 5, l. 26-28: "propositionum participantium utroque termino secundum eundem ordinem alie sunt contrarie, alie subcontrarie, alie contradictorie, alie subalterne"
[273] See *SL*, I.12, p. 6,
[274] ARIST., *De intr.*, 17b 17-26.
[275] See also PARSONS, „The Traditional Square of Opposition" în The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/square/> (2017).

translates the Greek term *ἰσοδυναμία*, which denotes de identity of signification between two propositions, which, although they share the same subject and predicate differ in form[276]. Ponzio identifies the term in *Eisagoge dialektike* a third century work attributed to Galen[277] and states that it is transmitted through Apuleius' commentary on *De interpretatione*. In the paragraph 14, the first paragraph named with the title '*De equipollentiis earum*', Peter discusses the following rules of opposition according to the matter of propositions:

> Contraries: if one proposition is true the other is false and conversely; this rule applies to propositions of natural and remote matter and even contingent when the predicate is inseparable from the subject. When the predicate is separable, both propositions can be false.
>
> Subcontraries: if one propositions is false, the other is true and not conversely. Both can be true in the contingent matter.
>
> Contradictories: if one is true the other is false and conversely. They cannot be both true or false in any matter.
>
> Subalternates: if the universal is true, the particular is true, and not conversely. The universal can be false and the particular true. If the particular is false, the universal is false and not conversely.[278]

Although those rules concern the truth of different pairs of opposite propositions, it is on the basis of those rules that the equipollence rules will be given. Despite the fact that paragraph 18 comes after the treatment of hypothetical propositions, the equipollence presented here has nothing to do with those kinds of propositions but it refers once again to the categorical propositions. The rules given are:

> "[R1] *si alicui signo preponatur negatio, equipollet suo contradictorio* […] [R2] *si alicui signo universali postponatur negatio, equipollet suo contrario* […] [R3] *si alicui signo universali vel particulari preponatur et postponatur negatio, equipollet suo subalterno* […] [R4] *si duo signa universalia negativa ponuntur in eadem oratione, ita quod unum in subiecto et reliquum in predicato, primum equipollet suo contrario, secundum suo contradictorio*"[279]

[276] See PONZIO (2010), p. 604, note 8.
[277] See GALENUS, *Eisagoge dialektike*, 21.1, 24.22, 43.10, 49.6.
[278] See *SL*., I.14, p. 7.
[279] *SL.,* I.18, p. 10-11; *CNP*, p. 117: "[R1] If before any sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its contradictory. […] [R2] If after any universal sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its contrary. […] [R3] If before and after any universal or particular sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its subalternate. […] [R4] If two universal negative signs are put in the same statement, such that one is in the subject and the other remains in the predicate, the first is equipollent to its contrary, the second to its contradictory."

It must be noted that Peter is referring here rather to an equipollence of signs than of propositions, while he seems to let the equipollence of propositions be implicitly understood. Thus, we will have the following equipollences:

-first rule (R1)

1. Non omnis S est P eq. quidam S non est P
2. Non nullus S est P eq. quidam S est P
3. Non quidam S est P eq. nullus S est P
4. Non quidam S non est P eq. omnis S est P

-second rule (R2)

1. Omnis S non est P eq. nullus S est P
2. Nullus S non est P eq. omnis S est P

-third rule (R3)

1. Non omnis S non est P eq. quidam S est P
2. Non nullus S non est P eq. quidam S non est P
3. Non quidam S non est P eq. omnis S est P (identical with R1.4)
4. Non quidam S non non est P eq. nullus S est P (identical with R1.3)

-fourth rule (R4)

1. nullus S est nullus P eq. omnis S est quidam P[280]

Peter offers an explanation for R4 but uses 'nichil' instead of 'nullus' and 'quidlibet' instead of 'omnis' and 'aliquid' instead of 'quidam', fact which makes no difference. His explanation can be rendered more exactly as follows:

nullus S est nullus P eq. omnis S non est nullus P (from R2.1)

omnis S non est nullus P eq. omnis S est quidam P (from R1.2)

In fact, even the other rules can have similar explanations. In the case of R2 we will have:

1. Omnis S non est P eq. Non quidam S non non est P (from R1.4)

Non quidam S non non est P eq. nullus S est P (from R1.3)

2. Nullus S non est P eq. Non quidam S non est P (from R1.3)

Non quidam S non est P eq. omnis S est P (from R1.4)

In the case of R3, we will have:

1. Non omnis S non est P eq. quidam S non non est P (from R1.1)

[280] See the examples offered in *SL*., I.18, p. 10-11.

quidam S non non est P eq. quidam S est P

2. Non nullus S non est P eq. quidam S non est P (from R1.2)

From the above considerations we can point out two aspects. The first is that from R4 we can see that Peter, like many medieval logicians of his time[281], allows the predicate to be quantified by the universal and particular signs, fact that seems to be denied by Aristotle[282]. The second is that Peter focus on the equipollence of signs. Only when offering examples, he suggests an equipollence of propositions. Those facts have made some authors to compare Peter's analysis with contemporary rules of quantifier exchange[283], a problem that will be analyses in the systematic section of our work.

The conversion of categorical propositions is a topic explored in paragraph 15. Conversion is a relation that takes places between two propositions that participate with both its terms but in reverse order, such that in the second proposition an interchange between the subject and the predicate takes places from the first one with the truth being preserved. Originally, Aristotle discusses the conversion of categorical proposition in *Prior Analytics* I, 2[284]. Peter distinguishes on the basis of Boethius' work *De syllogismo categorico*[285] between three different types of conversion: *simplex*, *per accidens*, *per contrapositionem*. Simple conversion is defined as *"*making a predicate out of a subject and conversely, while quality and quantity remain the same"[286]; accidental conversion, "making a predicate out of a subject and a subject out of a predicate, while quality also remains the same but quantity is changed"[287]; conversion by contraposition, as "making a predicate out of a subject and a subject out of a predicate, while quality and quantity

[281] See PARSONS, "The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th Centuries" in GABBAY, WOODS (eds), *Handbook of the History of Logic* (Vol. 2) (2008), p. 168-170, regarding William of Sherwood.
[282] See ARIST. LAT., *De intr.*, 17b 13-16; see PARSONS (2014), p. 56. The quantification of the predicate term is considered to be an extension of the Aristotelian logic.
[283] See PARSONS (2008), p. 168; *CNP*., p. 117, note 20; Parsons (2014), 3.*2 Equipollences*, pp. 60-62. According to this rule we have two main equivalences ~∀xPx eq. ∃x~Px and ~∃xPx eq. ∀x~Px, where ∀x is considered to be a generalized conjunction and ∃x a generalized disjunction. In the two equivalences the negation goes over the quantified variable with the change of the quantifier.
[284] ARIST., *Anal. prio*., I, 2, 25a.
[285] See BOETH., *Syll. cat.*, 804-806.
[286] CNP., p. 113; *SL*., I.15, p. 8, l. 5-6: "Simplex conversio est de subiecto facere predicatum et econverso, manente eadem qualitate et quantitate"
[287] CNP., p. 115; *SL*., I.15, p. 8, l. 10-12: "Conversio per accidens est de subiecto facere predicatum et de predicato subiectum, etiam manente eadem qualitate, sed mutata quantitate"

remain the same but limited terms are changed into unlimited terms"[288]. According to Peter, the categorical proposition can be converted as follows:

Simple conversion takes place for universal negative and particular affirmative propositions:

Nullus S est P - Nullus P est S

Quidam S est P - Quidam P est S

Conversion by accident takes place for universal affirmative and universal negative propositions:

Omnis S est P - Quidam P est S

Nullus S est P - Quidam P non est S

Conversion by contraposition takes place for universal affirmative and particular negative propositions:

Omnis S est P - Omnis non-P est non-S

Quidam S non est P - Quidam non-P est non-S

Peter does not tell us explicitly what conversion is, but it can be understood that is a type of direct inference. Those rules of conversion will be use in the process of reducing all the figures of syllogisms to the first one, in the fourth chapter of *Tractatus*. Regarding Aristotle, he talks only about that type of conversions which Peter includes in the *simplex* category and about the conversion of the universal affirmative which *Tractatus* includes under the *per accidens* type. Although the types of conversion presented by Peter are endorsed by Sherwood[289] and the author of *Summa lamberti*[290], Buridan will reject his rule of conversion by contraposition since it does not hold in every instance. The problem mentioned by Buridan is in fact that named in contemporary literature "*existential import*". According to Buridan, the conversion by contraposition is not formal, since the true value is not preserved during the process of conversion when terms stand for nothing[291].

The last two paragraphs of the first tract of *Tractatus*, namely 24 and 25, are dedicated to the topic of equipollence and opposition of modal propositions. On the basis that there are four

[288] CNP., p. 115; *SL*., I.15, p. 8, l. 16-18: "Conversio per contrapositionem est facere de subiecto predicatum et de predicato subiectum, manente eadem qualitate et quantitate, sed terminis finitis mutatis in terminos infinitos"
[289] SHERWOOD., *Introductiones*, ed. Lohr, 3.0.3, p. 241-242.
[290] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, p. 20-26. The text offers an interesting discussion of the status of conversion and questions the conversion of propositions that do not have the canonical form of standard categorical ones.
[291] See BURIDAN, *Summulae de dialectica*, transl. Klima, 1.6.4. p. 55; Buridan's examples for non-valid conversion by contraposition are: 'Some chimera is not a man' - 'some non-man is not a non-chimera' and 'Every man is a being'- 'every non-being is a non-man'.

propositions according to the four modes established in the paragraphs 21-22, Peter considers that there are sixteen modal propositions that must be taken into account[292]. Those propositions are established according to the place of the negation in relation to the verb and the mode of the proposition: without negation, with a negation in front of the verb, with a negation in front of the mode and with two negations, one for the verb and one for the mode. Four rules for the equivalence of modal proposition are given according to the place of negation forming four clusters of four equivalent modal propositions:

I *possibile est esse* eq. *contingens est esse* eq. *non impossibile est esse* eq. *non necesse est non esse*

II *possibile est non esse* eq. *contingens est non esse* eq. *non impossibile est non esse* eq. *non necesse est esse*

III *non possibile est esse* eq. *non contingens est esse eq. impossibile est esse* eq. *necesse est non esse*

IV *non possibile est non esse* eq. *non contingens est non esse* eq. *impossibile est non esse* eq. *necesse est esse*[293]

The four rules are partially unified into a single one:

> *"*omnes propositiones de possibili et de impossibili equipollent verbo similiter se habente et modo dissimiliter. Et omnes de possibili et necesse equipollent verbo et modo dissimiliter se habentibus. Et omnes de impossibili et necesse equipollent verbo dissimiliter se habente et modo similiter se habentes*"*[294]

According to Peter's own mnemonic lyrics, each group of equipollent propositions will occupy a specific place in the square of oppositions: IV-universal affirmative, III-universal negative, I particular affirmative, II particular negative[295]. Although Peter offers equipollence rules and a square of opposition for modal propositions, he will not use them further in any other parts of his *Tractatus*.

[292] See *SL*., I.23, p. 13.
[293] See *SL*., I.24, p. 14, l. 11-22.
[294] *SL*., I.24, p. 15, l. 3-10; *CNP*., 127: "all propositions about the possible and impossible are equipollent when the verb is in the same state and the mode is not; and all propositions about the possible and necessary are equipollent when both the verb and the mode are not in the same state; and all propositions about the impossible and necessary are equipollent when the verb is not in the same state and the mode's state is the same"
[295] See SL., I.24, p. 15-16; CNP., p. 125, note 27.

1.2.2. Tractatus 2 *De predicabilibus*

The second tract of *Summulae logicales* or *Tractatus* is dedicated to the purpose of summarizing the doctrine of predicables. This section has as its main and remote sources Boethius' Latin translation and commentaries of Porphyry's *Introduction*, along with the former's work *De divisione* and Aristotle's *Topics*. Following Porphyry, Peter's treatment includes an analysis on the notion of predicable, a discussion of each of the five predicables, a section dedicated to the different and common features that predicables have between themselves and a theory of predication originated in Aristotle's first paragraph from *Categories*. In what follows we will explore each of the aforementioned topic in order to clarify Peter of Spain's account on predicables.

1.2.2.1 The notion of praedicabile

The doctrines of the five predicables (genus, species, difference, proprium and accident) is a product of the consecutive mutations of Aristotle's theory of predication and Porphyry's account of it from his *Introduction*, a work written as a propaedeutic to logic. The distinction between *praedicabile* and *praedicamentum* is a medieval theoretical construct that originates in Aristotle's use of notions derived from the semantical field of the verb κᾰτηγορέω, κατηγορείν which means basically 'to predicate'[296]. Thus, the exegesis distinguished between κατηγορούμενον, *praedicabile* or predicable and κατηγορία, *praedicamentum/categoria* or predicate, although according to some scholars, this distinction can be considered an artificial construct imposed by force on Aristotle's text[297]. In fact, Aristotle does not use κατηγορούμενον as a technical term with the same semantical value that the term *praedicable* has in medieval logic, that is, to denote the five realities established by Porphyry's *Introduction*. Hermannus Bonitz, in his *Index Aristotelicus*, does not include the word κατηγορούμενον under a separate entry like κατηγορία and κατηγόρημα and does not establish a special use outside the one suggested by the verb κατηγορείν, which is 'predicate', 'to be predicated'[298]. What Aristotle does in his *Topics* with the purpose of identifying the elements from which the dialectical premises are constructed, is to differentiate between genus, proprium, and accident linking the difference with the genus[299]. Afterwards, he establishes a

[296] For the original juridical sense of the verb see HAMLYN, "Aristotle on Predication" in *Phronesis*, Volume 6: Issue 1-2 (1961), p. 110.
[297] See DE LIBERA (2014), p. 833.
[298] See BONITZ, *Index Aristotelicus* (1870), p. 377.
[299] See ARIST., *Top.*, 101b 11-29.

proprium which is called 'definition' that is capable of expressing the essence of a thing, and a proprium ascribed to a thing without describing its essence, thus without being its definition. Accordingly, Aristotle arrives of a list of four elements: the definition, the proprium, the genus and the accident. Then, in chapter 9, he makes a distinction between those four elements and the ten categories, stating that each element must be ascribed to a specific category[300].

Indeed, it is very important to clarify under what circumstances the Latin word *praedicabile* started to denote the genus, species, difference, proprium and accident and not simply something that ca be predicated, a *praedicatum*. Regarding this problem, Alain de Libera writes in the *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, the English version of the work *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles* edited by Barbara Cassin, that "the term *praedicabile* was introduced by Boethius in his translation of Porphyry's Isagoge to render katêgoroumenon"[301]. One can try in vain to track down where exactly does Boethius do this particular rendering. No '*praedicabile*' can be found neither in his translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* nor in his commentaries. Thus, we are inclined to consider De Libera's affirmation problematic. It can be said that Boethius translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* has played a major role in the shift of the signification of *praedicabile*, but the term was not introduced by him. As De Rijk points out "neither Aristotle nor his Greek commentators used a technical term to indicate the notion covering what from the Scholastic thinkers onwards is called 'praedicabile'."[302] In fact, the same author considers that the term '*praedicabile*' as a substantivated noun having the meaning of the five entities considered by Porphyry, appeared at the end of 12th century in the Parisian schools.[303] De Rijk identifies in Abelard an equivalence between '*quod praedicatur*' and '*praedicabile*', both referring to a potential predication and a use of '*preadicabilis*' with the same sense in William of

[300] See ARIST., *Top.*, 103b. For a comparative study between Aristotle's and Porphyry's account on the so (anachronical) called 'predicables' see EVANGELIOU, "Aristotle's Doctrine Of Predicables And Porphyry's Isagoge" in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 23, Number 1 (1985), pp. 15-34.
[301] DE LIBERA (2014), p. 833.
[302] DE RIJK, *Aristotle: semantics and ontology* (2002), vol. 1 (General Introduction. The Works on Logic) and vol. 2 (The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aritstotle's Strategy of Argument), p. 492 and notes 48, 49. De Rijk rightly shows that κατηγορούμενον is usually rendered by Boethius with 'praedicatum' or 'quod praedicatur' but never with *praedicabile*.
[303] Cf. DE RIJK (2002), p. 492.

Lucca[304]. In the 12th century a syntactical use of the term *praedicabilis* is observed in contrast to *subicibilis* (to stand as subject)[305].

Regarding the same problem of the *praedicabile*, an intermediary step of identifying the series of five entities discussed by Porphyry with the predicables was the presupposed naming of them by Porphyry with the expression *Πέντε φωναί/Quinque voces*, in the title and subtitle of the sixth chapter *Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν πέντε φωνῶν* of Porphyry's work. Again, this is not the case. Regarding the alternative title, it seems to be found only 200 years later, around 500, in the work of Ammonius[306]. Regarding the subtitle of the sixth chapter, it is considered to be unauthentic[307].

Although Porphyry does not establish the doctrine of the five entities as the doctrine of predicables, he does indeed establish the premises of a discussion regarding the ontological status of genus, species, difference, proprium and accident known today as the problem or quarrel of universals[308]. In the first passages of his *Isagoge* Porphyry states that he will make an exposition on the genus, the difference, the species, the property (or proprium) and the accident as an introduction to Aristotle's categories in order to better understand definitions, divisions and demonstrations[309]. But in doing so, Porphyry explicitly states that he will refrain himself from deeper inquiries regarding genera and species as their subsistence, dependence upon thought and the modes in which they exist.[310] It is especially those topics avoided by Porphyry that represent the starting point of the medieval debate on universals.

Peter of Spain begins his exposition with a distinction between a proper and a general sense in which '*predicable*' can be taken. In the proper sense, a predicable is "*what is predicable of many*"; in the general sense a predicable is "*what is predicated of many or of one*."[311] Obviously, Peter will choose the first sense of 'predicable', the proper one. Taken in this specific sense, the predicable is said to be the same thing as a universal, the only difference being that these two entities pertain to different ontological registers, since the first is define *per dici* and the latter *per esse*. Accordingly, on the one hand, the predicable is defined according to its capacity to be said

[304] Cf. DE RIJK (2002), p. 493-494.
[305] Cf. DE RIJK (2002), p. 494: The Parisian work *Ars Meliduna* and the logical *Summa* written by Nicholas of Paris are taken as examples.
[306] DE RIJK (2002), p. 496.
[307] PORPHYRY, *Introduction* (transl. Barnes, 2003), p. XII
[308] For a monography of this specific debate see DE LIBERA, *La querelle des universaux: de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (1996).
[309] PORPHYRY *Introduction* (transl. Barnes, 2003), p. 3, l. 3-7.
[310] PORPHYRY *Introduction* (transl. Barnes, 2003), p. 3, l. 9-15.
[311] *SL*, II.1, p. 17, l. 4-7.

of many (*dici de pluribus*), thus pertains to language. On the other, the universal is defined according to its capacity of being in many (*esse in pluribus*), thus pertaining to extra-linguistic reality[312]. By understanding Peter's consideration in this way, it is possible to distort his sketch of a theory of universals, because the predicable and the universal are not considered merely as linguistic or extra-linguistic entities, as we tend to simplify them, but onto-logical entities, that is logical entities that manifest themselves ontologically by implying relations between concepts, words and real objects. This fact can be seen in the following problem signaled by Alain de Libera in his entry of *The Dictionary of Untranslatable*:

> "The pair *dici* versus *esse in* is not congruent with the two relations used in the *Categories* to produce the four classes of things: primary and secondary substances, particular and universal accidents. In the *Categories*, the relation *kath' hupokeimenou legesthai [καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι]* (to be said of a subject) is the mark of universality, whereas *en hupokeimenôi einai* [ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι] (to be in a subject) is that of accidentality."[313]

What Alain de Libera is basically pointing out is that Peter's definition of the universal as an entity that *is in many* enters in conflict with Peter's analysis from tract III.3, where he states that "of those things that are, some are said of a subject but are in no subject [(in subiecto vero nullo sunt)], like genera and species of substance and differences of substance, which are all said to be universal substances."[314] The fact is that there is not conflict, since the expression '*to be in'* is said in the two places in different ways. In the following passages of III.3, Peter explicitly states that *to be in*, is taken here "*in the way that an accident is in a subject*"[315]. Obviously enough, the universals that are not universal accidents, that is, genus, species, proprium and differences, those that pertain to the category of substance, are not in something like an accident. Their different modes of *being in* are described in *SL.*III.3.[316] as onto-logical relations; for example, the relation between an inferior and its superior, will manifest: conceptually, in a hierarchical structure known as the Porphyry's Tree, where, a single genus, for example, *animal*, will *be in* the species *homo* and in every

[312] See *SL*, II.1, p. 17, l. 4-11: "*'Predicabile'* quandoque sumitur proprie; et sic solum dicitur *'predicabile'* quod de pluribus predicatur. Quandoque sumitur communiter; et sic dicitur *'predicabile'* quod de uno sive de pluribus predicatur. Unde *'predicabile'* proprie sumptum et *'universale'* idem sunt, sed differunt in hic quod predicabile diffinitur per *dici*, universale autem per *esse*. Est enim predicabile quod aptum natum est dici de pluribus. Universale autem est quod aptum natum est esse in pluribus."
[313] DE LIBERA (2014), p. 835.
[314] CNP, III.3, p. 151; *SL*, III.3, p. 28, l. 14-16: "Eorum que sunt alia dicuntur de subiecto, in subiecto vero nullo sunt, ut genera et species substantie et differentie substantie, que omnia dicuntur substantie universales"
[315] CNP, III.3, p. 151; *SL*, III.3, p. 28, l. 19-20: "sed *'esse in subiecto'* sumitur secundum quod accidens est in subiecto"
[316] See SL., III.2, p. 27, l. 17 -28, l. 4, the third, fourth and fifth mode of *esse in*.

individual under it; linguistically, as a predication, for example, '*homo est animal*' where a single predicable is said of a subject which can signify many objects; and ontologically, where every *homo* will have its own *animalitas* and thus, according to nature, the universal will be multiplied in particular instances[317]. But these aspects will be clarified in the further sections of the current analysis.

After giving the definition of the predicable and putting it in parallel with that of the universal, Peter discusses each of the five predicables.

1.2.2.2 Genus

In the second paragraph of the second tract, Peter discusses the genus. Following Porphyry's *Isagoge*, as usual for this tract, he identifies three senses of this concept. In the first sense genus is considered as a collection of things that has a common origin. In the second sense, genus is the beginning of every generation or descent. The third, and the accepted definition of 'genus' for Peter's purpose, is *"*genus cui supponitur species*"*, that is, the genus under which a species is put.[318] Attention must be paid concerning the terminology in use. As it will be seen, the verb '*suppono, supponere*' refers to the dispositions of genus and species, meaning, the subordination of the species under the genus as is presented in the so called 'Porphyrian Tree'. The same verb will be use in *logica modernorum*, in Peter's sixth part of *Tractatus* dedicated to the theory of supposition. Although the meaning of the verb and its corresponding substantival and participial forms are suffering a requalification of the sense, as it will be seen, even in the conceptual apparatus of supposition the sense of *supponere* as an act of subordinating something under something else will be preserved. Returning to the problem of genus, the final definition established by Peter is: "a genus is what is predicated of many that differ by species as to what [in eo quod quid], as animal is predicated of the horse, man, and lion that differ by species."[319] As usual, Peter takes every member of the definition and clarifies it; after showing in the following

[317] Although we have exposed here briefly the relation between the different entities implicated in the process of predication and Peter's realist position regarding the universal, those point will be explicitly argued in the following parts of our work. For Peter's solutions regarding the status of the universal according to natural philosophy and logic, see *SL*, VI.12, p. 86-87.

[318] *CNP*., p. 131: "that is called 'genus' under which one puts a species"; DINNEEN (1990), p. 17: "that is called a genus to which a species is subordinated". The same definition is offered again in paragraph 6 of the same treatise but this time using the plural form of the verb.

[319] *CNP*., p. 131; see *SL*., II.2, p. 17, l. 22-24: "genus est quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie *in eo quod quid*; ut animal predicatur de equo, homine et leone, que differunt specie."

paragraphs[320] in which way something can be said to be the same or different in species, genus and number, he lets us understand what he meant by the expression '*predicare in eo quod quid*' or '*in quid*.'[321] The fact that genus is predicated *in eo quod quid* or *in quid* means that it is predicated essentially, indicating what a thing is, namely, by responding to the question "what is?" addressed regarding the species.[322] The predication *in quid* or "as to what" is an intra-categorial predication that differentiate itself from the predication in which the members of the other nine categories or predicaments are predicated about a member from the category of substance. But what are these predicaments in relation with the genus? Following again Porphyry, Peter responds to this question by distinguishing between the most general genus (*genus generalissimum*) and subordinated genus (*genus subalternum*). Accordingly, the most general genera are the ten categories or predicaments, since no other genus can be found for them. Thus, the ten predicaments are in fact predicables, the most general ones. The other kind of genera, the subordinated ones, are in fact genera only in relation to the species that are subordinated under them; in relation with another genus superior to them, they are species. Thus, it can be said that they are genus only relatively to other predicables and their position in the Porphyrian tree; for example, as Peter states, *animal* is a genus in relation to its inferior, *homo*, and is a species in relation to its superior *corpus animatus*.[323]

1.2.2.3 Species

Peter continues in the paragraph 8 to discuss the species. He defines it as that which is able to be predicated of many that are different in number, within a predication made in the category of substance. Thus, when the species is predicated about an individual, the predication is pointing out what that individual is (*quid sit*). For example, '*homo*' is predicated about the individual 'Socrates', and thus by stating '*Socrates est homo*' an answer is given concerning the substance of the individual. The other two definitions of species are given in relation to genus. The species is that

[320] See *SL*., II.3,4, p.17-18.
[321] For the origin and history of this expression see DE LIBERA (2014), pp. 838-839.
[322] See *SL*., II.5, p. 18, l. 18-21: "Illud autem dicitur predicari *in quid* quod convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem factam per *'quid?'*. Ut cum queritur *'quid est homo?'*, convenienter respondetur: *'animal'*. Et ideo *animal* predicatur in quid de *homine*"
[323] See *SL*., II.7, p. 18, l. 24-p. 19, l. 6: "Genus dividitur in genus generalissimum et genus subalternum. Genus generalissimum est supra quod non est aliud superveniens genus, ut substantia. Vel sic: genus generalissimum est quod, cum sit genus, non potest esse species. Et dividitur in decem. Que sunt: substantia, quantitas, relatio, qualitas, actio, passio, situs, quando, ubi, habitus. Hec autem decem dicuntur generalissima, quia nullum genus habent supra se"

which is put under the genus and that about which the genus is predicated *in quid*.[324]. Like in the case of the genus, the species too can be divided in two. There are the most specific species and the subordinated species. The first are the ones which do not have other species under them, but only individuals, so that they cannot become genera in relation to its inferiors. The latter are the species situated between the most general genus and the most specific species and can become genera in in respect to their inferiors.[325]

1.2.2.4 Differentia

The treatment of *differentia* begins with the distinction between a difference that is said in a common, proper and more proper way. The first is the difference that takes place between a separable accident from its substrate, as the fact of being seated and not being seated. The second, that between inseparable accidents from substrate, like the fact of being of a snub-nose or aquiline-nose[326]. The third, the one officially accepted, is the difference which differs through a specific difference, as the species *homo* differs from the species *equo* through its difference *rationale*.[327] Thus, the difference will be defined as "what is predicated of many things differing by species with regard to what-kind"[328] Accordingly, any difference will be predicated by responding to the question '*of what kind is?*' (*quale sit?*) addressed to a species. By relating the differences to its species, for example *rationale* and *irrationale* to *animal*, new species are created, that is, *animal rationale* and *animal irrationale*, and the original species becomes their genus. If a further difference of the species *animal rationale* is added, namely, *mortale* it will constitute the most specific species, *homo*. The utility of such a division is given by the fact that, arriving at species

[324] See *SL*., II.8, p. 19, l. 8-16: "Species est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero *in eo quod quid est*. In hac autem diffinitione hoc verbum *'predicatur'* dicit aptitudinem et non actum – similiter et in aliis, ut *'homo'* predicatur de Sorte et de Platone et de aliis particularibus hominibus, qui sunt plura et etiam sunt differentia numero, ut prius patuit. Et predicatur de hiis *in quid*. Ut cum queritur: *'quid est Sortes?* vel *Plato?'*, convenienter respondetur: *'homo'*. Diffinitur etiam sic: species est que ponitur sub genere. Vel sic: species est de qua genus *in eo quod quid sit* predicatur"
[325] See *SL*., II.9 p. 19, l. 17-25: "Et dividitur per speciem specialissimam et speciem subalternam. Species specialissima est que cum sit species, non potest esse genus, ut *homo* et *equus* et consimilis. Vel: species specialissima est sub qua non est alia inferior species. Species subalterna est que cum sit species, potest esse genus. Unde quecumque sunt inter genus generalissimum et speciem specialissimam sunt genera et species, ad aliud et aliud sumpta. Sunt enim genera respectu inferiorum et sunt species respectu superiorum"
[326] *Simitas* is a property that signifies the fact of having a snub-nose, thus a property that cannot be separated from its substrate like *concavitas*. According to Aristotle to say in a proposition that 'a nose is snub' means to say 'a nose is a snub-nose', that is to repeat the same thing. For a short discussion on *simitas*, see *CNP*., p. 137, note 9; see also, for example, ARIST. *Metaph*., 1025b-1026a.
[327] See *SL*., II.12, p. 20-21.
[328] *CNP*., p. 137; *SL*., II.12, p. 21, l. 4-5: "differentia est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie *in eo quod quale.*"

we can construct definitions by taking the species as *diffinitum* and the genus and the specific differences as *diffiniens*. Accordingly, *'homo est animal rationale, mortale'* will form a definition of the most specific species *'homo'* by predicating its genus '*animal*' and its specific differences *'rationale, mortale'*[329].

1.2.2.5 Proprium

Since the predicable called '*proprium'* is rendered in the English translations as 'property', in the *CNP* version, and 'peculiarity', in Dinneen's translation, those two unsatisfactory options will be put aside in the favor of the English word 'proprium' borrowed from Latin. Regarding its treatment, Peter repeats the four division from Porphyry. According to it, proprium is that which belongs to[330]: some of the members of a species, all the members of a species but not to only one species, all the members of a species and to only one species but not always, and, finally, all the members of a species and to only one species and always. Only the latter one will be the proprium which is properly considered to be a predicable; the proprium for the species of *man* will be the capability to laugh (*risibile*), that is, a capacity that does not disappear and that is found in every man and only in the species of man and not in other.[331]

Peter is quoting Aristotle's *Topics*, 102a 18-22, to state that although the proprium is convertible to its object - meaning that as long as the man exists the capacity to laugh exists also, and, as long as the capacity to laugh exists, the man exists also - its predication does not indicate the substance or essence of the subject like in the case of genus combined with differences, thus,

[329] See *SL*., II.13, p. 21, l. 15-25: "Et est sciendum quod eadem differentia est divisiva et constitutiva, sed divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei, ut *rationale* dividit *animal* cum differentia sibi opposita. Dicimus enim: *animalis aliud rationale, aliud irrationale;* et iste due differentie constituunt diversas species sub *animali*. Omni enim differentia adveniens generi constituit speciem, et ideo constitutiva sive specifica nominatur. *'Mortale'* enim additum supra hoc genus quod est *animal rationale* constituit *hominem*. Et ob hic dicit Boethius quod sola species diffinitur. Diffinitio enim debet esse ex genere et differentiis; sola autem species habet genus et differentias; ergo sola species diffinitur."
[330] Peter uses the term '*inest'* while Boethius' translation of *Isagoge* is using '*accidit'*. Both terms translate the original Greek term 'συμβέβηκεν' which in this particular context means 'to belong'. Both *CNP* and Dinneen translations prefer to render '*inest'* with '*is in'*.
[331] See *SL*., II.14, p. 22, l. 2-12: "'*Proprium'* quadrupliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur *'proprium'* quod inest alicui speciei et non omni, ut esse medicum inest homini sed non omni, vel esse geometrem. Secundo modo dicitur *'proprium'* quod inest omni sed non soli, ut esse bipedem inest homini sed non soli. Tertio modo dicitur *'proprium'* quod inest omni et soli sed non semper, ut canescere inest omni homini et soli sed non semper, quia nonnisi in senectute. Quarto modo dicitur *'proprium'* quod appellatur proprie *'proprium'*, et diffinitur sic: proprium est quod inest omni et soli et semper; ut risibile inest omni homini et soli et semper; non enim dicitur homo risibile quod actu semper rideat, sed quia aptus natus est ad ridendum."

does not indicate its *quid est*. Accordingly, the proprium will not enter in the definition of a thing, although both the definition and the proprium are convertible with their object.[332]

1.2.2.6 Accidens

If the proprium was considered convertible to and as belonging always to its object, in the case of the accident we have the opposed situation. The accident is defined as what is being absent or present without the corruption of the subject to which the accident belongs. It cannot be equated with the other four predicables and cannot be predicated substantially or essentially about something; thus, cannot be predicated in the category of substance but only in one of the other nine categories and primary about an individual. Without violating the aforementioned definitions, Peter repeats Porphyry's distinction of accidents between separable and inseparable and adds the common - proper distinction.[333] Moreover, an accident can be of different intensity, that is, it receives variation in quantity, but the proprium does not; for example, a color can be less or more intense but the capacity to laugh cannot have this variation.

1.2.2.7 The Porphyrian tree and the theory of predication

At the end of the tract dedicated to predicables Peter of Spain offers, mainly on the basis of the same authorities, a theory of predication, that is, a classification of the different ways in which the predication can take place depending on the predicables. Surely enough, this theory will be clarified in Peter's chapter dedicated to predicaments.

[332] See *SL*., II.14, p. 22, l. 13-23: "Et hoc quarto modo dicitur *'proprium'* unum de quinque predicabilibus. Diffinitur etiam sic ab Aristotele: „proprium est quod soli speciei inest et conversim predicatur de re, et non indicat quid est esse", ut risibile inest homini. *'Non indicare quid est esse'* ponitur in descriptione proprii ad differentiam diffinitionis. Diffinitio enim conversim predicatur de re et indicat quid est esse, ut *'substantia animata sensibilis'* convertitur cum *'animali'* et indicat esse eius, quia omnis diffinitio fit per substantialia; omne enim superius est de essentia sui inferioris. – Diffinitio sic diffinitur ab Aristotele: „diffinitio est oratio quid est esse significans". – Proprium autem non significat quid est esse"

[333] Cf. *SL*., II.14-16, p. 23. Reading the first division of accidents, Peters examples, partially inspired from Porphyry, are the *white* and the *fact of sitting* for *man* (separable accidents), the black for a crow or for an Ethiopian, the white for a swan (inseparable accidents); the snub (*simum*) and white (common accidents), snubness and whiteness for Socrates (proper accidents). As the definition of accident states, all accidents are separable from their subject. Probably the inseparability signifies that usually the exemplified subjects come with those accidents, especially since the common believes in Peter's times were that all crows and Ethiopians are black and all swans white, although they could be imagined otherwise. The proper-common distinction of accidents reflects the distinction between general accidents and accidents that are proper to a particular individual. For an explanation of this distinction see *CNP*., p. 141, note 13.

At the beginning of Aristotle's *Categories*[334] we can find the distinction between 'ὁμώνυμα', 'συνώνυμα', 'παρώνυμα', which usually are translated as 'homonyms', 'synonyms', and 'paronyms'. Although these notions have some similar features with the grammatical homonymity, synonymity and paronymity, they must not be confused with them. Boethius' Latin translation renders them with '*aequivoca'*, '*univoca'* and '*denominativa'*[335]. This distinction differentiates between objects according to their name and their λόγος or *ratio*. The *logos* or *ratio* refer here to their definition or their appropriate predicables (genus and differences) which can be attributed essentially to them. Thus, Peter will distinguish in the last paragraphs of his tract[336] between a univocal, equivocal and denominative predication. The univocal predication takes places when the items predicated about the subjects have the same name and definition (*ratio*); for example, when we have two propositions like 'Socrates est homo' and 'Plato est homo' the predicates have the same name, and the same definition, since both predicates can be defined according to and interchanged with the same genus and the same specific differences (*animal rationale mortale*).[337] Equivocal predication takes places when the predicate is the same according to its name but differs according to its definition. For example, '*canis'* or 'dog' can be the predicate of a celestial body, a type of fish or man's best friend. In each case, the name will be the same but the definition will vary. A predication takes places in a denominative way when it implies the predication of a name that has its naming from another name and is different from the latter only by the termination. Peter's examples are in general adjectives obtained from substantives, as '*grammaticus'* from '*grammatica*'.

According to Peter, all predicables with the exception of the accident are predicated univocally about their subject. The accident is the only one that is predicated in the denominative way[338]. Peter does not come here with further specifications to show us what exactly this means. A possible meaning could be that genus, species, differences and proprium are all predicated about

[334] ARIST. *Cat*., 1a 1-15.
[335] ARIST. LAT. *Cat*., p. 5, l. 3-21.
[336] See *SL*., II.20-21. p. 25, l. 8-32; III.1, p. 27, l. 4-p. 27, l. 6.
[337] Although in this particular instance Peter, according to its sources, defines the univocal predication as an identity in name and *ratio* exemplified as *definition*, at the beginning of the third treatise (see *SL*, III.1, p. 26, l. 12-15), when discussing univocals, he will render Aristotle's examples. There the identity in *ratio* is established only at the level of genus and not at the level of genus and specific differences, inasmuch as the example is 'Bos est animal*'* and 'Homo est animal'. As it is evident, 'animal' is said about the ox and man in different ways, inasmuch as they have different specific differences. For the specific sense of *ratio* in the definition of univocals see *SL*., V.1, p. 55, l. 4-6.
[338] *SL*., II.19, p. 25, l. 4-6.

the same inferiors of substance[339]. This would be the explanation for the fact that only the accident cannot be predicated univocally about the individuals but in a denominative way, since the accident as predicate pertains to different sets of superiors than its subject.

But how exactly is the univocal predication exemplified? On the basis of Porphyry description from *Isagoge*, Peter gives one instance of univocal predication through a schematic representation known as 'the Porphyrian tree'. Although the manuscript tradition offers different representations[340] of it, De Rijk edition uses the following schema[341]:



1. The Porphyrian Tree

[339] Differences and proprium should then also be predicated in the category of substance but Peter seems to reject that.
[340] Annemieke R. Verboon consulted 70 manuscripts and states that at least 40% of the total number contain a graphical description of the Porphyrian Tree; see VERBOON, "The Medieval Tree of Porphyry: An organic structure of logic" in SALONIUS, WORM (eds.), *The Tree: Symbol, Allegory and Mnemonic Devices in Medieval Art and Thought* (2014), p. 97.
[341] The Porphyrian Tree can be found in *SL.,* II.11, p. 20, l. 5-30.

The entire explanation for this schema can be found in Peter's discussion on species.[342] The first line is occupied by the most general genus, the substance. Regarding this particular fact, it is important to note here that, this schematic representation is offered as an example - Peter is using the word 'exemplum' - only for the category or the predicate of substance. Theoretically, each of the remaining nine categories could be represented in the same way and thus enabling us to speak about ten Porphyrian trees.[343] The choosing of substance as an example is easily understandable, since all the predicables from the other nine categories are predicated non-univocally about the inferiors contained under substance, and especially about individuals. Starting with the most general genus, a division is made between two differences having a contradictory relation between them. In Peter's representation, only the affirmative difference will become a species for its genus and will be further analyzed, although the negative difference could also be expanded. Thus, substance can be corporeal and incorporeal, the corporal substance is a body which is divided into animated and unanimated. The animated body can be either sensible or insensible. The sensible animated body is called 'animal' which is further divided into rational and irrational. The rational animal can be mortal or immortal. The mortal rational animal is called 'man'. Man is the most specific species which cannot become a genus by dividing it in further species, since its inferior are all individuals. Thus, in this schema we can observe that the level of generality decreases from up to down while the number of entities increases in the same direction. At the first level, we have the most general genus, one in number, the substance. At the bottom we have an infinity of entities, particular or individual humans exemplified only by two proper names, Socrates and Plato. The univocal predication takes place always from up to bottom by predicating the superiors about each of its inferiors, following the Aristotelian principle that states that when something is predicated about the subject, whatever is predicated about that predicate is also predicated about the subject.[344] This means, for example, that whatever is predicated about the most specific species *homo* is also predicated about each inferior under the specie *homo*.

[342] See *SL.*, II.9-10, p. 19.
[343] The same observation is made by VERBOON (2014), p. 100.
[344] ARIST. LAT., *Cat.*, p. 6, l. 14-18: "Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur, ut homo de quodam homine praedicatur, animal vero de homine, ergo et de quodam homine animal praedicabitur."

Surely enough, this schematic representation has appeared in different forms throughout the manuscript traditions with different degrees of details and pictographic content.[345] Although the schematic representation originates before the 13th century, Peter is credited to be one of the first authors who calls this representation 'arbor Porphirii', tradition which, according to Annemieke Rosalinde Verboon could inspired the depiction of the diagram as a tree[346].

A last question that we want to address here is: what is the use of a theory of predication and of classifying and defining all the possible predicables and predicaments? While an implicit answer will be given in section seven of *SL*, we must anticipate that the wrong use of predicables and predicaments, that is, of unproper predication will lead to fallacious reasoning. One of the clearest examples can be found in the fallacy of equivocation. This fallacy is based on the fact that, in a syllogism, the terms are taken or predicated equivocally, that is, they have the same name but their notion differ. For example: "omnis canis est latrabile, sed quoddam marinum animal est canis; ergo quoddam marinum animal est latrabile"[347]. The problem here is that '*canis*' from the second premise is predicate equivocally about the marine animal in relation to the first premise, having the result the predication of the proprium '*latrabile*' to the wrong subject, the marine animal. Since the entity represented by middle term has in its two occurrences the same name but different notions or definitions, the entire reasoning is fallacious. The detection of such wrong modes of arguing depends directly on knowing how a proper predication should be made.

1.2.3 Tractatus 3 - *De praedicamentis*

The third tract of *Summulae logicales* synthesizes the entire work of Aristotle's *Categories*. The entire doctrine presented in this book can be summaries according to a division that is not used by Peter but which can be found, at least partially, in works like *Summa lamberti*, that between *antepraedicamenta*, *praedicamneta* and *postpraedicamenta*. In *SL*, the *antepraedicamenta* will be covered by the chapters 1-4, and will comprise the distinction between *those that are said about* and *those that are in*; then, the predicaments or categories will be discussed along with

[345] For a monographic study on the Porphyrian Tree see VERBOON, *Lines of thought: diagrammatic representation and the scientific texts of the Arts Faculty, 1200-1500* (2010).
[346] See *SL*., II.11, l. 1; see VERBOON (2014), p. 100. Although Annemieke Rosalinde Verboon tells us that Peter of Spain calls this diagram for the first time 'Porphyrian Tree' we tend to be skeptical about that, since almost the entire *Tractatus* contains already known logical doctrines, and thus represents a synthesis or a common place of an already known logical corpus. Thus, is very possible that this diagram was widely known as 'arbor Porphyry', and even textually mentioned so, before Peter wrote his *Tractatus*.
[347] *SL*. VII.30, p. 100, l. 1-3.

postpraedicamenta, that is, the discussion of opposition, prior, together and movement. In what follows we will give a short account of Peter's treatment of the doctrine from *Categories*.

1.2.3.1 Antepraedicamenta - prerequisites to categories

In the first paragraph of the third treatise Peter repeats the considerations on predication given at the end of the second tract, but this time following more closely the text from *Categories*. The difference between *equivoca*, *univoca* and *denominativa* are now stated explicitly as differences between linguistic entities (*quae dicuntur*, τὰ λεγόμενα), although, in virtue of the Aristotelian parallelism between thought, language and reality they surely imply a distinction between mental contents (concepts) and corresponding signified objects (external entities). We will not insist on them since a description was given in the previous section.

The entities which are said about something can either appear without entering in a composition (*complexio*), as in the case of the ten predicaments, or by entering in a predicative structure, the most basic being that of a proposition formed by a subject and a predicate. The fact of something being or not being predicated of (*dicitur de*) something, along with the eight[348] ways something can be said to be in (*est in*) something, constitutes, replicating Aristotle's *Categories*, the criteria of classifying the different entities that are (*quae sunt*), Aristotle's τὰ ὄντα. Thus, by combining the properties of predictability and inherence we obtain an ontological schema composed of four entities[349]:

Ontological entities	Logical entities	Predictability	Inherence	Examples
Universal substances/secondary substances	genera, species, difference of the category of substance	are said about a subject	are not in a subject [as an accident]	'homo', 'animal', 'rationale'
Individual substances/primary substances	Individuals [of the category of substance]	are not said about a subject	are not in a subject	['iste homo], ['iste equus'],

[348] The eight ways given by Peter can be found in Aristotle's *Physics* 210a15-25 and in Boethius *Commentary on Categories* 172B-C. Peter acknowledges that Boethius identifies in fact nine ways of *being in*. See *SL.*, III.2, p. 27, l. 7-p. 29, l. 13.

[349] See *SL.*, III.3, p. 28, l. 14-p. 29, l. 5: ARIST. LAT., *Cat.*, p. 5, l. 22-p. 6, l. 13. We put in square brackets the content which is explicitly missing from Peter's consideration but which is presupposed by its doctrine.

				[‘Platone’], [‘Brunelus’]
Universal accidents	genera and species of the other nine predicaments	are said about a subject	are in a subject	‘color’, ‘albedine’
Individual accidents	[Individuals of the other nine predicaments]	are not said about a subject	are in a subject	‘haec scientia’, ‘iste color’

2. Table of the ontological classification of entities

In order to better understand Peter’s rendering of Aristotle’s ontological classification exposed in the above table, we must see in the following subsection how each category or predicament contains a series of predicables and individuals and what role they play in the theory of predication.

1.2.3.2 Praedicamenta or categories

As Aristotle himself did, Peter introduces the categories under the classification of entities that are said without any composition or complexion. In Aristotle’s rendering and from a grammatical point of view, the majority of the categories are either interrogative locutions or infinitive verbs. In Latin this fact is in certain cases preserved since the ten categories are: *substantia*, *quantitas*, *qualitas*, *ad aliquid*, *ubi, quando*, *situm esse*, *habere*, *facere,* and *pati*[350]. But what are the ten categories from an ontological perspective, or, in other words, what is the status of their existence? Peter of Spain takes part in a tradition of thinking about categories along with Porphyry, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius and, most importantly, Boethius, where, the categories are not simple words, nor entities signified by words, nor simple thoughts[351]. They are words which signify the ten most general genus of things which describe the conditions of predication. How this thing actually takes places will be shown in the following rows.

We have already seen how the classification of entities contained under the category or predicament of substance, the basis of categorical ontology, is structured with the representation

[350] See *SL*., III.5, p. 29, l. 17-25. The Greek version of the ten categories runs as follows: οὐσία, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, πότε, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν and πάσχειν.
[351] See DE RIJK (2002), p. 358-361.

of the Porphyrian tree from the second tract. What Peter emphasis in the chapter dedicated to predicaments is that each substance, when 'substance' is taken in the most proper sense, signify always a numerical one entity, an individual (*hoc aliquid*). The species and genus of the category of substance are all substances in a secondary sense since they signify something common for the primary substance[352]. Each predication within the categories of substance, that is, of a superior (genus or species) about an inferior (species of individuals) is made by predicating the same name and the same definition, thus univocally. The more something can be called substance the more it is staying under (*substat*) its superiors. Since the substance in the proper sense is the individual, it cannot be in[353] or said about a subject. The reason for that is that the substances, and especially the primary substance, are primary the subjects of every predication (logically and grammatically) and the substrate of every accident (ontologically). Thus, all the entities signified by the 9 categories are ontologically dependent on the category of substance, since for particular accidents or universal accidents to exists there needs to be a substratum or subject which can bear them[354]. In this sense, a substance can receive accidents from every other nine categories but cannot be said to essentially vary according to them. This means that a substance, let's say an individual human, is only accidentally or non-essentially different from another substance of the same kind, another individual human; this difference is said in the sense of quantity, quality, position and so on.

The other nine most general genus or predicaments are further analyzed with various degrees of detail. The genus of quantity or *quantitas* is divided in two species, continuous and discrete, the first being characterized by having a common boundary (*terminus*) and the second by the lack of it. The species of discrete quantity are the number and the phrase. The species of continuous quantity are five: line, surface, body, time and place[355]. The quantities in themselves have nothing contrary to them, they do not admit the more or less but can be called 'equal' or 'unequal'. The genus of relation, relative or *ad aliquid* (literary, *towards something*) is defined as the one that comprises entities that have their being in relation to another or have a certain relation

[352] See *SL.*, III.10, p. 31, l. 17-22: "omnis prima substantia significat *hoc aliquid*, idest individuum et unum numero. Sed secunda substantia videtur significare *hoc aliquid* eo quod est in prima et de essentia eius, non tamen significat *hoc aliquid*, sed potius aliquid commune. Non enim quod significatur per secundam substantiam est unum sicut est unum quod significatur per primam."
[353] Surely, in the case of secondary substances, genus and species from the category of substance, the fact to be in the primary substance is admitted but not in the accidental way. See *SL.*, III.2, p. 27, l. 17-25; III.8, p. 31, l. 9-14.
[354] See *SL.*, III.9, p. 31; III.7, 30
[355] See *SL.*, III.14-15, p. 32-33.

(*se habere*) to another[356]. Examples are the doublets: double-half, father-child, greater-lesser, similar-similar, master-servant. Their names can either be the same for each item that takes part in a relation or different if the relation is one of subordination. The items in the category of relation are dependent epistemologically and ontologically to each other and thus can be said conversely of another[357]. The next category taken into account is that of quality or *qualitas*. It is that according to which something can be called to be of a certain kind. The category of quality has four species: *habitus* and disposition, the capacity or incapacity to do something or be affected, the affect and the qualities that can produce an affect, and, finally, the form and figure of a body. Attention is given to the notion of *qualia* or qualitatives, predicables predicated within the category of quality such as 'grammarian', 'white' etc. They are said either in a denominative way, that is, by derivation from a name of a quality, or in a non-denominative way, when the quality from which they are derived does not bear a name or the *qualia* has a different name from the quality[358]. Although contrariety and variation to 'more' or 'less' can be ascribed to some particular qualities, the fact that it can be called 'alike' or 'unalike' is their proper.

The next two categories, action (*actio*) and affection (*passio*), signify the action that the subject does and the action by which the subject is affected. Each action entails an affection, process that admits contraries and the more or less[359]. Like Aristotle, Peter is not discussing further the categories *ubi, quando* and *situm esse* which arguably can be included in the previously mentioned categories, but jumps to post-predicaments and in the final part of the treatise to the category of having or *habere*. Instead of a classification according to genus and species, *habere* is considered according to seven different meaning. Although different meanings are ascribed to the fact of having: quality, quantity, a member, a content or something contained, possession and wife, having is considered a predicament only if "belongs to bodies and those things that go around the body and next to it, like being-armored and being-shod"[360].

Since Peter synthesis of predicaments has been explored, we are left with the task of explaining the relation between predicaments and predication. The predication within the category of substance has been already clarified as being a univocal predication, where each superior is

[356] See *SL*., III.17, p. 34; III.20, p. 35.
[357] See *SL*., III.19, p. 35-36.
[358] See *SL*., III.26, p. 37.
[359] See *SL*.III.27-28, p. 38-39.
[360] See *SL*.III.33, p. 41-42: "habitus est corporum et eorum que circa corpus sunt adiacentia, ut armatio et calciatio"; p. *CNP*, p. 169.

predicated about the inferiors according to name and definition, with the ultimate inferiors being individuals or primary substances. Peter does not explicitly tell us what happens in other nine categories with each intra-categorical predication. For example, if the predication of a universal accident upon a particular accident from the same category takes place in the same univocal way. For examples, if the color 'red' (species) or 'color' (genus), both universal accidents, are predicated about a particular accident, that is, a certain color of red indicated by the expression 'this red', in the same category of quality[361]. The schematization offered through the Porphyrian Tree might allow us to form such a model of predication where the most specific species could be defined through proximate genus and specific differences, implying an accidental genus and am accidental species that could be predicated about accidental particulars[362]. But from an ontological view and taking the doctrine of *Categories* as a whole this situation cannot take place since all the nine categories are dependent on the category of substance. The nine categories are engineered to function inter-categorically, that is, by using mainly logical subjects from the category of substance and logical predicates from the category of substance and the other nine categories. In the latter case, each predication will be non-univocal; for example: 'This man is 5ft tall', 'This horse is white', 'Than man is a father', 'Man lives on Earth', 'Brunnelus was yesterday', 'Socrates is sitting down', 'Anna is wearing a scarf', 'Humans construct', 'Rabbits are hated', are all propositions which denote that a member comprised under the category of substance, thus primary or secondary substances, is the subject of the predicate of one of the members from the other nine categories. The predicates are accidents in relation to each particular substance and are predicated non-univocal, that is with a difference of name and definition, since each predicate would be defined within its proper category.

[361] Difficulties arise in establishing a Porphyrian tree in other categories. For example, should there be established most specific species of each individual color: redness, greenness, yellowness and so on, with the particulars corresponding variations in each individual color 'this red', 'that red'…'that green', 'this green'… and so on; or the most specific species should be that of 'color' with each individual color as particulars. The examples offered in the category of substance do not offer us much help.

[362] Obviously then, the property of being accidental will be consider only in the relation to the category of substance and not in the relation to each intra-categorical predication.

1.2.3.3 Postpraedicamenta

The so called 'post-predicaments' can be found in Aristotle's *Categories*, chapter 10-15, and can usually be considered relations[363] than can be established between entities which pertain to different categories[364]. Usually, there are considered to be five post-predicaments: priority, opposition, simultaneity, movement and possession. Opposition can be relative, privative, contrary or contradictory. The relation of relative opposition can take place between entities that classified under the category of *ad aliquid* (for example, pater-filius). Privative opposition, under entities classified by quality, like a certain habitus or disposition and the lack of it. Contrary opposition can take place in the category of quality, for example, white-black, and, generally, between each pair of species that are subordinated under a genus. The example for contradictory opposition is the state of affairs signified by two propositions, one that affirms something and the other that negates the same thing[365].

Regarding the *prior* or the notion of anteriority[366], Peter renders the four ways in which something can be said to be prior to something else: time, non-convertibility according to the existence of consequence[367], order and dignity or importance. To these four, following Aristotle, one additional is added, the priority or anteriority according to nature. The example here implies a realistic ontology model of thinking based on a theory of truth: the fact that *a man runs* is converted with the proposition 'a man runs' if the fact and the proposition is true. But the one that makes the proposition true, or in a contemporary language its truth maker, is the fact represented by that proposition. Thus, "a fact (res) is the cause of a sentence truly made about it. A true sentence is

[363] See STUDTMANN, "Aristotle's Categories" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/aristotle-categories/>: Emmanuel Kant considers the post-predicaments to be categories that were discovered after Aristotle has established the ten categories; Kant ultimately states this fact with the purpose of pointing out that Aristotle had no guiding principle in discovering them.

[364] Like in other cases, here we do not have an exhaustive exposition of the way in which each category relates to each post-predicament. Peter, according to Aristotle, offers just examples.

[365] See *SL*., III.29. p. 39, l. 8-p. 40, l. 3: "Dicitur autem alterum alteri opponi quadrupliciter. Oppositorum enim alia sunt relative opposita, ut pater et filius, duplum et dimidium, aut dominus et servus. Alia sunt privative opposita ut privatio et habitus, ut visus et cecitas aut auditus et surditas. Alias sunt contraria, ut album et nigrum. Alia sunt contradictorie opposita ut affirmatio et negatio, sicut *'sedet'* et *'non sedet'*. Que autem sunt relative opposita dictum est prius. Contraria sunt que sub eodem genere posita maxime a se invicem distant et mutuo se expellunt et in eodem susceptibili vicissim insunt, nisi alterum insit a natura, ut albedo nivi et caliditas igni. Privative opposita sunt que circa idem habent fieri ordine irregressibili, ut ab habitu est devenire in privationem et non econverso. Impossibile est enim a privatione fieri regressum in habitum, ut cecitas et visus habent fieri circa oculum et a visu contingit fieri motum in cecitatem, et non econverso, per naturam."

[366] See *SL*., III.30, p. 40.

[367] One is prior to two; if two exist there must be one; but if one exists (the consequence) there is no necessity for two to exist.

not a cause that a fact exists. Depending on whether a thing exists or not, a sentence is said to be true or false."[368] Accordingly, things or facts existent in the real world (*res*) are prior or anterior in nature to the propositions that express them.

About simultaneity, two accounts are given, the first, according to time and the second, according to nature. The entities that are generated together or in the same time are considered for the first. For the second, we have two cases, the relatives, in the case of which no corelative in a pair can be consider the cause of the other, and the species that divide a genus or the differences that divide a species. Both of them are considered to be simultaneous in nature[369].

The exposition on post-predicaments closes with paragraph 32, which offers the six species of movement, and paragraph 33, on *habere* or the fact of having, which we have already explored. Movement implies the categories of substance, quality, quantity and place[370]. In the case of substance, generation and corruption are defined as a passing from non-being into being and vice vera. Augmentation and diminution are conceived as changes in the category of quantity. Alteration is a change in the category of quality and is perceived as a change between contradictory qualities with or without mediation. Finally, there is the movement in the category of *ubi*, where the change according to place is considered (*mutatio secundum locum*). Its species are the six directions: up, down, forward, backward, right, and left[371].

1.2.4 Tractatus 4 - *De sillogismis*

The fourth treatise of *Summulae logicales* is dedicated to the study of the categorical syllogism and has at its basis Aristotle's Latin version of *Prior analytics* along with Boethius' commentary and his work *De syllogismo categorico*. In the first part of the treatise Peter is offering the definition of the syllogism and explanations regarding its constituent parts. After that, the first three figure of syllogism are treated, their moods and their corresponding rules. At the end of the treatise, the nineteen syllogistically moods are offered in verses with their Latin names. A method of encoding information for each name of the mood according to their composing letters is offered in a mnemotechnic that has been conserved up to contemporary elementary syllogistic teaching. In what follows we will try to summaries the entire doctrine on syllogisms offered by Peter.

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[368] DINNEEN (1990), p. 35; See *SL*., III.30, p. 40, l. 26-28: "Res enim est causa orationis vere de se facte. Oratio autem vera non est causa quod res sit. Ab eo enim quod res est vel non est, oratio *'vera'* vel *'falsa'* dicitur."
[369] See *SL*., III.31, p. 41, l. 1-12.
[370] See ANON. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 152-153, especially prop. 155.
[371] See *SL*., III.32, p. 41, l. 14-25.

1.2.4.1 The syllogism and its constituent parts

Peter's tract on syllogisms begins with the definition of *propositio,* the Latin equivalent of the Greek term πρότασις[372]. The definition originates in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, 24a 16, and is rendered as an affirmative or negative enunciation (*oratio*) where something is said about something else or something is removed from something else[373]. In Aristotle's work the passage with the definition of proposition is followed by a classification of different types of propositions which has already been covered by Peter in his first tract[374], and thus is skyped by him. Peter's paragraph continues with sequences originated from the same *Analytics* 24b17-25a1: on the one hand, the subject and the predicate are identified as the terms in which a proposition resolves itself; on the other hand, the famous principle *dici de omni et dici de nullo*, which can be found throughout the Middle Ages logic, is offered[375]. This principle was applied as a validation tool for syllogisms in the first figure[376] and refers to the universal categorical proposition, negative or affirmative, by sustaining that nothing must be subsumed under the subject without being that upon which the predicate is being said or removed.

As stated above, Peter does not repeat the classification of categorical propositions from *Analytics* since he has already done that in the first treatise. However, we must point out a difference in how Aristotle constructs its propositions used in *Prior Analytics*, in both Greek and Latin versions, and Peter's construct of propositions. While in Aristotle we have the construction formed of Predicate + *ὑπάρχειν/inesse* + subject, with variation in quantity and quality, meaning that the predicate pertains or belongs to the subject, in Peter's rendering we have the construction Subject + *est* + predicate, with the same variation in quality and quantity. However, Peter's manner of rendering categorical propositions cannot be considered in any way an innovation since Boethius already uses it.

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[372] Sometimes this term has wrongly been understood as premise. On the notion of πρότασις in Aristotle writings see CRIVELLI, CHARLES, "'ΠΡΟΤΑΣΙΣ' in Aristotle's Prior Analytics" in *Phronesis* 56 (2011), pp. 193-203 and HADGOPOULOS, "Protasis and Problema in the "Topics"" in *Phronesis*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1976), pp. 266-276.

[373] See *SL*, IV.1, p. 43, l. 4-5: "Propositio est oratio affirmativa vel negativa alicuius de aliquo vel alicuius ab aliquo"; see CNP, p. 171, note 1.

[374] See *SL*, I.8, p. 4.

[375] See *SL*, IV.1, p. 43, l. 5-12: "Terminus est in quem resolvitur propositio ut subiectum et predicatum. *Dici de omni* est quando nichil est sumere sub subiecto de quo non dicatur predicatus, ut *'omnis homo currit'*; hic cursus dicitur de omni homine et nichil est sumere sub homine de quo non dicitur cursus. *Dici de nullo* est quando nichil est sumere sub subiecto a quo non removeatur predicatus, ut *'nullus homo currit'*; hic cursus removetur a quolibet homine."

[376] This principle has been connected with the process of validation of syllogisms in the first figure see STUMP, *Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic* (1989), pp. 159-160.

1.2.4.2 The figures and moods of syllogism

The synthesis of the categorical syllogism's doctrine continues in the further paragraphs of the second tract. The syllogism is defined as an *oratio*, a complex linguistic entity, in which, since "certain things have been posited, it is necessary for something else to result through the things that have been posited"[377]. The things that are posited are propositions literary sent forward (*praemissae*) and called 'premises' (the first, 'major' and the second, 'minor'), from which a new proposition, that is, the conclusion, results. The syllogism is composed by three types of terms: the middle term - the term repeated in each premise that will not appear in the conclusion; the major term - the term from the first or major premise which will appear in the conclusion; the minor term - the term which appears in the minor or second premise and which will appear in the conclusion[378]. The position of the middle term in each premise relative to the major and minor terms, which are called also 'extremes', generates three syllogistic figures[379]. The variation in quality and quantity within each figure generates syllogistic moods[380]. Peter's exposition of categorical syllogism will further unfold according to each figure and mood. In his treatment, with a partial exception of the valid syllogistic moods whose names are explained in paragraph 13[381], Peter does not use any schematic representations or conceptual notations of terms like Aristotle sometimes does by substituting the three terms of syllogism with letters in specific examples.

In the first figure, the middle term stands as subject in the major premise and as predicate in the minor premise; in the second figure the middle term stands as predicate in both premises; in the third figure the middle term stands as subject in both premises[382]. Before entering in the

[377] See *SL*., IV.2, p. 43, l. 14-15: "Sillogismus est oratio in qua quibusdam positis necesse est aliud accidere per ea que posita sunt"; CNP, p. 172.

[378] See *SL*., IV.2, p. 43, l. 22-44, l. 5: "Omnis autem sillogismus constat ex tribus terminis et duabus propositionibus. Quarum propositionum prima vocatur *'maior propositio'*, secunda *'minor'*. Ex tribus autem terminis non possunt due fieri propositiones nisi alter illorum bis sumatur; et tunc ille terminus aut subicietur in una et predicabitur in altera, aut predicabitur in utraque, aut subicietur in utraque. Horum autem terminorum alter vocatur *'medium'*, alter *'maior extremitas'*, alter *'minor extremitas'*. Medium est terminus bis sumptus ante conclusionem. Maior extremitas est terminus sumptus in maiori propositione cum medio. Minor extremitas est terminus sumptus in minori propositione cum medio."

[379] *SL*., IV.3, p. 44, l. 7-9: "Figura est ordinatio trium terminorum secundum subiectionem et predicationem".

[380] *SL*., IV.3, p. 44, l. 21-22: "Modus est ordinatio duarum propositionum debita in qualitate et quantitate".

[381] See *SL*., IV.13, p. 52-53.

[382] See *SL*., IV.3, p. 44, l. 11-20: "Prima figura est quando illud quod subicitur in prima propositione, predicatur in secunda, ut *'omne animal est substantia, omnis homo est animal'*. Secunda figura est quando idem predicatur in utraque, ut *'omnis homo est animal, nullus lapis est animal'*. Tertia figura est quando idem subicitur in utraque, ut *'omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est risibilis'*. Modus est ordinatio duarum propositionum debita in qualitate et quantitate." The schematic representation, where 'S' represents the subject of the conclusion, 'P' the predicate and 'M' the middle term, will be (in the same order of the above exposition):

discussion of each figure and mood, *SL* offers some universal rules for the construction of a valid syllogisms: a syllogism cannot be made only from particular, indefinite, or singular premises; a syllogism cannot be made only from negative propositions; if one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular too[383]; if one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative too; and finally, the middle term should never be put in the conclusion[384]. Specific rules will also be given for each particular syllogistic figure[385].

Those general rules of syllogistic reasoning being established, we can advance to Peter's considerations of syllogistic figures. For the first figure Peter identifies 9 moods. 4 are concluding directly, that is, the conclusion has as predicate the major extreme which is predicated about the minor extreme. Those are directly discussed by Aristotle in *Prior Analytics*. The other five are indirectly concluding, that is, the conclusion of the syllogism contains as predicate the minor extreme predicated about the major extreme. Those five moods are supplemented by Boethius[386]. If their premises are transposed, that is the major becomes the minor, a process that will not affect their validity, those five moods will form what later will be called 'the fourth figure'[387]. Accordingly, Peter's 9 moods in the first figure are: AAA, EAE, AII, EIO, AAI, EAE, AII, AEO,

M P P M M P
S M S M M S
S P S P S P

[383] This rule is repeated two time on the same page in De Rijk edition, namely: *SL*., IV.4, p. 45, l. 9-11 and l. 16-18.

[384] See *SL*., IV.4, p. 45, l. 1-20: "Unde tales dantur regule universales ad quamlibet figura: ex puris particularibus vel indefinitis vel singularibus non potest fieri sillogismus. Unde oportet alteram premissarum esse universalem. Item: ex puris negativis in nulla figura potest fieri sillogismus. Unde oportet alteram premissarum esse affirmativam. Item: si aliqua premissarum est particularis, conclusio debet esse particularis, et non econverso. Item: si aliqua premissarum est negativa, conclusio est negativa, et econverso. Item: si aliqua premissarum est particularis, et conclusio debet esse particularis, et non econverso. Item: medium numquam debet poni in conclusione"

[385] See *SL*., IV.5, p. 46; IV.7, p. 48; IV.10, p. 49, IV.12, p.51: first figure: nothing follows if the minor premise is negative or the major is particular; second figure: nothing follows if there is a particular major or if the premises are all affirmative; third figure: nothing follows if the minor is negative and all its conclusions are particular.

[386] See CNP, p. 177, n. 8; Boeth. *Syll. cat.*, 821-824. The distinction between those two groups seems to originate in Theophrastus and Eudemus, see HENLE, "On the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism" in *Philosophy of Science*, Volume 16, Number 2, (1949), p. 94.

[387] P M
M S
S P

IEO[388]. The moods for the second figure are: EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO[389]. The third figure contains six moods: AAI, EAO, IAI, AII, OAO, EIO[390].

Although Peter reduces all the syllogistic moods[391] to the first four moods of the first figure, and thus demonstrates[392] their validity, he does not offer any explicit doctrine of the perfectness of those four moods. Aristotle seems to consider the first four moods of the first figure evident by themselves, in no need of further proof[393]. Thus, Aristotle seems to offer them what we can call today an 'axiomatic character'. Peter does not state this but, nevertheless, he uses the four moods as Aristotle did, as axioms to which all the moods of the other figures are reduced. Moreover, he explicitly offers the principle *dici de omni et dici de nullo* as a tool for the evident validity of those four moods[394].

1.2.4.3 Mnemotechnics of moods

In paragraph 13 of the fourth treatise, Peter offers 4 verses in which the 19 names of syllogistic moods are given in the same order they were discussed in the previous section of the tract: "BARBARA CELARENT DARII FERIO BARALIPTON/ CELANTES DABITIS FAPESMO FRISESOMORUM/ CESARE CAMBESTRES FESTINO BAROCHO DARAPTI/ FELAPTO DISAMIS DATISI BOCARDO FERISON". Each of those names encodes information about a valid syllogistic mood according to the following legend offered by Peter:

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[388] Peter offers examples of syllogisms in all those moods and not schematic notations as we did. The fifth mood is proved by the first by the conversion of the conclusion from a universal affirmative to particular affirmative. The sixth, by the simple conversion of the conclusion from the second mood and the seventh from the third. The eight is reduced to the fourth by converting its major premise by accident and it's minor one *simpliciter* and by using transposition, a process that transforms a major into minor or conversely. The nineth is also reduced to the fourth, using simple conversion for both premises and then transposition. See *SL*., IV.6, p. 46-48; IV.13, p. 53, l. 6-7.

[389] See *SL*., IV.7: EAE-2 is reduced to EAE-1 by simple conversion; AEE-2, to EAE-1, converting the minor and conclusion simply and by transposition; EIO-2 to EIO-1, by converting simply the major premise; AOO-2 to AAA-1 through *impossibile*, meaning by obtaining from the contradictory of the conclusion and one of the premises, a conclusion that contradicts the other premise, see *SL*., IV.9, p. 49, l. 12-20.

[390] See *SL*., IV.11, p. 50-51; the reductions to the first figure are: AAI-3 to AII-1 by converting by accident the minor; EAO-3 to EIO-1 by converting the minor by accident: IAI-4 to AII-1 by converting simply the major and conclusion and by transposition; AII-4 to AII-1 through the simple conversion of the minor; OAO-4 to AAA-1 through *impossibile*; EIO-4 to EIO-1 through simple conversion.

[391] For the entire list of syllogistic moods considered by Aristotle with their reference from *Prior Analytics* see PARSONS (2014), p. 16.

[392] For Aristotle's proofs for all the moods, see PARSONS (2014), p. 30-39.

[393] ARIST. LAT. *Anal. Prio.*, p. 6, l. 15-18; 26b 25-26b 35, p. 12, l. 3-10: "Manifestum igitur ex iis quae dicta sunt quoniam, si sit syllogismus in hac figura particularis, necesse est terminos sic se habere ut diximus; aliter enim se habentibus nullo modo fit. Palam autem et quoniam omnes qui in hac sunt syllogismi perfecti sunt (omnes enim perficiuntur per ea quae ex principio sumuntur), et quoniam omnia problemata ostenduntur per hanc figuram; nam et omni et nulli et alicui et non alicui inesse. Voco autem huiusmodi figuram primam."

[394] See also PARSONS (2014), p. 30, note 5.

1. The vowels A, I, E, O signify categorical proposition based on the words *affirmo* and *nego*: A signifies the universal affirmative; I signifies the particular affirmative; E signifies the universal negative; O signifies the particular negative
2. The initial consonants B, C, D, F signify the first four moods of the first figure, namely *B*ARBARA, *C*ELARENT, *D*ARII, *F*ERIO. They mark for the rest of the 15 moods the moods to which they can be reduced
3. The intra-syllabic letters S, P, M, C placed after vowels come from the words: simpliciter, per accidens, transpositio in premissis, and probari per impossibile[395] - they mark the method by which the mood is reduced to one of the first four moods of the first figure and the propositions involved in this process[396]

To exemplify what Peter says we can take the mood FRISESOMORUM. We can mark the significant letters according to the three levels of encoding as follow: *F*rISESOMorum. Thus, the first letter mark that the mood is reduced to the fourth mood of the first figure, that is, EIO-1 or Ferio; the first three vowels marks that it has the categorical form IEO-1[397]; the underlined letter, signify that the reduction to the EIO-1 takes place by converting simply the major and minor premise and by making a transposition in the premises. The rest of letters that we put in small caps have no informational value and it is possible that they are put along the other ones for sonority, versification and ultimately an easier memorization.

In order to see how the aforementioned rules and encoding principle apply we can take an example of an actual syllogism: 'quoddam animal est substantia, nullus lapis est animal; ergo quedam substantia non est lapis'[398]. In this syllogism we can see that the middle term '*animal*' is put as subject in the major premise and as predicate in the minor premise. This will mean that the syllogism pertains to the first figure. Since the minor extreme 'lapis' is present in the conclusion as a predicate, we understand that this is and indirect mood. From the quantity and quality of the premises and conclusion, we can see that the mood is IEO-1. From the mnemotechnics principles we can see that FRISESOMORUM is the name of the indirect mood of the first figure. The 'F' indicates that for this syllogism to be valid it must be reduced to FERIO, that is, EIO-1. The letter

[395] Peter does not always indicate in each of the three series of abbreviation the origin of the notation he established, that is why certain letters stand for certain function that the mood has.
[396] See *SL.*, IV.13, p. 52-53.
[397] The fact that the syllogism pertains to the first figure is given by the place it occupies in the verses offered for memorization.
[398] *SL.*, IV.6, p. 47, l. 30-32.

'S' after 'I' indicates the simple conversion of '*quoddam animal est substantia*' to '*quedam substantia est animal*'; the letter 'S' after 'E' marks the simple conversion of '*nullus lapis est animal*' to '*nullus animal est lapis*'; the letter 'M' after 'O' marks that a transposition must be made, that is, a switching between the major and the minor premise. This will amount to a syllogism of the form '*nullus animal est lapis, quedam substantia est animal, ergo quedam substantia non est lapis*' which is identical to FERIO or EIO-1 which is a valid mode.

1.2.5 Tractatus 5 - *De locis*

The subject matter of *De locis*, places or topics was originally developed in Aristotle's homonymous work which is preoccupied with dialectics, the methods of argumentation or reasoning from acceptable propositions[399]. Although Aristotle does not tell us in his work what *topoi* really are, he conceives them as a way to classify arguments and as an element of an enthymeme[400]. Usually, to compensate Aristotle's lack of specificity, Theophrastus' definition preserved by Alexander is given: "a topic is a principle and element from which we draw propositions that serves as a basis for reasonings on a proposed question"[401]. Aristotle identifies around 300 topics or rules of reasoning and discusses them according to the four so called "predicables"[402]. A conceptual and methodological refinement in the treatment of topics will take place is Boethius work *De differentiis topicis* through the influence of Cicero's *Topics*. It is especially this work written by Boethius that will stand as Peter's remote source for his fifth tract.

Peter defines the place or *locus* as the basis or site of an argument, that which confirms an argument or "that from which we get an argument that fits the question that has been posed"[403]. The sense in which Peter offers those definitions is qualified by the notions of argument, argumentation and question which are considered preliminary requisites for the study of places. In a dialectical disputation, a proposition that affirms or denies something can be subjected to doubt

[399] See ARIST. *Top*., 100a
[400] See. ARIST. *Top.*, transl. Smith, p. XXIV: 1403a17-18; BIRD, "The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham" in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1962), p. 309: ARIST., *Rhe.* 1396b23; *Metaph*., 1014b1.
[401] ALEXANDER, *In top.* 126.14-16, *apud* ARIST. *Top.*, transl. Smith, p. XXV and BIRD (1962), p. 310.
[402] See BIRD (1962), p. 307, 310; CNP, p. 40.
[403] *CNP*., p. 201; see *SL*, V.4., l. p. 58, l. 10-12: "Est enim locus sedes argumenti vel illud unde ad propositam questionem conveniens trahitur argumentum". Regarding the last definition, CNP point out that it reflects the definition given by Boethius. Boethius considered places to be a method of finding arguments and not of confirming them as in Peter's case. Surely enough, at least for Peter, the logical notion of locus is formed in analogy with the physical notion, since, in the Aristotelian sense, the physical *locus* strengthens and conserves the being of its inhabitant in virtue of a con-natural relation between *locus* and *locatum*.

and considered a question posed about a subject-matter, especially if no argument is given in order to produce fate or to confirm (*confirmo*) that proposition as a conclusion. What confirms or produced belief for a conclusion is the argument or *ratio*, notion taken with the sense of 'middle term that infers the conclusion' (*medium inferens conclusionem*)[404]. Thus, the argument is the one that secures the conclusion through its capacity of confirming it (*virtus probandi*) by its middle term. The argumentation is merely an exposition of the argument, the complex utterance that encompasses the premises and the conclusion[405].

While Peter has already exposed in his previous tract the first species of argumentation, that is, the syllogism, he is left to offer a short definition of the other three types. First, induction (*inductio*) is a progression from particulars to a universal, as from '*Socrates runs, Plato runs, Cicero runs*' and so on for each, it is inferred "every man run"[406]. Secondly, the example (*exemplum*) takes place "when one particular is confirmed by another because of something similar found in them"[407]. The famous instance given by Peter is the conflict between the cities León, Astorga and Zamora which exemplifies that the fight between neighbors (*affines*) is bad. Thirdly, the enthymeme is defined as an incomplete syllogism formed by the major premise and the conclusion[408]. Since every enthymeme contains all the terms of a complete syllogism - the two

[404] See *SL*., V.2, p. 55, l. 17-22: "Argumentum est ratio rei dubie faciens fidem, idest medium probans conclusionem que debet confirmari per argumentum. Est enim conclusio argumento vel argumentis approbata propositio. Sed antequam probetur est dubitabilis; et tunc idem est quod questio. Questio enim diffinitur sic: questio est dubitabilis propositio. Medium est quod habet duo extrema"

[405] See *SL*., V.3. p. 55, l. 23-p. 56, l. 8: "Argumentatio est argumenti per orationem explicatio, idest oratio explicans argumentum. Differt autem argumentum a medio et ab argumentatione, quia *'medium'* dicitur eo quod habet duo extrema, argumentum autem addit supra medium virtutem probandi conclusionem (unde ad hoc quod sit argumentum exigitur quod sit medium et quod habeat virtutem probandi conclusionem); *'argumentatio'* autem dicitur totalis oratio composita ex premissis et conclusione; et in illa manifestatur virtus argumenti. Aliqua enim totalis oratio potest inferre universalem affirmativam, aliqua autem nonnisi particularem affirmativam, aliqua nonnisi universalem negativam, et aliqua nonnisi particularem negativam."

[406] See *SL*., V.3, p. 55, l. 12-15: "Inductio est progressus a particularibus ad universale. Ut: *'Sortes currit, Plato currit, Cicero currit*, et sic de singulis *ergo omnis homo currit'*."

[407] *CNP*, p. 201; *SL*., V.3, p. 58, l. 4-8: "Exemplum est quando per unum particulare probatur aliud particulare propter simile repertum in ipsis. Ut: *'Legionenses pugnare contra Astoricenses est malum; Ergo Astoricenses pugnare contra Zamorenses est malum'* utrumque enim est affines contra affines pugnare."

[408] See *SL*., V.3, p. 56, l. 16-p. 58: "Entimema est sillogismus imperfectus, idest oratio in qua non omnibus antea positis propositionibus infertur festinata conclusio. Ut:*'omne animal currit*, *ergo omnis homo currit'*. In hac enim dicta argumentatione subintelligitur hec propositio scilicet *'omnis homo est animal'*, et non apponitur ibi, quia si apponeretur ibi, perfectus esset sillogismus. Sciendum autem quod omne entimema debet reduci ad sillogismum. Ergo in quolibet entimemate sunt tres termini sicut in sillogismo. Quorum terminorum duo ponuntur in conclusione et sunt extremitates, et alius est medium et numquam ponitur in conclusione. Illarum autem extremitatum altera est sumpta bis in entimemate, altera semel. Et ex illa extremitate semel sumpta et medio debet fieri propositio universalis secundum exigentiam modi et sic fiet sillogismus. Verbi gratia in hoc entimemate: *'omne animal currit*, *ergo omnis homo currit'*. *'homo'* et *'currit'* sunt extremitates, *'animal'* est medium. Sed ista extremitas, scilicet *'homo'*, sumpta est

extremes in the conclusion and the major extreme and the middle term in the premise - a reconstruction of the complete syllogism can be made for each enthymeme[409]. It is indeed this last species of argumentation, the enthymeme, that will be used to exemplify each type of locus that will be considered.

The place understood as that which strengthens or confirms an argument can be either a *maxim* (*maxima*) or *a difference of a maxim* (*differentia maximae*). On the one hand, the place which is a maxim is a prior proposition known or evident by itself or, in other words, a principle as: "every whole is bigger than its parts", "the defined is predicated of whatever is predicated the definition" and "the genus is predicated of whatever is predicated the species"[410]. On the other hand, the place which is a difference of maxim is a variation of a maxim which differs or has as difference only certain specific terms, as in the last two examples of maxims the couplets *defined-definition* differ from *genus-species*. In this case, with the exception of those difference in terms, the maxims are the same.[411]

Peter of Spain will further discuses places by classifying those that are differences of a maxim in (1) intrinsic - the places in which the argument is taken from those that are about the substance of a thing posited in question, (2) extrinsic - the places in which the argument is taken from those that are separated from the substance of a thing, and (3) intermediate, a combination between the previous two. For each case Peter defines the specific locus as a relation or disposition (*habitudo*) from (*ab*) the one that infers (*inferens*) to the one inferred (*illatus*) and gives always the name of a specific locus from the one that infers. The one that infers and from which a specific place is considered is put in the premise of an enthymeme and it is the middle term. The term that represents the place is put in turn as subject and as predicate in an affirmative or negative form. For each case is given a short definition of the specific place, examples of arguments to be constructed and maxims. For example, for the place *from the defined*, which is understand as a relation between the defined and definition, 4 arguments are taken into account and 4 maxims. The

semel; ex ipsa ergo et medio fiat propositio universalis sic: *'omnis homo est animal'*; et tunc completus est sillogismus sic: *'omne animal currit*, *omnis homo est animal*, *ergo omnis homo currit'*"

[409] See *SL*., V.3, p. 56-58.

[410] See *SL*., IV.4, p. 59, l. 6-10: "Locus dividitur in locum maximam et locum differentiam maxime. Locus maxima idem est quod ipsa maxima. Maxima autem est propositio qua non est altera prior, idest notior, ut *'omne totum maius est sua parte'*, *'de quocumque predicatur diffinitio, et diffinitum', 'de quocumque predicatur species, et genus'*."

[411] See *SL*., IV.4, p. 59, l. 11-16: "Locus differentia maxime est illud quo una maxima differt ab altera. Verbi gratia, iste due maxime: *'de quocumque predicatur diffinitio, et diffinitum', 'de quocumque predicatur species, et genus'* differunt per terminos ex quibus componuntur; una enim componitur ex *'genere'* et *'specie'*, et alia vero ex *'diffinitione'* et *'diffinito'*; unde isti termini simplices dicuntur *'differentie maxime'*."

arguments exemplify the term *man* as the one who is defined and which, since does not occur in the conclusion, corresponds to a middle term in a complete syllogism. This term *man* is put affirmatively and negatively as subject and predicate in the premises of enthymemes. Its *definiens* or definition, *mortal and rational animal* will appear in the conclusion with the other extreme, in the following way:

> "A man runs; therefore, a mortal and rational animal runs". Maxim: "whatever is predicated of the defined is also predicated of the definition"
>
> "Sortes is a man; therefore, Sortes is a mortal and rational animal". Maxim: "when the defined is predicated of anything, so is the definition"
>
> A man does not run; therefore, a mortal and rational animal does not run. Maxim: "whatever is eliminated from the defined is also eliminated from the definition"
>
> "A stone is not a man; therefore, a stone is not a mortal and rational animal". Maxim: "when the defined is eliminated from anything, so is the definition" [412].

Peter applies this analysis to the following list of places which corresponds in great part with Boethius list from *De differentiis topicis*[413]:

Intrinsic places:

- From substance
  - From definition (*SL.* V.6)
  - From the defined (*SL.* V.7)
  - From description (*SL.* V.8)
  - From the interpretation of name (*SL.* V.9)
- From accompaniments of substance
  - From the whole
    - From the universal whole or from genus (*SL.* V.12)

[412] *CNP*. 207-208; *SL*., IV.7, p. 61, l. 2-25: "Locus a diffinito est habitudo diffiniti ad diffinitionem. Et continet similiter quatuor argumenta et quatuor maximas. Primo subiciendo diffinitum affirmative, ut *'homo currit; ergo animal rationale et mortale currit'*. Unde locus? A diffinito. Maxima: *quicquid predicatur de diffinito, et de diffinitione.* Secundo predicando ipsum affirmative, sic: *'Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est animal rationale et mortale'*. Unde locus? A diffinito. Maxima: *de quocumque predicatur diffinitum, et diffinitio.* Tertio subiciendo ipsum negative, ut *'homo non currit; ergo animal rationale et mortale non currit'.* Unde locus? A diffinito. Maxima: *quicquid removetur a diffinito, et a diffinitione.* Quarto predicando ipsum negative, sic: *'lapis non est homo; ergo lapis non est animal rationale et mortale'*. Unde locus? A diffinito. Maxima: *a quocumque removetur diffinitum, et diffinitio.* Et sciendum quod in omnibus locis denominatur locus ab inferente et non ab illato. Unde quando diffinitio est inferens, est locus a diffinitione; quando autem diffinitum est inferens, est locus a diffinito. Quare? Quia ab inferente debet denominari locus sive differentia maxime et non ab illato."

[413] See BIRD (1962), p. 311-312. On the differences between Boethius and Peter of Spain see BIRD (1962), p. 313. For the division of places made by Cicero and Themistius according to Boethius see BOETH. *De diff. top.*, 1201-1204.

From species or the subordinated part (*SL.* V.13)

From the integral whole (*SL.* V.14)

From the whole in quantity (*SL.* V.15)

From the whole in mode (*SL.* V.16)

From the whole in place (*SL.* V.17)

From the whole in time (*SL.* V.18)

From part (*SL.* V.12-18)

From cause

From efficient cause (*SL.* V.19)

From material cause (*SL.* V.20)

From formal cause (*SL.* V.21)

From final cause (*SL.* V.22)

From generation (*SL.* V.23)

From corruption (*SL.* V.24)

From use (*SL.* V.25)

From accidents that take place in a common way (*SL.* V.26)

Extrinsic

From opposites

From relative opposites (*SL.* V.28)

From contraries (*SL.* V.29)

From privative opposites (*SL.* V.30)

From contradictory opposites (*SL.* V.31)

From greater (*SL.* V.32, l. 9-15)

From lesser (*SL.* V.32, l. 16-20)

From similar (*SL.* V.33)

From analogy (*SL.* V.34)

From transumption (*SL.* V.35)

From authority (*SL.* V.36)

Intermediate

From cognates (*SL.* V.38)

From cases (*SL.* V.39)

From division (*SL.* V.40)

At the end of this section, we can ask ourselves what is the use of the theory of places. The answer will be that places as principles of inference that guarantee the following of the conclusion from a

premise, and thus confirms and strengthens that conclusion, are like shortcuts for argumentative reasoning. There is no need for the conclusion of an enthymeme to be confirmed through its reconstruction according to a valid syllogistic mood.

1.2.6. Tractatus 6 - *De suppositionibus*

With the exception of the sophistical refutations, Peter of Spain summarized thus far almost the entire logical corpus of Aristotle. The sixth treatise of his *Tractatus* will be dedicated to the most important notion of his terminist logic, that of supposition. This treatise along with the seventh one dedicated to the problem of fallacies represent by their disposition and content a focal point and center of the entire handbook, by linking *logica antiquorum* with *logica modernorum* or the Boethian-Aristotelian logic with the terminist one. Usually, a theory of supposition is formed by the definition of supposition (*suppositio*) which often comes in contrast with the definition of signification (*significatio*) and the classification of the different species, types or modes of supposition. In the following subsections we will firstly discuss some prerequisites for the understanding of this terminist theory. Next, we will see what Peter understands by 'signification' and 'supposition'. Finally, we will explore the different modes of supposition[414].

1.2.6.1. Words, terms and propositional context

In the previous sections of our study, namely 1.2.1.2 and 1.2.1.3, we saw how Peter establishes some prerequisites notion of logic that can be used for a better understanding of signification and supposition. There we have seen that humans represent things through langue by a vocalization (*vox*) that is capable of carrying a signification (*significative*) which is instituted or established willingly by someone according to a convention (*ad placitum*). This vocalization capable of signification by convention is either simple, like the noun and the verb, or complex, like a word grouping or phrase (*oratio*). If the *oratio* has the capacity to signify something true or false, it will be called a proposition (*propositio*). At the end of the analysis of the structural parts of the proposition, Peter already gave the distinction between categorematic words - words which have signification by themselves and which are the constative parts of a proposition like the subject

[414] Parts of Peter's theory of supposition were already presented in two different articles, see ILE, "Some Remarks on Peter of Spain's Theory of Suppositio" in *Philobiblon: Transylvanian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research in Humanities*, 1, 1 (2017), pp. 75-91; ILE, "The Formality of Peter of Spain's Theory of Supposition" in *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia*, issue 63, vol. 3, (2018), pp. 11-30.

and the predicated - and syncategorematic or consignificative words - words that do not have signification by themselves and their capability of signify something depends on the constitutive parts of proposition. The categorematic words of a simple proposition, words that can signify by themselves and play a constitutive role in the proposition, will be called 'propositional terms' (*termini*). Although Peter talks at the beginning of his sixth[415] chapter about a *terminus incomplexus* which signifies one of the ten predicaments and does not enter in the construction of a proposition, his general use of '*terminus*' seems to be reserved for the words placed in the propositional context[416]. It is on those considerations exposed in the first treatise that Peter will formulate his views regarding signification and supposition.

1.2.6.2. Signification, supposition and copulation

Since the property of supposition is in certain aspects conceptually dependent on but essentially different from that of signification, Peter will start his analysis with the latter one. The signification of a term is defined as the representation of a thing made by a vocalization according to convention: "significatio termini [...] est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio"[417]. As the Boethian-Aristotelian sematic model[418] suggests, the signification process should include the language, the world and the mental realm. Peter insists only on language and extra-mental/extra-linguistical entities remaining silent about the mental ones. He considers the *res* signified by terms to be either universals or particulars, thus envisioning signification as a relation, mediated or not, between linguistic items and things[419]. He excludes from the process of proper signification any part of speech that is not a term, that is, that cannot signify a universal or a particular. Propositional signs, especially universal and particular signs as '*omnis*', '*aliquis*' etc. cannot be terms since they cannot signify by themselves the requested entities. Nevertheless, a concession will be made in their case in virtue of their syncategorematic function. They are able to signify in an improper

[415] See *SL*., VI.1, p. 79.
[416] See also the use of *terminus* as a constitutive part of a proposition in *SL*., I.8, p. 4. The term understood as a constitutive part of a proposition will rise some difficulties regarding the natural supposition that will be discussed in the following section of our work.
[417] *SL*., VI.2, p. 79, l. 11-12.
[418] See section 2.1.2. of the current study.
[419] *SL*., VI.2, p. 79, l. 12-13: "Significatio termini, prout sic sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio. Quare cum omnis res aut sit universalis aut particularis, oportet dictiones non significantes universales vel particulares non significare aliquid. Et sic non erunt termini prout hic sumitur *'terminus'*; ut sunt signa universalia et particularia.". It is important not note that these things that are signified and then enter in the relation of supposition can exist or not and thus are not necessary a *res existens*; see *SL*., X.1, p. 197.

manner the disposition (*disposition*) of the subject and predicate, and, since they co-signify with them, they contribute to the signification of the entire proposition, and thus to its truth value[420]. What we can call 'species of signification' are conceived according to the ontological correspondents of the two constitutive parts of a proposition or, more precisely according to the mods of things (*modi rerum*) signified. Thus, there are two cases:

A substantive (*substantive*) noun signifies a substantive (*substantive*) thing: 'man' signifies a man (particular or universal substances)

An adjectival (*adiective*) name or verb signifies an adjectival (*adiective*) thing: 'white' or 'runs' signifies the fact of being white or running (particular or universal accidents)[421]

The terms employed be Peter, *substantive* and *adiective*, in this context are, on the one hand, confusing, and, on the other, adaptable both to the ontological and linguistical registry as needed, confirming the parallelism thesis between language and world. *CNP*. seem to understand them mainly as adverbs offering the following couplets: 'substantive name' - 'thing as substance' and 'modifying name' - 'thing as modifier'[422], while Dinneen makes calques from the Latin forms[423]. The word *substantive (sub+stare)* refers indeed to the fact of noun being the possible subject for a predication and to the fact that a thing as substance can be subjected to different accidents. The same goes for *adiective*, which literary means *that which is added*: the adjective and the verb represent that which is added to the noun; accordingly, the qualities and affection of white and running represent those things which are added to a logical or ontological subject. Although *substantive* and *adiective* are terms whose understanding seem to depend on the other parts of speech and on their ontological counterpart, Peter is referring to *significatio* as a property that a word or an incomplex term has independent of a propositional context. The difference between the terms presented at the beginning of the sixth tract, the fact that parts of speech (noun, verbs, adjectives) and not of proposition (subject and predicate) are said to signify things, along with the offered examples ('homo', 'albus', 'currit'), are all reasons to consider that Peter of Spain's signification is a property that a word has before actually being put to use in a particular propositional context, and thus independent of it.

[420] See *SL*, XII.5, p. 210-211.
[421] See *SL*, VI.2, p. 79, l. 17-19: "Significationis alia est rei substantive et habet fieri per nomen substantivum, ut *'homo'*; alia est rei adiective et habet fieri per nomen adiectivum vel per verbum, ut *'albus'* vel *'currit'*."
[422] *CNP*., p. 241.
[423] See DINNEEN (1990), p. 69.

From the grammatical point of view, names (*nomina*) are said to have the property of supposition while adjectival names and verbs have the counterpart of supposition, a property named 'copulation'[424]. It must be noted that here is the only place where Peter is talking about *copulatio* and that this property will not be use in further places of *SL*. Moreover, although Peter seems to reserve the property of supposition for the names that will play the subject role in the proposition, he will apply it also on adjectival names and verbs at the participial forms that play the role of a predicate in a proposition.

But what is the property of supposition? Supposition is defined as "suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo"[425]. The action of the verb '*supponere*' can be understood in a common Latin language as an action of substitution made by the one which substitutes (*supponens*) upon the one which is substituted (*suppositum*). From the definition of supposition, the *supponens* is clearly a term, a linguistic entity. What exactly the *suppositum* is, can be shown from the contrast that Peter makes between supposition and signification. Signification is a property of a vocal emission that was imposed upon a thing (*res*) to signify it prior to the propositional context. Supposition is a property of a term, within a proposition, to be taken for something else, while the term is composed of vocal emission and signification, thus having prior to its supposition a signification[426]. The example offered by Peter is '*homo currit*'; the subject of the proposition '*homo*' supposits or is taken in the place of Socrates or Plato and so on. Accordingly, on the one hand, '*homo*' has already a signification outside of any propositional use; although Peter does not explicitly state that its signification is (a.) a universal, that is, the human taken universally as rational animal, thus something grasped through the intension of the notion of '*homo*', (b.) a particular, that is, an individual human, something grasped through the extension of the notion, or (c.) both a universal and a particular, his considerations seem to point in the direction of the last option[427]. On the other hand, '*homo*', already having a signification, stands in the place

[424] See *SL*., VI.2, p. 80, l. 5-6; VI.3, p. 80, l. 17.
[425] *SL*., VI.3, l. 8-9. *CNP*, p. 241: "*taking a substantive term in place of something*".
[426] See *SL*., VI.3, p. 80, l. 8-16: "Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem vocis ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo. Ut dicitur *'homo currit'*, iste terminus *'homo'* supponit pro Sorte vel pro Platone, et sic de aliis. Quare significatio prior est suppositione. Neque sunt eiusdem, quia significare est vocis, supponere veri est termini iam quasi compositio ex voce et significatione. Ergo suppositio non est significatio."
[427] Or in De Rijk words, De Rijk (1971), p. 73: "For Peter, the notion of signification covers both the connotation of the universal nature or essence and the denotation of the individuals participating in this essence". Peter states only that a term signifies a universal or a particular. But taking into account the notion of *impositio* or the act of name-giving, that is, individual objects are named by the first *impositor*, along with the Porphyrian tree structure of

of a universal or a particular (*suppositum*) depending on its relation of supposition, and, as it will be seen, on the other parts of the proposition. Understood in this way, Peter's theory surely has a commitment to a realist thesis. The manner in which the *suppositum* varies in function of the nature of *supponens*[428] and in function of the propositional context is captured in the division of the modes of supposition.

1.2.6.3. Modes and species of supposition

The particular way in which supposition is divided has already been pointed out in a schematic manner in many works, even in De Rijk's edition[429]. For the sake of our argumentation, we will do it again. Before that, as stated elsewhere[430], we specify that supposition is analyzed in a binary tree structure, in a series of five divisions that differentiate between nine types of supposition. Between the fourth and the tenth paragraph of the sixth treatise, each type or mode of supposition is defined and exemplified. In their definition, that is in the conditions stipulated for a specific supposition to take place, each sub-species will inherit the conditions of their parent supposition type. The division looks as follows:

Discrete supposition
Common supposition
Natural supposition
Accidental supposition
Simple supposition
Personal supposition
Determinate supposition
Confused supposition by:
~~Necessity of thing~~
Necessity of sign or mode[431]
Mobile
Immobile

predicaments, in each process of signification a particular and a universal might be involved, especially since the universal seems to be considered a *res*.
[428] See the section 2.1.3 of this paper for the distinction between different types of terms.
[429] See *SL*., p. LXXVII.
[430] See Ile (2017), p. 86; Ile (2018), p. 21.
[431] Division rejected by Peter in his *Dubia* and *Solutio* see *SL*., VI.10-12, p. 83-88.

For the first division of supposition, that between *suppositio discreta* and *suppositio communis* Peter uses only a distinction between types of terms, since "common supposition is what is produced by a common term, like 'human.' Discrete supposition is what is produced by a discrete term, like 'Sortes' or 'that human'"[432].

Next, the division of common supposition will have as subspecies *suppositio naturalis* and *suppositio accidentalis*. We must point out that, as any species of a genus, these two types of suppositions are defined in opposition:

> "Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus a quibus aptus natus est participari, ut 'homo' per se sumptus de natura sua supponit pro omnibus hominibus qui fuerunt et qui sunt et qui erunt. Accidentalis autem suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro eis pro quibus exigit adiunctum, ut 'homo est'; iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro presentibus; cum autem 'homo fuit', supponit pro preteritis; cum vero dicitur 'homo erit', supponit pro futuris."[433]

Natural supposition is defined as the natural capacity of a common term to be taken for all the things in which the universal form signified by term participates. Thus, '*homo*', taken by itself or absolutely, stands for all the individual humans. In an accidental supposition, the term stands only for those things requested by the other elements of the propositional context. For example, the same term in '*homo est*' stands only for the present human individuals. The opposition between those two types of supposition seem to consist in the independence and dependence of the supposition from the propositional context. If *suppositio naturalis* is taken as a relation that is conceived without any connection to the context of a proposition, this fact will cause some problem as: (a.) the distinction between supposition and signification will fade out and (b.) the natural supposition will contradict the general definition of supposition as a propositional context-dependent relation. De Rijk addresses these problems by reevaluating the interpretation of Joseph Mullaly, Ernest Moody, and Philotheus Boehner related to Peter of Spain's natural supposition[434]. He identifies cases in which supposition is used in a non-contextual manner, and thus he is finally concluding that "natural supposition is the natural capacity of a significative word for supposition be it in or outside the proposition"[435]. He understands natural supposition as the "direct result" of

[432] CNP, p. 243; *SL*., VI.4, p. 80, l. 19-22: "Suppositionis alia comunis, alia discreta. Suppositio communis est que fit per terminum communem, ut *'homo'*. Suppositio discreta est que fit per terminum discretum, ut *'Sortes'* vel *'iste homo'*."
[433] SL., VI.4, p. 81, l. 1-9; see CNP., p. 243.
[434] See DE RIJK (1971), p. 72-80.
[435] DE RIJK (1971), p. 79; See DE RIJK (1971), p. 76-80.

a term having a signification and ultimately as a natural and original capacity of a term to stand for something while referring to a possible propositional context[436]. However, the majority of examples offered by De Rijk for the non-contextual thesis are from chapters that pertain to other properties of terms like restriction, ampliation and appellation. We think that the examples offered for the non-contextual thesis are problematic for two reasons: (1.) Peter is discussing in the passages chosen by De Rijk other properties of terms like restriction and his main purpose is to show how those particular properties work. To extract a thesis regarding supposition from the section that are not dedicated directly to this topic and thus do not discuss it in full extent is hermeneutically problematic; (2.) Even in the tract dedicated to supposition Peter does not analyze its propositions and examples fully but only to a relative purpose. The fact that Peter does not show a contextual use of supposition when discussing other properties of terms, does not mean that he admits a non-contextual use of supposition, but that in particular stages of his logical exposition there is no need to point out the influence the context of a proposition has on the supposition of a term. What we ultimately think is that natural supposition is a necessary conceptual tool for explaining the theory of supposition as a whole. Without having through natural supposition an original or natural domain of individuals for which a term could stand, the restriction and ampliation of this domain of possible *supposita* will be much harder to understand.

Returning to Peter's classification, accidental supposition is divided in *suppositio simplex* and *suppositio personalis*. When defining the first, Peter states: "simplex suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro re universali significata per ipsum"[437]. Accordingly, in propositions as "*homo est species*" or "*risibile est proprium*", the subject term stand in relation of supposition for a universal entity, higher in the Porphyrian tree than the individual, as the human in common or the common capacity to laugh. It is important to note that in the explanations provided about simple supposition, Peter talks about the supposition of a common substantive term posited on the part of the predicate or in exceptive constructs. The examples offered are: "*omnis homo est animal*", "*omnis animal praeter hominem est irrationale*" and "*omnium contrariorum eadem est disciplina*". These particular suppositions are verified through direct inferences showing that a

[436] See DE RIJK (1971), p. 80.
[437] *SL*., VI.5, p. 81, l. 12-13.

false conclusion will be obtained if the common terms in question will be take personally, that is, by inferring the same proposition with the changing of the common term with a discrete one[438].

Personal supposition is defined as the taking of a common term in place of its inferiors, which equals to the taking of a common term in place of one or more individuals[439]. Personal supposition has two species, *suppositio determinata* and *suppositio confusa*. The first, determinate supposition, takes places when a common term appears indefinitely or with a particular sign attached to it as in "*homo currit*" and "*aliquis homo currit*"[440]. Peter does not tell us here explicitly for what *suppositum* the common terms in question stands for. The reason may be that when he offers the general definition of supposition in *SL*.VI.3 as example, he offers a determinate supposition "'homo currit', iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro Sorte vel pro Platone, et sic de aliis". Accordingly, we may say that a term has determinate supposition when it stands for a multitude of individuals that are put in the logical relation of disjunction, that is, the term '*homo*' in '*homo currit*' stand for this particular human or that particular human and so on. Discussing the same determinate supposition, Peter introduces an important distinction between the relation of supposition and the fact of rendering an expression true for something[441]. While in '*homo currit*' or '*aliquis homo currit*' the subject term stands for all the individuals taken disjunctively, for which 'homo' is the superior and thus can be rightly predicated about them no matter if those individuals are running or not, the proposition is true only for those individuals that are currently running. Whether the correct *suppositum* of a term in a specific proposition is that which makes that proposition true, and thus is a truth condition of that proposition, or the truth conditions and the suppositum are separate things, will be discussed in the specific section dedicated to the interpretation of supposition.

[438] See *SL*., VI.6, p. 81-82. The use of inference in which from a premise that contains a term with simple supposition we obtain a conclusion in which the same term is put in a personal supposition is a fallacy named *figura dictionis* which we will discuss in the following section.
[439] See *SL*.,VI.7, p. 82, l. 10-12: "Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus. Ut cum dicitur *'homo currit'*, iste terminus *'homo'* supponit pro suis inferioribus."
[440] See *SL*.,VI.8, p. 82, l. 14-16: "*'Determinata'* suppositio dicitur quam habet terminus communis indefinite sumptus vel cum signo particulari, ut *'homo currit'* vel *'aliquis homo currit'*."
[441] See *SL*., VI.8, p. 82, l. 19-23: "Et dicitur utraque istarum *'determinata'*, quia licet in utraque illarum iste terminus *'homo'* supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente vere sunt. Aliud enim est supponere et aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo. In predictis enim, ut dictum est, iste terminus *'homo'* supponit pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, sed reddit locutionem veram pro currente."

The confused supposition is understood as "taking a common term in place of many by means of a universal sign"[442]. In a proposition as '*omnis homo est animal*' where the universal sign is the mark of the confused supposition, the subject term is taken for each of its supposits, that is, for each individual man or each inferior contained under *homo*. Once again, Peter does not tell us explicitly what is the relation between these supposits and whether we might represent them in a phrase through a series of proportions coordinated by conjunctions. The contra-example exposed in the previous paragraph, where determined supposition is put in contrast with confused supposition, show us that Peter might have considered such and understanding. Moreover, a new notion is introduced as a further difference in the consideration of the confused supposition: mobility and immobility. The mobility is the property according to which a descending inference can take place from the proposition which contains the confused supposition. In this process the common term with confused mobile supposition along with the universal sign are replaced, according to Peter's examples, with the corresponding discrete term: "*omnis homo; ergo Sortes*", "*omnis homo; ergo Plato*"[443]. For this instance, the examples offered by *SL* are quite confusing since: (a.) a difference has been made already between rendering an expression true for a certain individual and the property of supposition, and (b.) the contra-example offered in *SL*, VI.8 suggest that the descend of a mobile confused supposition should take place in the following manner: "Omnis S est P; ergo s_1 est P et s_2 est P et sic de aliis", where 'S' is the common term in confused supposition and 's_1', 's_2' are discrete terms and inferiors of 'S'. This type of lack of rigor in Peter's consideration of supposition make us wonder whether he considered some parts of his theory as evident by themselves, a common knowledge not necessary to be detailed, or the apparent inconsistency or lack of specificity are inherent attributes of his conceptual framework.

1.2.6.4. Dubia and Solutio

The discussion on the confused supposition made by the necessity of sign or mood in contrast to the necessity of thing (*res*) offers the subject matter for the so called '*dubia*' which begins in *SL.,* VI.10. What Peter basically states and ultimately, as we will see, contest is that in the proposition "*omnis homo est animal*" the universal sign '*omnis*' has a double effect: on the one

[442] *CNP*., p. 249; *SL*., VI.9, p. 82, l. 29-p. 83, l. 3: "Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro pluribus mediante signo universali. Ut cum dicitur *'omnis homo est animal',* iste terminus *'homo'* mediante signo universali tenetur pro pluribus, quia pro quolibet suo supposito."
[443] See *SL*., VI.9, p. 83.

hand, through the necessity of the sign, diffuses (*confundit*) and distributes the terms '*homo*' movably for each human; on the other hand, through the necessity of thing[444], that is, since every human has its own essence and thus its own animality (*animalitas*), '*animal*' is diffused immovably, which is, without the possibility of a descending inference to its inferiors, since such a process will cause yet again a fallacy of reasoning[445]. Thus, the problem that Peter tackles is whether in the proposition *'omnis homo est animal'* the predicate '*animal*' has simple supposition or confused immobile supposition caused by the universal sign posited on the affirmative subject part. In the first argumentative step, those two possibilities are accepted in the same time since the first is taken according to the nature of the term, that is, the genus 'animality', and the latter according to the universal sign put on the part of the subject[446].

Paragraph eleven brings a contrary thesis that marks the starting point of Peter's own position through the expression "*sed ego credo*". Here he tries to refute that the predicate term is confused in any way by the universal affirmative sign. He puts forward four arguments for the proposition '*omnis homo est animal*'[447]. His argumentation is continued in paragraph twelve and

[444] Translated by *CNP* with 'factual necessity' see CNP, p. 249.

[445] See *SL*., VI.9, p. 83, l. 4-22: "suppositionum confusam alia est confusa necessitate signi vel modi, alia est confusa necessitate rei. Ut cum dicitur *'omnis homo est animal'*, iste terminus *'homo'* necessitate signi confunditur sive distribuitur pro quolibet suo suppositio, et cum unusquisque homo suam habeat essentiam, ideo hoc verbum *'est'* tenetur necessitate rei pro tot essentiis pro quot hominibus *'homo'*; et cum unicuique homini insit sua animalitas, ideo tenetur *'animal'* necessitate rei pro tot animalibus pro quot hominibus *'homo'* et pro quot essentiis hoc verbum *'est'*. Unde iste terminus *'homo'* dicitur supponere confuse mobiliter et distributive. Sed confuse et distributive supponit, quia tenetur pro omni homine; mobiliter vero, quia licet descensum fieri pro quolibet suo supposito, ut *'omnis homo; ergo Sortes'* vel *'omnis homo; ergo Plato'*. Sed iste terminus *'animal'* dicitur confundi immobiliter, quia non licet fieri descensum sub eo, ut *'omnis homo este animal; ergo omnis homo est hoc animal'*; sed ibi est processus a simplici ad personalem. Sicut hic: *'homo est dignissima creaturarum; ergo aliquis homo'*; et *'rosa est pulcherrimus florum; ergo aliqua rosa'*. Sed in hoc differunt quia in hiis est simplex suppositio a parte subiecti, in illa vero a parte predicati."

[446] See *SL*., VI.10, p. 84, l. 5-12: "Suppositio enim confusa mobiliter non potest simul esse cum simplici, neque secundum idem neque secundum diversa, sed supposito confusa immobiliter potest simul esse cum simplici, non secundum idem sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est. Sic oportet contrarietatem solvere que apparebat sustinentibus quod terminus communis in predicato positus haberet simplicem suppositionem et confunderetur immobiliter signo universali affirmativo existente in subiecto, ut *'omnis homo est animal'*."

[447] See *SL*., VI.11, p. 84-86. The arguments can be summarized in the following way: (1) in the proposition the genus 'animal' is essentially predicated about an inferior 'homo'; the term that signifies the nature of a genus cannot by distributed or confused in any way; thus 'animal' does not have any kind of confused supposition; (2) the predication in the offered example is a non-convers predication which falls in the definition of the object (*res*), i.e. man, that is put as subject through the term 'homo'; since 'animal' cannot be a difference, must by a genus that cannot be confused; (3) there is a difference between the universal whole or genus and the whole in quantity. The latter, as a complete whole in quantity, like in the case of 'omnis homo', can be confused movably and as an incomplete or diminished whole in quantity can be confuse immovably. But is impossible for a whole in quantity to be a genus and thus for the 'animal' no confused supposition takes place; (4) since the genus contains in itself all its inferiors without reducing itself to them, it cannot be said to 'multiply' or 'confuse' for each of its inferiors. The relation according to which the inferiors are reduced to their superior, like in the case of genus, is opposed to the relation according to which the superior is reduced to its inferiors, like in the case in which something is said truly to be multiplied or confused.

brings forward some particular points that articulates his own doctrine of universals by introducing the difference between *via logicae* and *via naturae*. The main concern is if the evident multiplication or diffusion of the subject through the universal sign involves also the multiplication or diffusion of the predicate, that is, if between the number of humans and the number of animalities is a directly proportional relationship. Peter's first argument states that there is indeed a multiplicity of "*animalitas*" but this multiplicity does not come from the predicate but from the subject, since the subject '*homo'* is logical composed of '*animal*' and '*rationalis*'. The same holds true for the proposition '*omnis homo est albus*', where is the same multiplicity of *'animalitas'* through the term '*homo'*[448]. This means that "*animal*" will be predicated and understood in the subject as a part of it, forming for "*omnis homo est animal*" the equivalent proposition "*omne animal rationale mortale est animal*"[449]. Thus, '*animal*' will be understood as present in the subject without the predicate and before any propositional context. This will make Peter to renounce at any confusion of the predicate. The only confusion is that of the subject term, a confusion according to the mode or sign, which implies the multiplicity of "*animalitas*", but only insofar as is understood as a constitutive logical part of the subject '*homo*'. This argument is refined further; *animalitas* and *humanitas* or animality and humanity are considered universal concepts, and, being as such, they are, logically speaking, one and the same in each individual[450]. If we take the humanity or animality as non-abstracted from the particular matter, as a subject of the natural science and not of logic, then we can speak about a multiplicity of *humanity* and *animality*, about *humanitas mea, humanitas tua, haec animalitas* and *illa animalitas*. Contracted with matter each universal is individuated in a particular being and thus can be considered multiple. The genus *animal* is contracted to the differences of *homo* and then to the differences of each individual being

[448] See *SL*., VI.12, p. 86, l. 10 - p. 87, l. 2: "Ratio autem propter quam movebantur facilis est ad solvendum. Dicunt enim quod cum dicitur *'omnis homo est animal'*, cum unicuique homini sua respondeat essentia et sua animalitas, eo quod non est possibile esse hominem, quin sit animal, - ergo iste terminus *'animal'* tenebitur pro tot animalibus pro quot hominibus *'homo'*. Dicimus enim quod in hoc argumento nulla est apparentia. Cum enim dico *'omnis homo est albus',* vel *'omnis homo est niger'*, cum impossibile sit esse hominem quin sit animal, necesse est quod tot animalia sive tot animalitates intelligantur in subiecto quot sunt homines pro quibus tenetur iste terminus *'homo'*. Tamen fatuum est dicere quod multitudo illarum animalitatum sit ibi ex multiplicatione predicati, cum ibi predicetur *'album'* vel *'nigrum'*. Unde dico quod quia *'homo'* constituitur, logice loquendo, non naturaliter, ex *'animali'* et *'rationali'*, ideo est quod *'homo'* de se habet *'animal'*. Unde cum *'homo'* multiplicatur, in se habet multiplicitatem illarum animalitatum. Ut cum dico *'omnis homo est albus'* vel *'omnis homo est niger'*, nullo modo habet has animalitates a predicato."
[449] *SL*., VI.12, p. 87, l. 9-10.
[450] *SL*., VI.12, p. 87, l. 24-25: "eadem est humanitas, secundum viam logice, non nature, in quolibet individuo hominis; sicut homo in communi idem est".

causing a multiplication according to matter. Obviously, this is not the way a logician considers the universal.

In conclusion, for Peter, in the proposition '*omnis homo est animal'*, the predicate '*animal*' is considered to be a genus with simple supposition and does not undergo any multiplication or confusion; the subject term '*homo'* is confused or multiplied and has a confused movable supposition; in each of its *supposita* or individuals to which it descends, there is a universal animality and humanity which is, logically speaking, one and identical for each of them. Only according to the diversity of matter, and thus in a secondary sense, the *humanity* and *animality* of each individual man can be called 'multiple'.

1.2.7. Tractatus 7 - *De fallaciis*

After discussing the most important theory of *logica moderna*, the theory of supposition, Peter returns in tract seven to the last subject of his summaries dedicated to *logica antiqua*, that is, the fallacies. Having as main and remote source Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *Sophistical refutations*, we can identify in this chapter two purposes: on the one hand, it analyses the practical aspect of dialectic by studying the act of disputation (*SL*., VII.1-21) and by offering a classification of the different types of fallacies (SL., VII. 22-190); on the other hand, it integrates in a certain degree the theory of supposition as a conceptual tool which serves to avoid some of the identified fallacies. Our analysis will consider in a limited way the first aspect and only when is relevant to the second one, the use of supposition theory, especially since, according to the quantitative analysis of *CNP*, the seventh tract represents almost a half of Peter's handbook, 47% of the entire text[451]. Since *De fallaciis* comes after the treatment of supposition, De Rijk has argued extensively[452] for the current placement of the tract which somehow seems to defy the dichotomy between modern and old logic. In fact, as we will show, the specific function of the theory of supposition can be considered a justification for the position of the seventh tract, which, accordingly, can be seen as a liaison between *logica antiquorum* and *modernorum*. In what follows, first, we will discuss Peter's consideration on dialectic, disputation and fallacies. Secondly, we will offer a schematic representation of Peter's division of fallacies. Thirdly, and

[451] See *CNP*., p. 17.
[452] See *SL*., p. XLVI-LIV.

most important, we will see how the supposition theory can be used in discussing some particular types of fallacies.

1.2.7.1. Dialectic, disputation and fallacies

We have already seen in the chapter 1.2.1.1 dedicated to the introductory notions how dialectic is defined and how it implies an act of discursive reasoning between an opponent and a responded. In tract seven, Peter develops further the concept of disputation. Disputation is defined as "actus syllogisticus unius ad alterum ad propositum ostendendum - the syllogistic act of one to another with the purpose of showing what was proposed[453]" According to Peter[454], this definition comprises synthetically the five elements that enter into a disputation: the opponent (*opponens*), the one who initiates the act of disputation, the respondent (*respondens*), the one towards which the act of disputation is oriented against, the syllogism, the instrument by which the disputation takes place, the thesis or proposed object of disputation (*propositum*) and finally, the disputation itself. The purpose or end of the act of disputation is exactly the fact of showing something about a given subject. Although Peter is initially putting in the definition of the disputation the syllogism as the tool for achieving this purpose, enthymemes, inductions and examples are also admitted as imperfect and deficient means of conducting a dispute[455]. Considering that the syllogism is the main tool of the act of disputing, the disputations will be differentiated according to the different types of syllogism. In his division Peter seems to have as distant sources the *Sophistical refutations*, 165a 39-165b 12 and *Topics*, 100a 25-101a 24. He distinguishes between a doctrinal (*doctrinalis*), *dialectical*, *tentative (temptativa)* and *sophistical* disputation.

The doctrinal disputation or, as it appears in the *Refutations*, the διδασκαλικός disputation, has a teaching function since has as instrument the demonstrative syllogism. Accordingly, it starts

[453] *SL*., VII.1, p. 89, l. 5-6. For different English renderings of this definition see CNP., p. 257; Dinneen (1990), p. 76.
[454] See *SL*., VII.1, p. 89, l. 6-20: "Cum autem ad disputationem quinque exigantur, - scilicet ille a quo est actus disputandi, scilicet opponens, et ille ad quem est actus disputandi, scilicet respondens, et ipsum propositum de quod disputatur, et ipse actus disputandi, et instrumentum disputationis – omnia ista quinque tanguntur in predicta descriptione *'disputationis'*. Per hoc enim quod dicit *'actus'*, tangit ipsam actionem disputandi; per hanc differentiam *'sillogisticus'* tangit quod iste actus egreditur a sillogismo et sic intelligitur ibi sillogismus, qui est instrumentum disputationis; per hanc differentiam *'unius'* intelligitur ille a quo est actus disputandi; per hanc differentiam *'ad alterum'* intelligitur ille ad quem est actus disputandi, et ille est contra quem disputatur; per hanc autem differentiam *'ad propositum'* intelligitur res de qua disputatur, que est obiectum disputationis."
[455] See *SL*., VII.3, p. 90, l. 5-10: "Sicut in gramatica est quod oratio simplex et congrua est instrumentum perfectum loquendi, oratio autem figurativa est instrumentum diminutum, similiter sillogismus est instrumentum perfectum et completum disputandi, inductio vero diminutum, et entimema et exemplum. Unde unius unum est instrumentum completum et non plura, sed incompleta et deficientia a completo possunt esse plura."

"from principles proper to one discipline or another, and not from those that seem right to the respondent"[456]. Its premises are prime and true or something that is derived from those that are so. Examples of its species are the mathematical and natural disputations, syllogistic reasonings made between an opponent and respondent from the principles of a particular science[457].

In contrast, the dialectical disputation through its dialectical syllogism starts from the premises that are provable (*ex probabilibus*) and collects contradictory propositions of the proposed thesis. In this definition *probabile* is taken in a specific sense: absolutely (*simpliciter*), meaning "what seems right to all or to many, or to the wise-and of the last, either most or all, or the best known"[458]. The dialectic disputation, according to its species, is used in competitions or casual encounters, in argumentative exercises and in other disciplines. In the last way, in establishing or removing accidents, genus, definitions and proprium related to a particular subject matter.

The tentative syllogism, or, as the *Topics* 100b25-101a1 suggests, the contentious or *litigiosus* syllogism, starts from provable premises, but this time *probabile* is taken in a relative way (*secundum quid*), according to the respondent[459]. Thus, the premises used in this tentative disputation only seem provable to the respondent and are not provable absolutely (*simpliciter*) like in the dialectical disputation[460]. This type of disputation is used in testing the respondent and can take place from common notions to common notion or from common notion to proper ones[461].

If the premises of a tentative disputations are still provable according to the respondent, in the sophistical disputations the premises seem provable but they are not. In this way, its instrument, the sophistical syllogism is an apparent syllogism which, as we will see, has as its main purpose the display of false wisdom or the apparent possession of knowledge.

Since there are four kinds of disputations according to the four kinds of syllogism, Peter asks which of them is called in the proper way "*disputatio*". His answer offers a classification (1.)

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[456] *CNP*, p. 259; See *SL*., VII.5, p. 90, l. 15-16: "Doctrinalis est que sillogizat ex propriis principiis uniuscuiusque discipline et non ex hiis que videntur respondenti."
[457] See *SL*., VII.12, p. 92, l. 27-30: "doctrinalis disputationis quedam species est mathematica disputatio, et alia naturalis; et utraque istarum plures habet species. Et similiter dividitur demonstrativus sillogismus"
[458] *CNP*, p. 261; see *SL*., VII.8, p. 91, l. 16-18: "Dialeticus autem accipit probabile simpliciter. Probabile autem simpliciter est quod videtur omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus, et hiis vel pluribus vel omnibus vel maxime notis."
[459] See *SL*., VII.8, p. 91, l. 18-21: "Sed temptativus non accipit tale probabile, sed solum probabile respondenti et ita probabile secundum quid. Et sic peccat contra probabile."
[460] See *SL*., VII.7-8, p. 90-91.
[461] See *SL*., VII.12, p. 93, l. 8-10: "Et similiter due sunt species prime temptativi sillogismi: unus qui est temptativus ex communibus ad communia et alius qui est ex communibus ad propria."

according to the performative aspect, that is, the opposition between the opponent and respondent, (2.) according to the syllogistic act and (3.) according to the purpose of disputation, the demonstration of a thesis. According to the first criteria, the order in which disputations will be said in a more proper manner will be: sophistical, tentative, dialectical and doctrinal. For the last two criteria, the order obviously will be reversed.

Considering that the stars of this tract are the fallacies, Peter main concern will be sophistical disputations. Their final purpose is to obtain the appearance of wisdom. This means that during a sophistical disputation the opponent will use a sophistical refutation, that is, an apparent refutation, of his adversary or respondent in order to bring him in an awkward situation in which he is forced to admit its defeat. Those situations, which in themselves are apparent situations, since we are speaking about an apparent refutation, are conceived, according to Aristotle and Peter, as five purposes (*fines* or *metas*) of the sophistical disputation[462]:

redargutio or refutation - when the respondent is force do deny what he was granted or admit what he was denying

falsum or false - when the respondent is forced to admit a proposition that contains in itself a contradiction or a proposition that contradicts an evident state of affairs

inopinabile or the inconceivable or paradox - when the respondent is forced to admit a proposition contradictory to a provable one taken *simpliciter* or absolutely

solecismus or the solecism - when the respondent is forced to admit a proposition that does not respect the rules of proper grammar

nugatio or triviality - when the respondent is forced to repeat in a useless manner a word in the same position or to put in the same position two words with the same meaning, without any discursive effect.

These five purposes will be attained through 13 types of fallacies or arguments taken from sophistical places which will be described in the following subdivision of our work. Accordingly, our author will understand the fallacies as causes or principles of a deception caused in a participant to a disputation by its adversary[463].

[462] For Peter's exposition, see *SL*., VII.14-18, p. 94-95.

[463] See *SL*., VII.26, p. 98, l. 5-7: "Sed intellige quod *'fallacia'* dupliciter dicitur, quia fallacia dicitur uno modo deceptio causata in nobis, alio autem modo fallacia dicitur causa sive principium illius deceptionis. Et isto secundo modo intendimus hic de fallaciis."

1.2.7.2. Division of fallacies

The tradition surrounding the interpretation of fallacies occupies a vast literature and we will not be concerned with it in this work. Our limited purpose is the exposition of Peter's division of fallacies which has as its distant sources Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*. Schematically rendered, these fallacies are classified as follows:

Fallacies within language

Equivocation (*SL.*, VII.26-39)

Amphiboly (*SL.*, VII.40-56)

Composition (*SL.*, VII.57-73)

Division (*SL.*, VII.74-76)

Accent (*SL.*, VII.77-82)

Figure of expression (*SL.*, VII.83-100)

Fallacies outside of language

Accident (*SL.*, VII.102-119)

According to something or simply (*SL.*, VII.120-130)

Ignorance of elenchus (*SL.*, VII.131-140)

Asking for what was in the beginning (*SL.*, VII.141-149)

Consequent (*SL.*, VII.150-163)

Non-cause as cause (*SL.*, VII.164-170)

Several questions as one (*SL.*, VII.171-179)

The first distinction in the classification of fallacies, that is, the difference between *fallacia in dictione* and *extra dictionem*, renders the difference in their cause of appearance (*causa apparentiae*) and falsity or non-existence, that is, the cause which moves the respondent to believe something that does not exist or is false or the cause that makes what is being believed false[464]. These two causes correspond, on the one hand, to the reason for which the respondent is deceived or tricked by its opponent, and, on the other hand, to the reason for which the argumentative situation presented by the opponent is false or describes a false reality. Fallacies within language have their cause of appearance in language and the cause of falsity in things (*res*). Fallacies outside

[464] See *SL.*, VII.27, p. 98, l. 8-16: "Unde sciendum est quod in qualibet fallacia isto secundo modo sumpta duplex est principium sive duplex causa, scilicet principium motivum sive causa movens sive causa apparentie et per hec omnia idem principium nominatur; aliud autem principium sive alia causa est principium defectus sive causa non existentie, quod idem est, sive causa falsitatis. Principium autem motivum sive causa apparentie in qualibet fallacia est quod movet ad credendum quod non est. Principium vero defectus sive causa falsitatis est quod facit creditum esse falsum."

language have both their causes, appearance and non-existence, in things[465]. These two criteria, the cause of appearance and the cause of falsity or non-existence, will give the specificity of each type of fallacy. In what follows we will offer a short description of each type of fallacy.

Equivocation "is a deception caused in us by an inability to distinguish different accounts in a name that is the same unqualifiedly"[466]. At the basis of this fallacy stands the use of equivocal names, which are words with the same name but different meanings or reasons (*ratio*), in a paralogism. The difference in reason of those names is put on the account of signification and consignification. An example is the following paralogism "*quicquid ridet, habet os, sed pratum ridet; ergo pratum habet os*". In this case, what will make a respondent to accept the false conclusion, the fact that the meadow has a mouth, is the appearance of this syllogism being correct. In fact, it contains an equivocation, since the same verb '*ridet* - laugh' signifies in the major premise by a prime imposed sense the act of laughing and in the minor, by a second sense obtained from a custom of speaking, the fact of blooming[467].

Amphiboly is the fallacy caused by the fact that a composed expression can signify many things due to: a. inherent ambiguity ('*liber Aristotelis*' signifies either possession or authorship), b. ambiguity caused by a confusion between metaphorical and proper sense of an expression due to a similarity between them (the use in the same syllogism of the expression '*plowing the beach*' with the sense of 'wasting time' and 'plowing the sand') and c. the ambiguity cause by the fact that in Latin certain words can be considered subjects (*subpositum*) or direct object (*appositum*) in certain expression ('*scit saeculum*' can mean both the fact that the world knows and the fact that someone knows the world or its time). Since the differences between equivocation and amphiboly are not so sharply made, Peter is offering in *SL*., VII.53-56, a section of *dubitationes* where he highlights that equivocation concerns the ambiguity of a word (*dictio*) while amphiboly concerns the ambiguity of an expression (*oratio*).

The fallacy of composition is an ambiguity produced by the multiplicity of meaning of an expression. This multiplicity of meaning is caused by the different ways in which it can be composed. This fallacy depends, once again, on the fact that in Latin we can find examples of

[465] See *SL*., VII.101, p. 145, l. 22-25: "*'Fallacia extra dictionem'* dicitur cuius causa apparentie et causa non existentie est in re. Et per hoc differt a fallaciis in dictione. Fallacia enim in dictione est cuius causa apparentie est in dictione et causa falsitatis in re."
[466] *CNP*., p. 275; *SL*., VII.28, p. 99, l. 18-20: "fallacia equivocationis est deceptio causata in nobis ex impotentia distinguendi diversas in eodem nomine rationes simpliciter."
[467] See *SL*., VII.32, p. 101. The example shows the second species of equivocation, but Peter discusses two more.

expressions where a word can determine multiple parts of speech and the context does not help us in establishing which specific one. Although the expression has its unity according to its particular composition and species, fact which is its cause of appearance, it has as the cause of falsity the possibility to signify different object[468]. An example is '*quicquid vivit semper est*' the adverb '*semper*' can be put either on the part of the subject (the verb 'est' is predicated about whatever lives always 'quicquid vivit semper') or on the part of the predicate ('semper est' or 'is always' is predicated about whatever lives), composing the proposition in different ways with different truth values and thus rendering different meanings[469].

Division is a fallacy that rest on the way in which a proposition has a double meaning according to its composed and divided sense. The divided meaning marks the interpretation of a proposition with conjunctive or disjunctive terms as a conjunction or disjunction of propositions[470]. An example will be "*five are two and three*". In a composed meaning the proposition is true since the meaning is that five equals two plus three; but in divided meaning the proposition will be "five are two and five are three" which is false. More generally, the fallacy of division refers to any way in which an expression can be divided according to what can be put on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate. For example, "*Tu es hodie natus*"; we have one true meaning if we say '*hodie*' determines '*es*' (today is the date of your birth) and another, a false one, if it determines 'born' (you are born in this day)[471].

The fallacy of accent is a principle of deceiving caused by the fact that the same word can have different meanings due to the different way in which is accentuated[472]. The term '*populus'*, for example, with the accent put on the first vowel, long 'o', signifies a poplar tree; without the

[468] See *SL*., VII.67, p. 122, l. 13-18: "principium motivum compositionis est unitas orationis secundum suam speciem ex compositione causata, principium vero defectus est possibilitas diversorum significatorum per eandem orationem. Unitas enim orationis composite movet ad credendum unum significatum sine possibilitate ad aliud significatum."
[469] See *SL*., VII.64, p. 121.
[470] See *SL*., VII.74-75, p. 125, l. 22-126, l. 6: "Est igitur principium motivum sive causa apparentie divisionis unitas orationis secundum suam speciem ex divisione causata, quia alteram habet speciem cum est divisa, et alteram cum est composita. Principium vero defectus sive causa non-existentie divisionis est possibilitas diversorum significatorum in substantia orationis divise. Et hoc dico quia, licet oratio illo modo quo est divisa, habeat unum significatum, tamen substantia eius possibilis est ad compositionem et sic ad alterum significatum. Modi autem divisionis sunt duo. Primus modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio potest coniungere terminos vel propositiones. Et hoc dupliciter, scilicet copulando vel disiungendo: coniungere enim commune est ad copulare vel disiungere, sicut coniunctio communis est ad copulativam coniunctionem et disiunctivam et ad alias coniunctiones; est enim genus omnium earum."
[471] *SL*., VII.76, p. 127, l. 26.
[472] See *SL*., VII.78, p. 128, l. 12-15: "Causa vero apparentie accentus est unitas dictionis secundum accentum unum. Causa falsitatis accentus est diversitas significatorum per possibilitatem dictionis ab uno accentu in alterum. Accentus autem sunt duo modi"

accent signifies the people or nation[473]. The lack of specification of accentuation leads to ambiguity in signification which can be exploited in the act of disputation. But Peter seems to take the notion of 'accent' in a larger sense than that which includes the traditional types of accents and aspirations, since he seems to consider the cause of this fallacy any ambiguity generated by the way of uttering, as when in verbal speech '*quies'* (quiet) and 'qui es' (you who are) can be confused[474].

The last fallacy within language is the figure of expression (*figura dictionis*). The ambiguity generated by this fallacy rests on the fact that an expression can signify in a double way: essentially, according to the aptitude or the usual way in which the expression relates (*secundum habitum*) and accidentally, according to the actual way in which the expression relates. The last way of signifying is proper to an expression that produces a figure of expression and thus is considered the wrong way of signifying. The principle of deceiving the respondent will be "*the likening [similitudo] of one expression with another in an accidental mode of signifying*"[475]; the cause of falsity or non-existence is the incomplete or small similarity of this likeness.[476] A first figure of expression is generated when a word's specific grammatical genus is interpreted as another, like the masculine in feminine, due to syllogistic reasoning[477]. The second figure of expression arises when due to an apparent syllogistic reasoning a change in the type of predication takes place, for example from *in quid* to *in quale* or *in quantum* or *ad aliud*; this means that a term which usually stands under a specific predicament is change to stand for another predicament[478]. The third figure of expression takes place when 'something of a certain kind' (*quale quid*[479]), which is something common, is interpreted as an individual (*hoc aliquid*) due to apparent

[473] See *SL*., VII.79, p. 128.
[474] See *SL*., VII. 80, p. 129, l. 7-15: "Secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliquid potest esse dictio vel oratio, ut hic: *'tu es qui es,* s*ed quies est requies*; e*rgo tu es requies'*. Prima est duplex, quia hoc quod dico *'quies'* potest esse dictio vel oratio, et secundum hoc significat diversa."
[475] *CNP*, p. 337."
[476] See *SL*., VII.91, p. 136, l. 25-27: "Principium motivum figure dictionis est similitudo unius dictionis cum alia in modo significandi accidentali. Principium vero defectus est incompletio sive diminutio illius similitudinis."
[477] See *SL*., VII.93, p. 137, l. 7-16: "Primus est quando masculinum interpretatur femininum, vel econverso, vel quando inter hec est alterum horum, ut: *'Omnis substantia colorata albedine est alba*, *sed vir est substantia colorata albedine*; e*rgo vir est alba'*. Et similiter hic: *'omnis aqua est humida, fluvius est aqua; ergo fluvius est humida'*. In hiis duobus interpretatur masculinum femininum."
[478] See *SL*., VII.96, p. 140, l. 10-13: "Secundus autem modus figure dictionis fit quando mutamus unum modus dictionis significantis universale in alterum modum dictionis significantis universale."
[479] On the notion of *quale quid* see *LM*, II, 1, p. 501.

syllogistic reasoning[480]. Peter's example is not so straightforward as one might expect "*Coriscus est tertius ab homine, sed ipse est homo; ergo est tertius a se*". In this example the ambiguity consists in the fact that '*Coriscus*', an individual, can be interpreted as something common, something of a certain kind, and 'homo', usually a common term predicated of many, can be interpreted as an individual[481]. We will see in the following chapter what this particular fallacy has to do with the theory of supposition.

The accident is the first fallacy outside of language discussed by Peter. Here *'accidens'* is not taken in its usual sense as a predicable or that which enters in contrast with the substance but as "what is not necessary in forming the consequence"[482]. Peter suggests that the gist of this fallacy is the fact that something is said to pertain in the same time to something put as subject and to one of its inferiors or to something that pertains to that subject. An example is the paralogism "*homo est species, Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est species*". 'species' is predicated as inherent to both '*homo*' and its inferior '*Sortes*'[483]. The cause of appearance or deceiving of this apparent syllogism is the identity in substance of '*homo*', the middle term, while the cause of falsity or non-existence is its diversity in reason, since in the major premise the term stays for a universal and in the minor as a universal in relation to its inferior[484]. The three modes of the fallacy of accident will vary

[480] See *SL*., VII.97, p. 141, l. 32-p. 141, l. 3: "Tertius modus figure dictionis fit quando *quale quid* interpretatur *hoc aliquid*, idest quando modus communis mutatur in modum singularem, vel econverso, extenso nomine *'communis'* ad commune simpliciter, ut *homo* vel *animal*, et ad commune ex adiunctione alterius, ut *'Coriscus musicus'*"

[481] For the full explanation of this example see *CNP*, p. 351, note 77.

[482] *CNP*., p. 359: See *SL*., VII.103, p. 146, l. 18-27: "Et ideo dicendum quod si querat de illo accidente quod assignatur inesse utrique, tunc illud accidens non est, prout sumitur a Porfirio, unum de quinque predicabilibus, neque secundum quod sumitur ab Aristotile, unum de quatuor predicatis in *Topicis*, neque est accidens quod ex opposito dividitur contra substantiam, cum dicimus: *'quicquid est, aut est substantia, aut accidens, aut Creator substantie et accidentis'*. Sed illud accidens est idem quod *'non-necessarium in consequendo'*."

[483] See *SL*, VII.102, p. 146.

[484] See *SL*., VII.106, p. 148, l. 9-19: "Visa ratione communi paralogismorum accidentis, et quod duplex accidens exigitur semper ad paralogismos accidentis, et qualiter sumantur ibi duo modi accidentis et qualiter non, et quod duplex idemptitas exigitur in quolibet sillogismo, nunc dicendum est de causis et modis accidentis. Principium ergo motivum accidentis est idemptitas medii secundum partem prout iteratur in premissis. Et dico *'prout iteratur in premissis'*, ut non intelligatur de illa idemptitate secundum partem que est ipsius medii ad extrema, sed in se, ut iteratum est. Principium autem defectus est diversitas medii iterati secundum rationem. Verbi gratia: *'homo est species, Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est species'*. Hic est accidens, quia medium, scilicet *'homo'*, est idem secundum substantiam in premissis, prout iteratur; non autem est idem secundum rationem, quia *'homo'* subicitur in maiori pro ipso communi secundum se, et non prout est in Sortes sive secundum comparationem quam habet ad inferiora – sed in minori propositione predicatur de Sorte secundum istam comparationem, et non secundum illam; et sic est in substantia idem, diversum autem in ratione, prout iteratur.". See also *SL*., VII.117, p. 155, where Peter reformulates more clearly how this apparent syllogism works: "note also that wherever there is a sophism of accident, I say that the middle term (or that of which what is treated as being in both is truly predicated) is the thing as subject; and the minor extreme (or what is on the side of the minor extreme) is an accident of the thing as subject, whether or not it can be a subject or predicate for the middle term; and the major extreme (or what is on the side of the major extreme) I say to be the accident that is treated as being in both."(*CNP*., p. 373-374).

depending on the fact that, in an apparent syllogism, an antecedent will pertain (*accidit*) to its consequent, the consequent to the antecedent or the convertible to its convertible.

Next, the fallacy *according to something or simply* (*secundum quid et simpliciter*) is considered to be an apparent reasoning based on the fact that a part or a reduced reason or aspect of a thing signified by a word is interpreted as the whole or as the notion taken absolutely[485]. Its modes vary according to the type of part which is taken as a whole and according to the categories of relation, place and time. An example of the first mode of this fallacy will be: "*est homo mortuus, ergo est homo*". As stated, in the premise the notion of man is taken in a limited way (*secundum quid*), that is according to the notion of the dead man, while in the conclusion is taken absolutely (*simpliciter*)[486].

The fallacy called '*ignorance of refutation*' is an apparent syllogism which creates in its conclusion a contradiction between one and the same object from those that are given by necessity, with reference to (1) the same thing, (2) the same aspect, (3) the same way and (4) the same time[487]. These four conditions will constitute the variety of modes of the fallacy. In the premises of this

[485] See *SL*., VII.120, p. 157, l. 14-p. 158, l. 6: "Sequitur de fallacia *secundum quid et simpliciter.* Primo igitur nota quod *'secundum quid'* dicitur dupliciter, quia uno modo *'secundum quid'* diminuit suum totum, ut *'albus pedem'* diminuit *'album'* simpliciter, et *'homo mortuus' 'hominem'*. Et per tale *secundum quid* fit fallacia *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Alio autem modo *'secundum quid'* non diminuit suum totum, sed simpliciter ponit ipsum et infert, ut *'crispus caput; ergo crispus'*, vel *'simus nasum; ergo simus'*. Et hoc est in qualibet forma et in quolibet accidente denominante totum per partem, ut crispitudo, que per caput denominat hominem; et simitas et aquilitas soli naso insunt, et per hoc dicitur homo simus vel aquilus; et cecitas est in oculis, et per hoc dicitur homo cecus; et scientia et virtus est in anima ut in subiecto, et per hoc dicitur homo sciens vel habens virtutes; et sic de aliis consimilibus, quecumque denominant totum per partem. Alie autem forme omnes et accidentia quecumque sunt forme et accidentia ipsius totius ita quod non partis tantum – hec, inquam, omnia non possunt denominare totum nisi simpliciter insint toti. Et in talibus incidit fallacia *secundum quid et simpliciter*, quia determinatio que fit in talibus secundum partem vel secundum alium respectum diminuit ipsum simpliciter. Et tale *'secundum quid'* sumitur hic, non autem illud aliud quod non diminuit. Ex predictis autem patet quod *'secundum quid'*, prout hic sumitur, dicitur determinatio diminuens rationem eius cui adiungitur; *'simpliciter'* autem appellatur res non diminuta, sive sit accidens, sive substantia, ut *'album'*, *'nigrum'*, *'animal'*, *'homo'*"

[486] See *SL*., VII.122, p.158.

[487] See *SL*., VII.131, p. 161, l. 27-p. 162, l. 8: "Elenchus est sillogismus contradictionis unius et eiusdem, non nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis, non sinonimi, sed eiusdem, ex hiis que data sunt ex necessitate – non connumerato quod erat in principio – secundum idem, et ad idem, et similiter, et in eodem tempore. In hac enim diffinitione elenchi duo sunt, scilicet *'sillogismus'* et *'contradictio'*. Elenchus enim nichil aliud est nisi sillogismus cuius conclusio contradicit conclusioni alterius sillogismi. Et tunc elenchus est duo sillogismi sibi invicem contradicentes, vel cuius conclusio contradicit alicui propositioni prius sumpte. Et tunc elenchus est sillogismus unius cum contradictione. Et sic elenchus est semper sillogismus cum contradictione.";VII.134, p. 164, l. 1-11: "*'ignorantia elenchi'* sumitur hic non negationis, sed dipositionis; et iterum non ignorantia dispositionis que est plures sive composita, sed sumitur illa que est simplex, cum sumatur hic *'ignorantia elenchi'* ratione perfectionis elenchi et sui complementi. Que quidem perfectio fit per proprias determinationes contradictionis, ut per has scilicet *'ad idem'*, *'secundum idem'*, *'similiter'* et *'in eodem tempore'*. Preterea quod hic sumatur ignorantia dispositionis ut est simplex, patet per hoc quod est principium arguendi, et sic comparatur ut principium ad conclusionem. Et ita per hanc simplicem ignorantiam causatur postea composita sive plures, cum decipitur respondens per eam sophistice arguendo."

apparent syllogism one and the same object is taken successively according to a particular aspect (*secundum quid*). This fact makes an apparent contradiction at the level of premises deceiving the respondent in accepting a contradictory conclusion predicated about the same object, but this time taken absolutely (*simpliciter*). An example will be the following apparent syllogism "*homo est species, nullus homo est species; ergo idem est species et non species*"[488]. The object human is taken in the major premise as a universal which is a species; in the minor premise, as a collection of particulars; in the conclusion, the two *secundum quid* meanings from the premises are disregarded and transform in *simpliciter* meanings within a contradiction.

Petitio eius quod est in principio or *asking for what was in the beginning* is the fallacy in which the conclusion or that which needs to be proven by the premises is asked (*petitur*) in the premises[489]. The fallacy does not consist of the simple repetition of the conclusion in the premises under the same form or name, but also of the repetition under a different name with the same reason or meaning. This difference in form creates an apparent difference between the conclusion and the premise and thus the appearance of a good syllogism. The modes of this fallacy are distinguished by the types of repetition: the defined in definition (or conversely), the particular in the universal, the universal in particular, the conjunct in its parts and one of the correlatives into the other. An illustrative example of the first mode will be the enthymeme *"animal rationale mortale currit, ergo homo currit*". Here the conclusion is repeating what was stated in the premise, since the subject '*homo*' is repeated in the premise under a different name but with the same reason through its definition '*animal rationale mortale*'[490].

The fallacy of consequent deceives the respondent into accepting an apparent syllogism which infers from a premise composed of an antecedent and a consequent (if A, then B), a conclusion formed by its converse. The falsity of the syllogism consists in the fact that the premise cannot be converted correctly[491]. The modes of this fallacy are conceived according to the way the

[488] See *SL*., VII.137, p. 165.
[489] See *SL*., VII.141, p. 166, l. 25-30: "Sciendum ergo quod petere id quod est in principio, prout hic sumitur, est quando conclusio que debet probari petitur in premissis. Cum ergo idem sub eodem nomine non possit se ipso probari (quia semper probans diversum est ab eo quod debet probari), sed idem et sub eodem nomine nec est diversum nec diversum videtur, ergo idem et sub eodem nomine non potest se ipso probari"
[490] See *SL*., VII.143, p. 167.
[491] See *SL*., VII.156, p. 170, l. 13-21: "Principium autem motivum *consequentis* est convenientia recte consequentie ad suam conversam. Principium autem defectus est falsitas converse. Et hanc duplicem causam breviter tangit Aristotiles dicens „eo quod putant consequentiam converti" que non convertitur. Per hoc enim quod dicit *'consequentiam'* tangit rectam consequentiam, que est principium motivum ad credendum suam conversam; per hoc autem quod dicit *'converti'* tangit conversam eius. Et hec est falsa consequentia, que est principium defectus."

consequence from the conclusion is obtained: according to the local dispositions (*si* A, B; *ergo si* B, A), according to circumstances inherent to a person (with the same form: "if he is an adulterer, he is sleekly dressed or a night prowler; therefore if he is sleekly dressed or a night prowler, he is an adulterer"[492]) and according to the opposition (*si* A, B; *ergo si non-A*, *non-B*: "If it was made, it has a beginning; therefore, if it was not made, it does not have a beginning."[493]).

Non-cause as cause is the fallacy according to which, in a syllogism that argues to something impossible, a thing is taken as the cause for that impossibility when in fact the true cause of the impossibility is something else contained in the other premises of the syllogism. As a cause of that impossibility, the premise in question is negated in a second conclusion[494]. One of the examples offered by Peter is "No donkey is a mortal rational animal; a human is a donkey and Brownie is a human; therefore, a human is not a mortal rational animal; but this is impossible; therefore, not: Brownie is a human"[495]. When someone is inquiring if Brownie is a man, the cause of the impossibility is taken to be the premise "*Brownie is a human*", when in fact the impossibility is obtain without that premise, from 'a human is a donkey'. The deceiving rests in the fact that the Brownie being a human is taken as the cause for the impossibility when it is not[496].

The last fallacy discussed by Peter is called '*several questions as one'* (*fallacia secundum plures interogationes ut unam*). The discussion surrounding this fallacy starts with certain considerations regarding the identity in substance and the proper differences of statements (*enuntiationes*), propositions (*propositiones*), questions (*quaestiones*) and conclusions (*conclusiones*). As the name of the fallacy suggests, the main concern is the question. Question differs from the other types of expressions by its mod of questioning (*modus interrogandi*) and has in common with the other types the so-called 'unity' of the proposition. This unity makes the proposition one according to the different acceptance of the oneness: by analogy, in genus, in

[492] DINNEEN (1990), p. 151.
[493] CNP., p. 401.
[494] See *SL*., VII.164, p. 173, l. 30-174, l. 3: "Sillogismus autem ad impossibile est quando sillogistice ducitur ad aliquod impossibile et propter hoc interimitur aliqua premissarum que est causa illius impossibilis. Unde iste sillogismus semper habet duas conclusiones."
[495] See CNP, p. 407; see SL., VII.165, p. 174.
[496] See *SL*., VII.165, p. 174, l. 12-26: "Sciendum autem quod *non-causa ut causa* semper fit in sillogismis ad impossibile. Fallacia autem secundum non-causam ut causam fit cum non causa ponitur ut causa propter quam apparet sequi impossibile, et illud quod apparet esse causa, postea interimitur, ut si queratur: *'estne Brunellus homo?'*; quo concesso contra: *'nullus asinus est animal rationale mortale, homo est asinus et Brunellus est homo; ergo homo non est animal rationale mortale, sed hoc est impossibile, non ergo Brunellus est homo'*. In hac enim argumentatione est *non causa ut causa,* quia interimitur hoc quod apparet esse causa illius impossibilis et non est, scilicet: *'Brunellus est homo'*; sine ipsa enim ex aliis sequitur impossibile. Et erit sillogismus in quarto prime, ut dictum est prius."

species, in number and in accident[497]. The fallacy arises when the interrogation has its unity of the mode of questioning but lacks the unity of the proposition. The interrogative unity of the mode of questioning is the cause that deceives the respondent into believing that there are no multiple questions, while the lack of propositional unity is the cause of falsity or non-existence[498]. Thus, this fallacy will consist in presenting a question which contains a multiplicity and demanding a unitary response. This fact can be seen in the first mode, where in the place of the subject or predicate are put several things in a singular number as "is that and that a man?" while pointing out two different individuals, Sortes and Brunellus. A positive response will offer the false conclusion "Brunellus is a man", while a negative one will bear the same result "Sortes is not a man", putting the respondent into a paradoxical position. Since the interrogation is in fact plural, a correct response to avoid the fallacy will involve a plurality, since the question is true for some members of the plurality and false for others. The secondo mode will involve the same lines of reasoning with the only difference that this time the number is plural: "are those goods?" while pointing to something good and something bad[499].

In the remaining part of the tract dedicated to fallacies (*SL*., VII.179-190), Peter, following Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*, discusses the special and general reductions of fallacies. According to him all the thirteen types of fallacies can be reduced to the ignorance of refutation (*ignorantia elenchi*) since, generally speaking, on the one hand, all the fallacies are against the differences presented in the *ignoratio elenchi*, and on the other hand, all the apparent syllogisms and paradoxes are against the proper syllogistic form and contradiction, elements which define a correct refutation of an adversary in a disputation[500]. In the following subsection we will show some possible links between Peter's extensive treatment of fallacies and his theory of supposition.

[497] See CNP., p. 411; see *SL*., VII.173-174, p. 177-178.
[498] See CNP, p. 413; see *SL*., VII.175, p. 178, l. 22-28: "Interrogatio autem plures est quando in interrogatione manet unitas modi interrogandi et deficit unitas que facit propositionem unam, que erat unitas simpliciter. Et quia manet ibi unitas modi interrogandi, ideo dicitur *'interrogatio'*; et quia deficit altera unitas, que erat unitas simpliciter, ideo dicitur *'plures'*. Et ideo bene coniunguntur hec duo insimul, scilicet *'interrogatio'* et *'plures'*, licet appareat dissonantia inter substantivum et adiectivum."
[499] See *SL*., VII.177-178, p. 179.
[500] See *SL*., VII.179, p. 180, l. 5-16: "Fieri quidem solet duplex distinctio ignorantie elenchi, secundum quod est una specialis de tredecim fallaciis, et secundum quod est generalis ad quam omnes tredecim fallacie reducuntur. Uno enim modo distinguitur sic quod ignorantia elenchi dicitur *'specialis'* secundum quod ignorantia elenchi causatur ignorantia harum differentiarum, scilicet *ad idem* et *secundum idem* et *similiter* et *in eodem tempore*; et sic ignorantia elenchi est contra formam completivam elenchi, quia iste differentie sunt completive contradictionis et sic elenchi, cum contradictio sit completiva elenchi. Secundum autem quod ignorantia elenchi causatur communiter ab ignorantia omnium differentiarum in diffinitione elenchi positarum, ita est generalis, et sic ad ipsam omnes fallacie reducuntur."

1.2.7.3. Fallacies and the theory of supposition

If we analyze the entire discussion of *SL* on fallacies, we can observe that Peter uses heavily terminology taken from the lexical field of *suppositio*. But his use does not always and necessary refer to the theory of supposition. In the majority of cases, '*suppositum*' often appears in a pair with '*appositum*'; the first means the fact of being put as subject in a proposition, while the second, being put as a direct object of the verb. In this sense, '*suppono'*, '*supponere'* has a similar meaning with the term '*subicio', 'subicire'*. The same can be said about the expression '*supponit verbo*' which means that something stands as subject for the verb. Those senses of *suppositio-terminology* clearly predate the *logica moderna*, especially since they appear in a treatise which pertains to *logica antiquorum*. But surely enough, between the theories of these two types of logic there are certain connections. In this sense, up to this point, we can make at least three remarks about the connection between the theory of supposition and the theory of fallacies. The first is that, in the tract six, dedicated to the theory of supposition, Peter qualifies the transition during a syllogistic reasoning from multiple determinate suppositions to a determinate one[501] and from a simple supposition to a personal supposition[502] as the fallacy of language named '*figura dictionis'*. The second one is related to the first; in his seventh tract, Peter strengthens the idea according to which supposition theory has a direct use in the detection of fallacious reasoning. In his discussion on the fallacies of accident and figure of expression he offers examples of apparent syllogisms where the cause of falsity or non-existence can be understood as an illegitimate change of the suppositio of a term, an ultimately of its *suppositum*. The third remark is that the entire order of *Tractatus*' books argued by De Rijk[503] seems to support the idea that one of the main uses of the supposition theory is to find and refute fallacious reasoning. The section containing the theory of supposition is put right before the treatment of fallacies and explicitly states, according to the aforementioned first remark, that some specific changes of the terms' supposition within an argument causes fallacies. The definition of fallacies afterwards comes as a natural further step. In the spirit of these three

[501] See for examples SL., VI.8, p. 82: "*'animal est Sortes, animal est Plato, animal est Cicero*, et sic de aliis; *ergo animal est omnis homo'*, hic est figura dictionis a pluribus determinatis ad unam"; see alsoo VII.180-190, pp. 181-184.
[502] For example, see *SL*., VI.6, p. 81: "Unde non sequitur: *'omne animal preter hominem est irrationale; ergo omne animal preter hunc hominem'*, sed est ibi figura dictionis, procedendo a simplici ad personalem. Similiter hic: *'homo est species; ergo aliquis homo est species'*; et hic: *'omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est hoc animal'*. In omnibus enim hiis sit processus a simplici ad personalem suppositionem."
[503] See *SL*., XLVI-LIV.

points, in the following rows, we want to explain what additional information can the treatment of fallacies offer us about the theory of supposition an its use.

The figure of expression is defined as a fallacy caused by the apparent similarity between two modes of signifying which in reality are different. These two figures are not different in the material form of expression, that is, they are not different words, but in their mode of signifying (*modus significandi*) an object[504]. The most representative mode of this fallacy for the supposition theory is the third one. Here, the fallacy is generated by the fact that the mode of an expression to signify an individual (*hoc aliquid - this certain thing*) is confused with the mode of signifying a universal or something common (*quale quid - something of a certain kind*), or vice versa[505]. Two of the clearest examples are: (e.g. 1) *'animal est Sortes, animal est Plato* (et sic de singulis); *ergo animal est omnis homo'*; (e.g. 2) *'homo est species*, *iste homo est homo*; *ergo iste homo est species'*[506]. Those two examples are versions of fallacies that Peter offered in *SL*., VI.8 and *SL*., VI.6[507]. In the first example, '*animal*', usually being a *quale quid*, has a universal mode of signifying, but, since 'Sortes', 'Plato' and each singular term signify an individual, the apparent situation is that '*animal*' is signifying and individual, a *hoc aliquid*[508]. For the theory of supposition this will mean that '*animal*' is falsely taken as having a determinate supposition in which a term stands for its inferiors, individuals designated by it which renders the premises true. Although Peter says that this paralogism is usually called by a certain group of people (*solent appelari*) *from multiple determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition*[509], if we take into account the definition of simple supposition and the discussion provided in the *dubia* and *solutio* sections of *SL.*VI, it seems that in reality '*animal*' has simple supposition, and the syllogistic transition from premises to conclusion will be equal to a transition from an apparent determinate supposition to a simple one. Regarding the second example the situation is reversed, '*homo*' has a mode of

[504] See *SL*., VII.89, p. 135.
[505] See *SL*., VII.97, p. 142.
[506] For the two examples see *SL*., VII.98-99, p. 143-144
[507] It is probably important to note that in *SL* VI when he offers an example of *a simplici ad personalem* he uses for the personal supposition a determinate supposition: *'homo est species; ergo aliquis homo est species'* but in *SL* VI when he offers an example of the same transition, he uses a discrete supposition: *'homo est species*, *iste homo est homo*; *ergo iste homo est species'*. This bags the question regarding the unity of the two tracts and Peter's division of supposition.
[508] See SL., VII.98, p.144, l. 3-7.
[509] See SL., VII.99, p. 144, l. 16-19: "Et solent appellare istum paralogismum et consimiles *'a pluribus determinatis suppositionibus ad unam determinatam suppositionem'*, quia *'animal'* in premissis et in conclusione determinatam habet suppositionem."

signifying a universal and '*iste homo*', a particular. Since '*homo*' is predicated in the minor premise about '*iste homo*', in the conclusion '*iste homo*' takes the apparent mode of signifying a universal. For the supposition theory this means that from a term that has simple supposition, '*homo*' from the major premise, a descending inference has been made to one of its inferiors '*iste homo*', fact which violets the rule o simple supposition. Moreover, to make this fallacy more explicit, the same example from *SL*., VI.6 is reused in SL., VII. 99 (*'omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est hoc animal'*). The purpose is to express that the transition from simple supposition in the premise to a personal supposition in its conclusion generates an apparent syllogism which can be used to deceive the respondent into believing that '*hoc animal*' signifies in a universal way. A proper knowledge of supposition theory will help in detecting the difference in supposition from premises to conclusion and establish clearly the possible entities for which the terms stand in relation of supposition. In this way, the *causae apparentiae* of the fallacy, the resemblance between the modes of signifying, will be destroyed. The supposition theory will stop the act of deceiving by strengthening the obviousness of the cause of falsity or non-existent of a fallacy. The same considerations will apply to the fallacy of accident, the partial counterpart of *figura dictionis* for the fallacies outside the language, since "wherever there is figure of expression, there is always accident and not conversely"[510]. The only difference being that in the case of accident, the cause of appearance will be the apparent identity between supposits (*supposita*), elements of reality for which the terms stand for, not an apparent identity between suppositions or terms with certain supposition, thus elements of language, as in the case of *figura dictionis*.

1.2.8 Tractatus 8 - *De relativis*

In the part of *SL* dedicated to the theory of supposition, Peter has established a method for analyzing propositions by determining for which things certain terms can stand. In the last part of his book, tracts 8-12, this method will be enriched with additional tools of analysis, all based on the theory of supposition. These tools can be conceived as properties of terms (*proprietates terminorum*), although Peter does not call them so[511]. One of the first determinants of the proposition taken into account is the relative (*relativum*). In what follows we will offer a short

[510] CNP., p. 373., See SL., VII.116, p. 154, l. 24-5

[511] These properties were in general considered properties of terms. LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, ed. Alessio, p. 205: "Multe autem sunt proprietates termini, scilicet: suppositio, appellatio, restrictio, distinctio et relatio". For Sherwood, the list is shorter: "Et sunt hae proprietates: (1) significatio, (2) suppositio, (3) copulatio et (4) appellatio" SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, ed. Lohr, 5.0.1, p. 265, l. 7-8.

description of Peter's theory of relatives. In the first part, the definition and classification of relatives will be taken into account, in the second some specific rules which regulate this property of terms.

1.2.8.1. Definition and classification of relatives. The difference between suppono, supponere and refero, referre

The next propositional element taken into account by Peter is the relative or *relativum*. Its definition is explicitly taken from Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae*[512]. Being so, it has certain differences from Aristotle's understanding of relatives as entities in the predicament of relation (*ad aliquid*), which have their being in relation with another or a certain relation with another. For Peter "the relative is recollective of a thing brought in before it"[513]. Understood in this grammatical way, *relativum* is a pronoun, noun or adverb that determined another part of proposition regarding which produces a recollection. Although its paradigmatic example is the relative pronoun as in "*Sortes currit, qui disputat*"[514], the discussion comprises a classification of relatives conducted in the following manner:

Relatives of substance: *qui, ille, alius*
- Relatives of identity: *qui, quod, ille, idem*
  - Reciprocal relatives: *sui, sibi, se, a se*
  - Non-reciprocal relatives: *qui, ille, idem*
- Relatives of difference: *alius*

Relatives of accidents: *talis, qualis, tantus*
- Relatives of identity: *talis*
  - Relatives of quality: *talis, qualis*
  - Relatives of quantity: *tantus, quantus*
- Relatives of difference: *alteriusmodi*

In order to obtain the aforementioned division of relatives, on the one hand, Peter uses the notion expressed by the verb *refero, referre* to distinguish between relatives of substance and of accidents, and, on the other hand, he uses the same notion along with that of *suppositio* to distinguish between relatives of identity and difference. Accordingly, first, he defines the relative of substance as being

[512] See PRIS., *Inst*., II, 17, p. 141, l. 20-142, l. 20.
[513] *CNP*., p. 427; SL., VIII.1, p. 185, l. 6-7: "relativum est rei antelate recordativum".
[514] *SL*., VIII.1, p. 185, l. 8.

the relative which makes a reference (*refert*) to the same object (*res*) in number as its antecedent or as the term which the relative determinates, in contrast with accidental relatives which makes a reference to the same thing in species[515]. The same differences are offered according to the way the reference takes place: for relatives of substance the reference is made in an univocal manner since both the relative and its referent are in the category of substance; for relatives of accident the reference takes places in an denominative way since the referent is in the category of quality or quantity as in "*Sortes est albus et talis est Plato*."[516] The difference between supposition and reference comes in when Peter establishes the difference between relatives of identity and those of difference. Inasmuch as relatives of identity are concerned, both in the cases of relatives of substance and of accident, the reference of the relative, that is, the object signified by the term to which it produces a recollection, and the supposition of the relative, that it the object for which the relative stands for, are identical[517]. Inasmuch as relatives of difference are concerned, the referent of the relative is different from its suppositum: "*Sortes currit et alius disputat" "Sortes est albus et alteriusmodi est Plato"*. '*Alius*' is referring to Socrates while it supposits for an individual different from him. "Alteriusmodi" is refereeing to the same species of quality of being white while it supposits for a different species from being white. In this way, the reference, the relation or the act described by the verb *refero, referre*, is used, on the one hand directly, in an intra-propositional way to designate the part of the proposition to which a relative makes a recollection, and on the other hand, indirectly, to designate the entity signified by the recollected term. But supposition, in contrast to reference, tells us for what entity the relative term stands for independent of its recollected term or object. Thus, supposition and the medieval notion of reference taken from Priscian are not conceptually and functionally the same.

As Peter inquires in *SL.*, VIII.4-9, in more complex propositional contexts fixing the right reference for a relative can be difficult when grammatically speaking there are more possibilities.

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[515] See *SL.*, VIII.2, p. 185, l. 15-16: "Relativum autem substantie est quod refert idem in numero cum suo antecedente, ut *'qui'*, *'ille'*."; VIII.16, p. 192, l. 10-14: "Alia autem datur differentia eorundem quod relativum substantie refert idem numero, relativum autem accidentis refert idem specie, ut *'Sortes est albus et talis est Plato'* quia idem accidens in numero non potest esse in diversis subiectis, sed idem accidens in specie."

[516] See *SL.,* VIII.16, p. 192, l. 2-9: "Relativum autem accidentis est quod refert rem eandem per modum denominationis, ut *'tale'*, *'quale'*, et consimilia. Unde hec est differentia relativi substantie ad relativum accidentis, quia relativum substantie refert rem univocem, sive per modum eius qui est *quid*, ut *'albedo que est in pariete'*, *'color qui est in corpore'*, et sic de aliis – relativum autem accidentis est quod refert rem per modum denominationis, ut *'Sortes est albus et talis est Plato'*."

[517] One example for the relative of substance is "Sortes currit, qui disputat" and for relative of accident is "Sortes est albus, et talis est Plato".

Deceiving may also occur, fact which will result in the possibility of constructing apparent syllogisms which will appeal to the fallacy of composition and division.

1.2.8.2 Rules of relatives

On the section dedicated to the relatives of substance the tract establishes three specific rules about relatives:

> R1: "if a relative of difference is added to something higher and lower, what is added to the higher is made lower and what is added to the lower is made higher."
>
> R2: "no proposition begun by a relative has a contradictory"
>
> R3: "every non-reflexive relative of sameness must have the same supposition that its antecedent has"[518]

R1 states that if we consider the relation between a relative of difference and the term to which it refers, for example, '*aliud ab animali*' '*aliud ab homine*' we can infer using the place from species the proposition obtained by substituting the genus '*animal*' with its inferior, the species homo. This means that a superior, '*animal*', becomes and inferior, '*homo*', when a relative of diversity is added and vice versa. Regarding the second rule, Peter states that the rule is false since every proposition has a contradictory; moreover, the contradictory of a relative proposition is established according to the agreement or disagreement between the subject and the predicate of the relative proposition and not in relation to the antecedent to which the relative relates. The third rule, R3, makes explicit what the definition of relatives of identity pointed out: the supposition of the relative term and that of the antecedent regarding which the relative makes a recollection or refers must be identical[519].

1.2.9. Tractatus 9 - *De ampliationibus*

Tract nine and eleven are dedicated to two properties of terms with personal supposition that bear and opposite effect: ampliation (*ampliatio*) and restriction (*restrictio*). In the following subchapter we will discuss only the first one.

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[518] See CNP, p. 433, 435; See *SL*., VIII.11, p. 189, l. 20-22: R1 "si relativum diversitatis addatur superiori et inferiori, quod additur superiori fit inferius et quod additur inferiori fit superius."; VIII.12, p. 190, l. 4-5: R2 "*nulla propositio inchoata a relativo habet contradictoriam*"; VIII.15, p. 191, l. 22-24: R3 "omne relativum idemptitatis non-reciprocum debet habere eandem suppositionem quam habet suum antecedens."

[519] *SL*., VIII.3, p. 185: "relativum idemptitatis est quod refert et supponit pro eodem". See SL., VIII.15, p. 191, l. 25-30 for Peter's example in which this rule leads to the strange situation in which Peter obtains the proposition "Every man is Socrates".

Peter begins his discussion of ampliation by offering again the definition of personal supposition from *SL*., VI.7, since ampliation and restriction are said to be its properties. Ampliation is defined as "the widening of a common term from a smaller supposition to a larger one"[520] in contrast to restriction, "*the narrowing of a common term from a larger supposition to a smaller one*"[521]. The property of ampliation means in fact the enlargement of the domain of entities for which a common term can stand. This can happen due to the intra-propositional context of the term, that is, due to the different elements of the proposition. According to the division of ampliation from *SL*., IX.3, verbs (for example, '*potest*'), names (for example, '*Antichristum*'), participles (for example, '*potens*'), and adverbs (for example, '*necessario*') can ampliate (*ampliat*) the supposition a term has in virtue of their semantical content. The most common case is that in which the common term with personal supposition is forced by the propositional context to stand for its inferiors that are placed in the future, as in the case "*homo potest esse Antichristus*"[522]; "*homo*" stands for those men that are and will be due to the verb '*potest*' that ampliates to entities from the future.

From the theoretical elements of ampliation theory it is not clear if we can speak about an original domain of supposition a term can have before ampliation. We may wonder if this original domain is represented by its signification or its supposition where the propositional context is not fully analyzed or by what the supposition of that term seems to be for a participant in a disputation. On the theoretical level, a maximum possible domain of ampliation can be represent by the natural supposition of that term, where, as seen previously, the entities for which a term can stand are not restricted by the propositional context. For the proper understanding of the ampliative effect of some elements of proposition, it must be noted that the personal supposition is a specific kind of accidental supposition, a supposition in which a term is taken in the place of those requested by the one added to it[523], that is, in which a term is taken in the place of those required by the other elements of the proposition. Ampliation seems to be an explanation of this accidental aspect, an explanation needed in more complex propositional contexts, where establishing the specific

[520] *CNP*., p. 441; *SL*., IX.2, p. 194, l. 13-14: "Ampliatio est extensio termini communis a minori suppositione ad maiorem."
[521] *CNP*., p. 441.
[522] *SL*., IX.2, p. 194, l. 14.
[523] For different interpenetrations and translations of the passage from *SL*., VI.4, p. 81, l. 5-6 see *CNP*., p. 243 and DINNEEN (1990), p. 70. In our opinion the two English translations are missing the point of the definition.

entities for which a term stands is not so straightforward as in a simple proposition like "*homo currit*".

Regarding the rules of ampliation, Peter is offering them according to a difference between types of ampliation. First, the ampliative aspect is considered according to the fact that the common term is put as subject for a verb that has the power to ampliate (*vis ampliandi*) and second, the ampliative aspect is considered according to time:

> R1: "a common term as subject for a verb that has the power to ampliate, by itself or by another, is ampliated to those items that can exist under the form of the subject term"
>
> R2: "a common term as subject, or as predicate, for a verb that has the power to ampliate as to tense supposits for items that are and that always will be"[524]

The first rule only states formally and explicitly how the effect of ampliation takes place. The verb, due to its own ampliative power or the power given by other propositional elements, extends the domain of personal supposition of its subject. The second one makes explicit the temporal effect of ampliation and states that the ampliative effect affects even the predicative names. The exampled offered is "*homo necessario est animal*". Here the adverb '*necessario*' ampliates both '*homo*' and '*animal*', from standing only for present entities to standing for present and future humans and animals[525].

1.2.10. Tractatus 10 - *De appellationibus*

Occupying a page and a half, the tract dedicated to the property of terms named 'appellation' (*appellatio*), is the smallest book of *SL*. Although, as we will see in the section dedicated to this problem, appellation played an important role in the development of supposition theory, Peter differentiates it from supposition despite the similarity between the two definitions[526]. He is defining appellation almost as a sub-species of supposition[527], since appellation is said to be "taking a common term in place of a thing that exists"[528]. Appellation, signification and

[524] *CNP*., p. 443, 445; *SL*., IX.5, p. 196, l. 1-3: R1 "terminus communis supponens verbo habenti vim ampliandi a se vel ab alio ampliatur ad ea que possunt esse sub forma termini supponentis"; IX.6, p. 196, l. 13-15: R2 "terminus communis supponens vel apponens verbo habenti vim ampliandi quoad tempus supponit pro hiis que sunt et que semper erunt."

[525] See *SL*., IX.6, p. 196, l. 16-17.

[526] For a short analysis of the concept of appellation in 13th century see DE LIBERA, "Le traité "De appellatione" de Lambert de Lagny (Lambert d'Auxerre)" in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 48 (1981), pp. 227-250; for the conceptual interplay between the terms of 'appellatio' and 'suppositio' in the early fallacy tradition, see sub-chapter *1.3.1.1. The logical tradition*.

[527] See DE LIBERA (1981). De Libera understands Peter's appellation as a supposition restricted to existing things.

[528] *CNP*., p. 447; *SL*., X.1, p. 197, l. 4: "appellatio est acceptio termini communis pro re existente"

supposition are different, since the last two deal with both existent (*ens*) and non-existent (*non-ens*) entities. Further, appellation is analyzed in contrast to signification and supposition according to the types of terms. Singular terms like proper names signify, stand in relation of supposition and stand in relation of appellation for the same existing object[529]. In the case of the common terms the situation is different depending on the type of supposition they have. On the one hand, a common term with simple supposition signifies, stands in relation of supposition and appellation for the same existing entity, a universal; in '*homo est species*', '*homo*' signifies, supposits and appellates for the same common nature[530]. On the other hand, a common term with personal supposition signifies a common nature, but stands in relation of supposition and appellation for existing individuals. In "*homo currit*", '*homo*' signifies the human in common, but supposits for individual humans and appellates existing individual humans[531].

Regarding the aforementioned observations on appellation, we must note two things. First, in the passages dedicated to the appellation of a common term with simple supposition Peter seems to fully embrace the realist commitment regarding the existence of universals. In the case of a term with simple supposition, the signification, supposition and appellation are identical describing three overlapping relations between a common term and a universal or a common nature that exists. What he means by this existence is the topic of our second remark. The notion of existence that appellation uses seems to refer to the material existence of an entity. 'Cesar', 'Antichristus' and 'chimera' have no appellation since the entities that they describe do not actually exist, even if their notions are conceivable, that is, we understand what 'Cesar' 'Antichristus' and 'chimera' mean[532]. Although the example offered in *SL*.X.2 for a singular term is 'Sortis', Peter is careful to use names as 'Iohannes' and 'Petrus' which can signify actual existing individuals and not historical figures that in the moment of appellation do not exist. The situation becomes more

[529] See *SL*., X.2, p. 197, l. 16-19: "Terminus singularis idem significat et supponit et appellat, quia significat rem existentem, ut *'Petrus'* vel *'Iohannes'*"

[530] See *SL*., X.3, p. 197, l. 21-198, l. 3: "Item, appellationis termini communis alia est termini communis pro ipsa re in communi, ut quando terminus communis habet simplicem suppositionem. Ut cum dicitur *'homo est species'* vel *'animal est genus'*. Et tunc terminus communis idem significat et supponit et appellat, ut *'homo'* significat *hominem* in communi et supponit pro *homine* in communi et appellat hominem in communi."

[531] See *SL*., X.4, p. 198, l. 4-8: "Alia autem est termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut quando terminus communis habet personalem suppositionem. Ut cum dicitur *'homo currit'*, tunc *'homo'* non idem significat et supponit et appellat, sed significat *hominem* in communi et supponit pro particularibus hominibus et appellat particulares homines existentes."

[532] See *SL*., XI.1, p. 197, l. 5-7: "Dico autem *'pro re existente'*, quia terminus significans non ens nichil appellat, ut *'Cesar'* vel *'Antichristus'* et *'chimera'*, et sic de aliis."

complex when we talk about the propositional context. The problem of existence begs more questions when the expression used in the theory of supposition '*acceptio pro presentibus'* - in the case in which a term is forced to stand in the place of present things - is put in contrast with the expression '*acceptio pro existentibus*' - in the case of appellation. Although Peter seems to be silent thus far regarding the difference between presence and existence, some clarifications will be offered in the eleventh tract dedicated to the problem of restriction. There, in the paragraphs 16 and 17[533], while discussing the sophism "*omne animal fuit in archa Noe*", our author states that the verb, according to its consignification, is only responsible for the temporal aspect of the subject's *supposita* and thus can make the subject to stand for present, past or future entities that come under the form of the term, and not for their existence. Accordingly, a verb at present tense restricts the *supposita* to entities that presently come under the form of the suppositing term independent of their existence. A term can have a present *suppositum* while it does not have an *appellatum*. For example, in "*Caesar currit*", it can be said that the subject stands for Caesar which presently comes under the form of the suppositing term, while Caesar does not exist actually, it does not appellate an existing entity. Or, a term can have a present suppositum which is identical with an existing entity, its *appellatum*. In "*iste homo currit*", the running individual pointed out, which presently comes under the form of the discrete term is an existing entity[534]. Thus, supposition is not concerned about the existence of its suppositum but only about its presence in a certain time indicated by the verb. However, the difference between material existence and presence under the form of a term is not so clearly defined. In the absence of a semantical conceptual tool for establishing unique individuals, the boundaries between *ens* and *non-ens* are not accurately stated and thus, is hard to determine whether the suppositum and appellatum of a term are identical or not.

[533] See *SL*., XI.16,17, p. 206-207.

[534] For Peter's explanation and examples see *SL*., XI.17, p. 207, l. 9-21: "Ad aliud dicendum quod duplex est forma termini communis, quia quedam est que salvatur tantum in rebus existentibus, ut *'humanitas'*, que est forma hominis, et *'animalitas'* animalis; et in talibus terminis omnia supposita presentia sunt existentia. Alia est forma termini communis que salvatur tam in rebus existentibus quam non existentibus. Ut *'enuntiabilitas'*, que est forma enuntiabilis, quia quedam enuntiabilia sunt existentia, ut *'Deum esse'* et omnia vera, et alia sunt non existentia, ut *'hominem esse asinum'* et omnia falsa; et in talibus cum restringitur terminus communis ad presentia, restringitur tam ad existentia quam ad non existentia. Unde istius propositionis: *'rosa non est'* sensus non est: *rosa que est, non est,* sed is est sensus: *rosa presentialiter sumpta non est.*"

1.2.11. Tractatus 11 - *De restrictionibus*

Tract eleven of *SL* is dedicated to the property called 'restriction' (*restrictio*) which, according to its effect, is the opposed property to ampliation that was discussed in chapter nine. In what follows we will summarize Peter's definition, classification and rules offered for this property.

As stated by Peter in chapter nine, restriction is defined as the "narrowing [of] a common term from a larger to a smaller supposition"[535]. This narrowing (*coarctatio*) of the domain of the *supposita* a common term can have is produced by different parts of the propositional context as: simple parts (name, verb and participle) and composed parts (a relative clause or *implicatio*)[536]. All those parts of the propositional context qualify and determine the possible *supposita* of the common term with personal supposition. Although the majority of restrictions are caused by a part of the propositional context, two additional types of restriction will be considered in a different way: restriction by usage (*ab usu*) and by verb's transitivity (*per transitionem verbi*).

After defining and stating the means through which restriction takes place, Peter is offering a series of nine rules that offers us further details regarding:

a. Restriction made by name

R1: "*every non-reductive name whose nature is not to ampliate, when joined on the same side to a more general term, restricts it to suppositing for those items that its signification requires*"

R2: "*if a universal sign extends to a restricted term, it distributes it only for the items to which it is restricted*"

R3: "*as to primary signification, nothing posited on the side of the predicate can restrict a common term posited on the side of the subject*"[537]

b. Restriction made by relative clause

R4: "*every embedded clause directly connected with a common term restricts it just as its own adjective does*"

R5: "*whenever a universal sign and an embedded clause are put in the same statement, the sentence is ambiguous*"[538]

c. Restriction made by a verb

[535] *CNP*., 449; See *SL*., XI.1, p. 199, l. 5-6, IX.2, p. 194, l. 10-11.
[536] See *SL*., XI.2, p. 199.
[537] For R1, *CNP*., p. 449; R2 and R3, *CNP*., p. 451.
[538] For R4 and R5, *CNP*., p. 453.

R6: "*a common term as subject, or as predicate, with a present-tense verb used unqualifiedly - without any ampliating effect on its own or from another word - is restricted to suppositing for items that come under the form of the suppositing term*"
R7: "*a common term as subject, or as predicate, with a past-tense verb used unqualifiedly - without any ampliating effect of its own or from another word-is restricted to suppositing for items that are or were under the form of the suppositing term*"
R8: "*a common term as subject, or as predicate, with a future-tense verb, and so on, supposits for items that are or will be under the form of the suppositing term, if the items that are will be in the future*"
R9: "*every verb used unqualifiedly - without any ampliating effect from itself or from another word - restricts the term that is its subject as to consignification, which is tense, and not as to its own signification*."[539]

Regarding the restriction that takes place through a name, Peter identifies three cases when a term has its supposition narrowed according to: an inferior adjacent to a superior (*animal-homo*), a specific difference added to a genus (*animal rationale*) and accidental adjective (*homo albus*). In the first case *animal* is restricted to supposit only for those humans that are animals; in the second, only for those animals that are rational; in the third, only for those humans that are white[540]. Although in these three examples and in more to follow the terms that supposit do not appear in a propositional context, it is our strong belief that Peter does not consider here a supposition that is not context-dependent[541]. Here, the purpose of the analysis is to isolate the subject part of a possible proposition in order to properly explain the specific mechanics of restriction. Regarding the rules offered for the restriction made through names, Peter states first (R1) that the restriction of the suppositing term takes place according to the signification of the term which is added on the subject part and not, as we will see in the case of the verb, according to the consignification. Secondly (R2), if a universal sign, like *omnis*, is added to a suppositing term that is already restricted by a term added to it, the descending caused by the universal sign takes place from the restricted term, that is, from the suppositing term narrowed by the name added to it. Thirdly (R3) and in relation to the first rule, Peter states that the predicate, according to its signification, has no restrictive

[539] For R6, *CNP*., p. 453; R7 and R8, *CNP*., p. 455; for R9, *CNP*., p. 459.
[540] See *SL.,* XI.3, p. 199. The action of narrowing takes place reciprocal between the two terms, for examples the *homo* is narrowed to the humans which are white, and white is narrow to the whiteness which is in humans, see. *SL*, XI.5, p. 200.
[541] De Rijk seems to have such a context-independent thesis. See DE RIJK (1971), p. 79; See DE RIJK (1971), p. 76-80.

power over the subject. In this way, the two constructions '*homo albus*' and '*homo est albus*' are different. In the fist, '*homo'* is restricted by the adjective '*albus'* to stand only for white humans; in the second, the predicate '*albus'* does not restrict '*homo*' to supposit only for white humans since the restriction of the verb does not consist in its signification[542].

The rules for the relative clause (a relative proposition introduced by a relative pronoun), state, on the one hand, that the relative clause behave just like an adjective and thus restricts the term to which is added accordingly (R4); on the other, if a universal sign is added to a proposition with a relative clause, that proposition can be constructed in multiple ways with different restrictive effects (R5). In the first one, the relative clause comes right after the subject term and the restrictive effect is obviously the one indicated by R4 in combination with R2. The second, is illustrated by the example '*omnis homo currit qui est albus'*. Here the distribution applies only to the unrestricted subject term '*homo*'[543].

Regarding the restriction that takes place through a verb, the first three rules (R6, R7, R8) state the restrictive effect a verb at present, past and future tense can have on the supposition of the common term. These three rules are then synthesized in a more general one, R9. The restrictive effect of the verb which does not have any power to ampliate makes the common term to stand for entities that are (for present tense), are or were (past tense) and are or will be (future tense) under the form of the suppositing term. As in the case of ampliation, it must be noted that the restrictive action of the verb upon the subject term does not take place according to the signification of the verb but according to its consignification (R9). This means that in a proposition like '*homo currit'* the verb does not restrict '*homo'* to supposit only for those humans that currently run, but for the humans that are presently under the form of the suppositing term, according to the time indicated by the verb. This important difference was touched in the tract on supposition[544] where, in the section dedication to personal determinate supposition a distinction was made between rendering an expression true for something (*reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo*) and the property of supposition. In the first case, that of rendering the proposition true, the *homo* will stand only for the running human, taking in consideration the signification of the predicate term. In the second case, that of supposition, the term *homo* will stand both for the running and not running human

[542] See *SL*., XI.7, p. 201.
[543] See *SL*., XI.9, p. 202.
[544] See *SL*., VI.8, p. 82.

taking into consideration only the consignification of the verb, namely the time. Thus, the verb only restricts the common term to supposit for entities under the form of the common term which are placed in the time indicated by the tense of the verb (*secundum consignificationem*) and not according to its meaning (*secundum significationem*). This means that the subject term of '*homo fuit albus*' stands for past or present entities which come under the form of '*homo'*, which is past or present humans and not for past or present white humans.

Two additional ways of restriction are discussed in the present tract. The first, the restriction made by usage (*ab usu*), rests on the fact that a restriction of a supposition can take place due to extra-propositional elements like an implicit convention of language established between speaker. For example, in the proposition "Nothing is in the box", 'nothing' stands for the lack of solid objects and not for the lack of air. In other two examples, "*the king comes*" and "*the teacher reads*" the subjects supposits by restriction *ab usu* for the specific king and a specific teacher, that is, for that of the speaker. Accordingly, this restriction is characterized by making an appeal to an extra-propositional context to determine the specific entity for which the term stands[545]. The second, the restriction made through the transitivity of the verb rests on the fact that, the direct object of a transitive verb is restricted to stand for something different from the subject, inasmuch as the subject and the direct object of a transitive verb differ. For example, in "Socrates feeds a human", 'a human', according to verb's transitivity, stands for someone different from Socrates[546].

1.2.12. Tractatus 12 - *De distributionibus*

The last tract of *SL* is dedicated to the property of distribution (*distributio*). This topic was introduced in *SL.*VI.8 and refers to the possibility to descend from a common term with a confused movable supposition to its inferiors due to the distribution made by a universal sign. The main concern of Peter here is those universal signs that have the power to distribute the terms on which they are applied. In doing so, he classifies the different types of signs, offers rule of distribution and discusses the propositional effect of these signs in complex and thus problematic instanced exemplified through a series of *sophismata*. In the following subchapter we will try to resume

[545] See *SL.*, XI.18, p. 206-207. It is pity that this appendix to supposition theory, restriction *ab usu*, was not developed further by Peter.
[546] See *SL.*, XI.19, p. 207. Surely, as Peter states, if the restriction made through a verb's transitivity is not taken into account, fallacies of accident can arise.

Peter's main points of interest regarding distribution, that are directly related to the theory of supposition. In doing so, since we are concerned only with the paradigmatic cases of supposition present in standard categorematic proposition; our main concern will be the signification of the universal signs and the distributive power of the negative sign.

1.2.12.1. Definition and classification of distributive signs

The distribution or confusion of a term is defined as "*the multiplication of a common term produced by a universal sign*"[547]. This means that when a universal sign is added to a common term, it produces a distribution of the term to each of the inferiors that fall under the form of the common term. Although there are some ambiguities regarding Peter's examples and definitions, we have seen in our discussion dedicated to confused supposition how this distribution might look by resorting to the notion of movability. But Peter's main interest for this chapter is to discuss the universal sign. Its main classification runs as follows:

Universal signs
- Distributive signs of substance
  - Distributive of integral parts: '*totus*'
  - Distributive of subordinated parts
    - Distributive of duals: *'uterque', 'neuter'*
    - Distributive of plurals: '*omnis'*, '*nullus'*, '*nihil'*
- Distributive signs of accident
  - Distributive signs of quality: '*qualelibet'*
  - Distributive signs of quantity: '*quotienscumque'*

The first distinction, that between distributive signs of substance and accidents, marks the mode of the objects which are distributed. As the names suggest, the distributive of substances apply to objects in the category of substance while the distributive of accidents apply to objects in the category of accidents, for example, quantity and quality. Almost each type of distributive sign will be defined by Peter and then followed by a sophism which puts into question how distribution works and how it can show the truth or falsity of a difficult propositional context in the analysis

[547] *CNP*., p. 465; *SL*., XII.1, p. 209, l. 4-5.

of terms. But what we will discuss in the following lines are the signification of the universal signs and the distributive power of the negative sign.

1.2.12.2. The signification of the universal signs

In *SL* VI.2, the tract dedicated to the theory of supposition, we have already seen that universals signs are not considered to be terms, inasmuch as they do not have a signification, understood as a capability to signify a particular or universal object[548]. However, in *SL*. XII, the situation seems more nuanced. The details regarding the way in which a distributive sign can have a certain signification are offered in full extend in the analysis of the universal affirmative sign '*omnis'* but they can be generally applied to any distributive term. The necessity of the signs to have a certain kind of signification is given by the fact that they contribute to the true value of the propositional context they are situated in. For the case of '*omnis*', Peter states that since '*animal est homo*' is true and '*omne animal est homo*' is false and since the only difference between those two propositions is the distributive sign '*omnis'*, it must have a certain signification that enters in the calculus of the true value of the proposition.[549] However, the signification of the universal sign does not consist in signifying a universal thing (*res*) but in signifying something (a *res* taken in a specific sense) in a universal manner (*universaliter*). The think that is signified in the case of '*omnis*' is the fact that the common term is taken for each of its inferiors. In this way, the universal sign signifies the disposition (*dispositio*, which is a *res* considered in its second sense) of the subject or the predicate on which it is applied, or in other words, the way in which the subject or predicate to which is added must be taken[550].

For the signification of the negative universals as '*nullus*' and '*nihil*', the situation is the same. The only difference being that they signify that something is taken universally in a negative manner and not in an affirmative one. The similarity is additionally enforced by the equipollence between '*omnis non*' and '*nullus'*, which signifies the same thing as '*nihil*', fact that was already established in tract 1.

[548] See *SL*., VI.2, p. 79.
[549] See *SL*., XII.5, p. 210, l. 20-25.
[550] See *SL*., XII.5, p. 211, l. 1-15.

1.2.12.3. The distribution of the negative sign

Inasmuch as the negative universal sign '*nullus'* signify in the same manner, but negatively, like the universal sign '*omnis*', it produces the same distributive effect. Peter offers the following examples[551]: in the proposition "*nullus homo est asinus*" the distribution of the subject term caused by the negative distributive sign takes place through a downwards inference to its inferiors like "*Sortes non est asinus, Plato non est asinus … et sic de aliis*". Thus, the distribution takes place by replacing the original proposition with a series of conjunctions of negative propositions where the common term is replaced with the discrete terms that come under its form. The same goes for the predicate term: from the proposition "*nullus homo est asinus*", by applying the distribution to the predicate we obtain: "*nullus homo est Brunellus, nullus homo est Fanellus … et sic de aliis*"[552]. For the distributive effect of the universal negative sign '*nullus*' upon the subject (*directly*) and predicate (*indirectly*) of a proposition, Peter offers the following rule: "*whenever this sign 'no' [nullus] is added directly to a common term, it confuses it distributively and movably; and likewise, for a term to which it is added indirectly.*"[553]

As it was established, '*nullus'* has the power to distribute both the direct and indirect common term to which is added. Being a negative universal sign, a further question must be address, whether its power to distribute consists in the negation and whether a negation alone, without being a universal sign, can distribute a common term. Peter's answer seems to be negative. The universal negative sign does not have the power to distribute due to the fact of being negative. Accordingly, a simple negation like '*non*' has no *vim distribuendi* whatsoever. Peter's arguments are constructed around two examples. The first, '*non Sortes'*, shows that '*non'* can be correctly added to a discrete term while a universal distributive sign does not, since it can be added only to a common term. This fact makes him conclude that the negation has no distributive power[554]. Regarding the second, '*non homo est iustus'*, Peter shows that the negation only negates the common term and its inferiors and does not produce any distribution. If a descent can be made under '*homo*', this fact is possible only due to the nature of the term which is negated and not due to the negation[555].

[551] See *SL*., XII.15, p. 219, l. 15-18.
[552] It must be noted that in both examples offered by Peter, he does not make explicit the second proposition from the series of conjunctive propositions like we did but only states: "*neque Plato*" and "*neque Fanellus*"
[553] *CNP*., 481.
[554] See *SL*., XI.24, p. 225, l. 5-13.
[555] See *SL*., XI.24, p. 224-225.

Conclusion

In the present chapter we tried to offer a short description of Peter of Spain's logical consideration from *Tractatus* with a special focus on the relation between two of its main components: the so called "old logic", represented by the Aristotelian-Boethian doctrine, and the "modern logic", represented by the doctrine of the properties of terms. From our analysis a few conclusions can be drawn.

First, at a structural level, we can speak about a systematic organization of the handbook in two thematic parts which partially converge in the middle of the work, in the treatises six and seven. The first thematic part has almost an atomistic structure, since it begins with the tract dedicated to the introductory notion which analysis all the elements of logic between the simplest one, the *vox*, and the most complex at this level, the relations between modal proposition. Further, the second and third tract deals with the elements which makes every possible predication explainable from a logical and ontological point of view, that is, the five predicables and the ten predicaments. The following two tracts, on syllogisms and places, deal with the inferential relations between propositions, thus with logical entities of a higher complexity. The transition from this first thematical cluster to the second one, is made by the following two tracts which represent the focal point of the work: the one dedicated to supposition and the one dedicated to fallacies. The sixth tract introduces us, on the one hand, to the *logica modernorum* through its main property: supposition; on the other hand, it introduces us to its possible, although not fully explored and assumed, use in the theory of fallacies, fact which is hinted a few times in the seventh tract. This unusual position of the tract of supposition between the treatment of places and of fallacies, can be interpreted as a connection between the two types of logic represented by these doctrines. For the second thematical cluster, the following five tracts are all theoretical developments of terminist logic which either explain properties connected but contrasted with supposition, the case of relatives and appellation, or explain how supposition works in function of the propositional context, the case of ampliation, restriction and distribution.

Secondly, at a doctrinal level, the unity of *Tractatus*, the role of the new terminist theory in old corpus of logic and the centrality of supposition can be argued in the following way. In *SL.* VI, the theory of supposition is defined as the property of a substantival term, which already has a signification, to be taken or to stand for something. The fact that a term is a categorematic part of

proposition, a type of word in which a proposition resolves; the fact that it can be a noun or a verb which plays the role of the subject and respectively of the predicated in word grouping that can be true or false; the fact that in their cases signification function as a relation of conventional representation of a *res*, are all doctrinal matters which are presented in the first tract and on which the construction of the terminists theory is erected. In the first tract, logic is conceived as a science of language (*scientia sermocinalis*), in which its functional concepts are partially taken from the science of grammar but are refined and regimented in accordance with the logical needs of the dialectician. The theory of supposition, throughout the division of its modes, presents us the way in which a certain term, due to its own nature and propositional context, can stand for or substitute a common nature, an individual substance or a collection of individual substances that have between them a relation which in a certain degree can be grasped logically. What exactly means for a term to stand as a subject in contrast to it being predicated and what it means to be a common nature, accidentally or substantially, and a primary substance both ontologically and logically, are all taken into account by the second and third chapter of *Tractatus.* Without the Porphyrian Tree and the explanation of the way in which the most general genus of substance is divided in consecutive species until arriving at individuals, and how in this division the superior genera and species are predicated univocally about its inferiors, the understanding of supposition as a relation of standing under the form of the suppositing term will not be so clear. Although, the relation of subordination within the category of substance, especially that of the most specific species and individuals, parallels and bears a close resemblance with that of a personal suppositing term and its inferiors, the difference is inferentially showed in *De locis,* V.11-15, in the passage of the *place from the whole*. In the case of personal confused supposition, we have to deal with a whole in quantity and not with a universal whole, which inferentially manifests differently. Moreover, since the personal modes of supposition are almost all verified through an immediate inference, especially through the notion of movability, the connection of tract six and tract five is manifest. Although the theory which explores the valid syllogistic figures has nothing to do directly with the theory of supposition, it has to do indirectly with it, since supposition seems to have an application in invalid reasoning. This invalid reasoning is treated in tract seven through the theories of fallacies. There we saw that the mechanics of the figure of expression and of the fallacy of accident can possibly be explained through the theory of supposition. Already in tract six, the transition from multiple determinate suppositions to a determinate supposition and from a simple supposition

to a personal one, both through an immediate inference and through a syllogism, are considered fallacious. Sure enough, deeper connections between the theory of supposition and the Aristotelian-Boethian corpus of logic can be identified. Some of them will be explored in later parts of our work. However, for the moment it suffices for an argument for the centrality of supposition theory. As for the rest of *Tractatus*, the connection with the theory of supposition seems to be clear. The eighth tract shows us how the grammatical notion of relatives presents an intra-propositional relation to a term which it determines by making a recollection of it. In doing so the intra-propositional relation of reference is contrasted to the extra-propositional one of suppositing. The tract on ampliation, restriction and distribution are all dedicated to the accidental aspect of personal supposition. The number of entities for which a term can stand in a propositional context can be extended or reduced in function of the other elements of the proposition. Names, verb, participles and in certain cases adverbs can ampliate or restrict the common suppositing term in accordance with specific rules. In as much as distribution is concerned, it stands at the core of personal confused supposition and explains the effect the universal sign has upon the propositional terms. Although they are sincategorematic word, universal signs, both negative and affirmative, play a central role in the theory of supposition and in the meaning of the proposition taken as a whole. The doctrine of appellation on the other hand, is comprised almost in the same manner as supposition, with the sole difference that the appellation is a relation between a term and an existing object. In this way, the supposition of a term and its appellation can differ.

In conclusion, we can state that Peter of Spain's handbook of logic represent a synthesis of two types of logic, classical or Aristotelian and modern or terminist one, and a timid intension of integrating them. It is true that this intention is no fully and explicitly assumed and is only a matter of interpretative speculation. Many doctrinal aspects related to the origins, use, coherence and ontological commitment of the supposition theory are missing and will be addressed in other parts of our work. However, supposition theory seems to be for Peter an extension of the old logic comprised in a systematic manner within a realist doctrinal orientation. In the following parts of the current section, we will address the problem of the origin of the supposition theory and we will analyze some of its different articulations throughout the 13th and 14th century.

1.3. Medieval logic and the theory of supposition

Within the medieval logic, the theories dedicated to the property of terms occupied a central place and represented an original contribution to the already known corpus of texts formed by the Aristotelian *Organon*. In general, those theories have as their main object of study the so-called *termini*, that is, constitutive, minimal and thus essential parts of proposition, which played the role of a subject or predicate. As we already stated, the main property of terms in 13th and 14th century is that of supposition, inasmuch as usually all the other properties are defined according to it. Generally speaking, this particular property clarifies the thing for which a term, that is, a word that signifies something by its own within a propositional context, stands for or supposits. The particular way in which the specific supposition of a propositional entity can be established according to both the nature of the term and the content of the propositional context, engages the user of this theory in a propositional analysis similar to those found in Fregean and Post-Fregean theories of language.

Although the exact source of the supposition theory cannot be traced back to a certain author or group of authors, a thematic base could be found in Aristotle's logical and Priscian's grammatical works. Uses of notions similar to that of supposition can be found in the theological, grammar and logical works of 12th century. Although we can speak about a proper theory of supposition only in 13th century, the early uses of supposition terminology played a fundamental role in the configuration of the conceptual framework used by the terminist logicians. All these early uses are layers of sedimentation gathered around a much older use of *suppositio,* which can be found in an unspecialized form in the natural language, and in a specialized one, in the juridical domain.

After the articulation in the form of a theory, in 13th and 14th century, our main period of interest, different versions of supposition were formulated by putting accent on different theoretical aspects of medieval logic. These theoretical instances were developed by different authors from different doctrinal orientations and traditions, fact that allow us to speak about an evolution of the supposition theory.

In this sub-section, in the first chapter, we will try to show the latest discussions about the sources of supposition theory. The second one will analyze, one the one hand, the 13th century theories of supposition that can be found in the works of William Sherwood and Lambertus de

Lagny, and, on the other, the 14th century theories of supposition of Johannes Buridan and William of Ockham.

1.3.1. Sources and origins of the supposition theory

Today we can state without any problem that the medieval theory of supposition has not been assimilated from other non-Latin cultural places[556] and that it was not the product of one particular medieval Latin logician or another. The current scholarship presents to us the logical construction of supposition theory as a result of the interactions between the logical tradition of commentaries to Aristotle's *logica nova* and the tradition of other disciplines like grammar or even theology[557]. To these uncontested sources, as we will see, it can be added two additional mentions, if not proper sources, that could have had facilitated the appearance if not of supposition theory at least of a mode of thinking similar to it: the Roman law and the natural Latin language.

It goes uncontested that the biggest breakthrough regarding the study of the origins of supposition theory is represented by the *Logica Modernorum*, the two-volume work of De Rijk. In our effort to follow the story of *suppo-terms*[558], we will not limit ourselves to this work, although it still represents one of the most important efforts dedicated to the origins of the terminist logic.

In the following sub-section, first we will explore the different sources of supposition theory that the modern exegesis has been able to identify thus far; secondly, we will offer some general and short considerations about a much broader possible use of the early supposition idea.

1.3.1.1. The logical tradition

1.3.1.1.1. The thesis regarding the commentaries of fallacies

From the very beginning it must be stated that the notion of *suppositio* does not have an equivalent in Aristotle's logic. The term ὑπόθεσις, the Ancient Greek equivalent of the Latin *suppositio* in so far as its construction concerns (ὑπό is equivalent to *sub/sup*, and θεσις with *positio*), has nothing to do with the medieval concept present in terminist logic. As Hermannus Bonitz and De Rijk show, in Aristotle's logic ὑπόθεσις means a proposition from which a syllogism or argument takes place, not in the sense of an axiom, but in the sense of provable

[556] On this particular problem of Byzantine and Arabic influences, see a short summary in *LM*, I, p. 18.
[557] The these according to which the doctrine of supposition has its origin in theology, logic and grammar ca be found in the works of Alain de Libera. For example, see DE LIBERA (2014), p. 1097.
[558] Terminology coined probably in VALENTE (2013), p. 119.

assumption[559]. In this way, the Greek term is more similar in meaning with the English term of *supposition*, equivalent to *hypothesis* or *assumption*, which refer to a belief that is void of proof or certain knowledge. Moreover, as the same De Rijk states: "we never find the term 'suppositio' [i.e. ὑπόθεσις] as found in the *Posterior Analytics* brought into connection by any Mediaeval commentator with the theory of supposition"[560]. Regarding the use of *suppo*-terminology in the corpus of Boethius' texts, the same De Rijk makes a few remarks. Boethius uses in *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos* at least one time the term '*supponitur*' with the sense of *being put as subject*, a use with a strong presence in the grammatical tradition[561]. In *Commentaria in Topica Ciceronis* the past participle *supposita* is used with a particular sense related to the fact that "words are tokens for things"[562]. Regarding this use, De Rijk does not offer us further details or interpretations but only considers it interesting and unexplored by medieval logicians[563].

In fact, De Rijk's extensive analysis of the logical origin of supposition theory points out to 12th century tradition of commentaries on fallacies. Generally speaking, the texts discussed by the aforementioned author suggest that the differences made by the 12th century logicians in explaining different types of equivocations, univocations and figures of expressions express similar ideas and use a similar terminological apparatus as the 13th century supposition theory. Although different words and sometimes different concepts are used, these texts on fallacies express the same change of the object for which a word stands due to its propositional context as the theories of supposition. A first example offered by De Rijk is Abelard and his concept of *translatio* from *Logica ingredientibus*. As far as we are concerned, he uses this concept to clarify on the one hand, the equivocation, for example, the difference between the propositional use of '*homo*' for denoting a species and for denoting an individual, and, on the other hand, the use of a word connected in a propositional context with the very name of the same word, for example, '*homo est vox*' or '*homo est nomen*'[564]. As it can be seen and as De Rijk clearly concludes, the first use is equivalent to the *supposition simplex*, when a word supposits for a common nature (species or genus), and the second, to a *suppositio materialis*, type of supposition absent in *SL,* but present

[559] See BONITIZ (1870), p. 796, l. 41b-797, l. 60a; *LM*., II.1, p. 13. Bonitz mentions an interesting sense of this term in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1436a 36, where it seems to mean the subject of a discourse.
[560] *LM*., II, 1, p. 16.
[561] BOETH., *Intro. ad syll. cat.*, 768b: "in singularibus vero propositionibus praedicato termino semper individuum supponitur, ut Socrates sapiens est." See *LM*, II, 1, p. 520.
[562] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 520-521.
[563] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 521.
[564] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 493-494.

in Sherwood's text[565]. According to him, in the case of material supposition, a word supposits for the expression itself or for the complex made by the expression and signification[566]. Moreover, other anonymous 12th century tracts are given by De Rijk to illustrate the logical origin of supposition theory. For example, for *Fallacie Parvipontane* the equivocation is caused by a difference in appellation or supposition, while univocation takes places when the signification of the words remains the same but the supposition varies[567]. A similar language with supposition theory is observed also in the discussions regarding the division of the figure of speech. *Glose in Arist. Soph. El.* and *Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum* identify a *figura dictionis secundum appellationem* in which a word that sems to belong to many signifies in fact an individual (*hoc aliquid*) through appellation[568]. Those examples are followed by many more from *Fallacie Vindobonenses*, *Fallacie Londinense* and *Dialectica Monacensis*[569]. At the beginning of 13th century, the theoretical aspects connected with supposition begin to receive autonomy. For example, in *Fallacie Londinense*[570], the causes of *figura dictionis* are considered in connection with the variation of supposition; both "the advance from a term sub-posited confusedly to a term that supposits determinately" and "the advance from a determinate sub-position to a confuse one"[571] are considered causes of this fallacy. The same extensive use of supposition in the theory of fallacy is observed in the *Dialectica Monacensis* written between the end of 12th and beginning of 13th century, but according to De Rijk, the influence of fallacy theory on supposition does not apply here since supposition is already treated separately in its own section[572].

While above we offered only a few examples of De Rijk's extensive analysis we already saw that the term '*appellatio*' is more frequently use than the term '*suppositio*' in the explanation of the different fallacies. In fact, as Sten Ebbesen points out, in the 12th century tracts, the term of

[565] See SHERWOOD, *Introductio*., 5.1.2, p. 266, l. 6-9: "Et dicitur *materialis,* quando ipsa dictio supponit vel pro ipsa voce absoluta vel pro ipsa dictione composita ex voce et significatione, ut si dicam:'"Homo" est dissyllabum,' '"Homo" est nomen.'".
[566] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 494.
[567] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 494-495.
[568] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 500: "S*umma Soph. El.,* p. 32716'26: Figura dictionis que fit secundum appellationem, est quando id quod communiter convenit pluribus, per appellationem videtur hoc aliquid significare". The same difference between what will be called simple and personal supposition will be restated by the division of the figure of speech *secundum diversitatem predicabilium*, see *LM*, II, 1, p. 501.
[569] For all the works dated between 12th century and 13th century on the basis of which De Rijk has constructed his thesis see LM, II, 2.
[570] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 505.
[571] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 507: "*processus a termino subponente confuse ad terminum supponentem determinate*" and "*processus a determinata subpositione ad confusam*".
[572] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 512.

'*appellare'* was used with the same meaning as the 13th century notion of '*supponere'*[573]. The aforementioned author, continued in a certain sense De Rijk's work, by establishing the interplay between these two terms. From his work, we can see that '*appellatio'* has started slowly to resembled with the '*suppositio*' from the terminist logic in the period of the second half of 12th century in work like *Anonymus Parisiensis, Fallaciae Vindobonenses* and *Fallaciae M. Willelmi*. Next, approximatively between 1190 and 1210 the two terms run in parallel, sometimes synonymously in works like *Fallaciae Parvipontanae* and *Fallaciae Lemovicenses*. Around the end of this period, 1210-1220, supposition begins to take over and to be used predominantly, forming in the end what will be known as a logical theory of terms[574].

The fallacy tradition thesis regarding the origins of supposition theory seems to be thus founded on the use of terms derived from '*appellare*' and '*supponere*' in the analysis of different types of fallacious reasoning. Although this terminological employment is evident and conclusive for the origin of the supposition theory, the validity of this thesis still resides in the dating of the anonymous manuscripts studied by De Rijk. This fact questions from the very beginning the thesis of a pure logical origin of supposition theory. While our exposition of these sources is made mainly according to the distinction between logic, grammar and theology, is more adequate to speak about an interplay between them. The next sub-thesis that we will approach is indeed an example of the reciprocal influence between grammar and logic.

1.3.1.1.2. The thesis regarding St. Anselm's *De grammatico*

The thesis that traces the theory of supposition back to Anselm has one of its first origins in the considerations of Father Philotheus Boehner. In his work *Ockham's theory of truth* written in 1946 and republished in a collective articles volume in 1958, Boehner states that the Anselmian difference, taken over later by Alexander of Hales, between "a signification which is made or applied by actually signifying the signified, and the signification which is assigned to a proposition as such and which is given to it or assigned to it regardless of its actual use and application to a

[573] See EBBESEN (1981), p. 36; he identifies both concepts with 'reference' fact which, as will be shown, is very debatable.
[574] See EBBESEN (2013), p. 73-75.

concrete fact*"*[575] can be one of the sources of the medieval theory of supposition[576]. Over a decade later, Desmond Paul Henry in its article *The Early History of "Suppositio"* restates the Anselmian thesis on more stable grounds, and tries to offer arguments for what Boehner has only alluded. He tries to find parallels between the debate surrounding Burleigh's and Ockham's theory of supposition and Anselm's treatment of signification. Desmond is able to point out that in Anselm's dialogue *De grammatico* we can find, on the one hand, a sense of signification equivalent to Ockham's notion of supposition (represented by the position taken in the dialogue by the student), and on the other, a sense of signification different from supposition and equivalent to Burleigh's uses (represented by the position taken in the dialogue by the Magister)[577]. In fact, Anselm's distinctions are connected to an old problem rooted in the logical and grammatical tradition that goes back to Aristotle and Priscian: what and how do paronyms or denominative terms, words obtained through derivation from other words, like '*grammaticus'* from '*grammatica'*, signify? Anselm's position regarding this problem can be observed in the four theses extracted by Henry[578] according to *De grammatico* XII, XV and XVIII. Accordingly, Anselm considers that a denominative or paronym term as '*grammaticus*' signifies *per se grammatica*, an accident, while the same term *appellates* or signifies *per aliud homo*, an individual substance. The former signification amounts to the essential meaning of the word, while the latter involves an accidental or contextual meaning. Thus, this difference between *signification per se* and *signification per aliud/appellatio* represents for Henry the counterpart of and consequently a source for the medieval distinction from terminist logic between signification and supposition. Moreover, Anselm's discussion of some propositions as '*Grammaticus est qualitas*' with the subject term signifying a quality, represents for the same Henry a possible source for the ideas encapsulated in the theory of simple supposition[579].

[575] BOEHNER, "Ockham's theory of truth" in Buytaert (ed.), *Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M., Ph. D. Collected Articles on Ockham*, (1958), p. 182.
[576] BOEHNER (1958), p. 183: "The distinction between assigned and made signification ultimately comes down to the distinction between signification as such and the actual use of signification in a proposition about facts, i.e., supposition." See also Boehner (1952), p. 27. His considerations regarding the Anselmian origin of supposition theory are considered in general merely conjunctures: see *LM*., II. 1, p. 16; HENRY, "The Early History of "Suppositio"" in Franciscan Studies, Vol. 23, (1963), p. 205.
[577] See HENRY (1963), p. 208.
[578] For the following rows which describes Anselm's position see HENRY (1963), p. 208. Especially regarding the problem of paronyms, see also MAIERÙ, *Terminologica logica della tarda scolastica* (1972), pp. 64-78.
[579] HENRY (1963), p. 210.

While the single use of the verb *supponere* in *De grammatico*[580] seems to be made in the classical way as denoting an action of subsummation under predicaments (*supponi praedicamentis*), in the sense of being put as subject and thus no technical and consistent use can be observed[581], the obvious important notion is that of *appellatio*. We already saw that in 12th century logical tradition *appellatio* played a similar function as *supposition* played in 13th century. If Anselm wrote his work before 1076[582] or even at the end of the second half of 11th century, can we consider it a veritable source for the supposition/appellation terminology and the theory of supposition? The answer is probably no, since, as we will see in the following section, the terminist conceptual apparatus was heavily influenced by the grammatical tradition which had similar uses around the same period if not earlier. The same point is made explicit by De Rijk, which admits Anselm's influence upon Ockham and other 14th century logician but rejects its status of being "the father of supposition theory"[583]. According to him, the lack of an extensive use of *suppo*-terminology forces the medieval historians to consider Anselm only an important medieval scholar who investigated some common problems for 11th and 12th century grammatical and logical tradition regarding the meaning of terms[584].

1.3.1.2. The grammatical tradition

The grammatical tradition originates in Priscian's grammatical handbook entitled *Institutiones grammaticae*, comprised in eighteen books which circulated in Middle Ages in clusters of volumes named *Priscianus maior* (the first seventeen books) and *Priscianus minor* (book 17 and 18). This work along with the 12th century tradition of its commentaries represents one of the most important sources for the *suppo*-terminology and the theory of supposition. The

[580] For example, see ANSELM., *De grammatico,* ed. Schmitt, p. 165: "Rem quidem unam eandemque non puto sub diversis aptari posse praedicamentis, licet in quibusdam dubitari possit; quod maiori et altiori indigere disputatione existimo, quam hac nostra brevi sermocinatione assumpsimus. Unam autem vocem plura significantem non ut unum, non video quid prohibeat pluribus aliquando supponi praedicamentis, ut si 'albus' dicitur qualitas et habere. Albus enim non ita significat qualitatem et habere ut unum, quemadmodum homo significat ut unum substantiam et qualitates quibus constat homo".

[581] On this point see HENRY (1963), p. 211.

[582] On the date of composition see ARCHAMBAULT, "Anselm's De grammatico: structure, sources, pedagogical context" (2016), pp. 1-25.

[583] *LM*, II, 1, p. 18; see also GALONNIER (1987), p. 373-374: "Sans être à l'origine absolue d'une future théorie des propriétés des termes et de son étape majeure qu'est la théorie de la suppositio, le D.G. témoignerait d'un moment constitutif de son élaboration".

[584] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 18.

documentation of the grammatical influence is offered mainly by the same De Rijk. Some interesting remarks, as we will see, are offered by Sten Ebbesen.

De Rijk identifies a particular grammatical use of suppo-terminology in Priscian's works. '*Suppositum*' is used for the grammatical subject of a verb thus being equivalent to the Latin '*subiectum*'. '*Substantia supposita*' refers to '*persona agens*' or to the individual thing who acts[585]. Some of the passages offered in this sense are *Institutiones grammaticae*, XVII, 23 and XVII, 41:

> "For when we search the substance (*substantiam*) of a certain suppositum (*alicuius suppositi*) we say 'who is moved?', 'who walks?', 'who talks?'; while the act is manifest, that is, the movement, the walk, the talking, the person that acts (*persona agens*) is uncertain; for that reason, the nominative subjects (*subiectiones*) belong to appellatives and proper ones, even if the proper ones make visible the general substance. For we respond 'a human walks' or 'a horse' or 'Typho' in which a human is understood, or even a part is put as subject (*subicitur*) that is taken in the place of a name, for example, a proper name, that is, a pronoun, when we say 'I'[586].
>
> If you ask 'who is that?', to this it can be responded that any species of substance which is the supposit of the interrogation (*supposita interrogationi*), as 'a human', 'a horse', 'a raven', 'a fish'"[587].

Accordingly, the *suppo*-terminology in Priscian refers to the grammatical subject of the proposition or to that thing which fulfils the action described by the verb. '*Subicio, subicere*', from which we will have '*subiectum*', is the verb which describes its action. The grammatical subject is usually represented in a proposition by a *nomen* which, according to Priscian, signifies the substance and quality[588]. Thus, even from Priscian, a short proximity is made between three important concepts: supposition, subject and substance. This proximity has made researchers as Corneille Henri Kneepkens to consider that Priscian's term of '*suppositio*' has a semantical or ontological meaning. Accordingly, this particular acceptance of *suppo-terminology* has been

[585] See LM., II, 1, p. 516, 527; STREINU (1973), p. 115.
[586] For the Latin text see PRIS., *Inst*., XVII, 23, p. 122, l. 1-9: "Nam substatiam alicuius suppositi quarentes dicimus 'quis movetur? quis ambulat? quis loquitur?', cum manifestus sit actus, id est motus vel ambulatio vel loquella, persona vero agens incerta; ideo subiectiones nominativae fiunt appellativorum vel propriorum, propriis manifestantibus etiam generalem substantiam. Respondemus enim vel 'homo ambulat' vel 'equus' vel 'Trypho', in quo etiam 'homo' intelligitur, vel etiam pars subicitur, quae pro nomine accipitur, sed nomine proprio, id est pronomen, quando dicimus 'ego'"
[587] For the Latin text see PRIS., *Inst*., XVII, 41, p. 133, l. 15-18: "ut si dicam 'quis est ille', potest ad hoc omnis substantiae species responderi, quae est supposita interrogationi, ut 'homo', 'equus', 'corvus', 'piscis'."
[588] See PRIS., *Inst*., II, 18, p. 55, l. 6: "Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare".

transmitted to the 12th century grammar[589]. But De Rijk points out[590] that this grammatical use of *suppo*-terms is void of any ontological commitment, in contrast to the Aristotelian logical-grammatical subject (ὑποκείμενον) which is both the subject of propositional predication and its ontological counterpart, the substratum of any accidents, or "an entity of the kind that underlies all other entities"[591].

As again De Rijk points out, the same use of supposition understood grammatically is taken over in the commentary offered around the middle of 12th century by Peter Helias. He uses the passive pairs *supponi* and *apponi* to denote the fact of something being put as subject and attribute in a proposition[592]. Regarding the origin of this complex, it must be noted that, although the term '*supponere*', with its prominent syntactical sense, is taken from Priscian, the term '*apponere*' seems to originate in Boethius. As Corneille Henri Kneepkens shows in his short survey of the history of this pair of concepts, Boethius translates in his commentary on *Perihermeneias* Aristotle's *prosthesis* with *appositio* (*"adpositiones"*) and then equates it with *praedicatio*[593]. Moreover, commenting on a passage from *Institutiones* XVII, 20, Peter Helyas talks about a first, second and third supposition of a thing (*suppositio rei*) subscribing to the same grammatical use of the term. Accordingly, '*suppositio*' and '*supponere*' mean "the act of putting something as a grammatical subject"[594].

De Rijk's analysis continues with Abelard, where an interesting aspect of Priscian's considerations is highlighted. Although according to Priscian the '*suppositio*' refers to that which stand as subject in the proposition, the subject as a grammatical part usually denotes or refers to an actual entity or substance. This transition from the linguistic aspect to the ontological one is

[589] See KNEEPKENS, "Suppositio and supponere in 12th-century grammar" in Jolivet, DE LIBERA, *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum. Actes du Septième Symposium Europeen d'Histoire de la Logique et de la Semantique Medievales ; Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisatione Médiévale de Poitiers ; Poitiers 17 - 22 juin* (1985), pp. 325-353. According to Kneepkens, a proper syntactical meaning of *suppositio* (*subject term*) as corelative of *appositio* (predicat term) is visible predominantly only in the grammar tradition of the second half of 12th century, due to a chain of transmission that originates in Priscian and it's mediated by Gilberus Porretanus and Peter Helias.
[590] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 517.
[591] *LM*., II, 1, p. 516, note 3.
[592] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 517. The use of *supponi* and *apponi* in this sense is put into question by KNEEPKENS (1987), p. 333, which considers the phrases containing these terms as later interpolations. He admits their use as specified by De Rijk in the grammatical works that appear after Petrus Helias: *Summa 'Breve sit'* by Robert of Paris, *Summna* of Robert Blund, gloss-commentaries '*Promisimus*', '*Omnis traditio*' and '*Absoluta cuiuslibet'*, see KNEEPKENS (1987), p. 331.
[593] KNEEPKENS (1987), p. 329. Kneepkens is paraphrasing here M. H. Jellinek's *Geschite der neuhochdeutschen Grammatik von den Anfaengen bis auf Adelung*, 1944, p. 466
[594] See *LM*, II, 1, p. 527.

thus present in Abelard, who in the fragment from *Logica ingredientibus* cited by De Rijk, corelates the fact of being a *suppositum* to that of being a substance:

> "Illud amplius quod ostendit, scilicet quod species est magis substantia quam genus, alio modo confirmat, per hanc scilicet maiorem similitudinem quam habent cum primis substantiis quam genera, quod cum primae substantiae maxime sunt suppositae atque ex eo dicantur maxime substantiae et similiter species magis sint suppositae quam genera, magis sunt in suppositione similes primis substantiis quam genera"[595].

The first substances or individuals are thus in a maximal degree *supposita*, while the species, as second substances, are *supposita* in a lower degree than the first but in a higher degree than the genus. This relation is natural since, after all, individuals are put at the bottom of onto-logical schematization of the Porphyrian tree and since the very meaning of *suppositio* contains the sense of something that is put under another (*sub-pono*). According to this, especially in the case of Abelard, is hard to maintain such a position as the one postulated by De Rijk a few pages later: "from the above evidence it is quite clear that the verb 'supponere' and the substantive noun 'suppositio' are used by Peter Helyas and by Abailard as well in a purely grammatical sense"[596]. Concerning Peter Helias, this thesis is infirmed by Kneepkens by showing exactly the opposite: "the term complex of supponere is found in Peter Helias` *Summa* in the meaning of 'putting an extra-linguistic entity as subject' but not in the meaning of 'putting or being the subject term'. The object of the verb supponere is always a *res* in this interpretation."[597]

In the 12th century grammatical tradition additional steps are made towards the configuration of a terminological apparatus similar to that found in terminist logic. Starting from the fact that according to Priscian a name signifies a substance and quality, *Quaestiones Victorinae* and the gloss *Promisimus* make further steps towards connecting the domain of language with that of reality. For the first, the expression "*supponit cum statu rei*" is used as an explanation for Priscian's "*significare substantiam cum qualitatem*"; for the second, "*supposita locutioni, sive significet rem per se existent sive non*" is used for the same purpose[598]. According to De Rijk, the two ways in which *supponere* is used, makes it an equivalent for Priscian's "*significare*

[595] See LM, II, 1, p. 519. De Rijk speaks about this aspect in passing saying only that "Abailard's use of the term supponere and suppositio is rather confused in that they seem to refer at the same time to grammatical-logical supposition (subjection) and to ontological 'underlying'".
[596] *LM*, II, 1, p. 521.
[597] KNEEPKENS (1987), p. 335.
[598] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 524.

substantiam" which amounts to an act of denotating an individual with or without its universal natura or form.[599]

To sum up the entire influence of the grammatical tradition on the terminist logic we can say, according to De Rijk[600], the following: Priscian uses the suppo-terms in a grammatical sense meaning the grammatical subject of a proposition and standing for the person who acts. This use was taken over by the grammatical tradition of 12th century, Peter Helyas being an example. In the same time, we can add that, a close proximity was made between *subiectum, suppositum* and *substantia,* which can be seen in Abelard and some 12th century grammatical treatises. The grammatical subject of a proposition, the person who act or the subject matter was usually expressed by a noun which, according to Priscian, signifies a substance with quality. Thus, suppositio will means the act of signifying a substance with or without its qualities; not any substance, but an individual one, a concrete individual thing. Regarding this ontological shift of the meaning of supposition in the 12th century grammatical tradition, it was C. H. Kneepkens who insisted on this idea. For him, in the *Summa* of Peter Helias, *suppositio* is used in a semantical way, to denote an extra-linguistic entity as subject, and not in a syntactical way, to denote a part of the proposition, the subject term. Surely, the name which signifies an individual thing is established by an act of imposition or institution, and that very individual, according to grammars, can be denoted in an act of *appelatio, nomination* or even *suppositio*. Moreover, by speaking of paronyms or denominative terms, the grammars considered not only the signification of an individual, but also of a universal nature, the quality, common nature or form of the substance.

Sten Ebbesen, in his two articles written in 1981 and 2013, offers a different interpretation of the grammatical tradition of suppositio. He considers that De Rijk's identification of a grammatical sense of suppositio void of any ontological meaning is problematic if not false. Tracking Priscian's *suppositum* to the notion of ὑποκείμενον used by the second century Greek grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, he does not agree with De Rijk's interpretation of '*suppositum*' as grammatical subject or as that which is put as a subject in a proposition[601]. For Ebbesen *suppositum*, as that which is underlying, is "what is within the range of a name, that which the name refers to or which is talked about, that which is the bearer of quality etc."[602] It is especially

[599] *LM*., II, 1, p. 524; See also DE RIJK (1982), p. 163-164.
[600] See *LM*., II, 1, p. 527-528.
[601] See EBBESEN (1981), p. 37.
[602] See EBBESEN (1981), p. 37.

the notion of "the bearer" which represents for Ebbesen the key for the understanding of the historical concept of *suppositio*. As a concept with ontological implications, to be a *suppositum* amounts to be "the bearer of a name or of a form/quality"[603]. For our author, it is this particular understanding of *suppositum* that is transmitted from Apollonius to Priscian and then to Peter Helias. In his 2013 article, Ebbesen continues the same idea according to which, in grammar the *suppositum* is the bearer of the form indicated by the predicate term while in logic is the individual which bear the universal form indicated by a predicable[604]. The so called "*metaphysical thesis*" regarding the meaning of *suppositum* is tracked by him in short examples taken from the disciplines of grammar (for example, Peter Helias), logic (for example, Boethius, John Pagus, Anonymus Aurelianensis) and theology (for example, Porretan school, Stephen Langton). But his interpretation of *suppositum* as the bearer of form is not completely convincing, since at least in logic and grammar, according to the sources gathered by De Rijk, there is no such a strong hylomorphic grounding as required. In this case, the interpretation of *suppositum* as the bearer of forms can be applied with success on some particular texts of theology, as we will see, but cannot be found as stated explicitly by the authors and texts studied by De Rijk. Nonetheless, Ebbesen's 2013 article has a great merit, that o sketching a history of supposition which describes the evolution of suppo-terminology and which touches questions regarding another domain of study which was neglected by De Rijk in his *Logica modernorum*, that of theology. In the following chapter we will explore the theological origins of supposition.

1.3.1.3. The theological tradition

Regarding the theological origin of supposition theory, a considerably part of scholarship believes that before the assimilation of the new logical corpus of Aristotelian texts that emerge between 1130-1150, there is already a Western theological tradition of studying similar semantical problems as found in the logical tradition starting with the second half of 12th century[605]. This theological tradition is linked to the Parisian milieu, to the figure of Gilbertus Porretanus and to the so-called 'Porretan school'. Its main focus is the divine predication, a problem originated in Augustine's *De trinitate* and Boethius' homonymous treatise[606]; these works are two of the first

[603] See EBBESEN (1981), p. 38.
[604] See EBBESEN (2013), p. 60.
[605] See LIBERA (1987), p. 438; EBBESEN (1983), p. 3-4.
[606] For a history of trinitary predication see THOM, *The Logic of the Trinity: Augustine to Ockham* (2012).

relevant texts in which the problem of how to apply Aristotle's logical category to the discourse about God is considered[607]. This theoretical approach which considers the application of logical categories *in divinis* is known under the concept *translatio*. In order to see the measure in which a theological origin for the theory of supposition can be tracked back to the works of the Porretans, we will mainly take into consideration two of the most important contributions on this topic: Luisa Valente's *Logique et théologie. Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220*[608] and the collection of essays *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la Logica Modernorum*[609].

The starting point for the theological tradition of supposition can be placed in the semantical and metaphysical considerations of Gilbertus Porretanus (around 1086 - d. 1154), that can be found especially in his commentary works on Boethius' theological treatises. At the basis of his metaphysical considerations stands the distinction between *quo est* (*esse, forma essendi*), that is, that through which something is, its nature, being or form of being, and *quod est,* that is, that which is, the subsistent or substance, as shown by De Rijk[610]. Thus, each individual thing (*subsistens, substantia, substratum*) has on the one hand, substantial forms or qualities in virtue of which is a subsistence in a certain mode of being, and, on the other, non-constitutive elements or accidents that are added from exterior[611]. Relying on Priscian understanding of name as something which signify a substance and quality, the aforementioned ontological distinction is applied to language. A name signifies on one hand, *substantia nominis*, the substance of the name, an individual or *id quod est*, and, on the other, a *qualitas nominis*, the quality of the name or its form, *id quo est*[612]. In a basic predicative context, as Luisa Valente shows, this means that "the inherence of the form signified as *qualitas nominis* [is expressed] by the predicate term in the subsistent signified as *substantia nominis* by the subject term: in '[a] human is white' we declare that a form, whiteness, is inherent in a particular human being"[613]. In articulating these considerations, Porretanus analyses different type of propositions and uses the *suppo*-terminology. De Rijk, does not pay much attention to the use of *suppo*-terms, but from the passages that he quotes we can see

[607] See for example AUG., *De trinitate*, VII,4, 7; V.
[608] VALENTE (2008).
[609] JOLIVET, LIBERA (1987).
[610] See DE RIJK, "Gilbert de Poitiers, ses vues sémantiques et métaphysiques" in JOLIVET, DE LIBERA, *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum. Actes du Septième Symposium Europeen d'Histoire de la Logique et de la Semantique Medievales ; Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisatione Médiévale de Poitiers ; Poitiers 17 - 22 juin* (1987), p. 148.
[611] See DE RIJK (1987), p. 153-158.
[612] See VALENTE (2013), p. 120 and RIJK (1987), p. 161.
[613] VALENTE (2013), p. 120

that *suppositio* means for Porretanus to stand as subject or to be the subject of discourse[614]. Surely, that which stands as subject ultimately stands in a proposition for a subsistent or "a bearer of forms", as Ebbesen would say, but the connection between the notion of *suppositio* and that of standing in a specific relation to a specific object outside or inside the language in not fully made. The situation looks similar as in Priscian's case: although they are not directly linked to extra-propositional entities, *suppo*-terms seem to be used in Priscian for the grammatical subjects which naturally signify or stand in language for extra propositional entities. However, the scholarship position regarding Porretanus varies. Despite the fact that she admits a referential relation regarding Gilbert's use of *suppo*-terms, Luisa Valente confirms partially our approach: *"*in Gilbert's *Commentaries on Boethius' Opuscula sacra*, suppo* terms mainly concern the act of a speaker (or of the author of a written text) that consists of referring—by choosing a name as subject term in a proposition—to one or more subsistent things as what the speech act (or the text) is about. Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of term"[615]. On a different position, and we think more adequate, is placed Corneille Henri Kneepkens, following the considerations of Jan Pinborg. Kneepkens thinks that Gilbert's use of suppo-terms is a syntactical one, and thus *suppositio* must be in general understood as "*putting something as subject*", although its ultimate object will be extralinguistic. In this manner *supponere* will be equivalent in a certain degree with *subicere*[616].

According to Luisa Valente, Gilbertus Porretanus' logico-theological considerations are taken a step further by two of his students in the texts *Summa Zwettlensis*, written by a so-called master Peter of Poitiers between the uncertain period of 1140-1280, and *Dialogus Ratii et Everadi* of Everard of Ypres composed between 1190 and 1198[617].

Regarding the first text, *Summa Zwettlensis*, the topic of trinitarian predication starts with a distinction between name: a. *discretiva/propriae appellationes* (names for just one of the three divine persons), b. *communia discretiva/appellationes communes* ‹*discretivae*› (names for two of the three persons), c. *comunia/communes appellationes* (can be said of the three persons together or separately)[618]. *Appellatio* here seems to designates a function similar to *nominatio* or

[614] See for example Gilbertus' commentary on *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*, 345, 48-52 in DE RIJK (1987), p. 165; 346, 53-60 in DE RIJK (1987), p. 166.
[615] VALENTE (2013), p. 122.
[616] KNEEPKENS (1987), p. 337-338.
[617] VALENTE (2013), p. 121, 123.
[618] See VALENTE (2013), p. 123.

significatio, which is not context-dependent. Further, on the basis of this distinction, the author establishes three types of basic and correct trinitarian propositions formed by a subject and a predicate: a.+c. (for example, "*Pater est Deus*"), b.+c. (for example, "*Emittens est Deus*") and c.+a./c. (for example, "*Deus est Spiritus Sanctus/dominus/potens*", "*Trinus est Deus*"). While Valente stresses out that in these classifications, we have a distinction between different kinds of suppositions[619], it is clear that *suppositio/supponere* is used here, as Valete himself recognizes[620], with the sense of being but as subject/subject-term in a proposition, being contrasted and appearing in a pair with *predicatum/praedicare*. Surely, when the author of *Summa* applies the Gilbertian metaphysical principals on this predicative theory, *supposita* and *personae suppositae* will ultimately be extra-propositional objects pointed out specifically in virtue of the propositional context, due to an effect of restriction made by the predicate term.

The second text, *Dialogus Ratii et Everadi* of Everard of Ypres, is relying on the same Priscian and Gilbertian principles. A name is imposed to an object called '*substantia nominis*' or '*supposita locutioni*'[621] due to a quality or a form, that is, *qualitas nominis*, in virtue of which the object is what it is. Thus, a name, according to the grammatical principle establish by Priscian, signify both. When talking about the predicative context, names in subject position stand for (*supponens*) the *subsitens, suppositum* or *persona* while names in predicate position stand for (*apponens*) the quality or form[622]. These functions of language are put once again in trinitarian context. Words like '*Deus*' have a confused signification (*confuse significet*) which is clarified by the predicative term when put in proposition context like '*Deus est Pater*'. In this instance 'Deus' stands for the Father since the predicative term indicative the form of paternity which must be in the *suppositum*[623]. Further, the notion of *usurpatio* that this work uses is put by Valente in correlation with that of *suppositio simplex.* In propositions like "*homo est species animalis*" or "*homo est species individuorum*" a concrete name put as subject does not stand for a *suppositum*

[619] VALENTE (2013), p. 127.
[620] VELNTE (2013), p. 127: "It seems that by *suppositio* here the *Summa* means the name itself as used as subject term in a proposition, by *appellatio* the name considered independently from its being used within the proposition, and by *supponere* the action performed by names when used as subject terms in propositions"
[621] See for Alain de Libera, the expressions *rem locutioni subicere* found in D'Ypres "corresponds perfectly with the terminist *supponere pro*", LIBERA (1987), p. 448.
[622] Cf. VALENTE (2013), p. 135-136.
[623] See VALENTE (2013), p. 137.

understood as an individual, but stands in an improper manner for its quality or form *humanitas*, first example, or for its effect, the participation to that form, the second example[624].

Another representative of the Porretan School is Alan of Lille (1128 – 1203). In his *Summa homines* and *Regulae caelestis iuris* he continues the same program as seen at the previous authors, to semantically analyze trinitarian propositions on the same basis of Gilbertian ontology. First, he classifies types of divine names: *essentialia* (names of divine essence)*, essentialia quasi concretiva* ('*Deus*')*, coessentialia* (names for trinitary relations)*, partim personalia partim essentialia* ('*persona*', '*trinitas*')*, personalia* (names for the three persons and for their properties) and *compersonalia* ('*distinctus*', '*differens*', '*alius*'). Then, he establishes different functions of these names through the actions described by the verbs *significare, praedicare/apponere*, *appellare* and *supponere*[625]. For example, an essential name as a concretive one, like 'Deus', signifies the divine nature and persons, predicates the essence, appellates a divine person and stands properly for a person and improperly for the divine essence, depending on the propositional context and more exactly on the predicate in use[626]. Valente considers that for Alain of Lille *appellare* is almost synonymous with *nominare* and has a non-contextual function, while the notions of *supponere* and *supponere pro* are used for the subject term of the proposition in order to represent or to make a reference[627]. Alain de Libera identifies six aspects according to which Alain de Lille's theoretical articulations can be considered a source of terminist logic: 1. his "technical use" of *suppositio* with its referential function; 2. the use of *modi supponendi*; 3. the supposition of relatives; 4. considerations about syncategorematic words; 5. a contextual approach; and 6. a textual style of analyzing questions through *instantiae* similar to those found in *sophismata* and *insolubilia* literature[628]. Regarding the first two points, the most important for our purpose, we must note a few aspects. First of all, supposition and signification are not so clear differentiated. There are instances in the *Summa* where the two notions seem to be used as synonyms. An example can be found is chapter 56 cited by Libera to illustrate this distinction: "hoc nomen 'homo' proprie ponitur ad significandum et supponendum hominem, ut cum dicitur 'homo est animal' […] improrie tamen ponitur ad significandum et supponendum speciem, ut cum dicitur 'homo est species'"[629].

[624] See VALENTE (2013), p. 138-139.
[625] See VALENTE (2008), p. 311; Libera (1987), p.
[626] See VALENTE (2013), p. 311.
[627] See VALENTE (2013), p. 312.
[628] See LIBERA (1987), p. 455-456.
[629] See LIBERA (1987), p. 444.

Secondly, we do not have a theory of *modi significandi* but mere adverbial and substantival descriptions of the way *suppositio* works. These two points bags the following question: what is *suppositio* after all in Alan of Lille's view? An answer could be giving by taking a quick look in his *Liber in distinctionibus dictionibus theologicalium*, at letter 's'. There *supponere* is defined in the following way: "supponere properly marks the fact that one thing is put in the place of another; for that reason, in Gen. is read that Laban has put (supposuit) Leah [for] Jacob, that is, has put (posuit) her in the place of Rachel. According to grammarians is the thing about which is the discourse, where other things are put in place of another"[630] Here Alan of Lille recognizes on the one hand, that *supponere* is a common relation of substitution, probably referring to Genesis 29:19-26, where Laban, after agreeing with Jacob to give his daughter Rachel to him after seven years of work, has substituted Rachel with Leah in the feasting evening; on the other hand, he recognizes a grammatical sense of *supponere* equivalent to the act of *standing as the subject of discourse*, a sense that does not seem to be completely endorsed by him. This fact might make us think that, although Alan of Lille is familiar with the grammatical use of *suppo*-terms, his concept of *suppositio/supponere* is based on a relation from the common language, that of putting something in the place of another, and does not have any explicit referential import.

Further, in his 1987 article, *The semantics of the trinity according to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen*, Ebbesen seems to show the measure in which another theological origin of the supposition theory can be traced back to the end of 12th century discussion regarding the trinitarian predication. In his analysis he takes into account the writing of Stephen Langton[631], who studied and then taught theology at Paris, and of his allegedly student Andrew Sunsen[632]. Their considerations are based on a trinitarian ontology. In statements regarding God a term can signify, stand for (*supponere*) or couple (*copulare*): "(1) the one divine essence *(essentia, usia, substantia, natura, deitas*); or (2) the three divine persons (*personae: Pater, Filius, Spiritus Sanctus*), or five notions/properties/relations (*notiones/proprietates/relationes: paternitas, innascibilitas, spiratio,*

[630] PL 210, col. 963c: "Supponere proprie notat unam rem pro alia ponere, unde in Gen. Legitur quod Jacob Laban supposuit Liam, id est loco Rachel posuit. Apud grammaticos est rem de qua est sermo aliae supponi". See also Valente (2008), p. 312.

[631] He is seen by Luisa VALENTE (2008) as theoretically occupying a separate position from the Porretans due to its originality.

[632] See EBBESEN, "*The semantics of the trinity according to Stephen Langton and Andrew Sunesen*" in JOLIVET, DE LIBERA, *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum*. Actes du Septième Symposium Europeen d'Histoire de la Logique et de la Semantique Medievales ; Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisatione Médiévale de Poitiers (Poitiers 17 - 22 juin 1985), Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1987, p. 403.

filiatio, processio)"[633]. According to the Porretan tradition, each ontological category is associated to a divine logical one, the first with *quid*, the second with *quis*, and the third with *quae*. Thus, the divine essence is an analogue of the substantial form, the persons are analogue of an individual and the notions are analogues for the accidental forms[634]. What Langton does with these "*quasi-logical*" categories, is to replicate the same functions found in the treatises on the logical fallacies and to apply them in the domain of divine predication. Thus, a syllogism as "*omnis persona est processio vel spiratio; omnis notio est persona; ergo omnis notio est processio vel spiratio*"[635] is considered a fallacy of accident since "*persona*" and "*notio*" have different significations, and thus, an illegitimate transition from the *quis* category to that of *quae* is made. Surely, this parallelism with the logical commentaries is pointed out by Ebbesen, since in logic, this syllogistic transition from one logical category to another is captured in terms of a difference in signification, supposition or appellation. Moreover, the two theologians in question establish the distinction between supposition and copulation: the first is something that pertains to substantival terms, while the second is reserved for adjectival terms[636]. When the divine essence, persons and notions are articulated in propositions, the supposition establishes the correct trinitary predication. There are terms which stand always for and signify the essence, terms which stand for the essence or persons and signify the essence, terms which stand always for persons and signify a person or notion[637]. For example, 'Deus' signifies the divine essence. In the propositional context '*Deus generat*', the substantival term 'Deus', stands for (*supponit*) whom 'Deus' can be predicated about and for the one person indicated by the by the predicate '*generat*', the Father. The Father as *suppositum* is the bearer of the form signified by the notion '*generat*' such that "*Pater generat*" is a correct proposition. This mechanics of divine predication makes Langton speak about a series of rules and a restriction of a term to supposit for something (*restringitur ad supponendum*), similar to that found in the supposition theory[638].

The texts analyzed by Ebbesen attest clearly a heavy use of *suppo*-terminology accompanied by the distinction between signification and supposition, quasi-rules of supposition, quasi-properties of supposition as restriction. Moreover, a contextual approach and proposition

[633] EBBESEN (1987), p. 405-406.
[634] See EBBESEN (1987), p. 414.
[635] EBBESEN (1987), p. 407.
[636] See EBBESEN (1987), p. 413.
[637] See EBBESEN (1987), p. 420.
[638] See for example EBBESEN (1987), p. 422.

analysis similar in certain degrees to that of terminist logic can be observed. But those things do not change the fact that Langton's supposition is not a rigorous defined property of term. From the way the *suppo*-terms are used, we think again that these two theologians had in mind a common relation of substitution or of putting something in place of another and not a specialized notion of *suppositio.*

From the presented considerations, we can see that the Porretans were preoccupated by the same logical problems as found in the logical tradition, the equivocity of language born out of the multiplicity of meaning. Beside the problems implied by language, they were forced to go further, since the object they studied, God, needed a different approach from the other objects of discourse. The fact that they had to explain how one God in three different persons can be correctly represented with the Aristotelian categories, has stimulated explanations which employed the terminological apparatus of *suppo-terms*. The Porretans seem to offer a system of establishing what kind of divine category is in question when something is predicated about God: essence, persons, attributes of all persons, attributes of some persons and so on. However, the way they used '*suppositio*' strongly resembles the grammatical tradition, even if we can admit that their '*suppositum*' is indirectly an individual substance understood as a bearer of form. In fact, as we will try to argue in the following part, the meaning of '*suppositio*' in the logical, grammatical and theological traditions could have a much older and common origin.

1.3.1.4. Law and common language

In the previous sub-sections, we saw how the logical, theological and grammatical traditions prior to the 13th century make use of *suppo*-terminology and the manner in which they can be considered proximate sources for the theory of supposition developed within the terminist tradition. In this sense, we saw that *suppositio* was use for the subject of discourse, the person who acts, the subject of the proposition and for the fact of putting a word in the place of something, be it a propositional or extra propositional entity. All these acceptances, which are not mutual exclusive, are woven together, layer after layer, in the grammatical, theological and logical tradition starting probably from Priscian. Thus, we arrive at a close proximity between the concepts *suppositum*, *substantia, substratum* and *subiectum*, fact which will enable modern interpreters to speak about a referential import. But the fact that each technical acceptance of *suppo*-terminology from different particular disciplines has something in common makes us reconsider the origin of

supposition theory. We believe that at the core of each technical or semi-technical use of *suppo-* terms there is a common and intuitive relation described by the classical meaning that *suppositio* has in Latin: that of substitution or of putting something in place of another in the sense of replacing it. It is concerning this common, much older, and more intuitive acceptance of suppositio that we want to offer a few remarks.

In his contribution to the *Dictionary of Untranslatable*[639], Alain de Libera reconstructs in a certain manner the history of the concept of *suppositio* and brings into question the way in which this concept was, should and can be translated into the modern language[640]. He analyses through the rendering options of Jacques Maritain the translation of '*suppositio*' by '*substitution*' or its French counterpart '*suppléance*'. While he concludes correctly that this option never prevailed in modern translations and that the medieval grammatical, logical and theological understanding of the term presents a "supplementary meaning"[641], the problem must not be disregarded. In fact, we can consider that this "supplementary meaning" is a particular contribution of each individual discipline which is constructed over a common and intuitive understanding of *suppositio*. A hint in this sense in offered almost involuntary by De Libera itself between parentheses: "the terms [i.e. 'substitution'/'suppléance'][642] being synonymous only in the juridical expression *supposition d'enfants*, designating the fraudulent substitution of two newborn"[643]. It is this juridical sense in which we are interested.

Maybe we are not mistaken if we think that the Latin juridical language represents a version of regimented Latin language, in which certain words become technical terms in order to depict common life situations that must be addressed in a legal fashion. We think that this is the case of '*suppositio*', a term that, as we will see, refers to a common social practice which was consider to have legal implications and which forced the term for a juridical configuration. In Early Latin comedy *suppositio*, that is, the fraudulent substation of child, is almost a leitmotif and represents a constant intrigue present in different plays. Plautus is one of the examples. Living between the 3rd and 2nd century B.C. his plays depict characters accused of suppositio. For example, in *Truculentus*, Phronesium, in order to deceive Stratophanes puts another's baby, which in the end

[639] Originally BARBARA CASSIN (dir.*), Vocabulaire européen des philosophies : dictionnaire des intraduisibles*, Paris, Le Seuil, Le Robert, 2004.
[640] For our considerations regarding Alain de Libera, see DE LIBERA (2014), p. 1097-1098.
[641] DE LIBERA (2014), p. 1097-1098
[642] Inserted by me.
[643] DE LIBERA (2014), p. 1098.

will prove to be Diniarchus' children, as his own. In this sense we can find expressions as: "praemandare et quaerere puerum aut puellam, qui supponatur mihi - to ask and search a boy or a girl, to be put as my own"[644] stated by Phronesium; "suppositionem pueri quae mihi credidit - the substitution of the child that she [Phronesium] disclosed to me"[645] expressed by Diniarchus; and the threats of the same character directed towards Phronesium and his made Astaphium "iam hercle apud novos omnis magistratus faxo erit nomen tuom, post id ego te manum iniciam quadrupuli, venefica, suppostrix puerum - By Hercules! your name will be brought in front of all the new magistrates, after that I will sue you for fourfold, you sorceress, you suppostrix of children"[646]. All these uses bare witness for the common character of suppositio.

Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere[647], the same author but this time in *Captivi*, makes another mention of our term. At the end of the play we are told, not without a comic effect, that the work was made in accordance to virtuous habits (*ad pudicos mores facta haec fabula est*) and that no love intrigues (*subigitationes*), money schemes or fraudulent substitutions of children (*pueri suppositio*) can be found in it[648]. Although we never made an extensive search on other authors from the same proximate period, it seems that *suppositio* was a popular comic theme[649]. But beyond the social practice and its comic effect, *suppositio* refers to an actual crime. If we take a look in Adolf Berger's *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* we can find the notion of *partus suppositus* used synonymously with *partus subiectus* or *partus subditicius* all signifying "*a fraudulently substituted (suppositious) child*"[650]. The same source renders as synonyms the infinitive verbal forms *subicere* and *supponere*, both meaning "to substitute one person for another"[651]. This action was considered to be a crime of forgery or false, especially where the problem of succession, inheritance or civil status were at stake[652]. Although the origin of the legal

[644] PLAUTUS, *Truculentus*, 403-404.
[645] PLAUTUS, *Truculentus*, 437.
[646] PLAUTUS, *Truculentus*, 761-764.
[647] ILE (2017), p. 89.
[648] PLAUTUS, *Captivi*, 1030-1032.
[649] See, for example, WATSON, *A Commentary on Horace's Epodes* (2003), p. 568. See the prologue of Terentius, *Eunuchus*, 35-40.
[650] See BERGER, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (1953), p. 619. See *subditicius filius*, p. 719.
[651] BERGER (1953), p. 720
[652] For more details see GOTTFRIED, "Suppositio Partus" in: *Brill's New Pauly*, Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider, English Edition by: Christine F. Salazar, Classical Tradition volumes edited by: Manfred Landfester, English Edition by: Francis G. Gentry. Consulted online on 27 June 2021 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1126160> (2006). On this problem see also TORRENT, ARMANDO, "Suppositio partus-Crimen falsi" in *Anuario de historia del derecho español* (1982), pp. 223-242.

framework of the *suppositio* crime is attributed to the *Lex Cornelia de falsis*, we can observe the regulations in the much later legal compendium of Roman Law named *Digesta* or *Pandectae*, ordered by Justinian. For example:

> "Again, a son is not indeed prohibited from making a complaint of the action of his mother, if his charge is that she has fraudulently substituted a child so that he has a co-heir; but he is not permitted to bring a charge against her under the lex Cornelia"[653]
>
> "An accusation of substitution of a child is never cut off by prescription of time, nor does it matter even if the woman alleged to have substituted the child has died"[654]
>
> "In the case of a substituted birth, only the parents, or persons affected by the matter, bring accusations; [it is] not for just any citizen to make a criminal accusation."[655]
>
> "Where the question is one of substituted birth, or if [someone] is claiming an inheritance whom the other sons allege not to be their brother, interrogation under torture will be applied to the slaves of the inheritance"[656]

From the legal use, we can see that *suppositio* clearly meant a non-ambiguous action, that of fraudulent substitution of something with something else.

But before being a legal term that in the medieval times has been qualified within different disciplines, *suppositio* expressed in the common Latin language the action of putting something in the place of another as its etymology indicated: *sub-ponere*. We even find recurrences in parallel with the Ancient Greek that suggests this fact, whether they are connected with the legal use or not. Aristotle, in his *Historia animalium*, book 8, chapter 29, describes the behavior of the cuckoo bird. He mentions that the cuckoo makes no nest but lays its eggs in the nest of another bird in order to be hatched. Although is considered to be of a cowardly nature, Aristotle admits regarding the female cuckoo a great sagacity and concern for the survival of its young offspring to which it refers as a suppositious child. The term used here is "ὑποβολιμαῖος" which Moerbeke will translate in Latin with the term "*suppositos*"[657]. The same behavior of the cuckoo regarding the putting of

[653] WATSON (transl.), *The Digest of Justinian*, 48.2.11.1, p. 312.
[654] WATSON (transl.), *The Digest of Justinian,* 48.10.19.1, p. 341.
[655] WATSON (transl.), *The Digest of Justinian,* 48.10.30.1, p. 343.
[656] WATSON (transl.), *The Digest of Justinian,* 48.18.17.2, p. 358.
[657] See ARIST. LAT., *Historia animalium*, IX, 29, 618a 26-28: "Videtur autem coccuz prudentem facere parturitionem; quia enim conscius est sibi ipsi de formidolositate et quod non utique possit auxiliari, propter hoc tamquam suppositos facit proprios pullos ut salventur - But it seems that the cuckoo disposes its progeny with care; for is conscious of its own fear and that it cannot help them, for that so to speak makes its own younglings suppositious in order to save them".

its egg in the place of the eggs of a different bird will be observed by Pliny the Elder in its *Historia naturalium*, but this time using the *subicio*, *subicere* verbs[658].

As unimportant as they seem, these uses of '*suppositio*' can be used towards an argument of the following form. '*Suppositio*' is not an artificial concept created in a particular discipline, but is a notion that had a use and a specific sense in the common Latin language. This sense was substitution and described the action of putting an object in place of another. The juridical language has understood it as such and qualified the term in order to denote a fraudulent substitution, a crime. Under this understanding, logic, grammar and theology did not change the signification of the term in great extend but only constructed on its foundation, on the relation of substitution between physical objects. Thus, it can be said that each particular acceptance of '*suppositio*' from different domains, has at its core a common and intuitive meaning. How this meaning is afterwards transposed in order to be used in logic, grammar and theology, represents a mutation on the semantical level of the notion.

Conclusion

In this section we tried to explore the main theses regarding the origins of supposition theory. In the first section we have showed how De Rijk argues for a logical origin placed mostly in the 12th century tradition of fallacies. According to it, '*appellare*' and afterwards '*supponere*' were used to explain the difference between types of fallacies. The cause for fallacies like univocation, equivocation and figure of expression were explained according to a variation of appellation or supposition within an argument. Moreover, authors like Abelard and Anselm have used the *suppo*-terminology and considered similar logical problems as those present in the theory of supposition, but without them being its traceable source.

In fact, De Rijk, Ebbesen and possibly many others seem to consider that the 13th century supposition theory has multiple sources. One of them is represented by the second thesis which places the origin of supposition in the grammar tradition. According to it, the term '*supponere*' can be found in the work of Priscian and in its 12th century tradition. De Rijk has argued for a sense of '*supponere*' found in Priscian which is void of any ontological implication and reflected in the works of Abelard and Peter Helyas. Accordingly, the term has as its main meaning *putting something as the subject of the proposition* or *as grammatical subject*. Other scholars like

[658] See PLINIUS, *Naturalis historia,* Teubner, 1909, X, 11, 25-27.

Kneepkens and Ebbesen have argued for an account in which the pure grammatical sense cannot be held. We have tried to show that in the interplay between grammar and logic, the use of '*suppositio*' formed indeed a close proximity with '*subiectum*' and '*substantia*'. The grammatical category of subject ultimately refers to an entity (and its qualities) which is conceived logically and ontologically as a substance. This fact shows that even in the case of Priscian and the tradition that followed, we cannot speak of a pure grammatical sense of '*suppositio*'.

In the third part we tried to show the theological origin of supposition theory. On the basis of the studies conducted by Valente, Libera, Ebbesen and De Rijk we have analyzed the use of supposition in the Porretan tradition. This tradition is characterized by an effort of explaining the divine predication through the grammatical and logical tools available. In doing so they seem to understand the notion of 'suppositum', as Ebbesen suggest, as *the bearer of forms.* Each predication expresses an inherence of a form signified by the *qualitas nominis* in a subsistence signified by *substantia nominis.* This schema was applied to the trinitarian predication. A system of rules, modes of suppositions and logical and grammatical categories were used in order to hermeneutically analyze combinations of subjects and predicates, which involved terms related to God and denoting its essence, persons and attributes. In some cases, like that of Alan of Lille's, the tradition founded by Gilbertus Porretanus seems to explicitly distance itself from the grammar tradition. However, we think that the theological tradition can be seen as a method of applying already known grammatical and logical doctrines to a particular subject matter. In this way it cannot be solely credited for the apparition of the 13th century supposition theories. In fact, our thesis is that none of the above traditions can be considered independently as a source for the supposition theory.

In the last part of the section, we tried to show that the term '*suppositio*' or '*sub-positio*' has an intuitive sense originated in the common Latin language. This sense stands at the very foundation of each of its specific acceptances in the grammar, logical and theological traditions. Starting from Aristotle's natural observation, continuing through the old Latin language of someone like Plautus and arriving at the Roman law, supposition seems to have designated a specific kind of relation. The replacement of an object with another, putting something in the place of another or a substitution between two physical objects, were all commonly referred through the *suppositio* terminology. In this sense, the Roman Law was the first one which regimented this

commonly used term of '*supponere*', making it to denoted a punishable crime, that is, *the substitution of children*.

In conclusion, we believe that the supposition theory has its distant origin in a common and intuitive relation between physical object, that of substitution. In the course of centuries, the term was filtered through difference disciplines and suffered different regimentations. Law, logic, grammar and theology have partially reconfigured its sense by applying it to different doctrinal contents. In this process the relation represented by the term can be said to have suffered a degree of abstraction. The supposition was not described directly and exclusively as a relation between physical objects but was conceived as a relation between a type of word and something else which could be specified according to each individual discipline (substance, subject matter, divine person etc.). During this process, rules, classification of types of supposition and reflections about the context in which the substitution takes place have naturally occurred. In fact, we could say that supposition was a method of thinking abstractly about language. Since we cannot bring objects in language, the words are in facts those that stand for, supposit or substitute for objects. In this way, at the very core of the terminist theory of supposition stands the relation of substitution between physical objects.

1.3.2. Theories of supposition

In the previous sub-section, we saw how, beginning with the second half of 12th century, the *suppo*-terminology was used in logic, theology and grammar, as a tool to clarify the semantical function of a word within a propositional context. The concept of signification, as a natural property of a word, has slowly but surely proven to be an insufficient concept for the new language-situations that appeared. These new problems, and especially the doctrines on fallacies, invited the medieval logicians to study with new conceptual tools the relations between language and reality. Since on the basis of Priscian's and Aristotle's doctrines, a word can signify both a universal and an individual nature, new conceptual tools were needed to clarify the exact signification that a word has in a propositional contextual. The property of signification was contrasted, or rather supplemented, with that of *standing for something*, first through the concept of *appellatio* and then through that of *suppositio*. The supposition apparatus evolved gradually until 13th century when we can properly speak about a theory of supposition developed within the terminist logic[659].

[659] For a short sketch of this development see DE RIJK (1982), p. 162-173

Regarding the 13th and 14th century development of supposition theory, we can speak, according to Alain de Libera, about two interconnected traditions: the Oxford and Paris one. Firstly, the Parisian tradition is traced back to the Parvipotan school in works like *Fallacia Parvipontane*, while the Oxford tradition, which seems to be based on the Parisian one, is traced back to early works like *Logica 'Cum sit nostra'*, *Logica 'Ut dicit'* and *Introductiones Parisienses*, all edited by De Rijk in the second parts of his second volume of *Logica modernorum*[660]. Although there are many resemblances and common points between these two traditions, they seem to present a big difference: "the Oxford treatises ascribe supposition to subject and predicate terms alike, while the *Fallacie Parvipontane* provides rules of appellation for subject terms alone"[661]. According to the same author, in the second part of the first half of 13th century, when the Summulist tradition seems to emerge more promptly, the difference is accentuated: Peter of Spain, representing the Parisian tradition, focuses, according to De Libera, on the notion of *natural supposition* (which implies a semantical account of supposition), while appellation is treated only as a restriction to existing entities; William of Sherwood, representing the Oxford tradition, understands supposition and appellation in a more syntactical manner employing the concept of *dispositional supposition*[662]. Surely for the second half of 13th century we can talked about the influence of the grammar oriented *Modistae* theories in Paris, and in Oxford about the role of Roger Bacon in rejecting them through his theory of signs[663]. Boethius and Martin of Dacia, Radulphus Brito, and, after that, Thomas Erfurt where promoters of a theory of speculative grammar based on the notion of different modes of signifying, understanding and being[664].

[660] See DE LIBERA (1982), p. 174-176.
[661] DE LIBERA (1982), p. 176.
[662] See DE LIBERA (1982), p. 177-180.
[663] For Alain de Libera the modist tradition can be summaries as follows: "the new division of logic according to the three operations of the soul taken over from Aristotle's *De anima,* the reformulation of the terminists' 'natural' and 'accidental' suppositions as respectively 'supposition by virtue of discourse' *(de virtute sermonis* or *locutionis)* and 'supposition for truth's sake', the gradual accentuation of the problem of empty classes, the generalization of the question whether terms may lose their signification, the elaboration of a doctrine of univocation firmly rooted in ontology and epistemology, and the logical use of the so-called 'modes of intellection, signification, and being' *(modi intelligendi, significandi, essendi)*" De Libera (1982), p. 183. Regarding Roger Bacon, see DE LIBERA (1982), p. 180-185. See also UKELMAN, LAGERLUND, "Logic in the Latin Thirteenth Century" in DUTILH, READ (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic* (2017), p. 132-133.
[664] See UKELMAN, LAGERLUND (2017), p. 137; 136-138 for a very brief presentation of *Modistae*.

In the 14th century, together with the advent of nominalism, the most significant contributions regarding supposition theory are represented by William Ockham[665] and John Buridan[666]. While both have close ties to the Parisian milieu, the first is a representant of the Oxford tradition, while the latter of the Parisian one. Both reconsidered the theory of supposition on different grounds from those that we found in the previous century, since both proposed a nominalist ontology.

Since we cannot talk about a unique and general medieval theory of supposition but about multiples theories with different conceptual articulation that were developed in different traditions, in this part of our work we will try to explore some relevant examples different from Peter of Spain. Our purpose is to see how different Summulist authors from 13th and 14th century articulate in their logical books the notion of supposition. This endeavor will allow us to put the considerations presented in *Summulae* in context and to evaluate them in a comparative analysis for a better understanding of the general evolution of supposition theory. Although the scholarship is plenty of studies which take into account different theories of supposition from this period separately or in a comparative study with different purposes, we could not find one which directly addresses our purpose.

Thus, in the first section, we will show two version of supposition theory from 13th century. On the one hand, the supposition theory from Lambertus of Lagny's *Logica* or *Summa Lamberti* representative for the Parisian tradition; on the other hand, the theory from William of Sherwood's *Introductiones in Logicam*. The second section will be dedicated to the 14th century, where Buridan's and Ockham's theories of supposition from *Summulae de dialectica* and *Summa logicae* will be presented. In our endeavor we will try to focus only on the way supposition is defined and classified under different modes.

1.3.2.1. Lambertus of Lagny

In the eight chapter of *Logica* or *Summa Lamberti*[667], the one dedicated to signification and supposition, we can find some interesting introductory remarks that in Peter's case are lacking.

[665] For an introduction in Ockham's logical and philosophical thought see, for example, BIARD, *Guillaume d'Ockham. Logique et philosophie* (1997) and SPADE (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* (1999).
[666] For an introduction in Buridan's logical and philosophical thought see, for example, KLIMA, *John Buridan* (2008); BIARD, *Science et nature: la théorie buridanienne du savoir* (2012).
[667] We consulted LAMBERTUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Logica (Summa Lamberti)* (ed. Alessio, 1971) edition along with the English translation of Maloney, LAMBERT OF AUXERRE, *Logica or Summa* (transl. Maloney, 2015), which contains

Lambert states explicitly that supposition, restriction, distribution and relation are properties of the term (*proprietates termini*) and that, since they are founded on signification, signification must be studied first[668].

Lambert defines signification more explicitly and more closely to Aristotelian-Boethian texts than Peter does. He brings into question in his definition all the four domains of reality involved: extra-mental objects, understanding or concepts, language or vocal emissions and their connection in the union between the vocal emission and the concept of a thing. Thus, the signification of a term is defined as "the concept of a thing, for which concept of a thing (*intellectus rei*) a vocal sound is imposed at the will of the one instituting it, for […] vocal sounds are signs of affections (passiones) that are in a soul, that is, in an intellect, whereas concepts are signs of things"[669]. Thus, for Lambert, a specific case of a vocal sound (*vox*), a term, will signify primarily or will be the sign *per se* of a concept of a thing (*intellectus rei*) and only secondly will signify or be the sign of an external object (*res*)[670].

For Lambert, the difference between signification and supposition consists in the fact that, signification is prior to supposition. Signification consists of the union between a vocal expression and a concept or a mental representation of a thing. Through this mapping of a word with a signified concept, the word becomes a term. Supposition is a property of such a union already constructed. Moreover, what a word signifies depends on its imposition, for example, "*homo*" signifies (a) human, while its supposition arrives at what we could call its extension or at those entities that are contained under the concept of human. Thus "*homo*" stands for (*supponere pro*) Socrates and Plato[671].

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numerous useful and necessary emendations of Alessio's edition. According to Maloney, the work was composed around 1250s, probably by Lambert of Ligny-le-Châtel, possibly "former canon of the cathedral of Auxerre", and then "friar of the [same] Dominican convent", closely connected to the court of Navarre; see LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), p. xxxviii-xl; see also DE LIBERA (1981), pp. 229-232.

[668] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 205: "Multe autem sunt proprietates termini, scilicet: suppositio, appellatio, restrictio, distributio et relatio, inter quas prius dicendum est de relatione; sed quia significatio est sicut perfectio termini et proprietates termini supra significationem fundantur, ideo in principio ad evidentiam sequentium videndum est quid sit termini significatio et in quo differt a suppositione."; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1231, p. 253.

[669] LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1232, p. 253; LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 205: "Significatio termini est intellectus rei ad quem intellectum rei vox imponitur ad voluntatem instituentis […] voces sunt signa passionum que sunt in anima, id est in intellectu; intellectus autem sunt signa rerum"

[670] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 205: "Sic ergo vox primo et per se et immediate est signum intellectus rei; ulterius vero mediate est signum rei"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1236, p. 254

[671] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 206: "Differt autem significatio a suppositione in hoc, quod prior est significatio quam suppositio; significatio enim est intellectus rei qui per vocem representatur, ante cuius unionem cum voce non est terminus, sed constituitur terminus in unione illius intellectus rei cum voce. Suppositio vero est quedam proprietas

In a second step, the author of Summa identifies four acceptances of supposition: first, supposition taken as a special signification of a term, the signification of the substantival term or substantival thing which has as counterpart copulation, the signification of the adjectival term or thing[672]; second, supposition as used in disputations and referring to "the acceptance of a proposition as true and proven"[673], sense that relates to our common understanding of the supposition as assumption or something taken to be true in an argumentative process; thirdly, a sense which pertains to grammar, according to which supposition is "the locational arrangement of a part of an expression in the role of something of which something else is said"[674]; in this way, a name is put under a verb which is predicated about it; the forth way in which supposition is taken will be that regarding which Lambert will be concerned and which corresponds truly to a property of a term. Thus, supposition is finally defined as "acceptio termini per se sive pro re sua, vel pro aliquo supposito contempto sub re sua vel pro aliquibus suppositis contemptis sub re sua"[675]. As we will see in the following lines, the supposition thus defined incorporates its different modes of division.

Regarding the division of supposition, firstly we are told that *suppositio* can be said in a common manner (*communiter*) and in a proper one (*proprie*). The supposition that is said in a common manner is identified with the generic sense of supposition offered in the fourth acceptance of the '*suppositio*' term. The difference between these two modes consists in the fact that, speaking commonly, substantive and adjectival terms supposit both, while speaking properly, only substantival terms supposit while the adjectival one copulate[676]. According to the proper

termini sic constituti. Alia est differentia, quia significatio solum extenditur ad rem ad quam significandam imponitur terminus, sed suppositio non solum extenditur ad rem que per terminum significatur, sed potest extendi ad supposita contempla sub illa re. Verbi gratia, significatio hominis solum extenditur ad hominem, non ad contempta sub homine: «homo» enim significat hominem, non Sortem nec Platonem. Potest tamen «homo» supponere pro Sorte et pro Platone et pro homine"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1238, p. 255.

[672] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 206: "*substantiva rei designatio vel sign[ific]atio*"; See LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1239, p. 255, note c.

[673] LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1239, p. 255; LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 206: "Secundo modo dicitur suppositio acceptio alicuius propositionis tamquam pro vera et probata sicut frequenter sumitur in disputationibus"

[674] LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1239, p. 255: LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 206: "Tertio modo dicitur suppositio ordinatio partis orationis in situ eius de quo alterum dicitur, sicut dicitur esse suppositio in nomine respectu verbi: nomen enim supponit verbo, et de nomine verbum dicitur, et huic suppositioni respondet appellatio, et potest dici appellatio ordinatio in situ eius quod de altero dicitur"

[675] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 206; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1239, p. 255: "the acceptance of a term for itself or for its [signified] thing, or for some suppositum [logically] contained under its [signified] thing, or for more than one suppositum contained under its [signified] thing".

[676] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 207: "Communiter enim loquendo supponunt termini substantivi et adiectivi; sed proprie loquendo suppositio convenit terminis substantivis, et copulatio terminis adiectivis."; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1242, p. 256

acceptance, supposition is defined as: *"*Et est suppositio proprie dicta acceptio termini rem fixam et per se stantem representantis secundum quam teneri potest pro re sua, [vel] pro supposito vel suppositis contemptis sub re sua*"*[677]. Understood as such, supposition is configurated as a relation between a signifying term and a variety of objects: the term itself, the concept it signifies directly and one or many individuals or *supposita* which are signified indirectly and are contained under the signifying concept.

Further, supposition is divided in natural supposition and accidental supposition; accidental supposition, in simple and personal; personal supposition, in discrete and common supposition; common supposition, in determinate and confused supposition and confused supposition, in a variety of mobile and immobile suppositions. With the exception of the difference between discrete and common supposition, which in *SL* is put at the first level of division, the modes used by Lambert are parallel to those of Peter of Spain. In the following lines we will give a short sketch of these different modes.

The first level of division, that between natural and accidental supposition, is marked by the absence or presence of an adjoining term. On the one hand, *suppositio naturalis* is defined as a supposition in which the term is uttered for itself or its nature, without having a relation (*intentio*) to something exterior. The term that has this supposition stands in the place of *(supponit pro)* all those who share (*participant*) the form of the term, whether this sharing or participation takes place in the present, past or future. On the other, *suppositio accidentalis* takes place when something is added to the suppositing term, such that the adjoined one requires the suppositing term to stand for something specifically. For example, the time of the active indicative verb *sum, esse, fui* adjoined to the term '*homo*' makes this term to stand for present, past or future humans.[678]

[677] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 207; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1243, p. 256, (and commentary d): "Supposition strictly speaking is the acceptance of a term representing a thing that is stable and stands on its own, in accord with which it can be interpreted for itself, for its own [signified] thing, or for a suppositum or supposita contained under its [signified] thing"

[678] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 208: "suppositionum alia est naturalis, et alia accidentalis. Naturalis suppositio est quam habet terminus a se et a natura sua: hanc dicitur habere terminus quando per se ponitur, id est quando nulli alii adiungitur; terminus vero habens illam suppositionem non solum supponit pro hiis que participant formam suam, immo pro omnibus hiis supponit qui participant formam suam, scilicet pro presentibus preteritis et futuris. Dicitur autem ista suppositio naturalis, eo quod non est intentio ab extrinseco sed ab intrinseco: naturale enim est cuius principium est intra. Accidentalis suppositio est quam habet terminus ab adiuncto et in hac supponit terminus secundum exigentiam illius cui adiungitur. Si enim dicatur «homo est», supponit pro presentibus quia adiungitur verbo de presenti; si dicatur «homo fuit», pro preteritis; si dicatur «homo erit», pro futuris. Dicitur autem hec accidentalis eo quod inest termino ab extrinseco: quod enim ab extrinseco inest alicui accidentale est ei."; cf. LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1250-1251, p. 258.

The second level of division is that of accidental supposition between simple and personal supposition. Here the criterion of division is the absence or presence of a relation to the *supposita* contained under the form of the suppositing term. For *suppositio simplex* this means that the suppositing term is taken for (*tenetur pro*) itself, for its signified object or for its form. The classical example is the term '*homo*' in '*homo est species*'. Although the considerations related to simple supposition parallel in a certain degree those of Peter of Spain, Lambert makes a concession regarding the relation to *supposita*. *Suppositio simplex*, in a properly way, has no determinate relation to its *supposita*, but in a special way can have an indeterminate relation to them, as '*homo*' in '*scio hominem esse in Anglia*'[679]. *Suppositio personalis* is the supposition in which the term is taken for its supposit or supposits, meaning, for the individual or individuals contained under the suppositing term[680].

On a third level of division, personal supposition is differentiated in discrete and common supposition. The difference consists in the type of suppositing term. *Suppositio discreta* has a discrete name as the suppositing term, that is, a proper name or a demonstrative pronoun adjoint to a common term. *Suppositio communis* has a common term.[681]

[679] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 209: "Simplex suppositio est illa secundum quam tenetur terminus pro se vel pro re sua, non habito respectu ad supposita sub se contempta. Dicitur autem illa suppositio simplex que est in termino ratione forme sue et quia forma de se simplex est et indivisibilis, ideo illa suppositio que inest termino a forma, simplex dicitur […] Sed notandum quod non habere respectum ad supposita potest esse ita quod nullo modo nec determinate nec indeterminate sit respectus ad illa; vel ita quod non determinate sit respectus ad illa, sed indeterminate. Secundum hoc potest dici quod quedam est suppositio simplex in qua terminus nullo modo respicit supposita, sed solum tenetur pro forma sua: hanc habet iste terminus «homo», cum dicitur «homo est species», et hec est proprie simplex suppositio. Alia vero est suppositio simplex in qua terminus communis non respicit supposita determinate, habet tamen respectum ad illa indeterminate: hanc suppositionem habet ille terminus «homo» cum dicitur : «scio hominem esse in Anglia» ; similiter «piper» cum dicitur : «piper venditur hic et Rome» : hec enim minus proprie dicitur suppositio simplex quam prima."; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1253-1254, p. 258-259.

[680] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 209: "Personalis suppositio est secundum quam terminus tenetur pro supposito vel pro suppositis; dicitur autem personalis suppositio hac ratione: suppositum vel individuum in substantia rationali idem est quam persona. Boethius enim sic diffinit personam : persona est nature rationalis individua substantia. Individuum enim in substantia rationali est persona, et quia secundum proportionem sumptam a rationalibus sumuntur individua in aliis rebus, ideo illa suppositio in qua tenetur terminus pro suppositis vel individuis dicitur personalis, non quia omnia individua sint persone: individua enim in substantia rationali solum persone sunt, alie vero nequaquam, sed omnia individua aut sunt persone, aut secundum proportionem eorum que persone sunt sumuntur"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1255, p. 259. Lambert states that the name of this supposition comes from the individual or the suppositum of the rational substance which is called according to Boethius 'persona'.

[681] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 209-210: "suppositionum personalium alia discreta, alia communis. Discreta est illa quam habet terminus discretus in se ut : «Sortes currit», vel in equivalenti, ut quando sumitur terminus communis cum pronomine determinato ut : «iste homo currit». Discreta autem dicitur quia terminus talem suppositionem habens tenetur po aliquo simpliciter discreto. Communis est illa que termino communi convenit. Dicitur autem communis quia communi termino convenit"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1256-1258, p. 259.

Further, the fourth division is that of common supposition in determinate and confused supposition and concerns the number of *supposita* for which the term is taken. On the one hand, *suppositio determinata* takes place when the *suppositing* term can be taken indifferently for at least one *suppositum*. This means that in propositions like '*homo currit*' the subject term stand for one or more *supposita* but for its truth it requires only one running individual. On the other, *suppositio confusa* takes place when the suppositing term is taken necessary for all its *supposita*, that is, for all the inferiors comprised under the suppositing term[682].

The fifth level of division implies a further distinction of confused supposition according to its mobility. First, we have a strong mobile confused supposition (*suppositio confusa vehemens mobilis*). This supposition adds to the confused one the possibility of descending to all the *supposita* necessary contained by the suppositing term. The mobile confused supposition is marked by a universal sign (*omnis, nullus*) added directly (for the negative and affirmative universal signs) or indirectly (only for the negative universal sign) to the common term. This sign confuses and distributes the term to which is added[683]. Second, we have a weak immobile confused supposition (*suppositio confusa exilis immobilis*). In this case the suppositing common term stands for many of the supposits but not for all of them and a descending to them cannot take place. The example here is a common term to which a universal sign is added indirectly as '*animal*' in '*omnis homo*

[682] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210: "Determinata est illa quam habet terminus communis quando indifferenter potest sumi pro uno vel pro pluribus, ut cum dicitur : «homo currit» ; in hac «homo» habet determinatam suppositionem. Est enim ista vera uno homine currente, vel pluribus. Dicitur autem determinata quia ad veritatem propositionis in una ponitur terminus communis talem suppositionem habens, sufficit quod pro aliquo supposito teneatur de necessitate iste terminus communis, nec exigitur quod pro pluribus teneatur de necessitate, licet possit in tali suppositione teneri pro pluribus. Necesse est ergo quod terminus communis in tali suppositione teneatur pro uno determinate; si autem pro pluribus, hoc accidit. Confusa est illa quam habet terminus communis quando de necessitate tenetur pro omnibus suis suppositis vel pro pluribus"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1259-1261, p. 260.

[683] There is an exception in the case of the affirmative sign added indirectly. In this case the universal sign confuses but does not distribute the term. See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210: "Vehemens mobilis est illa quam habet terminus communis quando tenetur pro omnibus suis suppositis de necessitate, et potest fieri descensus sub eo, et hoc fit quando signum universale affirmativum immediate additur termino communi, ut cum dicitur: «omnis homo currit»; et similiter quando signum universal negativum mediate vel immediate additur termino communi, ut cum dicitur : «nullus homo est lapis»: in hac enim terminus cui immediate additur hoc signum «nullus», scilicet «lapis», et similiter cui additur immediate, habent confusam suppositionem vehementer mobilem; nam signum universale affirmativum terminum cui immediate additur confundit et distribuit; mediate autem adiunctum confundit sed non distribuit; signum vero universale negativum terminum commune sibi adiunctum immediate et mediate confundit et distribuit. Similiter hanc suppositionem habet terminus communis cui additur negatio immediate, ut cum dicitur : «non homo currit», hoc est dicere: «nullus homo currit»; vel mediate, ut cum dicitur: «non video hominem», hoc est dicere: «nullum video hominem»."

est animal'[684]. The proposition will be false if '*animal*' is taken for all its individuals, humans and non-humans. Certainly, Lambert discuses two exceptional cases of common terms with confused supposition where the descending cannot take place due to its immobility. If an exceptive sign is added to a common term with a direct universal sign, for example, '*tantum omnis homo currit*', although it, '*homo*', will have a strong supposition, it will be immobile. The same immobility applies when the common term with a universal sign of distribution is taken collectively, for example, '*omnis homo trahit navem*'[685].

1.3.2.2. William of Sherwood

William of Sherwood discusses supposition in the fifth tract of his *Introductiones* which is dedicated entirely to the properties of terms[686]. There he considers four properties: signification, supposition, copulation and appellation. First, a short distinction is drawn between the first two properties: signification is the presentation of a certain form to understanding (*presentatio alicuius formae ad intellectum*), while supposition is the ordering of a certain understanding under another (*ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio*)[687]. But the above definition of supposition is *secundum actum* or, according to Kretzmann's translation "*with respect to an actual occurrence*"[688]. Its definition *secundum habitum* or "*with respect to the capacity for such an occurrence*"[689] bears witness to the dependence of supposition on signification, since, in this particular acceptance, supposition is the signification of something as of a subsistent (*significatio alicuius ut subsistentis*). Such being the case, it will naturally be order under another, including thus the definition of

[684] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210-211: "Exilis immobilis est illa quam habet terminus communis quando de necessitate tenetur pro pluribus suppositis sub se contemptis, non tamen pro omnibus, nec sub ipso potest fieri descensus"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1262-1264, p. 260-261.
[685] See LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 211: "Bene enim potest esse vehemens et immobilis: cum dicitur tantum «omnis homo currit», «homo» habet confusam suppositionem vehementem, sed immobilem. Dicto enim exclusiva adveniens ipsi termino distributo impedit quin fiat descensus sub eo. Similiter est suppositio confusa sed immobilis quando signum additur termino communi in singulari vel in plurali et tenetur collective ut cum dicitur: «omnis homo trahit navem», positione facta quod omnes homìnes trahunt navem et nullus per se, et similiter cum dicitur: «omnes apostoli sunt duodecim»"; LAMBERT, *Logica*, (transl. Maloney, 2015), 1265-1266, p. 261
[686] In our exposition we will use the 1983 Lohr edition, LOHR, KUNZE, MUSSLER (eds.), *William of Sherwood, 'Introductiones in Logicam' Critical Text* (1983), along with the translation offered by Norman Kretzmann in 1966 and reprinted in 1975, SHERWOOD, *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975).
[687] SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.0.1., p. 265: ""Est igitur *significatio* praesentatio alicuius formae ad intellectum. *Suppositio* autem est ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio"; see SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 105.
[688] SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 105.
[689] SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 105.

supposition *secundum actum*[690]. Accordingly, terms, being substantival name, pronoun or substantive expressions, through the property of supposition signify a thing (*rem*) as subsistent and ordered under another[691].

After defining supposition in a brief contrast with the other three properties of terms, Sherwood offers from 5.1.1 to 5.1.7, l. 45, the division of supposition. This division will be re-discussed by him in a series of *quaestiones* and *dubitationes*.

The first level of division in William's case is that between material and formal supposition, a distinction that we cannot find in the 13th century Parisian tradition, for example in Peter of Spain. *Suppositio materialis* takes place when a term or word (*dictio*) stands for the utterance (*vox*) itself ('*Homo est dissyllabum*') or for the word composed from utterance and signification ('*Homo est nomen*'). The formal supposition takes place when the word supposits or stands in the place of what it signifies[692].

Further, formal supposition in divided on a second level in simple and personal supposition, although Sherwood admits a second division according to the types of terms, that is, common and discrete. Regarding *suppositio simplex*, it is defined as the supposition where the word is taken for the signified form or where the word "*supposits what it signifies for what it signifies*" as in '*Homo est specie*'[693]. As we can see a few pages later in 5.1.8, simple supposition is divided further according to the relation of the suppositing term with the things (*res*) in three different modes. The first mode is that of *suppositio manerialis*, where the term stands for the *significatum*, which in this case is the manner of the species, without having any relation to the things contained under the form. The example is the subject term in '*homo est species*'. The following two modes of simple supposition have indeed a relation to the things (*res*) contained under the suppositing term. On the one hand, in propositions like '*homo est dignissima creatura*', '*homo*' is not taken simply

[690] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.0.1., p. 265: "Secundum autem quod sunt *in habitu,* dicitur *suppositio* significatio ali cuius ut subsistentis. Quod enim tale est, natum est ordinari sub alio"; see SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 105.

[691] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.0.3., p. 265: "Ex his patet, quod *significatio* est in omni parte orationis seu dictionis, *suppositio* autem in nomine substantivo tantum vel pronomine vel dictione substantiva. Haec enim significant rem ut subsistentem et ordinabilem sub alio"; see SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 105.

[692] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.2., p. 266: "Est igitur suppositio quaedam materialis, quaedam formalis. Et dicitur materialis, quando ipsa dictio supponit vel pro ipsa voce absoluta vel pro ipsa dictione composita ex voce et significatione, ut si dicam:'"Homo" est dissyllabum,' '"Homo" est nomen.' Formalis autem est, quando dictio supponit suum significatum"; SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 107.

[693] SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 107; The first two definitions offered are "dictio supponit significatum pro significatum" and "accipitur pro forma significata" Sherwood, *Introductiones*, 5.1.2., 5.1.5., p. 266

for the abstract form but for the form inasmuch as it is in a thing (*res*). Thus, inasmuch as the individual thing participates to the form, the suppositing term can be replaced with a discrete term but only if the species is repeated again after the substitution as in '*iste homo, inquantum homo, est dignissima creatura*'[694]. On the other, in propositions like '*piper venditur hic et Romae*', the subject term does not stand for the abstract species like in the first case, nor for the individuals comprised under the species, for a particular pepper. The subject term '*piper*' stands for that which is signified in a common manner relating the form to its individuals in a vague or unfixed way[695].

Personal supposition is contrasted with simple supposition through the fact that it does not take place when the suppositing term stands in the place of the signified form but in the place of the thing (*res*) which carries the form of the suppositing term (*pro re deferente formam*)[696]. Personal supposition is divided further in determinate and confused supposition. The determinate supposition takes place when the suppositing term stands for a certain one (*pro aliquo uno*), that is, for one individual thing, bearer of the form, that makes the proposition true. The example offered by Sherwood is the subject term in '*homo currit*'. *Suppositio confusa* takes place when the suppositing term stands for many (*supponit pro multis*). The confused supposition is said to be divided in *confused and distributive* and *merely confused* supposition. The example for the first is the subject term in '*omnis homo est animal'*, while for the latter is the term '*animal*' from the same proposition[697]. Further, the distributive supposition can be mobile or immobile depending on the possibility to descend under the suppositing term[698]. Now, according to its definition, every

[694] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.10., p. 268: "*Primus modus* (1) fit sic: 'Homo est species.' Et solet dici, quod hic est suppositio manerialis, quia supponit pro ipsa manerie speciei. *Secundus modus* fit sic: 'Homo est dignissima creaturarum.' Et non est similis haec suppositio priori, quia non praedicatur de ipsa specie abstracta, sed in quantum est in rebus. Unde potest tale praedicatum dici de qualibet re speciei, inquantum participat naturam speciei. Unde potest dici: 'Iste homo, inquantum homo, est dignissima creaturarum.' Et est haec suppositio, ubicumque res speciei suscipiunt aliquam praedicationem solum cum reduplicatione speciei et non aliter."

[695] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.11., p. 268: "*Tertius modus* (2b) fit sic: 'Piper venditur hie et Romae.' Et non est suppositio similis primae, quia species ipsa non venditur. Nec secundae, quia non dicitur hic 'piper' inquantum piper, sed supponit hic 'piper' pro suo significato communiter et vage se habente ad suas res. Unde solet dici, quod haec est vaga suppositio. Et supponit pro specie inquantum per sua individua, sed non significata."; SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 112.

[696] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.5., p. 266: "Aut accipitur pro forma significata et tunc est *simplex* suppositio, aut pro re deferente formam et tunc *personalis*"

[697] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.7, p. 266: "Et est *determinata,* quando poterit exponi locutio per aliquod unum. Et hoc est, quando dictio supponit pro aliquo uno, ut cum dico: 'Homo currit'. Ista potest esse vera, quolibet currente. *Confusa* autem, quando dictio supponit pro multis. *Distributiva* autem, quando supponit pro multis, ita quod pro quolibet, ut haec dictio 'homo,' cum dico: 'Omnis homo est animal'. Confusa tantum*,* ut haec dictio 'animal.'"

[698] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.6-5.1.7., p. 266: "*Mobilis* autem, quando potest fieri descensus, ut in praedicto exemplo in hoc termino 'homo'. *Immobilis* est, quando non potest fieri descensus, ut hic: 'Tantum omnis homo currit.'

distributive supposition is mobile, that is, in every case where a term stands for many as for each of its contained individuals, a descending is possible from the very beginning. What renders the difference between mobility and immobility is the adjoined word which can block this descending as in the case of '*tantum*'.

After offering the so called '*modi supponendi*', Sherwood discusses the division he made along with a series of *quaestiones* and *dubitationes*. The first question is similar to the problem addressed by Peter of Spain in *SL* starting with VI.10, that of the status of the predicate term, whether it predicates only the form under a simple supposition. Sherwood answers that all names signify only the form, not absolutely, but as it informs the substances which carries that form. Thus, the form will be signified differently by the subject and predicated term. The form in predicate is signified as the form predicable of a substance which is understood through the subject term. While the form is already and differently understood in the substance of the subject. His concluding remark on this topic seems to be that the predicate term stands only as the subject requests[699].

The following questions and doubts, regarding which we will not be concerned, are further offered: whether '*homo est species*' is singular[700], the truth value of some puzzled language situations: '*Haec herba crescit hic et in horto meo*' or '*Mulier, quae damnavit, salvavit*'[701], whether the subject term in '*homo currit*' has an uncertain and undetermined supposition and the distribution of the subject term in '*omnis homo videt homonem*'[702].

Thus far, Sherwood's consideration of the supposition theory, taken in parallel with that of Lambert and Hispanus, has no remarkable articulations with some exceptions in its definition and

Non potest inferri: 'Ergo tantum Socrates currit.'"; see SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 108-109.

[699] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.7., p. 268: "Omne enim nomen significat solam formam et non absolute, sed inquantum informat substantiam, deferentem ipsam. Et sic aliquo modo dat intelligere substantiam. Nomen ergo in praedicato dat intelligere formam, dico, ut est forma substantiae subiecti. Et ideo cum ilia substantia intelligatur in subiecto, non intelligetur iterum in praedicato. Unde praedicatum solam formam dicit.[…] Sciendum autem, quod haec est auctoritas Boethii: 'Talia sunt praedicata, qualia permiserint subiecta,' et non huius conversa. Et est exemplum eius ibidem istud: 'Homo est iustus; Deus est iustus'. Diversimode enim sumitur 'iustus' hic et ibi, et hoc secundum exigentiam subiecti".

[700] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, p. 269, l. 130-145.

[701] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, p. 269, l. 146-159.

[702] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, p. 269-270, l. 183.

division of its modes. Nonetheless, at the end of his tract dedicated to supposition, he is offering some rules exemplified with inferences which can be resumed as follow[703]:

1.1. Every distributive sign confuses and distributes the immediate adjoined term.

1.2. The affirmative distributive sign merely confuses the remote sign to which is adjoined.

1.3. The negative distributive sign confuses and distributes the remote sign to which is adjoined.

2.1. From a merely confused supposition it does not follow a confused and distributive supposition

3.1. From multiple determinate suppositions does not follow only one determinate

4.1. From a determinate supposition does not follow a confused and distributive supposition

5.1. From a confused and distributive supposition follows a determinate supposition and not a merely confused supposition

These rules may account for what De Libera has pointed out as a more rigorous and syntactical approach to supposition theory characteristic for the Oxford tradition. On the one hand, the first three rules offer us hints about the supposition of the terms in the classical categorical propositions. Thus, the subject term of the universal affirmative and negative proposition has a distributive and confused supposition, as the predicative term of the universal negative proposition. The predicate term of the universal affirmative proposition has a merely confused supposition. The supposition of the subject and predicate of particular affirmative and negative propositions are explicitly lacking, although they may be deduced in connection with the equipollence of signs from the first

[703] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, p. 270, l. 185-p. 271, l. 214: 1. "Habetur ergo pro *regula,* quod omne signum distributivum confundit terminum sibi immediate adiunctum confuse et distributive. Sed signum affirmativum confundit terminum remotum confuse tantum. Signum autem negativum confundit terminum remotum confuse et distributive. Unde sequitur: 'Nullus homo est asinus; ergo nullus homo est iste asinus'. Sed non sequitur: 'Omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est hoc animal'."; 2. "Non sequitur a suppositione confusa tantum ad confusam et distributivam, ut, omni homine videnteseu tantum, non sequitur: 'Omnis homo hominem non videt; ergo omnis homo non videt hominem.'"; 3. "Non sequitur a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum, sed ad unum confusum, ut, omni homine videnteseu tantum, non sequitur: 'Homo videtur a Socrate et a Platone, et sic de singulis; ergo homo videtur ab omni homine,' sed sequitur: 'Ergo ab omni homine videtur homo'.", 4. "Non sequitur a determinata ad confusam et distributivam, sed ad confusam tantum. Ut non sequitur: 'Hominem non videt Socrates; ergo Socrates non videt hominem,' at si videat unum solum. Sed bene sequitur: 'Hominem videt omnis homo; ergo omnis homo videt hominem.'"; 5. "A confusa et distributiva sequitur ad determinatam et non a confusa tantum. Ut: 'Socrates non videt hominem; ergo hominem non videt Socrates'. Sed non sequitur: 'Omnis homo videt hominem, ut si quilibet videat se tantum; ergo hominem videt omnis homo'."

tract of the work[704]. On the other hand, the following four rules, give us hints about what was the use of supposition theory. By stating that in an argument we must pay attention to the type of supposition that the terms from the premises have, in contrast to those from conclusion, supposition becomes a criterion to establish the validity of argumentative reasoning. Thus, an inference from a certain proposition in which a term has merely confused or determinate supposition to a proposition in which the same term will have confused and distributive supposition will be invalid. The same case will be if from multiple propositions with determinate suppositions we infer one with determinate supposition. However, from a proposition with a term that has confused and distributive supposition can be inferentially obtained a proposition in which the same suppositing term has determinate supposition.

1.3.2.3. Johannes Buridanus

As Alexander W. Halls suggests, based on the considerations of E. P. Bos, John Buridan's[705] logical treatise *Summulae de dialectica* was written at some particular time between 1325 and 1360[706]. As stated in the *prooemium*, the work was in a certain degree intended to be a commentary to *Summulae logicales*, but in reality, it goes far beyond Peter of Spain's logical theories[707]. Buridan does not only treat subjects that are lacking from Peter's handbook of logic - for example treatise 8 *On demonstration* and the *Sophismata* part, which is sometimes considered an independent work - but reworks part of Peter's text and inserts its own consideration when Peter's position cannot be held. The last option is the case for the tract dedicated to supposition theory. As Ria Van Der Lecq points out in her introductory study, if in the first three tracts of his work Buridan takes the lemma from Peter's texts and comments it, in the tract on supposition he does not make any reference to it[708]. This fact can be explained by Buridan's doctrinal orientation.

[704] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 1.6., p. 229-231.
[705] Regarding Buridan's importance in medieval philosophy see KLIMA, *John Buridan* (2009).
[706] See HALL, "John Buridan: On Aristotle's Categories" in LLOYD (ed.), *Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Categories* (2008), p. 302. A more concise date in established by Ria Van Der Lecq, around 1340, on the basis of the parallelism between the Statue of 1340 which condemns Ockhamists and Buridan's discussion from *Summulae de dialectica* 4.3.2; see BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), p. xvi; THIJSSEN, "Once again the Ockham statutes of 1339 and 1340: some new perspectives" in *Vivarium* vol. 28 (1990), p. 150-151.
[707] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 4: "I have chosen to deal in particular with that short treatise of logic which the venerable professor, master Peter of Spain, composed a while ago, by commenting on and supplementing it; indeed, occasionally I am going to have to say and write things that differ from what he has said and written, whenever it appears to me suitable to do so"
[708] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), p. xvii-xviii; on some general difference between Buridan's and Peter's treatment of supposition, see the same text p. xxv-xxvii. Surely, we can see non-explicit references to

As a representative of *via moderna* or nominalism, Buridan's considerations enter in contrast with the 13th century supposition theories which, to a certain degree, can be described as having a realist orientation. In fact, Peter was conceived as one of the main figures of *via antiqua*, the old way of doing logic. The new or modern way, at least in Buridan's and Ockham's case, as we will see, was focused on the existence of a mental language whose elements where concepts directly or non-mediately signified by spoken or written language. Individual objects existing in reality were signified only through these concepts and were considered *significata ultima.* This particular position will enable nominalists to avoid the existential commitment regarding the universal. In the following lines, we will offer a short analysis of Buridan's treatment of supposition theory from its fourth treatise of *Summulae de dialectica.* In doing so, we will rely on Ria Van der Lecq's 1998 critical edition of the fourth tract, along with the English translations provided by Peter King in 1985[709] and Gyula Klima in 2001.

The treatise of *Summulae de dialectica* that is reserved to supposition contains six chapters: the first is dedicated to the differences between signification, verification, appellation and supposition; the second contains a division of the utterances that signify by convention; the third comprises the division of supposition in modes; the fourth is dedicated to the relative terms and the last two chapter discusses appellation and the properties of ampliation and restriction.

From the very beginning Buridan distances himself from the grammatical understanding of supposition. He does not consider supposition to be the act of putting something as the subject for a verb, but considers it in a logic sense[710]. For the logical sense, first, the concept of signification must be discussed. Invoking *De anima* 435b 24-6, signification is understood primarily as a function or power of uttered language to transmit a mental content to another person[711]. Accordingly, the significative utterance (*vox significativa*) "should signify the concept of the speaker to the hearer and should give rise to a concept in the hearer similar to the concept of the speaker"[712]. It must be noted that signification is a property of a word independent from the

theoretical positions which can be attributed to Peter of Spain and regarding which Buridan categorically distances himself.

[709] BURIDAN, *The Treatise on Supposition* (1985).

[710] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.1., p. 8, l. 14-15: "Sed etiam addendum est quod non intendimus de suppositione prout est reddere suppositum verbo apud grammaticum"; see BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 221-222.

[711] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.2, p. 9, l. 7-15: "Quantum ad primam clausulam notandum est quod data fuit nobis virtus vociferandi finaliter ut possemus aliis significare conceptus nostros"

[712] see BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 223.

propositional context. This independence can be seen especially in the case of naturality significative utterances (*voces significativae naturaliter*) which do not need a propositional context in order to convey an understanding to the hearer. But supposition is not a property of any utterance which signify a mental concept, but only of the utterances which are imposed to signify by convention (*ad placitum*), and which are constitutive parts or terms of proposition, that is, the subject and predicate[713]. Moreover, the suppositing utterances have another condition which must be taken into account. They must be able to be the object of a pointing out (*demonstratio*) which is propositionally expressed by truly predicating the suppositing term to a demonstrative pronoun, such that the object of the pointing out will verify the truth of the initial proposition[714]. The last aspect invites us to speak about *verificatio*. Verification is a property different from but used by supposition. On the one hand, verification is a property of a proposition, not of terms, like supposition, in virtue of which a proposition can be called 'true' or 'false'[715]. Surely, truth and falsity are primarily properties of mental propositions; uttered proposition are true or false only in virtue of the former. On the other hand, supposition, by showing for what exactly a term can stand in a proposition context, tells us for what and how many *supposita* the proposition verifies or for what substituting terms the proposition maintains its truth value[716]. Moreover, in the last subsection of the first chapter on supposition, a further distinction is drawn between supposition and appellation. *Appellatio* is not a special kind of supposition like in Peter's case, but a property reserved to terms like '*chimera*' and '*vacuum*' which do not supposit, for oblique terms, for terms like '*album*' which supposit for a substance and appellates the whiteness as inherent in the substance[717]. In short, a term "appellates everything it signifies other than that for which it

[713] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.1., p. 7, l. 10-11: "Quia non est propositionis supponere, sed termini qui est subiectum vel praedicatum"; 4.1.2., p. 8, l. 22-24: "differunt significatio et suppositio, quia cuiuslibet dictionis quae non materialiter sumpta est pars propositionis, interest significare et audienti eam conceptum aliquem constituere secundum insitutionem ad placitum sibi datam. Et non omnis talis dictionis est supponere, quia solus talis terminus est innatus supponere".

[714] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.2., p. 8, l. 24-p. 9, l. 5: "Et non omnis talis dictionis est supponere, quia solus talis terminus est innatus supponere et omnis talis qui, aliquo demonstrato per hoc pronomen 'hoc' vel aliquibus demonstratis per illud pronomen 'haec', potest vere affirmari de illo pronomine. Ideo iste terminus 'chimera' non potest supponere, quia quocumque demonstrato falsum est dicere 'hoc est chimera', et quibuscumque demonstratis 'haec sunt chimera'."

[715] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.3., p. 11, l. 2-5: "verificatio est propositionis et non termini, quod est quia propositionis propria passio est esse veram vel falsam".

[716] See for example the case of a distributed term BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.3., p. 10, l. 22-25: "Et si sit terminus distributus, oportet verificationem esse pro omnibus pro quibus supponit, si propositio debeat esse vera; et si non sit distributus, sufficit pro aliquo vel aliquibus"

[717] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.1.4., p. 12-14.

supposits as pertaining [adiacens] to that for which it supposits"[718]; appellation is as Van der Lecq's shows equivalent to the connotative function of a word[719].

After discussing in 4.2 the different divisions of the significative utterances by convention, in 4.3 Buridan begins his exposition of the different modes of supposition. The first division is that between proper and improper or figurative supposition. *Suppositio propria* takes place "when the utterance supposits according to that nature or signification commonly instituted for it"[720]. *Suppositio improria* or *transsumptiva* is reserved for poetry and takes place when an utterance is taken in the place of the signification of another word, due to a certain similarity - e.g. '*pratum ridet'* suppositing for a blossoming meadow - or an intended effect like irony - e.g. the predicate of the expression '*o, tu es valde bonus puer'* which stands for a disobedient child due to the father's intention to mock his son[721].

The second division is that between material and personal supposition. *Suppositio personalis* takes place when the propositional term stands in the place of its ultimate significate(s) ("*supponit pro suis ultimatis significatis vel pro suo ultimato significato*"[722]). For '*homo currit*', the subject term stands in the place of or supposits for men[723], that is, it stands not in the place of concepts but in the place of individuals. *Suppositio materialis* takes place when the uttered word supposits for or stands in the place of itself or something similar to itself or its immediate significate, which is a concept; the common example is the subject term in '*homo est species*'[724]. Regarding the material supposition, Buridan makes a series of remarks that articulates its distinct mark of nominalist. He rejects a third member of the aforementioned division, namely *suppositio*

[718] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 226.
[719] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), p. xviii.
[720] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 251; BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.1, p. 37, l. 3-5: "propria dicitur quando vox supponit secundum suam naturam vel secundum significationem sibi communiter institutam".
[721] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.1, p. 37, l. 5-7, l. 17-p. 38, l.10 "Impropria est quando vox supponit secundum significationem alterius vocis ex transsumptione propter similitudinem vel ironiam aut huiusmodi aliam causam, ut si dicamus 'pratum ridet'[...] De prima parte manifestum est quando aliquando aliquem hominem dicimus esse asinum, si ipse est rudis, quia asinus videtur animal rude. Et sic iste terminus 'asinus' non ponitur in illa propositione ad supponendum proprie, quia nec pro se nec pro asinis, ad quos impositus est ad significandum, supponit, sed supponit pro hiis pro quibus supponeret iste terminus 'rudis' [...] Et similiter secundum ironiam pater dicit filio suo: 'o, tu es valde bonus puer,' et intendit quod hoc predicatum 'bonus puer' supponat non pro bono puero sed pro malo."
[722] BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 38, l. 11-15.
[723] BURIDAN rejects any connection between the names of the personal supposition and the concept of person, connection that can be found in Lambertus of Lagny's treatise; see BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 39, l. 9-12
[724] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 252-253; BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 38, l. 15-18.

simplex. This rejection is oriented against a realist interpretation of simple supposition, according to which the "universal natures are distinct from the singulars outside of the soul [...] it supposits simply when it supposits for that universal nature"[725]. As the critical edition correctly points out, this particular understanding of simple supposition can be identified in Peter of Spain treatise[726], although Peter of Spain, inasmuch as he never takes into consideration material supposition, did not took *suppositio simplex* as a third member of the division between material and personal supposition. However, Buridan's specific position regarding the universal is stated further: the universals are concepts which can be predicated of many like the genus and the species and do not exist outside the human soul[727]. Thus, in a proposition like '*homo est species*', the subject term '*homo'* stands in the place of or supposits for the concept according to which it was imposed to signify humans, since the propositional utterance is subordinated to its corresponding mental concepts[728]. Since material supposition takes place when the term stand for itself and something similar to itself, that is, for an utterance or proposition, not just for its concept, this fact begs the question regarding the supposition of some particular propositions expressed in infinitival constructions. Some of them can be considered to have material supposition, but others personal[729]. This fact, along with the whole personal-material distinction, makes Buridan to wonder how we ought to establish a supposition of a term in virtue of the word or of its capability to signify (*de virtute sermonis*). His answer comes as a middle ground between two extremes. On the one hand, there are some which considers that '*homo est species*' is absolutely false (*simpliciter falsa*) according to *virtus sermonis* since the subject term must be taken personally[730]. On the other, there

[725] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 253.
[726] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 38, l. 21.
[727] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 39, l. 19-24: "Universalia secundum praedicationem principaliter dictam non sint praeter animam, illa non sunt nisi conceptus animae quibus anima concipit indifferenter plures res, ut quia omnes homines indifferenter concipit conceptu a quod imponitur hoc nomen 'homo', et sic de conceptu animalis quantum ad animalia. Ideo cum genera et species sint universalia secundum praedicationem, apparet quod species et genera sunt tales conceptu animae."
[728] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 40, l. 5-8: "Iste ergo terminus vocalis 'homo', si supponat pro illo conceptu secundum quem impositus est ad significandum homines, ut dicendo quod homo est quoddam universale vel quod homo est species, idest iste terminus mentalis cui subordinatur haec vox 'homo', tunc haec vocatur suppositio materialis."; see BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 254.
[729] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 40, l. 12-25.
[730] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 41, l. 1-9: "Quidam enim dixerunt istam esse falsam de virtute sermonis 'homo est species', quia principalis suppositio est personalis. Voces enim sunt impositae ad supponendum pro suis significatis ultimatis, quia non possumus ea portare ad disputationes; et non fuerunt impositae ad supponendum pro se ipsis, quia etiam sic possunt supponere voces non impositae ad significandum, ut quod 'buf est vox trium litterarum' et 'buba est duarum syllabarum'. Et tunc dicunt illi quod de virtute sermonis veritas vel falsitas debet attendi secundum primam et principalem suppositionem, ideo secundum personalem. Et sic ista est falsa 'homo est species'. Ideo simpliciter de virtute sermonis ipsa dicenda est falsa."

are some which consider the same proposition true *de vritute sermonis*, because the subject term must have a material supposition; they justify their position by stating that the capability of words to signify comes from the imposed convention (*impositione ad placitum*) and use (*usus*) of the author. In case of '*homo est species*' the authors are the philosophers which consider the proposition to be true[731]. Buridan's position is that the capacity of words to signify and even to supposit depends on us and on the context in which we are involved and not on the words themselves. We can either stick to a common and proper signification or supposition accepted by many or we can impose a new meaning, an improper one, as can take place in the disputation context with the agreement of the parts involved. Regarding '*homo est species*', Buridan states that, if by *virtus sermonis* we must understand the acceptance according to the proper locution, that is, according to the fact that utterances were imposed to signify and stand for their *significata ultima*, in this case for *res*, then the proposition is false. But insofar as the aforementioned proposition was put by its author in an improper way, in which is true, it must be taken in that particular improper sense. In conclusion, if someone wants to take the proposition '*homo est species*' according to *virtus sermonis* and not according to the uses of its author and to declare the proposition false, he must state in which sense is false and in which sense is true, since it cannot be absolutely false. Only the *dyscolus* and *protervus* will declare the proposition false *simpliciter*[732]. The truth of propositions with material supposition like '*homo est species*',

[731] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 41, l. 10-15: "Alia opinio ponit contrarium, scilicet quod de virtute sermonis haec est vera 'homo est species', quia sermo in significando et supponendo non habet virtutem nisi ex impositione ad placitum et usu, et non possumus scire quae fuit impositio nisi per usum auctorum. Auctores autem et philosophi usi sunt ista tamquam vera 'homo est species', quae non est vera nisi secundum suppositionem materialem. Ergo in hac propositione debemus hanc materialem suppositionem reputare de virtute sermonis."

[732] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 41, l. 16-p.42, l. 10: "Tertia opinio est, cui ego assentio, quod vox in supponendo vel significando non habet virtutem propriam nisi ex nobis. Unde per conventum disputantium, ut in obligationibus, sibi possumus imponere novam significationem et non uti communi eius significatione. Et sic possumus loqui transsumptive et ironice ad alienam significationem. Sed tamen locutionem propriam vocamus quando utimur voce secundum significationem sibi communiter institutam et magis principaliter, et vocamus impropriam locutionem si aliter utamur ea quamvis liceat aliter uti ea. Et absurdum esset dicere simpliciter quod propositio auctoris sit falsa, si ponat eam secundum locutionem impropriam secundum quam sit vera; sed debemus dicere quod vera est, quia secundum sensum verum posita est, iuxta dictum Aristotelis primo *Ethicorum* quod sermones sunt intellegendi et recipiendi secundum materiam subiectam. Sed debemus bene dicere quod propositio non esset vera, si esset posita et recepta secundum propriam locutionem. Si ergo huiusmodi proprietatem locutionis volumus ad placitum vocare "virtutem sermonis", tunc diceremus quod ista 'homo est species' est vera sicut ponitur ab auctoribus, sed non est vera de virtute sermonis, idest non esset vera si poneretur secundum propriam locutionem, quia primo et principaliter voces fuerunt impositae ad significandum ut starent pro suis significatis et non pro se, ut dicebatur prius. Videtur ergo mihi quod, ubi apparet auctorem posuisse aliquam propositionem ad aliquem sensum verum, licet non secundum propriam locutionem, negare simpliciter propositionem esset dyscolum et protervum. Sed ne erretur debet bene dici quod propositio non est vera secundum proprium sensum sive de proprietate sermonis, et debet ostendi secundum quem sensum est vera"

'*Socrates est prima substantia'* etc. must be admitted since are used in the specific field of logic and philosophy with a particular sense imposed by Aristotle himself[733].

The third division is that between common and discrete supposition, which are modes of personal supposition. Buridan is not insisting here with further explications and examples but only states that the difference between these two suppositions consists in the type of terms: common and discrete terms[734].

The fourth division is that of common supposition in natural and accidental supposition. *Suppositio naturalis* takes place when the suppositing term stands indifferently in the place of everything it can supposit, whether the supposita are past, present or future[735]. *Suppositio accidentalis* takes place when the suppositing term stands in the place of what the predicate term demands, that is, for present or present and past or present and future *supposita*[736]. While Buridan states that "*multi moderni negant suppositionem naturalem*"[737] he defends natural supposition for its usefulness in demonstrative sciences. If we have definitional propositions like '*tonitruum est sonus factus in nubibus'* or *'omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis'*, they do not concern a particular thunder or triangle existing in a certain time, as the properties of words *(de proprietate sermonis)* may seem to suggest on the basis of the verbal time, but the thunder or triangle taken in any time: in past, present and future. Thus, in the demonstrative sciences, instead of specifying each time that '*any thunder, whenever it is, was or will be, it is, was or will be a sound produce in the clouds*', for the shortness of the discourse the proposition '*tonitruum est sonus factus in nubibus*' with the normal copula '*est*' taken in an improper manner, without the temporal aspect, will be used. According to Buridan, we are forced to use the same copula like in the proper expressions since we do not have a specific copula which can express a mental complex of subject and predicate without temporal differences[738].

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[733] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.2, p. 43, l. 4-17.
[734] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.3, p. 44, l. 19-22: "Suppositio communis est illa in qua supponit terminus communis, ut 'homo'. Suppositio discreta est in qua subicitur terminus discretus, ut 'Socrates' vel 'hic homo'."
[735] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.4, p. 45, l. 4-6: "Naturalis suppositio vocatur secundum quam terminus indifferenter supponit pro omnibus pro quibus potest supponere tam praesentibus quam praeteritis vel futuris"
[736] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.4, p. 45, l. 7-9: "Suppositio accidentalis vocatur secundum quam terminus supponit solum pro praesentibus, vel pro praesentibus et praeteritis, vel pro praesentibus et futuris secundum exigentiam verborum et praedicatorum"
[737] BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.4, p. 45, l. 11.
[738] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.4, p. 46, l. 15-p. 48, l. 12: "Deinde quarto scientiae demonstrativae utuntur huiusmodi suppositione, quia, si dicamus in libro *Metheorum* 'omne tonitruum est sonus factus in nubibus' vel

Further, the accidental common personal supposition is divided into confused and determinate supposition. Both types of supposition are defined in relation with the truth value of the proposition and with the notion of inference. *Suppositio determinata* takes place when the proposition in which the suppositing term appears is true for some determinate suppositum[739]. For examples, for the truth of '*homo est albus*' it is necessary for the subject term to stand for a particular white man[740]. In other words, as specified a few lines later, in the case of determinate supposition it is necessary and sufficient that the proposition to be true or verified for one determinate suppositum, although it could be true for more *supposita*[741]. Comprised as such, Buridan offers in a more rigorous manner two inferential condition for the determinate supposition to take place:

1. From any proposition obtained by substituting the term in a determinate supposition with its suppositum we can infer the original proposition. Thus, in the case of '*homo currit*' we can make the following inferences: '*Sortes currit; ergo homo currit*' or '*Plato currit; ergo homo currit*' and so on.[742]

'omnis iris est reflexio aut refractio lucis', non intendimus hoc solum dicere pro praesentibus. Immo, si nullum esset tonitruum in praesenti vel iris, tamen ita diceremus. Et si geometer habeat demonstrationem quod omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, non est imaginandum quod habeat per hoc scientiam solum de triangulis qui modo sunt. Immo, si ilia scientia sua habitualis maneat per tres annos et interim multi trianguli generarentur, ipse de illis habebit scientiam illam sicut de aliis sine nova demonstratione.[…] Item, sicut intellectus potest concipere hominem et animal sine differentia temporis illis conceptibus a quibus imponuntur isti termini 'homo' et 'animal', ita verisimile est quod potest formare conceptum complexivum illorum sine differentia temporis. Et erit tunc propositio mentalis omni tempore, praesenti, praeterito vel future, indifferens. Ideo etiam termini pro omnibus illis temporibus supponunt indifferenter. Sed non habemus vocem proprie impositam ad significandum talem copulam mentalem. Ideo possumus ad placitum hac voce 'est' uti ad significandum talem copulam per quam non significabitur magis tempus praesens quam praeteritum vel futurum, immo nullum. Ideo, sic erit suppositio naturalis terminorum."

[739] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5., p. 49, l. 4-8: "Vocatur autem suppositio determinata alicuius termini, si necesse sit ad veritatem illius vel talis propositionis in forma quod ipsa sit vera pro aliquo determinato supposito".

[740] There is a little problem regarding Buridans example of determinate supposition, as Klima points out working of Hubien's 2001 unpublished edition, and as the Ria Van Der Lecq's critical apparatus shows. The critical text exemplifies the determinate supposion with "*Ut si ista sit vera 'homo est albus', oportet quod sit vera pro isto homine vel pro isto albo, et sic de aliis*" but there is another version in which the same supposition is exemplified with "*Ut si ista sit vera homo est albus, oportet quod sit vera pro isto homine albo vel pro isto homine albo*", see BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5, p. 49, l. 9; BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 262, comment 64. For our exemplification we choose the second option.

[741] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5., p. 49, l. 19-21.

[742] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5., p. 49, l. 22-p. 50, l. 4: "Unde notandum statim quod duae sunt condiciones suppositionis determinatae alicuius termini communis. Prima est quod ex quolibet suppositio illius termini possit inferri terminus communis remanentibus aliis in propositione positis. Verbi gratia, quia in ista 'homo currit' iste terminus 'homo' supponit determinate, ideo sequitur 'Socrates currit; ergo homo currit', 'Plato currit; ergo homo currit', et sic de quodlibet alio singulari contento sub 'homine'".

2. From a proposition with a term in determinate supposition we can infer a disjunction of propositions where, for each proposition the suppositing term is replaced with a different suppositum. Buridan's example is: "*'homo currit; ergo Socrates currit vel Plato currit vel Iohannes currit' et sic de aliis*".[743]

If these two conditions are met and no cause for the confusion of supposition can be observed, the supposition will be determinate.

Suppositio confusa is defined first in relation to determined supposition. In the case of confused supposition, is not sufficient for the proposition which contains it to be verified for a single suppositum but for all its supposita[744]. Further, a new division is advanced between confused and distributive and confused and nondistributive supposition. The first is "that in accordance with which from a common term any of its supposita can be inferred separately, or all of them at once conjunctively, in terms of a conjunctive proposition"[745]. This means that from '*omnis homo currit*' we can infer both '*Socrates currit*' or '*Plato currit'* (separately) and "*'Socrates currit et Plato currit' et sic de aliis*"[746] (together). The second, the nondistributive supposition, is that according to which we cannot infer neither copulatively, like in the case of distributive supposition, nor disjunctively, like in the case of determinate supposition, a concatenation of propositions in which the suppositing term is replace by its supposita. The only inference which characterizes this type of supposition is that with a disjunctive extreme[747]. The example for this kind of supposition is the predicate term '*animal'* in "*omnis homo este animal*": "*'omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud animal ... et sic de aliis*"[748].

[743] BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5., p. 50, l. 5-7: "secunda condicio est quod ex termino communi sic supponente possunt inferri omnia disiunctive secundum propositionem disiunctivam. Verbi gratia, sequitur 'homo currit; ergo Socrates currit vel Plato currit vel Johannes currit' et sic de aliis"

[744] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.5., p. 49, l. 10-14: "Sed suppositio alicuius termini vocatur confusa si propositio in qua ponitur vel talis in forma possit esse vera absque hoc quod sit vera pro aliquo uno supposito illius termini; sicut haec propositio 'omnis homo est animal' est vera, nec tamen sufficit ad veritatem illius quod sit vera pro Sorte nec pro Platone."

[745] BURIDAN, *Summ. de dia.*, (transl. Klima), p. 264; See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.6., p. 50, l. 14-17.

[746] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.6., p. 50, l. 14-18: "Suppositio confusa et distributiva est secundum quam ex termino communi potest inferri quodlibet suppositorum seorsum vel omnia etiam simul copulative secundum propositionem copulativam, ut 'omnis homo currit; ergo Socrates currit et Plato currit' et sic de aliis."

[747] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.6., p. 50, l. 18-22: "Suppositio confusa tantum est secundum quam non sequitur singularium seorsum retentis aliis in propositione positis, nec sequuntur etiam singularia disiunctive secundum propositionem disiunctivam, licet forte sequantur secundum propositionem de disiuncto extremo."

[748] BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.8.4, p. 66, l. 8-9.

The rest of the section dedicated to the modes of supposition comprises a discussion regarding the causes for the distributive and nondistributive confusion of common terms. After giving in each case the cause of confusion, some particular instances are discussed. We will limit ourselves in pointing out the cause of confusion which can serve as rules[749]:

Distributive confusion:

1. The universal affirmative sign distributes the common term to which is immediately added
2. The negation which negates distributes all the term which are put after the negation
3. The negation which causes an infinite name distributes the term on which it is applied
4. The comparison distributes its second term, the ablative one
5. Word which implies negation distributes

Nondistributive confusion:

1. The universal affirmative sign confuses nondistributively the common term to which is mediately added
2. Two parts of speech which produce distribution render the term nondistributive
3. Special parts of speech put in front of the common term, like those that express how many times something happens, like the adverbs '*ter, quater*' or combinations of spatial and temporal adverbs or adverbial expressions, confuse nondistributively
4. Verb like "*scio, cognosco, intelligo*" and others confuse nondistributively the participle which follow them

As a last consideration, it is important to point out that Buridan also devised inferential relations between different types of supposition: distributive supposition implies through a formal consequence determinate and nondistributive supposition and not conversely. But determinate supposition implies formally "*in the common mode of confusion*" confused supposition. Merely confused or nondistributive supposition implies determinate supposition, but only with the removal of the cause of confusion[750]. These relations will bridge the theory of supposition with Buridan's theory of consequences.

[749] For all the rules of distribution see *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.8., p. 61-p. 68.

[750] See BURIDANUS, *Summ. de supp.*, (ed. Lecq), 4.3.6, p. 51, l. 14-22: "Et propter hoc etiam est talis habitudo harum suppositionum adinvicem quia ad distributivam sequitur bene determinata vel etiam confusa tantum, sed ad neutram harum sequitur distributiva formali consequentia. In communi autem modo confusionis ex determinata suppositione bene sequeretur confusa; sequitur enim bene 'animal est omnis homo; ergo omnis homo est animal'. Sed ex confusa non sequitur determinata nisi causa confusionis removeatur; ideo non sequitur 'omnis homo est animal; ergo animal est omnis homo'. Sed remoto signo distributivo quod erat causa confusionis, bene sequitur. Unde sequitur bene 'omnis homo est animal; ergo animal est homo'.".

1.3.2.4. William Ockham

A few years before Buridan's *Summulae de dialectica*, somewhere between 1321 and 1324, William of Ockham composed his *Summa logicae* where he developed his theory of supposition. In the first part of his *Summa logicae*, starting from the first chapter, Ockham distinguishes according to the Boethian logical tradition three types of terms (*terminus scriptus, prolatus, conceptus*), according to three types of language: written, spoken and mental. These three types of language with their corresponding terms are put in a relation of subordination: the written language depends on the spoken one, and the spoken language on the mental one[751]. Regarding the signification of the terms which compose these three kinds of languages, it must be noted that the spoken and written terms have a meaning established *ad placitum* or according to a convention, while the meaning of mental terms, that is, concepts, intentions or affection of the soul, is established by nature[752].

Further, in chapter 33 Ockham explores the different acceptances of the '*significare*' concept and its close connection to the notion of supposition. In a fist sense, signification seems to be identical to supposition since a sign signifies something when is capable to supposit for that particular thing[753]. The explanation runs as follows: a term 'x' signifies a thing z, when the proposition formed with a demonstrative pronoun 'this is x' is true while pointing out (*demonstrando*) to z. Thus 'white' signifies Socrates, when 'This is white' is true pointing out to Socrates[754]. The second sense takes into account the changeability of the *significatum* and modifies the first acceptance of *significare* in order that the relation of supposition can be applied to present,

[751] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 1, p. 7-8: "Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret".

[752] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 1, p. 8, l. 46-52: "Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quod sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque."

[753] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 33, p. 95, l. 3-4 "dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit vel natum est supponere pro illo".

[754] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 33, p. 95, l. 5-8: "Et sic <album> significat Sortem; haec enim est vera 'iste est albus' demonstrando Sortem. Sic 'rationale' significat hominem; haec enim est vera 'iste est rationalis', demonstrando hominem. Et sic de multis aliis concretis."

past, future and modal propositions[755]. In a third way, signification is different from supposition since the signification take place in accordance to the imposition of a word or concept upon a thing. In this acceptance 'white' signifies whiteness but does not supposit for whiteness[756]. The fourth acceptance of '*significare'* is the most general one and void of any specificity; according to it, a proposition and its parts, being principal or not, signify something, whether positively or negatively[757].

The proper treatment of the theory of supposition starts from the chapter 63. Supposition is a property of the constitutive parts of a proposition, subject and predicate terms, and cannot thus appear outside of the propositional context. For Ockham, '*to supposit for something*' means '*to stand or to be put for another*' ('*pro alio positio*', '*stare pro aliquo*'). This fact is understood according to the first definition of signification that was offered in chapter 33 and is explained in the following way: *"*when a term stands for something in a proposition in such a way that we use the term for the thing and the term or its nominative case (if it is in an oblique case) is truly predicated of the thing (or the pronoun referring to the thing), the term supposits for that thing"[758]. Thus, if '*homo*' stands for Socrates, '*Socrates est homo*' or *'hoc est homo'* pointing out to Socrates must truly be predicated. But the relation of supposition is further defined in relation to propositional context: if the suppositing term is the subject term, then it will supposit for that for which the predicate term will predicate; if the suppositing term is the predicate term, it will

[755] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 33, p. 95, l. 9-20: "Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel de praesenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo supponere. Et sic 'album' non tantum significat illud quod nunc est album, sed etiam illud quod potest esse album; nam in ista propositione 'album potest currere', accipiendo subiectum pro eo quod potest esse, subiectum supponit pro his quae possunt esse alba. Accipiendo 'significare' primo modo et 'significatum' sibi correspondens, per solam mutationem rei frequenter vox et etiam conceptus cadit a suo significato, hoc est, aliquid cessat significari quod prius significabatur. Secundo modo accipiendo 'significare' et 'significatum' sibi correspondens, vox vel conceptus per solam mutationem rei extra non cadit a suo significato."

[756] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 33, p. 95, l. 21-26: "Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud dicitur significari a quo ipsa vox imponitur vel illud quod primo modo significatur per conceptum principalem vel vocem principalem. Et sic dicimus quod 'album' significat albedinem, quia 'albedo' significat albedinem, pro qua tamen albedine non supponit hoc signum 'album'. Sic 'rationale', si sit differentia, significat animam intellectivam."

[757] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 33, p. 96, l. 27-35: " Aliter accipitur 'significare' communissime quando aliquod signum quod est natum esse pars propositionis vel natum est esse propositio vel oratio aliquid importat, sive principaliter sive secundario, sive in recto sive in obliquo, sive det intelligere sive connotet illud, vel quocumque alio modo significet, sive significet illud affirmative sive negative, quo modo hoc nomen 'caecus' significat visum, quia negative, et hoc nomen 'immateriale, significat negative materiam, et hoc nomen 'nihil' sive 'non-aliquid' significat aliquid, sed tamen negative; de quo modo significandi loquitur Anselmus, *De casu diaboli*."

[758] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), p. 189; see Ockham, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 63, p. 193, l. 11-14: "Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus in propositione stat pro aliquo, ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo de quo, sive de pronomine demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit obliquus verificatur, supponit pro illo."

supposit for that for which the subject term will function as subject[759]. Thus, the supposition of a term will function in a proposition in such a way that the true predication will be preserved. In doing so, as we will see, the particular mode of a suppositing term will depend on the other extreme of the proposition.

Regarding the modes of supposition, first, we must point out that Ockham identifies two modes in which the terms are not taken significatively, that is, the terms do not stand for their *significatum*. On the one hand, *suppositio simplex* takes place when a term stands for an intention or concept of the soul or mind (*supponit pro intentione animae*). It is the case of the subject term in '*homo est species*', where '*homo'* does not stand for its significate, in this case, a particular human being, a *res,* but for a concept[760]. On the other hand, *suppositio materialis* takes place when a term stands for itself, or more exactly for something uttered or written. The subject terms of '*homo est vox disyllaba*' or '*homo est dictio scripta'* are instances of material supposition[761].

Secondly, the only mode in which the term is taken significantly, that is, it stands for its *significatum*, is personal supposition. But *suppositio personalis* is not contrasted with simple and material supposition according to the types of entities for which a term can stand (*res* in contrast to *intentio*, *vox, scriptum*), since in personal supposition a term can stand for all types of entities - extra-mental object, concepts, written and spoken words - as long as they represent the actual *significatum* of the term[762].

Regarding the further division of personal supposition, we already offered a brief presentation in another place[763], but for the sake of argumentation we will explore it once again. The first level of division of personal supposition is that between discrete and common supposition. *Suppositio discreta* takes place when the suppositing term is a proper name or a

[759] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 63, p. 194, l. 15-35.
[760] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 64, p. 196, l. 25-29: "Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo 'homo est species' iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro intentione animae, quia illa intentio est species."
[761] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 64, p. 196, l. 38-46: "Suppositio materialis est quando terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro scripto. Sicut patet hic 'homo est nomen', li homo supponit pro se ipso, et tamen non significat se ipsum. Similiter in ista propositione 'homo scribitur' potest esse suppositio materialis, quia terminus supponit pro illo quod scribitur."
[762] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 64, p. 195, l. 22-24: "Ex quo patet quod non sufficienter describunt suppositionem personalem dicentes quod suppositio personalis est quando terminus supponit pro re". The examples offered by Ockham regarding the personal supposition of subject terms in which they stand for different entities are: '*omnis homo est animal'* (for extra-mental object, individual humans), '*omnis species est universale*' (for individual concepts), '*omne nomen vocale est pars orationis*' (for individual utterances), '*omnis dictio scripta est dictio*' (for individual written words); see OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 64, p. 195, l. 9-17.
[763] ILE (2018), p. 24-25.

demonstrative pronoun followed by a common term, such that the proposition formed will be a singular proposition. Ockham's examples are: '*Sortes est homo*' and '*iste homo est homo*'.[764]

On a second level, common personal supposition, the supposition in which a common term supposits, is further divided into determinate and confused supposition. From this point onwards the modes of supposition will be more rigorous defined on the basis of the notions of '*descent*' and '*ascent*', that is, descending inferences from the original proposition which contains the suppositing term to the propositions containing the *supposita* and ascending inferences from propositions which contain the *supposita* terms to the original proposition. In this way, *suppositio determinata* takes place when we can descent under the suppositing term to a disjunction of singular proposition where the suppositing term is substituted by its *supposita*, and when from any singular proposition so obtained, we can infer the original proposition that contains the determinate supposition. Thus, the subject term of '*homo est animal*' has determinate supposition since we can infer correctly "*'iste homo est animal vel ille homo est animal' et sic de aliis*" and since from '*iste homo est animal*', pointing out to any individual human, we can infer '*homo est animal*'[765].

On a third level, confused supposition is further divided into confused and distributive supposition and merely confused supposition. The first, *suppositio confusa et distributiva*, takes place when we can descent copulatively under the suppositing term to a concatenation of propositions in which the suppositing term was substituted with its *supposita* and we cannot inferentially ascent from any such propositions to the original one. The example offered here is *'omnis homo est animal'*. By descending under the subject term, we can infer a conjunction of singular propositions like *"'iste homo est animal et ille homo est animal' et sic de aliis"*, but an ascending inference is impossible[766]. The second, *suppositio personalis tantum confusa,* takes

[764] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 70, p. 209, l. 2-6: "Suppositio discreta est in qua supponit nomen proprium alicuius vel pronomen demonstrativum significative sumptum; et talis suppositio reddit propositionem singularem, sicut hic 'Sortes est homo', 'iste homo est homo', et sic de aliis."

[765] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 70, p. 210, l. 19-21: "Suppositio determinata est quando contingit descendere per aliquam disiunctivam ad singularia; sicut bene sequitur 'homo currit, igitur iste homo currit, vel ille', et sic de singulis"

[766] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 70, p. 211, l. 62-68: "Suppositio confusa et distributiva est quando contingit aliquo modo descendere copulative, si habeat multa contenta et ex nullo uno formaliter infertur. Sicut est in ista 'omnis homo est animal', cuius subiectum supponit confuse et distributive: sequitur enim 'omnis homo est animal, igitur iste homo est animal et ille homo est animal, et sic de singulis; et non sequitur formaliter 'iste homo est animal', quocumque demonstrato, 'igitur omnis homo est animal'". Ockham talks also about the mobility or immobility of such confused and distributive suppositions. For him immobile suppositions are those confused and distributive supposition in which a copulatively descending is possible but only with some additional modifications; see de example of the exceptive word: OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 70, p. 212, l. 71-88.

place when from the proposition which contains the suppositing term we can infer a proposition with a disjunctive predicate formed by the *supposita* of the suppositing term and from a singular proposition made from one of the members of the disjunctive predicate, we can infer the original proposition. Thus, the predicate term of '*omnis homo est animal*' allows us to correctly infer "'*omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud animal vel aliud animal' et sic de singulis*"; furthermore, from '*omnis homo est hoc animal*' pointing out to any individual animal, we can infer '*omnis homo est animal*'[767].

These definitions are supplemented by a set of rules for determining the specific kind of personal supposition. Those rules are offered in functions of the propositional signs (universal, particular, negation) and their place in the proposition. As will be shown in the second part of our work, they can be considered a tool for establishing the type of personal supposition for the subject and predicate of the A, E, I, O categorical propositional forms. The relevant rules are the following:

Rule for determinate personal supposition

> "First it should be noted that when in a categorical proposition no universal sign distributing the whole extreme of a proposition is added to a term, either mediately or immediately (i.e., either on the part of the same extreme or on the part of the preceding extreme), and when no negation or any expression equivalent to a negative or universal sign is added to a common term, that common term supposits determinately"[768]

Rule for merely confused personal supposition

> "First, where a common term mediately follows an affirmative sign of universality, it has merely confused supposition. That is, in an affirmative universal proposition the predicate has merely

[767] See OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 70, p. 211, l. 44-62: "Suppositio personalis confusa tantum est quando terminus communis supponit personaliter et non contingit descendere ad singularia per disiunctivam, nulla variatione facta a parte alterius extremi, sed per propositionem de disiuncto praedicato, et contingit eam inferri ex quocumque singulari. Verbi gratia in ista 'omnis homo est anima', li animal supponit confuse tantum, quia non contingit descendere sub animali ad sua contenta per disiunctivam; quia non sequitur 'omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal, vel omnis homo est illud animal, vel omnis homo est aliud anima' et sic de singulis. Sed bene contingit descendere ad propositionem de disiuncto praedicato ex singularibus, quia bene sequitur 'omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud', et sic de singulis; quia consequens est una categorica, composita ex hoc subiecto 'homo' et hoc praedicato 'hoc animal vel illud vel illud', et sic de singulis. Et manifestum est quod hoc praedicatum vere praedicatur de omni homine, ideo illa universalis est simpliciter vera. Et similiter ista infertur ex quolibet contento animalis, nam bene sequitur 'omnis homo est hoc animal, quocumque animali demonstrato, 'igitur omnis homo est animal"

[768] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 71. 2, p. 202; OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 71, p. 212, l. 7-p. 213, l. 13: "Est ergo primo sciendum quod quando in categorica nullum signum universale distribuens totum extremum propositionis additur termino nec mediate nec immediate, hoc est nec a parte eiusdem extremi nec a parte extremi praecedentis, nec negatio praecedit nec aliqua dictio includens aequivalenter negationem vel signum universale, semper talis terminus communis supponit determinate."

confused supposition. Thus, the predicate in 'Every man is animal' and 'Every man in white' have merely confused supposition. But where a sign of universality is placed on the subject-side but where the proposition is not a universal affirmative proposition or where the sign of universality does not distribute the whole subject, the predicate does not have merely confused supposition"[769].

Rules for confused and distributive personal supposition

"The first rule is that in every universal affirmative and universal negative proposition that is neither exclusive nor exceptive, the subject has confused and distributive mobile supposition. This is clear in 'Every man runs' and 'No man runs'. The second rule is that in every such universal negative proposition the predicate stands confusedly and distributively. The third rule is that when a negation determining the principal composition in a proposition precedes the predicate, the predicate stands confusedly and distributively. Thus, the word 'animal' in 'Man is not an animal' stands confusedly and distributively. 'Man' however stands determinately".[770]

While in the case of William Ockham, the notion of supposition is very close defined to that o signification, the way he articulates his modes of personal supposition arrives at a maturity that cannot be found in the 13th century. By defining *determinate, confused and distributive,* and *merely confused supposition* through the notions of descending and ascending inferences, Ockham makes an important step in the understanding of supposition, fact that, as we will see, will not go unnoticed by its modern or contemporary scholars.

Conclusion

From the second part of the present sub-section, where we considered different versions of 13th and 14th century supposition theory, we can draw some conclusion. First, although supposition theory is presented in the Summulist tradition in different ways, the medieval logicians considered by us have all in common the fact that they formed a unitary meaning of '*suppositio*' specific to

[769] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 73. 1, p. 211-212; OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 73, p. 226, l. 5-15: "Una est quod quando terminus communis sequitur signum universale affirmativum mediate, tunc stat confuse tantum, hoc est semper in universali affirmativa praedicatum supponit confuse tantum, sicut in ista 'omnis homo est animal', 'omnis homo est albus', et sic de aliis. Sed quantumcumque signum universale ponatur a parte subiecti, si tamen propositio non sit universalis affirmativa, nec signum universale distribuit totum subiectum, praedicatum non supponit confuse tantum."

[770] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 74. 1-3, p. 213-214; OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (ed. Boehner, 1974), 74, p. 228, l. 6-p. 229, l. 15: "Una est quod in omni propositione universali affirmativa et negativa, quae non est exclusiva nec exceptiva, stat subiectum confuse et distributive mobiliter, sicut patet in istis 'omnis homo currit', 'nullus homo currit'. Secunda regula: quod in omni tali universali negativa praedicatum stat confuse et distributive. Tertia regula est quod quando negatio determinans compositionem principalem praecedit, praedicatum stat confuse et distributive, sicut in ista 'homo non est animal', li animal stat confuse et distributive, sed 'homo' stat determinate."

terminist logic, in spite of their doctrinal difference. Supposition is a property that the terms have and it is based on the notion of signification. Its main function seems to be that of establishing the thing(s) for which a term can stand based on the propositional context and on the nature of the suppositing term. In fact, understood as such, supposition can be seen as a property that classifies and establishes the possible meanings of terms based on the propositional context. Although a logical sense is sometimes contrasted with the grammatical one, the terminist logicians seem to be integrating all the different and previous meanings of 'suppositio' in their own account. Substitution, the fact of being put as subject (since the predicate copulates in the 13th century, at least theoretically), the fact of being a subsistence, bearer of forms (see especially Sherwood[771]) or substance and the fact of being subordinated or put under the form of a term, are all acceptances of the *suppo*-terms which predate the supposition theory and are incorporated in its articulation.

Second, beside the division of *modi supponendi* caracteristic of each tradition, as De Libera showed, there are some differences between the four theories we analyzed that allow us to speak about an evolution of supposition. In the two 13th century doctrines, the simple supposition is primary conceived as the property of a term to be taken for its signified form or for its objects contained under that form but without having a determinate relation to them. The confused mobile supposition is conceived as a property marked by a distributive sign; it takes place when the term stands for each of its individuals or bearers of form contained under the term or under the form of the suppositing term. Such a type of supposition is explained by the possibility of a descending inference from the suppositing term to each of its *supposita*. The 14th century doctrines were more rigorous articulated with a focus on the connection between the property of a term to stand for something and the fact that the thing for which the terms stands verifies or makes the proposition true. Much more attention was given to the role of the logician in establishing the type of supposition that a term can have and on the condition under which each mode of supposition is defined. They conceive what the 13th century logicians called '*suppositio simplex*', as a property according to which a term stands for a concept or notion of the soul, void of any hard ontological commitment. Determine supposition, merely confused supposition and confused supposition were explained by both ascending and descending inferences that were made: disjunctively, with a disjunctive extreme or conjunctively. Supplemented by much more rigorous rules of distribution,

[771] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.6-5.1.7., p. 266; SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 108-109.

the three aforementioned types of supposition are systematically explained through types of possible inferences from the original proposition that contains the suppositing term, to a proposition or concatenation of propositions where the suppositing term is replace by its inferiors, and from those, back to the original one. This treatment will allow a more comprehensive explanation of the simple categorical propositions on the basis of the properties of supposition. Finally, this allows us to consider that the supposition theory in its transition from 13th century to 14th century nominalist accounts, has suffered a process of maturation and evolution visible at the level of its conceptual framework.

Conclusions

In the first section of our study, we tried to offer a historical and doctrinal analysis of Peter of Spain's handbook of logic named '*Tractatus*', with a special focus on its theory of supposition. In doing so, we tried to understand Peter's logical theory in its own terms and according to the limitations imposed by its proximal doctrinal and historical context.

In the first part, we analyzed a series of problems related to the authorship of *Tractatus*, to its date and place of composition, to the corpus of works attributed to Peter of Spain, to the main characteristics of his logical handbook, and, ultimately, to the reception and diffusion of his work. First, according to the studies offered by De Rijk, D'Ors, Meirinhos, Tugwell and others, we have showed the three main theses related to the identity of Peter of Spain, that have been defended by different scholars starting with the 19th centuries. We tried to explain and subscribe to what it seems to be the current *consensus* regarding the authorship problem: the Byzantine and Papalist thesis can be rejected in favor of the Dominican one. While Peter of Spain, the author of *Tractatus*, may have been a Black Friar, we have shown that the current scholarship is not able to point out further specific details. Surely, the two most discussed candidate are Petrus Alfonsi and Pedro Ferrando, individuals connected with Estella and Zamora traditions respectively; however, the testimonies related to these two options are problematic in themselves and are in need for further studies. Yet, the scholarship seems to have accomplished a real progress, by showing how unreliable are the theses according to which, on the one hand, *Tractatus* was said to be a mere translation from a Greek work and, on the other, *Tractatus* was one of the dozens works, comprising almost all the domain of sciences, made by the famous Pope John XXI. Second, we showed Meirinhos' contribution to the debate surrounding the authorship of *Tractatus* through his study of the Petrine corpus of texts. The author of *Tractatus*, possible member of the Dominican order, might be the author of certain *Sermones* and commentaries to the works attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, but it should not be confused with the Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, active in the first part of the 13th century, nor with Petrus Hispanus Medicus, author of the commentary on *De animalibus*. Regarding the date and place of composition, we have showed the different positions of the scholarship taken since De Rijk's critical edition. Although Northern Spain or Southern France are still viable places of composition, the years of 1230's were heavily criticized, since the commentaries on which De Rijk relied are of a later composition than considered initially. The period between 1240 and

1270's seems to be a more adequate alterative for the composition of *Tractatus*. Third, we have analyzed the characteristics according to which Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* was considered a veritable handbook of logic, which managed to summarized both the classical Boethian-Aristotelian and the terminist doctrines of logic, in a comprehensive, systematic and, to a certain degree, realist manner. Being oriented towards delivering doctrinal content for logical teaching, we argued against Meirinhos towards the irrelevance of the originality issue. However, if the problem of originality should be addressed, it can be manifest in Peter's realist orientation and in his method of exposition. The latter can be considered accountable for the fame and wide circulation of the handbook, that was manifest until around the 17th century. We have shown that *Tractatus* circulated in a high number of copies in regions of France, Italy, Spain and Germany, that it was commented by realists and nominalists alike, by Thomists, Albertits and Scotists, that it was critically assimilated by the humanist movement, and that it arrived also in front of the Byzantine and Jews intellectuals. Regarding our own times, we have showed how the rediscovery of Peter's *Tractatus* was made possible through the efforts of editing and translating it starting with the middle of 20th century.

The second part of the current section offered a descriptive analysis of Peter's handbook of logic with the explicit purpose of showing the relation between the theory of supposition and the other doctrines of logic developed in the rest of the eleven tracts. We explained the apparent strange placement of the supposition theory – that between the cluster formed by the first five tract of Aristotelean logic (*On the introductory notions, On predicables, On predicaments, On syllogisms, On places*) and the treatise of fallacies followed by the cluster of five tracts dedicated to the terminist logic (*On relatives, On ampliations, On appellations, On restrictions, On distributions*) – by its central role. On the one hand, the definitions of a signifying vocal emission by convention, of the categorematic words contrasted with the sincategorematic ones, of a categorical proposition and its constitutive parts, the classification and definition of the different types of predicables and the division of logico-ontological entities made through the predicaments are all notions on which supposition theory is constructed. The connection of supposition theory with the tract on places and syllogism, comes from the fact that certain types of supposition are explained by showing how a direct inference, enthymeme or incomplete syllogism, can take place from a proposition containing a personal supposition to another proposition which differs from the first by its suppositing term, which was substituted with one

of its corresponding *suppositum*. The connection with the tract on fallacies comes from the fact that, a change of the supposition of a term in the course of syllogistic reasoning, may be considered the cause for the apparition of certain fallacies as the figure of expression. In this sense, rules as *from multiple determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition* and *from simple supposition to personal supposition*, mark fallacious types of reasonings that may be detected through the theory of supposition. On the other hand, supposition is the main concept of the properties of terms, while relatives, ampliation, restriction, appellation and distribution are second-degree properties dependent on it. A relative is a recollection of a term that is made in most cases by a pronoun. A relative makes a reference or refers (*refert*) to a previous propositional term. The reference is contrasted with the property of supposition, although in some cases, especially in the case of the relatives of identity, the thing for which a term refers and supposits can be identical. The ampliation and restriction are properties that account for the widening and narrowing of the domain of entities establish by the personal supposition. Due to the propositional context and its ability to affect the supposition, the signification and consignification of the propositional elements, depending on their type, can modify the personal supposition of a common term. Regarding appellation, it can be conceived as a specific type of supposition. Defined as the taking of a common term in the place of an existing thing, appellation accounts for the type of supposition were the objects for which the term stands are not merely present under the form of the suppositing term, as in the case of supposition, but are materially existing. Yet, in certain cases the relation described by supposition, appellation and even signification overlap. The doctrine of distribution accounts for a theory in which the multiplication of a common term made by a distributive sign is explained. The theory defines the logical status of the syncategorematic terms which are universal signs, for example, *'nullus'* and '*omnis*'; their role is made explicit by rules, at least to a certain extent, that state how the confusion or distribution of terms that have a personal distributive, confused, mobile supposition take place. In conclusion, we argued that Peter of Spain's account of logic is unitary, and that his summarizing program presupposes a synthesis between the elements of the Aristotelian logic and those of *logica modernorum*, within a general science of logic, strongly connected to dialectics, and understood as a science of language *(scientia sermocinalis)*.

Under this framework, his theory of supposition is conceived as an extension of the classical theory of signification or as an analysis of the relation between the language expressed

propositionally and the world. Supposition is a property of a substantival term which already has a signification imposed according to a convention. This signification is expressed almost in a modist manner, through a parallelism between the manner in which words relate between themselves and the *modi rerum*. Defined as the "taking [of] a substantive term in place of something"[772], supposition can be conceived as the relation between a term, the *supponens*, and a thing, one or many, the *suppositum* or *supposita*. The relation of *suppositio* bares resemblances with the old logical, ontological and grammatical notions of *subiectio*, *substantia*, *subpositio* since: a. the suppositing term, that is a substantival term, is in most cases the subject of the proposition; b. the *suppositum* is a certain kind of substance; and c. the relation between the suppositing term and *supposita* is one of subordination, or one that relates a superior to the inferiors comprised under its form. The specific ways in which the *supponens* and the *suppositum* or *supposita* relate, is accounted by Peter's division of the different modes of supposition. He distinguishes between discrete and common, natural and accidental, simple and personal, determinate and confused, and mobile and immobile types of supposition, in function of the types of terms, the other propositional elements directly or indirectly adjoined to the suppositing term and in function of the nature of entities for which the suppositing term stands. The most important types of supposition are *suppositio simplex, suppositio determinata*, *suppositio confusa mobilis*, last two being types of personal supposition. The simple supposition is understood as a relation in which a term stands for the universal entity (*res*) signified by it. This fact, along with other doctrinal specifications from the rest of his handbook, makes Peter a realist committed logician. Personal supposition is understood as a relation in which a term stands for its inferiors. Determinate supposition is not defined as straightforward as we would want. Yet, it may be understood as a relation, marked or not by a particular sign, in which a common term stands for a certain individual or another. Confused mobile supposition is that in which a common term stands for many by means of a universal sign which distributes and confuses the term. This means that a valid descending inference can take place form the suppositing term to its inferiors. This descending may be conceived as a conjunctive concatenation of propositions in which the suppositing term is replaced in each proposition by one of its inferiors. The hallmark of Peter of Spain's account of supposition, is his use of simple

[772] *CNP*, p. 241; see *SL*., VI.3, l. 8-9.

supposition. For him, even the predicate of a universal affirmative categorical proposition stands in the place of a universal object. This position is debated and then stated and defended in the *Dubia* and *Solutio* sections of *SL.* VI. A consequence will be that the universal sign put on the part of the subject term has no proper effect on the predicate term. Although he seems to be a realist regarding universals and his account does not take into consideration the mental language, in this part of the *SL* he makes a small concession by contrasting the science of logic with that of natural sciences.

The third part of the section deals with the relation between medieval logic and the theory of supposition. In a first part, the theses regarding the origin of the theory of supposition are analyzed, while in the second, different articulation of supposition theory from 13th and 14th centuries are taken into consideration. We explained how the scholarship, through the works of De Rijk, Ebbesen, Valente, Libera and others, established either a logical origin, especially in the 12th century tradition of fallacies commentaries, a grammatical origin, in the 12th century commentaries on Priscian's grammar or a theological origin, within the Porretan tradition. Often enough, especially in the case of De Rijk, an interplay between these traditions was suggested such that we can speak about a multiple origin of supposition theory. Yet, for each particular position, a specific understanding of '*suppositio*' was considered. In the tradition of fallacies, first '*appellatio*', then '*appellatio*' and '*suppositio*', and finally '*suppositio*', with their corresponding verbal forms, were used to point out the causes of fallacies such as univocation, equivocation and figure of expression. A change of supposition or appellation would equal to a change of the thing for which the term in an argument stands and, thus, will result in a fallacious reasoning. For the grammatical tradition, the main meaning of '*supponere*' seems to be the fact of a word being put as a grammatical subject within a proposition. For the theological tradition, the term seems to designated a subsistence which is a bearer of forms. However, we have argued that all these different acceptances are interconnected, such that a close proximity will be formed between the notion of substance, subsistence, subject, subordination and supposition, before the arrival of a proper terminist logic. Moreover, our thesis was that at the basis of all these acceptances there is a common, older and intuitive meaning of 'suppositio'. This meaning is based on a relation between physical objects and can be conceived as a substitution or replacement. One object supposits another when it replaces it or substitutes for it. This meaning was first regimented or conceptualized by the Roman law through the punishable crime of the

supposition of children. Then, throughout the centuries, the relation of substitution has suffered different regimentations and mutations according to different disciplines, which implied a degree of abstraction. The supposition was no longer a relation that took place between physical objects but between words and physical objects, directly or indirectly. A word or term arrived at standing or substituting in language for a substance, for a subsistence which bears a form, for the grammatical subject, for the subject matter or, indirectly, for all of them. In fact, all these meanings are reflected in the construction of the 13th century supposition theory.

The second part of the third subsection accounts for the variation of the supposition theory throughout the 13th and 14th century. In this sense, the theories of suppositions developed by Lambertus of Lagny, William of Sherwood, Johannes Buridanus and William of Ockham were analyzed. We have showed that a proper logical sense of supposition appears only in 13th century when the concept is developed in a theory and is conceived as a property of terms. The property of supposition has the main function of establishing for what kind of things a term can stand for in virtue of its own nature and of the propositional context. The major difference between the 13th century and 14th century can be expressed in terms of ontological commitment and degree of conceptual rigor. The 13th century logicians did not exploit the supposition theory to the extent the authors of the following century did regarding: the connection of supposition with the truth value of the proposition; the explanation of the personal modes of supposition in accordance to both ascending and descending inferences; the possibility to explain the simple supposition by resorting to a mental language and thus, to avoid the commitment to the existence of universals; the account of distribution; the possibility to define different types of personal suppositions through schemata of conjunctive and disjunctive concatenations or of propositions with a disjunctive predicate, all obtained inferentially; the possibility to highlight that a certain term can be interpreted in different ways such that it can have different suppositions, and thus, the hermeneutical role of the logician. All these aspects were put at work in 14th century theories, such that the rules for defining and determining each mode of supposition were given in a more clear, systematic and comprehensive manner. In this sense we can speak about an evolution of the supposition theory.

In conclusion, according to the historical and doctrinal analysis, we can state that Peter of Spain's theory of supposition develop in *Tractatus* can be better understood as a theoretical construct engaged in a historical development. First, '*supponere*' was used to express the action

or relation of substitution between physical object. Then, during the logical, grammatical and theological traditions, formed up to the end of 12th century, which used the *suppo-terms*' conceptual apparatus, this relation has suffered different modification and became more abstract. It became a relation of substitution between an object of language and a logical, grammatical or physical object. After that, the 13th century Summulist tradition extended the logic understood as a science of language, by supplementing the theory of signification, incapable of dealing with more complex language situation, with the property of terms named 'supposition'. In this stage, definitions, classifications and rules for this relation that explained how terms are put to stand for different things, were stated. The 14th century nominalist tradition brought another layer in the historical development of supposition, by offering more extensive and systematic rules for each mode of supposition and by connecting in a more explicit manner the supposition theory with other portions of logic. Yet, at this stage of our analysis, the guiding question, 'What the supposition theory really is?', still remains partially unanswered. If we explained how supposition theory can be conceived in its own terms, the way in which it was or should be interpreted still remains unexplored. Thus, in the following section, we will analyze the different ways in which supposition theory was considered inside what Catarina Dutilh Novaes calls 'the systematic line of thinking'. In doing so, we will try to analyzed the theory of supposition by resorting to the concept of 'formality'.

2. Section II: The systematic analysis

After we saw the explicit treatment of supposition in Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*, our grasp of it goes quite well. We have understood in its own terms how it's defined, on what kind of linguistic entities it applies, what is its main function and how this function can vary under certain propositional conditions. But as easily we comprehend the main features of the suppositio theory, as puzzled we remain regarding some particular aspects of it. One could take as an example a basic exercise of explaining it. If we try for a moment to move away from the medieval language employed in the thematization of the theory, and try to reformulate it in our own terms, we seem to face some difficulties. For example, the famous proposition that is meant to describe the property of supposition *acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo* (*SL* VI.3) seems for us to be situated somewhere between a metaphor and an obscure definition. We surely understand the meaning of each word and what means the fact of *taking something in place of another* regarding objects of which a replacement or a substitution is usually predicated; but what about a replacement or substitution between a linguistic entity and a non-linguistic one? In this case, our understanding of the phenomena seems to be a little bit murky. Making use of what is familiar to us, we try to represent this relation *per analogiam*, that is, we are representing what was meant to be a relation between a propositional term and an object, with the help of a representation that we already have, that of the relation between physical objects[773]. For a definition that pertains to logic, medieval or not, we can agree that it's not a desirable thing to resort to such kinds of elusive explanations.

Besides, when one goes deeper than the explicit lines of *SL* and wonders what is the purpose of this theory, in what context was meant to be used, if it had such a purpose of use, or how is that under the same name of 'logic' or 'dialectic' were put together theories like the Aristotelian syllogistics and the supposition, one, once again, faces difficulties. Unfortunately, the author of the *Summule* does not offer us any explicit clarifications whatsoever.

In fact, we consider that the particular manner in which the theory of suppositio is formulated is the source of our problems in understanding and explaining it, and implicitly the source of many different types of approaches in the modern scholarship. The type and limitation

[773] The fact that in its historical development *suppositio* seems to have at the beginning this last particular sense of relation, and that this definition was possible meant to be understood in virtue of this characteristic, does not concern us in this part.

of language used, the lack of explicit clarifications and qualification have opened the gates to many different attempts in clarifying what the medieval supposition theory really is.

But concurring with the character of supposition theory, many descriptive expositions of medieval logic in general or of supposition theory in particular have a particular role in the multiplicity and diversity of the modern interpretations or explanations of the theory. Since at the very beginning of the modern scholarship[774], almost all the studies, and implicitly almost all the efforts of answering the bothering question "What is the supposition theory?", are made from a particular point of view regarding logic. For example, Father Philotheus Boehner in 1952 is characterizing medieval logic in comparison with the modern one as follows:

> "Among the elements shared in varying degrees by genuinely scholastic logic and modern logic, there is one particular that brings them in close proximity and facilitates a comparison. It is the character of formality."[775]
>
> "Let us make clear at the outset that logic as we understand it is *formal,* that is to say, it studies the form or structure of inferences and their elements. Hence, to speak of "formal logic" is, in scholastic terminology, a *nugatio* or tautology. To speak of "material logic" is a simple contradiction. In this we are in harmony with the scholastic logicians, for scholastic logic too is interested only in the formality or structure of discourse. Hence it does not recognize the distinction of formal logic and material logic."[776]

The character of being formal attributed to medieval logic is quite a leitmotif in the studies of medieval supposition theory. But often one specific aspect of this view has been omitted, namely *the degree* in which medieval logic is said to be formal. In 1956, I. M. Bochénski, in his *Formale Logik*, after insisting on the same formal aspect, is also pointing out to some particular differences regarding modern and medieval logic:

> "And this brings us back to the fundamental difference already remarked on between the two forms of formal logic; scholastic logic deal with ordinary language, contemporary logic develops an artificial one."[777]

And then, the same observation is applied to the theory of supposition:

[774] For a brief history of the *suppositio* scholarship limited to the referential interpretation see DUTILH (2007a) p.10-12.
[775] BOEHNER (1952), p. xiv.
[776] BOEHNER (1952), p. xvi.
[777] BOCHÉNSKI (1961), p.173.

> "If we ask how the expression 'supposition' is to be rendered in modern terms, we have to admit that it cannot be. 'Supposition' covers numerous semiotic functions for which we now have no common name."[778]

Obviously, there are many more differences between those two types of formality besides the mere language employed. As early as 1966, Ernest A. Moody gives us a clearer hint regarding the differences between medieval and modern logic:

> "Medieval logic, like ancient logic, was a quasi-empirical formulation of the logical structure of natural language and not, like modern logic, an axiomatic construction of a formal calculus expressed in artificial symbolism. As compared with Aristotelian logic, however, it had two new features. First, it was formulated metalinguistically throughout, by means of rules referring to language expressions, and it was not presented by means of formulas containing variables replaceable by object-language expressions. Secondly, it included the semantical as well as the syntactical dimensions of language analysis, and was developed in terms of the basic concepts of denotation, truth and consequence (or entailment)"[779].

But why these aspect matter after all? They matter because if we do not pay close attention to the degree of formality, we are condemned to a slippery slope effect: medieval logic and implicitly the theory of supposition is simply formal without qualitative qualifications regarding its formality. This means that the same tools and methods that are used in modern logic can be applied to medieval logic as well, in spite of the differences between them. But, if we evaluate the degree of formality in medieval logic at the right extent, a new question can arise regarding the modern studies on supposition theory: "Is formality truly a property of supposition theory (or of medieval logic in general), or it is a property imposed by the methods of studying it?". If this question seems legitimate, its answer will play a crucial role in our inquiry. The degree of formality that the theory of *suppositio* presents should be an important factor for the approach that we choose in studying it and consequently in answering the main question of our study.

In the following chapters of this section, we propose an evaluation of the theory of supposition regarding the character of formality and a prerequisite analysis of Peter of Spain's doctrine. First, we will try to clarify with the aid of some recent studies the concept of formality and its equivocalness. Secondly, we will point out some particular aspects of Peter's supposition

[778] BOCHÉNSKI (1961), p.173.
[779] MOODY, "The Medieval Contribution to Logic" in *Studium generale* vol. 19 (1966), p. 445-446.

theory that will allow us to argue for its generic formality or generic non-formality. Thirdly, we will try to assess the different modern interpretations of supposition theory.

2.1. The concept of 'formal'

Our main purpose is to evaluate the character of formality in Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. As we have seen, this character is usually attributed to modern and, in some extent, to medieval logic and supposition theories. Regarding the latter, often enough this concept was taken for granted as being self-understood or was treated in connection with certain medieval writers like Ockham or Buridan, but not in connection with Peter of Spain. To obtain our goal, first of all we must acquire a conceptual framework of the notion of formal. In this sense, important steps were made in the recent studies of Sven Ove Hansson[780], John Gordon MacFarlane[781] and Catarina Dutilh Novaes[782]. In their analysis we can find a classification of the different types of formality and historical examples for each type. Consequently, an important step in our endeavor will be to explain the equivocalness express by the concept of 'formal'. But before engaging in the multiplicity of meanings that could be attributed to this concept, we must make some specific remarks about its historicity and about the constellation of adjacent notions that can describe its specific functions.

2.1.1 Origin of the concept of 'formal'

Historically speaking, the concept of 'formal' has its distant origin in what we call today Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, that is, Aristotle's distinction between matter and form. As we all know *hulê* and *morphê* played an important role throughout the Aristotelian corpus. This pair of concepts are used in all of Aristoteles sciences: in the theory of four cause, in his theory of being as being, of feeling and intellection, of movement, in his theory of the soul and in his theory of language. Although these two concepts appear as an indivisible pair, one seems to have a more dominant character than the other. In ontology, the form is the active principle of existence, that brings the matter into actualization; in epistemology, the form is the substance of things which by abstraction from matter makes the object intelligible and represents the

[780] HANSSON (2000).
[781] MACFARLANE (2000).
[782] DUTILH (2007a), (2007b), (2011a).

condition of an object to be knowable; in psychology, the substantial form of the body is identified with the soul; in language, a thing must be defined in correspondence with its form so that the parts of the definition will correspond to the parts of the form[783]. Starting from the external world, continuing with the psychological one and arriving finally at the world of discourse, we can observe that in Aristotle's philosophy the form penetrates all the dimensions of reality and makes possible the very existence, knowledge and utterance of things. But what about his logic? It is a known fact that in his theory of categorical syllogism, that is, the general theory of syllogism found in *Prior Analytics* that can be applied to demonstrative, dialectical and eristic arguments[784], Aristotle makes extensive use of letters that stands for concrete subjects and predicates of propositions and that, upon these propositions, the syllogistic reasoning applies a normative character. This fact was considered by the modern scholars, like Jan Łukasiewicz[785] for example, a sign that his theory is formal. Moreover, stronger claims about the formality of Aristotle's syllogistic can be made on the basis of the general program developed in *Prior Analytics*. As Terence Parsons points out[786], we can speak about a "system of logic" that can be considered to a certain degree axiomatic. The first figure functions as an axiom to which the other syllogistic figures are reduced by logical techniques such as conversion, reduction and what we call today existential instantiation and generalization[787]. But with the exception of one particular case, Aristotle does not use the hylomorphic distinction between form and matter regarding his logic. MacFarlane[788] is pointing out that the sole application of the hylomorphic concepts is found in *Physics*. Arguing for the reduction of the causes of things to four in 195a 16-21, Aristotle gives as an example for the 'that from which' cause. Accordingly, the premises are considered to be a material cause for the conclusion of a syllogistic reasoning[789]. But what will be the formal cause? Aristotle gives no explicit further analogies. We can only guess that the formal cause will be what Łukasiewicz calls "the form of the syllogism", the syllogism resulted from the substitution of extremes and middle terms with letters, or, in other words, the figure of syllogism. But this is already an interpretation and not

[783] ARIST., *Meth.* 1035b 34.
[784] See MACFARLANE (2000), p. 259.
[785] ŁUKASIEWICZ, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic* (1951).
[786] See PARSONS (2014), p. 1.
[787] See PARSONS (2014), p. 1-2, 6-52.
[788] Cf. MACFARLANE (2000), p. 255
[789] See ARISTOTLE, *The complete works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 1, (1984), p. 737-738

Aristotle's position for the formality of logic or for the use of the form-matter distinction on the syllogism. In fact, this specific kind of distinction is made explicit only in the later peripatetic tradition, by the commentators of Aristotelian logic like Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus and Amonius[790]. Starting with them, we can speak about what MacFarlane has coined as "the tradition of logical hylomorphism", "the tradition of characterizing logic as distinctively formal"[791].

2.1.2 The mechanics of formality

The concept of 'formal' is not only used in the characterization of a theory for simply qualifying it as being formal or to point out an inherent property of it. It is true, we can state that a theory or a system has the property of being formal especially when we have serious reason to think so. The way in which it is deductively formulated, the use of certain tools of notation or explicit remarks about it can represent causes for advocating for the formality of a theory. But as we will see, often enough, and especially in Middle Ages logic, these obvious signs of formality are missing. What we have then at our disposal are certain features or hints that are advocating implicitly for a tendency to what we call today 'formality'. But there is a big difference between an implicit tendency to and a full and explicit presence of the property of being formal. This fact can be argued by showing how the notion of 'formal' does not include in its semantical field only a property but also, as Dutilh suggests, *an action, an object that suffers the action, the means by which that action is realized* and, finally, *the object that is the product of the action*[792]. In fact, understood in this way, the notion of 'formal' will replace in its framework the classical theory of Aristotle's four causes, accounting for the changes a theory may undergo. Exploring the concept of 'formal' in relation to its phenomenality, that is, describing the mechanics of the concept in its use, will help us later in the assessment of the responses given by the modern exegesis to our main question. Whether the fact of being formal

[790] See MACFARLANE (2000), p. 260, ŁUKASIEWICZ (1951), p. 8.
[791] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 6.
[792] These elements are identified also by Dutilh in *Formalizing medieval logical theories* (2007a), p. 219 with the difference that instead of the means of formalization she is putting an agent of formalization. This option is rooted in the fact that the action of formalization is not requiring only technical skills but also a good understanding of the object that is formalized: "formalization in itself is not a formal procedure"; see (Dutilh), p. 292. The orientation towards the agent will be fully explored by her in *Formal languages in logic* where the interest rests on the effects of formal languages from a cognitive and philosophical point of view. Here the object of formalization or "the target phenomena" is an intentional entity, skipping the ordinary language.

is a property of the theory which is being formalized or a property of the product of formalization is of a great importance for explaining what Peter's theory of supposition really is. These being said, in the following passages we will try to expose the principal elements of the mechanics of formality following the recent remarks regarding the function of the 'formal' concept or regarding the "philosophy of formalization", that were given by Sven Ove Hansson in *Formalization in philosophy*[793] and by Dutilh Novae in *Formalizing medieval logical theories*[794] and *The formal and the formalized: the cases of the syllogistic and supposition theory*[795].

The action that pertains to the concept of 'formal' is that of formalizing, which in a broad sense seems to mean 'to make something formal'. Regarding this fact, there appears to be a consensus about its implication. First, the act of formalizing comes in various degrees and in various kinds; second, it implies a possible change of the object which suffers the action of formalizing.

For the first claim, Catarina is considering that the varieties of formalizations do not need to be reduced to the obvious three canonical types (axiomatization, symbolization, conceptual translation), but that they are depending on the very notion of 'formal'. Consequently, extending the notion of 'formal' beyond its rigid signification, the existence of a degree of formality will be a given thing[796]. The same view, but in different manner will apply in Hansson's case. He sees the formalization as a process that takes places in two steps "form common language to a regimented philosophical one and from regimented into mathematical or logical language"[797]. Each step represents a different kind of formalization; for the first, the act of formalizing is marked by the use of philosophical concepts or formal philosophy[798]; for the second, by the use of mathematical or logical notation with a different degree of formality. In this regard, we agree with formalization being of various kinds and degrees. As we will see in the next chapters, the modern formalizations made by scholars on the theory of supposition are differing in the types of methods used and in the degree in which the theory is made formal. This means that the qualification of the act of formalizing does not rest only on the definition of

[793] HANSSON (2000).
[794] DUTILH (2007a).
[795] DUTILH, "The Formal and The Formalized: The Cases of Syllogistic and Supposition Theory" in *Kriterion*, Belo Horizonte, nº 131, Jun./2015, p. 253-270
[796] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 222.
[797] HANSSON (2000), p. 164
[798] For formal philosophy see HANSSON (2000), p. 165.

the concept of 'formal' but, more explicitly, on the means by which something is formalized and on the possible difference between the initial object that will be formalized and the product of formalization. This possible difference will concern the second claim.

For the second claim, as Catarina has pointed out, it is quite a debate whether the act of formalization is changing the object that is being formalized[799]. This fact depends, as she puts it, on whether the act of formalization is an epistemic process, meaning a process that only shows explicitly the formal properties that are implicitly in the object before the process of formalization. But as we will see in the case of supposition, the many senses of 'formal' identified by her are changing the object whether they add or leave something aside. This fact is quite obvious for the understanding of formalization as an action of modelling. The oversimplification of the objects, the exclusion of some important parts, false unification of concepts, false conceptual primitivity are just some of the disadvantages that Hansson identifies. For him formalization is merely an idealization[800] and as any idealization, the object which is idealized differs in certain aspects from the product of idealization.

Regarding the object of formalization, it can be of various types such that it varies in at least two aspects: in quantity and in quality. The object which is to be formalized can be, for example, a part of natural or informal language, a philosophical theory with a high conceptual rigor or even with some symbolic representations, or a full formalized theory. In consequence, we must pay attention in each case to the type of object we have to deal with, since it has a particular part-whole relation with its context and a different degree of formality before the process of formalization takes place. From this perspective, being able to establish the status of supposition theory as an object of formalization will allow us to make an adequate assessment

[799] DUTILH (2007a), p. 220: "In other words, there seem to be two competing conceptions of formalizing, one according to which to formalize is to turn an informal object (theory, argument) into a formal one (by adding 'missing' premises, for example, cf. (Wang 1955, 227), (Hansson 2000, 166)), and another according to which to formalize is to make explicit the (implicit) formal character of the object of formalization. In the first case, if formalization transforms its non-formal object in such a way that it becomes formal, one may wonder whether this is a legitimate transformation. If to be formal or non-formal is an essential feature of the object in question, this transformation is really more of a violent mutation (similar to what happens to the main character of the film 'The Fly', whose DNA is mixed with that of a fly, or to Gregor Samsa in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*). Suppose that an argument is not formal; if one turns it into a formal argument, by adding premises, for example, is it still the same argument, or even a legitimate counterpart thereof? There seems to be a good case for the claim that the product of such a transformation is in fact a transfiguration of the original object. If, however, to formalize consists solely of making explicit the implicit but already present formal character of a given object, then a formalization becomes essentially the epistemic process of revealing something that is already there."

[800] See HANSSON (2000), p. 168-170.

of the modern formalizations of it. Inasmuch as the quality of the object is concerned, for example, the presence of specific rules for the modes of supposition, articulated with different logical tools, for example, mere examples vs. descending and ascending inferences, may entail a different kind of formality for the various versions of supposition theories articulated by different authors. Inasmuch as the quantity of the object is concerned, a formalization can take into account only a part of the object and not its whole. As we will see, this is the case of some modern interpretations of supposition theory, in which, the understanding resulted from the formalization of the personal modes of supposition is taken as an interpretation for the whole theory of supposition.

If we consider the action of formalization as a process in which certain "tools" are gradually applied on an object, then the means by which it is accomplished varies. In this sense, we must identify those "tools" of reasoning or of logic that are used to render an object in a more formalized manner. Catarina Dutilh Novaes has already identified *axiomatization*, *symbolization* and *conceptual translation* as methods of formalizing[801]. In the description of those methods, we can find various means of accomplishing this process: the reordering of the concepts of a theory under a deductive structure, the transposition of a theory with the aid of logical or mathematical symbols and the use of a formal theories to formalize another theory[802]. Generally speaking, the means by which a formalization is realized depends of the notions of formal itself, fact already pointed out by the same author. Regarding the contemporary logic, these means can be elements of formal systems, like element of: propositional logic, the language of first order logic, second order logic or of any artificial or semi-artificial language like those we can find in formal semantics. The studies in the systematic paradigm of the theory of supposition, which we will explore in detail later, is a clear example in this sense. But if we consider the property of supposition itself or even the philosophical endeavor in general, having in mind a concept of formal understood in a broader sense, the tool of formalization can pertain even to a natural language that has a high level of regimentation. In this last sense, all the generic

[801] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 231-292.
[802] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 216: "*Axiomatization* concerns the internal articulation of what is being formalized (a theory, an argument), and consists in spelling out how different statements are related to one another. *Symbolization* concerns the language in which the theory or argument is expressed, and usually consists of a 'transcription' of vernacular pieces of language into artificially created languages. *Conceptual translation* into a formal theory concerns the conceptual makeup of the object of formalization, and usually consists of (besides the use of a given symbolism) a mapping between the key concepts of the latter into the key concepts of the formal theory in question"

methods of philosophy, inasmuch as philosophy tries to render its objects in a more intelligible manner, can be considered means of formalization: the selection and grouping of elements of a theory under concepts and the reordering of them, establishing causal relations between propositions of a theory, the representation of regularities or groups of objects under variables, schematic letters, placeholders and even the fact of setting a particular concept to represent a particular aspect of a theory.

The final product of the action of formalization is a formalized object. The degree in which it is said to be formal varies depending on the means by which the formalization was carried out. Obviously, when we employ a tool which has a lower level of formalization the result will be a formalized object with a low level of formality. For example, for a schematic representation of the types of suppositions used by Peter of Spain, one that is usually made for teaching purposes, we will follow the text and extract and represent according to the author's order only the names of the types of suppositions. In this case, the act of formalizing resembles with an analytical abstraction of the content, inasmuch as we leave aside the examples, theoretical discussions and particular aspects of each type of supposition. Besides, we do not presuppose a difference between the object to be formalized and the product of formalization. But if we take for example the so-called theory of ascent and descent and we try to explain it by offering a formalization in first order logic, where we show how from one particular type of categorial proposition we can infer other types, and consequently we show in this way how the supposition of a term can be understood as a double entailment, the situation will be quite different. In this case the question if the formalized object, the product of formalization, is the same object as the one before the formalization needs to be address. The formal or semi-formal language in which the formalized medieval theory is expressed, is quite different from the medieval Latin language. But the medieval Latin language is not so different from our contemporary modern language as it is from the language of contemporary logic. Besides, the descent or ascent through the supposition of a term is also different from an inference between propositions.

Up to this point, we have tried to explain the mechanics of the 'formal' concept. We have seen that an action of formalization is applied to an object to be formalized and that in this process are used certain tools that are rendering the product of formalization in a more formal manner. The formality of both the object before the formalization and the means of

formalization varies. Between the latter and the product of formalization we can assert the existence of a direct proportional relation: the more formal the means, the more formal the product. Besides, from this, we can extract certain parameters according to which we must pay close attention in our further analysis on the contemporary formalizations of the theory of supposition:

1. The quality and quantity of the object to be formalized. (In our case, in what sense the theory of supposition is formal and if the entire theory is formalized or only a part of it)

2. The means of formalization. (What type of tools are applied in the process of formalization and how they can influence the formality of the initial object)

3. The product of formalization. (In what sense the product of formalization is different from the initial object and how this difference can influence the response to our main question)

But beside those criteria, we face a challenge regarding the study of supposition theory through the mechanics of formalization. If we keep in mind the assumption that medieval logic and supposition theory is in some way formal, and consequently the theory of supposition can be itself a process of some kind of formalization, then there needs to be an extension of the concept of formal. This extension will include not only the medieval logical theories but philosophical reasoning in general understood as abstraction. In consequence we can anticipate a tension between a notion of formal proper to contemporary logic and a notion of formal proper to medieval logic and other domains of knowledge. In the following section we will take a look on this very issue, the multiple meaning of the notion of 'formal'.

2.1.3 Types of formality

Up to this point, we have seen what the concept of formal implies in its use. But without a proper definition of the notion of 'formal', the description of the process of formalization is to a lesser extent helpful in our purpose. As a first problem we must ask if the notion of 'formal' can have a unique or multiple sense. It is quite obvious from the variation of the object, means and products of formalization that we have to deal with a multiple sense of 'formal'. These meanings were clarified in recent scholarship by two different programs. In the first one, MacFarlane tries to established a proper demarcation of logic from other disciplines according to the principle of formality. In the second one, Catarina Dutilh Novaes' historical account deduces the many types in which something can be said to be formal.

In this sub-section, first, we will present the different notions of formal that will be further used in our study as criteria for the evaluation of *suppositio* theory. Second, we will try to establish whether the different meanings are incompatible between them, or whether some may include others, and if so, in what way[803].

2.1.3.1 MacFarlane's three types of formality

The project developed by MacFarlane's thesis has the purpose of demarking the proper sense of 'formal' that can be attributed to logic in contrast with other disciplines which can be said to be formal in a measure or another. In this sense, logic is distinguished from other disciplines by its formality in a specific manner. From an historical perspective and within the tradition of logical hylomorphism, that is, the tradition of describing logic as being formal, he tracks back to Immanuel Kant three senses in which logic can properly be said 'formal'. Although they can be all found in Kant's works, MacFarlane will argue that the three types of formality, without forming an exhaustive distinction, are conceptually independent of each other. In his own words those three notions of 'formal' can be understood as follows:

> "[M1] To say logic is 1-formal is to say that its norms are constitutive of concept use as such (as opposed to a particular kind of concept use). 1-formal laws are the norms to which any conceptual activity - asserting, inferring, supposing, judging, and so on - must be held responsible.
>
> [M2] To say that logic is 2-formal is to say that its characteristic notions and laws are indifferent to the particular identities of different objects. 2-formal notions and laws treat each object the same (whether it is a cow, a peach, a shadow, or a number). Mathematically, 2-formality can be spelled out as invariance under all permutations of the domain of objects.
>
> [M3] To say that logic is 3-formal is to say that it abstracts entirely from the semantic content of 'matter' of concepts - that it considers thought in abstraction from its relation on the world and is therefore entirely free of substantive presuppositions."[804]

A reformulation for each type of formality in a more intuitive manner is made afterwards on the basis on the concept of abstraction from content or subject matter, resulting in a description of logic as independent from: a particular domain of conceptual application for 1-formality or M1, particular objects or individuals for 2-formality or M2, semantic content for 3-formality or M3. Accordingly, 1-formality or M1 is the property of logic of being applicable in any domain of

[803] A shorter version of these considerations was presented in ILE (2018), p. 16-19.
[804] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 51.

conceptual activity, 2-formality or M2 is the property of logic of treating each individual entity the same without being concern about its individual features and, finally, 3-formality or M3 is the property of logic that makes the logical content void of factual meaning[805].

Disregarding the transcendental aspect of the first notion of formality[806], we can see that they can be applied also in particular formalizations. As an example, for those types of formality we can consider de reformulation of Father Boehner's understanding of a particular affirmative, categorical proposition formalized by Gareth B. Matthews[807]. The formalization represents a descent made following the rules of the common personal determinate supposition as follows: $(\exists x)\ (Fx \cdot Gx)$ which implies $(Fx_1 \cdot Gx_1 \cdot \vee \cdot Fx_2 \cdot Gx_2 \cdot \vee \cdot \ldots)$. In our context, the object of formalization is the implication of "This man is an animal or that man is an animal or that man...." from "Some man is an animal". Putting aside de adequacy of the formalization, we can observe the presence of all three types of formality. The logical formula can be applicable in various domains of activity depending on our interpretation of the variables and predicates. The entities and properties for which the variable and predicates are standing for can be changed with any entities or properties according to our interpretation. Besides the logical constants that have the same semantic value in the logical language, the characters used are void of any semantical content unless are applied to an object to be formalized. If this formalization can explain the supposition of a subject-term in Ockham's logic, and by doing so, inasmuch as is using a logical language, it presents the three types of formality, then we can ask by what type of formality can the theory of supposition itself be characterized. This question is more important since in the case of the medieval supposition theory we deal with another type of language. But this aspect will be explored later. Now, we must pay attention to another part of MacFarlane's study on formality.

In the second chapter he identifies another three senses in which logic can be said to be unproblematic formal. Logic can be said to be (M1*) *syntactically formal*, (M2*) *schematically formal* and (M3*) *grammatically formal*. The syntactic formality is described as the property of

[805] See MACFARLANE (2000), p. 51.
[806] As Dutilh has pointed out in DUTILH (2011a), p. 315 "For Kant (general), logic is beyond being topic-neutral: it has no topic at all, as it only defines the formal conditions of pure thought. In the Kantian sense, 'formal' is not what is topic-neutral, and thus can be applied to a variety of topics, but rather what cannot have any content at all."
[807] MATTHEWS, "Ockham's Supposition Theory and Modern Logic" in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1964), p. 92-93.

logic of being treated "without reference to the meaning of expressions"[808]. The schematic formality describes logic as having schematic laws "that is, they contain <<blank spaces>> in which any <<material>> expressions of the appropriate categories can be placed."[809]. Grammatical formality makes "properties of sentences depend only on their grammatical forms or structures; that is, on the order and arrangement of their grammatical particles and the grammatical categories of their <<categorematic>> terms"[810]. For his purpose of demarcating the logical from non-logical domain, these acceptances do not do their job and are called 'decoy notions of formality'. Syntactic formality is present in other sciences (his example, formal physics or formal economics) and it can be seen as a method applied to a specific subject; consequently, the fact of having syntactical formality does not exclude the idea of having a semantical content. Schematic formality, the view of logic according to which formal means to be concerned with inference patterns and schemata in independence from content matter[811], presents problems too. According to the same author, there needs to be a relational notion of schematic formality which must specify of constants and semantical categories used, so that the schemata or the inference patterns can be distinguished from the content. Concerning grammatical formality, it is uncapable to be a proper demarcation for logic because of the multiplicity of grammars and its meta-grammatical problems like identity and the grammatical chauvinism[812].

MacFarlane's analysis on the notion of formal gives us six types of formality that can be attributed to logic. On the one hand, 1-formality or M1, 2-formality or M2 and 3-formality or M3 seem to consider logic in its purest form or the formality in a strong sense. On the other, syntactical, schematically and grammatical formality seem to be weaker versions of formality. Although he identifies in Middle Ages precursor notions of the strong sense of formality, for example in Abelard's theory of perfect inference and then in Ockham's theory of formal consequence, they are considered to be far away from the formality of contemporary logic[813]. However, regarding the last observation we can make a conceptual distinction. In Abelard's

[808] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 31.
[809] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 31.
[810] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 31.
[811] MACFARLANE (2000), p. 37.
[812] See MACFARLANE (2000), p. 48.
[813] For example, See MACFARLANE (2000), p. 257.

case, if not in the case of any medieval theory, an inference is expressed in natural language and, at most, with the help of schematic letter, while the considerations about the formality are expressed in a meta-logical way, in theorizing about the inference. In contemporary logic, the full formalization of a theory is a direct expression of formality in a strong sense. This fact, if true, can be from the beginning a cause for the medieval theories lack of formality in a strong sense; consequently, the theory of supposition will be qualified only for a weaker sense of formality by reason of the language in which is expressed and the theoretical presuppositions to which it subscribes. Whether this is the case or not, will be discussed in the section dedication to Peter of Spain's theory. For now, we will explore the many senses of the formal notion in Catarina Dutilh Novaes' account.

2.1.3.2 Catarina Dutilh Novaes' notions of formality

In this stage of our study, the notion of formal is defined in a strong and weak sense. Although, both senses can be attributed to contemporary logic, the former is pertaining to it in a more proper way than the latter, especially while we remain in MacFarlane's conceptual framework. Regarding medieval logic, the situation seems to be reverse. It is possible that a strong sense of formality cannot be attributed directly to it but only a weaker one. However, even in this weak sense, the formality of medieval logic is still confined to the contemporary concept of formality. A proper way of determining in which sense the medieval theory of supposition is formal will probably be accomplished only by analyzing the theory itself. But until then, we must explore another taxonomy of the notion of formal which can be found in Catarina Dutilh Novaes works.

In her book on the formalization of medieval logical theories[814] we can find six different notions of formal that are used in various ways in the action of formalizing through axiomatization, symbolization and conceptual translation. They are grouped in two clusters according to two general meanings of the notion of 'formal'. The first two types correspond to formal as strict application of rules (opposed to informal) and the following four to formal as form (opposed to matter), as follows:

D1. Formal as regimentation

[814] See DUTILH (2007a), especially chapter "4.1.3 The notion of the formal", p. 224-230.

D2. The algorithmic notion of formal

D3. Formal as structure and abstraction from content

D4. Formal as absence of meaning

D5. Formal as variation

D6. Formal as indifference to particular objects[815]

According to this particular taxonomy, logic, formal theories or formalizations made through logic can be considered formal because: (D1) their formal language is generated by applying explicit defined rules, (D2) the inference-making can be made by a machine by strictly applying rules, (D3) they deal with the relation between objects and not with their matter, (D4) symbols are not considered meaningful expressions but only simple objects, (D5) the logical form of an expression permits the variation of specific objects under schematic letters or (D6) objects are not considered in their particularity or accidental properties but in their property of simply being objects[816].

The taxonomy considered by Dutilh regarding the formality of logic is not so different from the considerations put forward by MacFarlane. In fact, with the exception of the pejorative shade of the decoy senses of formal and the transcendent(al) import of M1, M2 and M3, we can corelate the two mentioned classifications as follows:

M1* - D4

M2* - D5

M3*, M3 - D3

M2 - D6

M1 - D1, D2[817]

What MacFarlane calls 'syntactical' (M1*) and 'schematic' formality (M2*) are associated by Dutilh with the fourth (D4) and fifth (D5) type of formality respectively, that is, formality as absence of meaning and formality as variation[818]; grammatical formality (M3*) and 3-formality (M3) can be correlated with the third sense, formal as structure and abstraction from content (D3); 2-formality (M2) with the sixth one in Dutilh's classification, which is a formality manifested as indifference to particular objects (D6). Only the formal as pertaining to rules

[815] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 224-230.
[816] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 224-230 and ILE (2018), p. 18.
[817] See ILE (2018), p. 18.
[818] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 228 and note 402; p. 225-224 note 393 for the rejection of the 1-formality type of formal.

seems to be omitted as a specific type by MacFarlane, being instead presupposed by 1-formality (M1). In fact, our intuitions are confirmed by Dutilh herself in a more recent analysis of the ways in which logic can said to be formal[819]. There, the division between formal as pertaining to form and formal as pertaining to rules remain the same. The difference consists in the renaming of some types of formalities or creating new subdivisions. Accordingly, formal as pertaining to form is subdivided in formal as variability (the formal as schematic, the formal as indifference to particulars) and formal as abstraction from content (formal as topic neutral, formal as total abstraction from content and formal as de-semantification). The formal as pertaining to rules is directly divided in formal as computable, formal as pertaining to regulative rules and the one pertaining to constitutive rules. Comparing this taxonomy with its older brother, we can see that the only novel distinctions are the formality as topic neutral and as pertaining to constitutive rules[820], consequently they will be the only ones to be mentioned by us. The topic neutral notion of formal represents the property of logic of being applied in different disciplines inasmuch as it provides "patterns of correct reasoning valid across [them]"[821]. As we all know this idea of logic as organon or instrument was wide spread in the Aristotelian tradition, in the learning program of Middle Ages, and even in the times closer to us of logical positivism. Regarding the formal as pertaining to constitutive rules, Dutilh tracks its origins to the Kant's idea of laws of thoughts, as constrains to our cognitive activity. In a broader sense, constitutive rules will be defined as cognitive "conditions of possibility for the existence of whatever phenomenon (entity, fact) they constitute"[822]. But as herself is pointing out, this notion is quite problematic inasmuch as it presupposes an equivalence between the rules of logic and the rules of thought.

From MacFarlane's and Catarina Dutilh Novaes' classifications of the different meanings of the 'formal' concept, we can draw some conclusions. First, the notion of 'formal' comprises multiple senses such that the property of formality presents different degrees applicable to a variety of theoretical objects which may not pertain exclusively to contemporary logic. The rules, the abstract notations, the governing deductive principles and the language in

[819] DUTILH (2011a).
[820] The formal as pertaining to regulative rules can be equated with formal as regimentation from the early taxonomy, although the regulative rules are defined here in a broader sense.
[821] DUTILH (2011a), p. 314.
[822] DUTILH (2011a), p. 327-328.

which a theoretical object is conceived play all a role in the various acceptances of the formality of an object. Secondly, the two sets of acceptances of the notion in question provided by the two aforementioned authors are reducible to each other. According to their consideration, we may say that a theoretical object can be considered formal if: is constructed by means of abstracting from the actual meaning of expressions; it presents schemata that can be represented by symbolic or abstract notations in which different objects can variate; it is constructed on structural notions, such as the structure of abstract reasoning or language, and not on the semantical ones that take into account the relation with the world; it is constructed as an abstraction from the accidental or particular characteristics of the object it considers; and is constructed with rules, set of norms or laws which constrains its formulation and applies a normative character. Under such a generous understanding, the notion of formality is malleable enough to be applied to different articulations of medieval logic, while being adequate for a rigorous analysis in which the specific degrees of its formality is questioned.

Conclusion

In the first sub-section dedicated to the systematic analysis, we tried to set up the basic framework of our investigation. In the first part we have explained that, the definition of supposition, especially as formulated by Peter of Spain, seems to be an explanation of a logico-linguistical phenomenon that tends to be understood through a physical relation of substitution, as showed in the historical and doctrinal analysis. Being as such, it is rather explained by analogy and through natural language and not by rigorous logical or formal means. However, we have showed that since the beginning of the modern scholarship, represented by figure such as Father Philotheus Boehner and I. M. Bochénski, medieval logic was considered to have more in common with the contemporary logic that we might thought. The main resemblance was stated in terms of its formality. Medieval logic was considered to be formal, often enough without specifying in which particular sense. Thus, our analysis tried to understand through the works of Sven Ove Hansson, John Gordon MacFarlane and Catarina Dutilh Novaes what the concept of formality implies in its use. First of all, we have showed that the origin of this notion can be tracked back to Aristotle hylomorphic theory which is applied almost to its entire philosophy. There the form is the directive and dominant principle which is responsible for the becoming of the matter as explained by all of its particular disciplines. Although, in his logic, the

hylomorphism is not directly applied but only presupposed and exemplified in his theory of four causes, according to MacFarlane, the tradition that follows him can be considered responsible for the characterization of logic as formal, or more exactly of applying the hylomorphic principles to logic. Secondly, we have showed that formality must not be understood only as a static concept or a property which can be ascribed to a theoretical object, but implies something more. Formality is seen by Hansson and Dutilh as having a performative dimension. For the first, formality implies formalization, a process of gradual abstraction done with sets of different tools from general and specialized philosophical concepts to logical and mathematical notions, which can be considered in themselves as formal. Understood in this way, formalization can be considered a type of idealization. For the second, the framework is much more complex. When we speak about formality, we must address the problems related to the action of formalizing, the object which suffers the action of formalizing, the means by which the formalization is done and the product of formalization. Thus, those four aspects, that involuntary reinterprets Aristotle's four causes by putting the accents on the form, make the notion of formality more variable and flexible. According to them, we established certain criteria under which a theoretical object can be assessed in order to evaluate its formality. However, at this point, the notions of formal still remains undefined. In order to address this problem, in the third part we analyzed the different types of formality. From the studies made by Dutilh and MacFarlane, we have seen that formality can be understood either as: independence from a particular domain of conceptual application (M1), independence from particular objects or individuals (M2), independence from semantic content (M3), absence of reference to the meaning of expressions (M1*), schematic laws (M2*), grammatical structures (M3*); or as: regimentation (D1), algorithmic reasoning (D2), structure and abstraction from content (D3), absence of meaning (D4), variation (D5) and indifference to particular objects (D6). But the two clusters are reducible one to another as it was shown. From this we can see that, generally speaking, a theoretical object can be consider formal if: (a.) is constructed by means of abstracting from the actual meaning of expressions; (b.) it presents schemata that can be represented by symbolic or abstract notations in which different objects can variate under placeholders; (c.) it is constructed on structural notions, such as the structure of abstract reasoning or language, and not on the semantical ones that take into account the relation with the world; (d.) it is constructed as an abstraction from the accidental or particular characteristics of the object it considers; and (e.) is

constructed with rules, set of norms or laws which constrain its formulation and applies a normative character. These are all features according to which the property of being formal of a theoretical object can be assessed.

Understood as such, the concept of formality implies a logical phenomenology of a theoretical object. It concerns how a theoretical object is given in its initial articulation and what transformations it suffers through an action of interpretation. But before analyzing the multiple interpretations or formalizations of supposition theory in contemporary scholarship, first we must seek if a generic formality can be ascribed to the theoretical object in question. Thus, the following sub-section will deal with the formality in medieval logic and especially in supposition theory.

2.2 Formality in the medieval supposition theories

In the first section of our work, we tried to show how the medieval theory of supposition evolved starting from an understanding of *suppositio* as substitution between physical objects and arriving at a terminist theory in the 14th century, which uses more rigorous conceptual tools, that is, ascending and descending inferences. In this sense, each stage of evolution represents layers of theoretical sedimentation with different degrees of formality. Often those layers can in a certain degree be read in a particular articulation of supposition theory. This is the case of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. Since it can be successfully place at an early stage of maturity, it presents features from both historical parts. On the one hand, it has features from the previous stages of development, in which *suppositio* was linked to its grammatical, theological and non-terminist logical acceptances, all of which were link to the common use of this concept in Latin; on the other, it presents characteristics that announce the future stages of theoretical articulations made on firmer logical grounds, that will be fully achieved in the works of Ockham and Buridan. Such being the case, in the following subparts, we will try to see in what sense Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be considered 'formal' on a generic level. In doing so, first we will offer some considerations about how the status of medieval logic is conceived. Then, the generic formality of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition will be sought. Finally, a comparative account between Ockham's and Peter's theoretical articulations will be made.

2.2.1 The status of medieval logic

A starting point for the assessment of the formality of the supposition theory should first be considered on the basis of the status of medieval logic. We already saw from the considerations of Father Philotheus Boehner, I. M. Bochénski and Ernest A. Moody formulated in the 20th century how the status of medieval logic varies from being a formal construct similar to that of contemporary logic to being something entirely or partially different from it. This will allow us to formulate two different theses:

ThMl1: Medieval logic is similar to contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of their formality

ThMl2: Medieval logic is entirely different from contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of its lack of formality[823]

In the current literature these two theses were either ignored altogether or endorsed, implicitly or explicitly, by many scholars who studied the theory of supposition. In our point of view, the explicit subscription to ThMl1 or ThMl2 is important, since it legitimates a particular interpretative endeavor of a theory formulated within the medieval logic. As we will see in the chapter dedicated to contemporary interpretations of supposition theory, logically speaking, an endorsement towards one of these two theses should entail a specific approach to suppositio theory. On the one hand, if medieval logic and contemporary logic or theories of language have a common type of formality, then an interpretation of the supposition theory through the tools of contemporary logic can be made. Surely, as stated elsewhere[824], from the very beginning we can see that medieval logic seems to differ from what can be considered a formal system - *"*formal language supplemented with a set of axioms and/or rules of inference specifying which sequences of formulas from the language are to count as derivations*"*[825] - and from a formal type of logic - "a theory which investigates the structure of sentences and of deductive inference by a method which abstracts from the content of sentences and deals only with their logical form"[826]. However, it cannot be denied that medieval logic aims for a certain rigor, clarity of language, conceptual coherence and systematization of certain logical and linguistic phenomena. All of these features may certify for a certain degree of formality.

If medieval logic is void of formality in contrast with contemporary logic and theories of language, then any interpretative attempt of supposition theory made through the contemporary concepts can be classified as anachronistic and illegitimate[827]. Under the ThMl2 thesis, no equivalence between modern or contemporary concepts and the medieval ones can be made, forcing supposition theory to be studied in its own terms and within its own limits. As a secondary effect, this thesis will entail, as we saw from Bochénski account, to a certain impossibility of rendering the supposition theory key concepts in modern languages. A similar

[823] See ILE (2017), p. 76, where a similar point was made.
[824] See ILE (2017), p. 79.
[825] COOK, *Dictionary of Philosophical Logic* (2009), p. 124.
[826] MARCISZEWSKI, *Dictionary of Logic as Applied in the Study of Language: Concepts/Methods/Theories* (1981), p. 183.
[827] For a particular understanding of this type of anachronism, see DUTILH (2007a), a risk permanently mentioned in her study of formalization.

account based on the discrepancy between the medieval and contemporary conceptual framework, will make Alain de Libera a few years later to speak about the untranslatability of the supposition theory[828].

For the historian of philosophy both theses have their shortcomings. The first is forcing the scholar to interpret supposition theories through the conceptual frameworks that are foreign to medieval thought. The result will be, as we will see in the corresponding chapter, the equivalence of supposition theory with a theory of: reference, conceptual notation, computational hermeneutics/propositional meaning, inference or quantification. The second thesis can create a disconnection and lack of any continuity between medieval and modern or contemporary considerations of language and logic. This will force the scholar to limit itself to the medieval thought and to renounce to any fruitful historical dialogue. However, if we consider ThMl1 and ThMl2 as two interpretative extremes regarding the nature of medieval logic, a middle ground can be obtained. If we look back to the considerations of Bochénski and Moody, two aspects could be highlighted: (1.) medieval logic was expressed in an ordinary or "quasi-empirical" language contrasted with the artificial language of contemporary logical symbolism and (2.) in its language analysis both syntactic and semantic notions were taken into account[829]. If the second aspect (2.) goes uncontested, the first (1.) needs a little clarification. The medieval Latin in which the logical theories were formulated was not merely an ordinary language but a highly regimented one. As we saw in the first part of our work, the *suppo*-terms suffered from their ancient use a series of conceptual mutations within different domains of study (law, grammar, theology and logic). These mutations bare a double effect: on the one hand, they conserve the common sense that can be found in the natural language; on the other, they offer new specialized senses according to a specific domain of use. Moreover, medieval logic with the aid of grammar selected specific parts of language to serve as logical tools of analyzing particular language situations. In doing so, semantic and syntactic rules were offered to account for logical and linguistical phenomena. A mere ordinary language could not accomplish all these functions. Thus, foreign in a certain degree to the artificial symbolism of the contemporary logical or language theories, medieval logic was in a certain degree formal. Catarina Dutilh Novaes highlights this aspect in the following lines according to the concept of symbolism:

[828] See DE LIBER (2014), p. 1097-1102.
[829] See MOODY (1966), p. 445-446; BOCHEŃSKI (1978), p.173.

> "the analysis of medieval logic seems to speak both against and in favor of the view that logic is essentially symbolic: on the one hand, a remarkable degree of sophistication was often achieved by medieval logicians; on the other hand, they never attained the degree of technical complexity that is now characteristic of work in logic. Moreover, while the language they used can be viewed as an 'ordinary language', at that time Latin was no longer spoken in non-official contexts, for example, in everyday life; in fact, later medieval (academic) Latin is full of more or less *ad hoc* artificial conventions (cf. Klima 1991), to an extent that, even though it is not a full-blown 'symbolic' language, it is undoubtedly a highly regimented language (including extensive use of abbreviations and schematic letters)"[830].

As pointed elsewhere[831], Laurent Cesalli, in *What is medieval logic after all? Towards a scientific use of natural language*, bridges the gap between the two theses mentioned above, ThMl1 and ThMl2, by identifying two different constrains of the medieval logician: a formal and a material one. The formal constrain refers to the tendency of the medieval logic or logician to use or fashion a language void of ambiguity and semantic confusion such that can be used in the demonstrative sciences. The material one refers to the fact that the language the logicians had at their disposal was not a purely formal one but Latin, a natural or semi-natural one[832]. The same constrains are identified by Parsons:

> "medieval logic is formulated entirely within a natural language, Latin. This is a major constraint that needs to be respected and dealt with. It shapes the development of the theory from start to finish. To be sure, medieval Latin is a somewhat artificial natural language. In medieval times it was no longer anybody's native tongue; everyone learned it by schooling, as a second language"[833].

These two constrains could be in fact considered properties of medieval logic: on the one hand, medieval logic can be considered material, since is expressed in a semi-natural language; having a strong connection with the common Latin language it offers to the logical theories an intuitive character by replicating structures, uses and notions from it; on the other hand, medieval logic can be considered formal, since it does not limit itself to ordinary language, but defines concepts and formulate rules with a normative character; the rules and logical entities comprised in specific theories are put to use in analyzing specific portion of language; in this sense, we can

[830] DUTILH (2007a), p. 296.
[831] See ILE (2017), p. 80.
[832] For this distinction, see CESALLI (2010), p. 52.
[833] PARSONS (2014), p. 1.

speak about a highly regimented language or a semi-formal one. In this entire story, the Latin grammar used in logical theories plays a doble role: it offered a grammatical form which, on the one hand, can sometimes be contrasted with the logical form, and, on the other, can stand on the basis of articulating a logical syntax; but in the same time grammar offers to logic its own ambiguities, problems and shortcomings. In the following subpart, we will show in what sense can Peter of Spain's theory of supposition be called 'formal'.

2.2.2. The generic formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory

In order to construct an argument for the formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory we can look for two different instances of formality. On the one hand, we must look for a distinction between logical, syntactical or formal elements and non-logical, semantical or non-formal elements of a proposition. This distinction will help us to identify a logical structure of the proposition in virtue of which we can point out its essential and constitutive elements. On the other hand, we must take into account the specific rules of the theory of supposition and its modes that explain how the logical syntax or form of a proposition and its specific elements generate a particular type of supposition.

As we already seen in the first section of our work, in the first treatise, *De introductionibus*, Peter of Spain starts his analysis of *scientia sermocinalis* with the definition and division of the simplest elements. Two of these elements are of particular interest for our purpose, the *nomine* and the *verbum*. They are vocalizations that signify something by convention. Following the Aristotelian tradition, the noun and the verb are not taken here purely in their grammatical sense, but are reconfigured to fit the dialectician use. In this sense, indetermined and oblique names and verbs are excluded from the interest of logic[834]. Although usually dialecticians like Peter of Spain restrict the concept of '*nomen'* to the nouns in the nominative case and that of '*verbum*' to the verbs at the indicative mode, present tense, later theoretical developments of the supposition theory will study the properties of parts of speech that do no respect these rigid definitions. Nevertheless, those condition may be established in order to highlight what will be considered the constitutive parts of a categorical proposition. Until then, it must be noted that when the *nomen* and the *verbum* are meaningfully combined,

[834] See *SL*., I. 4-5, p. 2, l. 12 - p. 3, l. 5.

they form an *oratio*, an enunciation, phrase or word-group. When we have a complete *oratio*, expressed through an indicative verb, which can signify the true or falsity, then we have a *propositio* (proposition). If we speak about the categorical proposition (*propositio categorica*), we can understand it as a composed entity minimally formed by a noun and verb, which, in virtue of their propositional functions are now called 'subject' - that of which something is predicated - and 'predicate' - that which is predicated about the subject[835]. The noun and the verb which play the functions of the subject and the predicate are the constitutive parts of a predicative context. In virtue of this fact, the subject and the predicate are called 'terms' of a proposition or 'categorematic words'. But the fact of being categorematic does not relate only to the predicative context, but also to the capability of these terms to signify something on their own. According to the sixth treatise, *De suppositionibus*, paragraph 2, each term, that is, each categorematic word, has the property of representing a thing, universal or particular, through the vocalization, according to convention[836]. Thus, terms or categorematic words are combined with the other parts of the proposition which, according to *SL* I.5 are called '*sincathegoremata'*. According to the sixth treatise, examples of these syncategorematic words in a categorematic proposition are the universal and particular signs which were given at *SL* I.8 (*omnis, nullus, nichil, quilibet, uterque, neuter, aliquis, quidam, aliter reliquus etc.*)[837]. It is important to know that, although these sincategorematic words do not signify by themselves a thing (*res*) but only co-signify something along with the categorematic words, it can be said nonetheless that they have an improper significative function. In the twelfth treatise, when discussing the signification of the universal sign, Peter states that the signs signify the disposition of the term to which they are applied, that is, they signify the way in which the terms are taken according to those signs[838].

The distinction between the categorematic and syncategorematic words or parts of propositions helps us to distinguish between what looks like a syntactical and semantical level of a proposition. The syntactical level is represented by the elements of the proposition which although are void of any semantical content understood as a representation of a *res*, play a certain role in the semantical value of the entire proposition. Syntactical elements are the universal and particular signs, the copula and the negation. To them it could be added the notions

[835] See *SL*., I. 7, p. 3-4.
[836] See *SL*., VI.2, p. 79.
[837] See *SL*., VI.2, p. 79, l. 14-16; I.8, p. 4.
[838] See *SL*., XII, 5-6, p. 210-211.

of subject and predicate, but only understood as logical categories abstracted from actual words which play these functions in an actual proposition. The semantical level is represented by the actual categorematic elements or terms with their specific meaning. Although the existence of a clear distinction between syntax and semantics is problematic, it can be easily seen how Peter, by employing the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic elements, configurates a logical form of a proposition separated but not entirely independent from the semantical content[839]. Although this propositional form is not expressed symbolically or in an abstract notation but in a highly conceptualized natural language, it manages to configurate a logical propositional structure on which the supposition theory can be constructed. In what follow we will want to see how the different modes of supposition are articulated on the basis of this logical form, and what formality argument we can draw from them.

In the first part of our work, in the section dedicated to the theory of supposition we have already seen how supposition is understood as a relation between a *supponens*, a term, and a *suppositum*, a *res*. We have pointed out that defined as a relation between a term and an extra-mental and extra-propositional entity, the supposition theory presents from the very beginning a semantical foundation, and thus a problematic concept of formality[840]. A concession can be made if we consider the *suppositum* to be indirectly a linguistic entity or term which signifies directly the actual *res*, such that supposition can be considered in a certain degree a logical relation between propositional elements. Moreover, through the division of its modes we have seen how the type of supposition varies according the nature of the suppositing term and of the other elements of the predicative context. In what follows we want to see if the conditions under which supposition is defined can be considered syntactically formal or not[841].

The first level of division, that between discrete and common supposition has as criteria of distinction the type of the suppositing term: discrete or common[842]. Since the criteria here is the type of the *supponens* term, which functions like a placeholder for any term of a specific type, we can arguably say that we have here a logical or formal condition for establishing a particular type of supposition. But this logical condition can hardly be considered a syntactical

[839] For a similar conclusion see ILE (2018), p. 20.
[840] See ILE (2018), p. 21.
[841] A similar analysis has been made in Ile (2018), p. 21-23.
[842] *SL*, VI.4, p. 80, l. 19-21: "suppositio communis est que fit per terminum communem, ut 'homo'. Suppositio discreta est que fit per terminum discretum, ut 'Sortes' vel 'iste homo'".

or proper formal one, since in differentiating between types of terms we must take into account the types of *res* for which those terms stand, and thus we must take into account semantical aspects[843].

The second level of division is that between natural and accidental supposition, both types being comprised as subspecies of common supposition[844]. In this case we can identify three different conditions: (1.) a semantical condition established by the common supposition, the requirement of the term to be of a common type, (2.) a syntactic condition that refers to the present or absence of some other parts of speech which can join the propositional context of the *supponens* and (3.) a semantical condition, the range or extension of the *supponens* or the actual *supposita* for which the term stands, which directly depends on the meaning or semantical content of the other propositional elements.

The third level of division is that between simple and personal supposition[845]. Both being species of accidental supposition, they inherit the three conditions we established at the second level of division. Further, from the definition of simple and personal supposition we can see that an additional criterion should be added, the types of objects or *res* for which the *supponens* term stands, that is, a universal, in the case of simple supposition, and individuals or inferiors, in the case of personal supposition. This additional criterion could be interpreted only as a semantical condition, since it refers directly to the extra-mental and extra-linguistic entities.

The fourth level of division is that between determinate and confused supposition, both being species of personal supposition[846]. Beside the conditions of the previous levels of division, in this stage a further criterion of distinction can be added, the type of the sign which is added

[843] For Catarina Dutilh Novaes, a condition formulated according to the type of terms is a quasi-syntactical or formal feature of a proposition but not a fully syntactical one. The type of term is understood as "a semantical type": see for example DUTILH (2007a), p. 47. This reading follows the point of view expressed by Peter Geach in *Reference and generality*, p. 15: "Whether a name is a proper name depends on the kind of thing it is a name *for,* and this is a matter of its sense, not of its syntactical category; in syntax there is only the category of *names.*"

[844] *SL*., VI.4, p. 81, l. 1-9: "Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus a quibus aptus natus est participari, ut 'homo' per se sumptus de natura sua supponit pro omnibus hominibus qui fuerunt et qui sunt et qui erunt. Accidentalis autem suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro eis pro quibus exigit adiunctum, ut 'homo est'; iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro presentibus; cum autem 'homo fuit', supponit pro preteritis; cum vero dicitur 'homo erit', supponit pro futuris."

[845] *SL*, VI.5, p. 81, l. 12-13: "Simplex suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro re universali significata per ipsum*"*; VI.7, p. 82, l. 10-11: *"*Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus".

[846] *SL*, VI.8, p. 82, l. 14-15: "determinata suppositio dicitur quam habet terminus communis indefinite sumptus vel cum signo particulari."; VI.9, p. 82, l. 2 - p. 83, l. 1: "confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus mediante signo universali".

to the *supponens* term. If no sign or a particular sign is added to the common personally suppositing term, then we have a determinate supposition. If a universal sign is added, then we have a confused supposition. Since those signs are syncategorematic words, void of any proper semantical content, this criterion can be considered a syntactical one.

A further additional level of division can be added, but certainly is not a proper division of the modes of supposition: the division between the movability and immovability of personal confused supposition. The movability or immovability is caused by the necessity of the sign or mode and is understand as a possibility or impossibility of a descending inference. This inference takes place from a proposition which contains a common term with personal confused supposition to a proposition where the suppositing term is replace with one of its inferiors; for example, "*omnis homo [est animal]; ergo Sortes [est animal]*"[847]. Besides the inherited conditions, the criterion for establishing the movability or immovability of a personal confused supposition seems to be here the possibility or impossibility to descend from the suppositing term to its inferiors, criterion which can be interpreted as a syntactical one.

Comprised as series of conditions, we can observe the generic level of syntactic formality for Peter's theory of supposition. It is especially the fourth level of division, that between determinate and confused supposition, and of the division between movability and immovability of confused supposition which are defined on the basis of syntactical criteria. But even in those cases, the types of supposition inherit the semantical conditions of their superiors such that we cannot speak about a pure syntactical definition of the suppositing modes. Presented in this way, Peter of Spain's supposition theory seems to be a theoretical construct that show us for what type of object (*res*) a term can stand in a propositional context. This propositional context is analyzed in an abstracted manner in virtue of its syntactical and semantical aspect. Even at the third level of division, when Peter is defining supposition semantically, in accordance with the object for which a term stands, the theory deals with the extra-mental and extra-linguistic entities in an abstract manner by discussing types of object or objects understood logically and not merely empirical object. In conclusion, we state that the generic formality that we have shown from the conditions which define the modes of Peter of Spain supposition is indeed a weak one, since both syntactical and semantical conditions are

[847] *SL*, VI.9, p. 83, l. 15-16; see also VI.9, p. 83, l. 4-22.

taken into account. In what follows we want to show how the classical categorical propositions can be analyzed within Peter of Spain's theory. This analysis will be put in parallel with other instances of supposition theory for the assessment of their formality.

2.2.3. Peter of Spain vs. William Ockham. On the supposition of elementary categorical propositions

We have showed in the previous subsection how the modes of supposition are defined according to Peter of Spain in a combination of semantic and syntactic conditions. Moreover, we have shown that only from the fourth level of division, that between determinate and confused supposition, we can argue for a certain degree of syntactic formality. But even in this last case, the situation is problematic. If we take into account the way in which Peter of Spain articulates his doctrine of supposition, it can easily be shown that his lack of explicit examples and clarifications makes an assessment of formality hard to obtain. Moreover, if we put in parallel Peter of Spain's doctrine with a more rigorous version of the theory of supposition, which can be found in later developments, the lack of rigor for the first will be shown. In what follows we will want to illustrate in two tables how the degree of formality can be observed in the way the supposition theory can be applied in the analysis of the classical A, E, I, O types of propositions.

In the following table we will offer a schematic rendering of the supposition of the extremes in the categorical propositions according to Peter of Spain. The table is made only according to those passages which offer explicit hints regarding the type of supposition one should ascribed to the subject and predicate terms of the categorical propositions. A question mark will be put where further considerations are needed.

Peter of Spain

Cat. Prop.	A proposition Universal affirmative	E proposition Universal negative	I proposition Particular affirmative	O proposition Particular negative
Structure	Every S are P Omnis S est P	No S is P Nullus S est P	Some S are P Aliquis S est P	Some S are not P Aliquis S non est P

Supposition of the extreme S/P	Confused and distributive supposition (VI.9)	Simple supposition (VI.6)	Confused and distributive supposition (XII.15)	Confused and distributive supposition (XII.15)	Determinate suppositio n (VI.8)	Simple supposition (?)	Determinate suppositio n (VI.8)	(?)
Ad literam examples	Omnis homo est animal	Omnis homo est animal	*Nullus homo est asinus*	*Nullus homo est asinus*	*Homo currit/ Aliquis homo currit*			
Ad literam descending under the supposing term	'ergo Sortes' vel 'ergo Plato'	X	*ergo Sortes non est asinus, neque Plato*	*ergo nullus homo est Brunellus neque Fanellus'*, et sic de aliis	*iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro Sorte vel pro Platone et sic de aliis* (VI.3)			

3. Table of the suppositions of the extremes in the simple categorical propositions according to Peter of Spain

In the case of William of Ockham, the situation looks as follows[848]:

[848] Here we will use and English rendering. A similar paring for the extremes of the categorical propositions with the personal modes of supposition can be found with lesser details in SWINIARSKI, "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of some Contemporary Criticisms" in *Franciscan Studies*, Volume 30, (1970), p. 203.

Cat. proposition	A proposition Universal affirmative		E proposition Universal negative		I proposition Particular affirmative		O proposition Particular negative	
Structure	Every S are P		No S is P		Some S are P		Some S are not P	
Supposition of the extreme S/P	Confuse and distributive movable (74.1)	Merely confused (73.1)	Confuse and distributive movable (74.1)	Confuse and distributive (74.2)	Determinate (71.1)	Determinate (71.1)	Determinate (74.3)	Confuse and distributive (74.3; 71)
Descent to	(conj.) (70.8) This S is P and That S is P and…	(disj. extrem)(70.7) Every S is this P or that P or…	This S is not P and That S is not P and…	No S is this P and No S is that P and…	(disj.) (70.4) This S is P or that S is P or…	(disj.) (70.5) Some S is this P or Some S is that P or…	(71) This S is not P or this S is not P or…	Some S is not this P and Some S is not that P and…
Ascent from	No ascent	Every S is this P, pointing out to any P	No ascent	No ascent	This S is P, pointing out to any S	Some S is this P, pointing out to any P	This S is not P, pointing out to any S	No ascent

4. Table of the suppositions of the extremes in the simple categorical propositions according to William of Ockham

If we were able to highlight the main points of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, we can make some observations. First, Peter of Spain does not offer an explicit account for the predicates of I and O propositional forms and we were not able to find examples of supposition for those elementary categorical forms. Secondly, he does not offer pertinent and rigorous

examples or explanations for how the descending inferences actually work. In the case of the E propositional form, it seems that Peter would suggest for personal, confused, distributive and movable supposition a descending to a conjunction of propositions where, in each proposition, the distributive sign is removed and the suppositing term is replaced by one of its inferiors. But this mode of exemplifying the confused and distributive supposition is not uniformly applied. This means either that Peter of Spain considered such information as common knowledge that can be abridged (for example, '*Omnis homo est animal, ergo Sortes*'), or that his doctrine presents some inconsistences. In the case of the determinate supposition of the subject of the I-form proposition, Peter seems to have in mind a descending under the suppositing them through a disjunction of propositions where, in each particular proposition the suppositing term is replace by one of its inferiors. But again, Peter is not explicit enough. The descending is not exemplified through an inference like in some of the cases of confused and distributive supposition, but by simply stating that the term '*homo*' can stand for Socrates or Plato or any other individual. Thirdly, no real and extensive use of the ascending inferences can be found.

Moreover, if we take into account Ockham's formulation, we can see that: (1.) Peter is not using only personal modes in the elementary categorical propositions like Ockham; (2.) Peter does not ground the definition and explanation of the personal modes in the ascending and descending inferences like Ockham; (3.) from Peter's account we cannot properly form an explanation of the types of supposition that the extreme of the A, E, I, O propositions have, like in Ockham case; (4.) Peter of Spain's account is less formal than Ockham's, since the first does not address all cases and does not have a unitary account in his examples, while the second explains the supposition of each extreme in function of the ascending inferences and descending under conjunctive or disjunctive propositions and under the disjunction of terms.

As a partial conclusion, it can be stated that, Peter of Spain's theory of supposition does not offer a full account of the classical categorical propositions of A, E, I, O forms and that, in the way it explains the supposition of their extremes is less formal than William Ockham's version.

Conclusion

The second subpart of the current section, that is, 2.2. *Formality in the medieval supposition theories*, has tried to analyze the generic formality of the theoretical object in

question. The formality of supposition theory was addressed before being engaged in the action of interpretation or formalization made be the current scholarship. In the first part, we showed that, regarding medieval logic in general, two theses can be formulated. On the one hand, ThMl1, according to which medieval logic is as formal as the contemporary logic. On the other, ThMl2, which states that medieval logic is fundamental different from contemporary logic and theories of language since it lacks formality. We have showed that these two positions can be interpreted as extremes, and that a more accurate description of medieval logic can come from an intermediary position, tracked in the works of Cesalli, Parsons and others. Accordingly, the medieval logic does not use a simple natural Latin language, but a highly conceptualized and regimented version of it. This employment is made with the specific purpose of building tools for the analysis of logico-linguistic situations. Thus, we can speak in the same time about a formal and a material aspect of medieval logic.

In the second part, we tried to assess the formal character present in the theory of supposition at a generic level. First, we showed that, a distinction between a semantic and syntactical level can be made on the basis of Peter's difference between categorematic and syncategorematic elements of a proposition. By identifying syncategorematic elements that do not bear proper sematic content and types of terms in a logico-grammatical account, the medieval logicians configurate a logical form or structure of a proposition. Second, we tried to see if an argument for the formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory can be made from the way the modes of supposition are defined. There, the conclusion was that the modes of supposition are defined through a combination of semantical and syntactical conditions. Even in the case of determinate and confused mobile supposition, where the definitions are offered in accordance to the syntactical elements, that is, types of signs and descending inferences, the semantical conditions are there by inheritance from the superior modes of supposition that were divided.

The lack of a strict formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory was once more showed in comparison with Ockham's doctrine. It was pointed out that Peter does not have a full account of the categorical propositions in his theory of supposition. A non-personal mode was used for the predicate of A-form proposition which is defined semantically. Where the extremes of categorical propositions were accounted in terms of inferences, the examples and explanations were incomplete and lacking formality. In contrast, Ockham's account is more

formal, since all the extremes of the categorical types of propositions were explained by personal suppositions and by means of schematic inferences that resulted in disjunctive or conjunctive propositions or propositions with a disjunctive extreme.

At this point, it seems clear that Peter of Spain's theory of supposition has a low degree of formality, event in parallel with other terminist theoretical constructs. In what follows we will search for the different ways in which medieval theory of supposition was interpreted and thus formalized according to the contemporary conceptual framework of understanding.

2.3. Contemporary interpretations of supposition theories

At the beginning of the second part of our work, we have seen how starting with the middle of 20th century a close parallelism between terminist logic and modern logic or theories of language has started to emerge at some authors like Father Philotheus Boehner. Meanwhile, more reserved historical considerations regarding this parallelism were offered by authors like I. M. Bochénski and A. Moody. These two types of commitments to medieval logic, or more specific terminist logic, are exemplified by modern and contemporary scholars in the actual interpretation of supposition theories. In fact, regarding the way in which the modern scholarship has studied the theory of supposition, Catarina Dutilh Novaes in *Formalizing Medieval Logical theories*, identifies two lines of thinking, one historical, one systematical:

> "The historical line is primarily concerned with the establishment of reliable editions of the original Latin texts, with the identification of historical threads of influence among the different authors, and so forth. The systematic line is often undertaken by philosophers of logic, frequently with no formal training in medieval logic, who for one reason or another estimate that some of the theories and ideas developed by medieval logicians can be fruitfully applied to current problems of philosophy of logic and language. In order to do so, they take up the task of 'reconstructing' medieval logical systems so that the latter acquire the form to which philosophers and logicians of the 20th and 21st centuries are accustomed"[849].

While is quite arguable if the driving force of the systematic approach is the usefulness of the medieval logical theory in relation to the "current problems of philosophy of logic and language", and not the other way around, Dutilh's observations are important and well established since they describe two different methodologies. On the one hand, we have the historical-contextual approach devoted to the establishing and rendering in contemporary languages the medieval texts and their corresponding doctrine. In doing so this approach studies the source of those doctrines, their transmission and their social and cultural context. In a certain sense, the scholars which engage in this methodology have the advantage of being closer to their object of interpretation, and thus rendering it in a more adequate manner; but in the same time, they often have the disadvantage of being ignorant of or distant from contemporary theories which potentially can render its object of study in a more challenging manner, within a dialogue between past and present models of understanding[850]. On the other hand, we have the

[849] Dutilh (2007a), p. 8
[850] For a similar view see also Dutilh (2007a), p. 9.

systematical or critical approach which is devoted to studying and assessing medieval logic theories with the conceptual tools of modern and contemporary logic and theories of language. As Dutilh states, their act of interpretation is in fact a "reconstruction" or formalization[851] of the object they study, according to contemporary standards. The scholars which engage in this methodology have the advantage of putting the medieval logical theories in a new light, but are confronted with the disadvantage of being very distant from their object of interpretation, such that they could be accused of misinterpretation due to an anachronistic rendering[852]. In fact, the systematic line of thought can be understood in a new way by addressing the problem of formality. The justification of systematic approach comes usually from identifying common features or resemblances between contemporary theories and medieval ones, such that the latter could be considered proto-versions of the former, but without a rigorous historical argument. Understood as such, the interpretation of medieval supposition theories through the modern or contemporary logical apparatus seems to be justified. Thus, as suggested elsewhere[853], it seems that the systematic approach is either a byproduct of endorsing the ThMl1 thesis, the one according to which medieval logic is similar to contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of their formality, or a byproduct of the lack of problematizing the degree of formality of the two types of logic. In either way, there needs to be an assessment of the degree of formality for both types of theories, such that the contemporary interpretations could not be accused of changing the object that they study through the act of formalization.

In what we understand by 'the systematic approach', the theory of supposition has been interpreted in different ways. In our view, all these interpretations presuppose an equivalation between the supposition theory and a modern or contemporary theory, that is, theory of language or logic developed in the Fregean or Post-Fregean era. Thus, in the modern exegesis considerations, we can find identifications of the theory of supposition with:

a. A theory of reference: a theory originated in the difference between *Sinn* (meaning or sense) and *Bedeutung* (reference) that, among other functions, describes the

[851] See also DUTILH (2007a), p. 8-9.
[852] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 9
[853] See ILE (2018), p. 13.

relation between a name and its referent, which often is a determinate and specific extramental and extralinguistic object[854].

b. A theory of quantification: a theory that offers a semantic for quantifiers or a theory that tells us how the quantified expressions should be interpreted.
c. A computational hermeneutical theory or a theory of propositional meaning: a theory of interpretation or of semantic analysis which has as a purpose to determine "what can be asserted by a given proposition" in an algorithmic manner[855]. In other words, a theory which tells us on the basis of rules applied mechanically under what conditions a certain proposition can be considered to be true.
d. A theory of inference: a system of rules which describes how valid inferences are made
e. A theory of conceptual notation, part of the medieval art of memory: a theory of substitution comprised as a place-system which basically tells us how a type of word can be replaced with other words on the basis of different schemata[856].

It must be noted that these kind of conceptual equivalations are made critically, which means that the scholars that embrace one particular sort of interpretation offer quite often arguments for rejecting the other options. In fact, proceeding in this manner, starting around 1960 they have articulated a vivid discussion which tried to critically evaluate and interpret the medieval supposition theory. Moreover, a common feature of this critical or systematic tradition is that the object of its analysis was not primarily the theory of supposition as articulated by Peter of Spain, but more formal instances of it. The theory of supposition articulated by Buridan, and especially by Ockham, offered a more promising theoretical ground for modern reconstructions, since they are more rigorous articulated. Accordingly, what can be done for our purpose, that of evaluating Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, is to show in what way such conceptual equivalations are made. Ultimately, in the last section of our work, we will want to see how those interpretations could be applied to Peter of Spain's considerations. In the following subsections we will only try to exemplify each individual type of the aforementioned contemporary interpretations. But before doing that, a word of caution must be offered.

[854] See for example FREGE, "Sense and Reference" in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 57, Issue 3 (1948), p. 212-214.
[855] DUTILH (2007a), p. 30.
[856] See PERREIAH, "Supposition theory: A new approach" in *The New Scholasticism*, Vol. LX, No. 1 (1986).

Although we can find different authors that defended a thesis according to which supposition is to be understood as a theory of: reference, quantification, meaning, inference or conceptual notation, in fact, some of these theories can be considered interconnected. For instance, a theory of refence, inference or meaning may include both a semantic of quantifiers and a conceptual notation. What qualifies a certain interpretation to be considered of a specific kind depends on its focal points and on its author explicit or implicit endorsement.

2.3.1. The theory of supposition as a theory of reference

One of the most widespread opinion regarding supposition theory, which has circulated since the revival of medieval logic at the middle of 20th century, was that this theory is a kind of reference theory. This sort of consideration was made either implicitly, as a given and obvious fact[857], or explicitly, by arguing in what specific sense supposition is the same thing as reference. One of the first authors who offered an explicit treatment for the equivalence between the theory of supposition and the theory of reference was Peter Geach[858]. In *Reference and generality* Geach clearly states that the supposition theories are "medieval theories of reference" applied on isolated common terms or referring phrases accompanied by applicatives, which are the equivalent for the medieval universal or particular signs. According to him, these theories describe the modes of reference a noun can have in function of their applicatives and sometimes in function of the total sense of the proposition[859]. Although, as far as we understand, he is not so sharp in offering a clear definition of what reference is, he insists in separating the theory of reference from an account regarding the truth value or truth condition of a proposition, tracing this independence in the writings of Buridan[860]. The sort of reference Geach has in mind for the theory of supposition is constantly described in a degree of parallelism with Bertrand Russell's theory of denotation. What Geach basically states, is that both Russell's theory of denotation

[857] See for example SPADE, "Ockham's "Rule of Supposition": Two Conflicts in His Theory" in *Vivarium*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1974), p. 63.
[858] The one who identifies the origins of interpreting the theory of supposition as a theory of reference in the works of Peter Thomas Geach was Catarina Dutilh Novaes: see DUTILH (2007a), p. 10. Unfortunately, she limited the whole systematic approach to the reference interpretation.
[859] See GEACH (1980), p. 81, 84.
[860] GEACH (1980), p. 10: "A theory of reference is the principle that the reference of an expression E must be specifiable in some way that does not involve first determining whether the proposition in which E occurs is true. The first explicit statement of this principle that I have found is in Buridan's *Sophismata* (c. vi, *sophisma* v); the principle might suitably be called Buridan's Law".

and the medieval theory of supposition function referentially in the following way: in a referring phrase formed by an applicative and a general name, the general name refers impartially and indirectly to each object called by that general name, and the way this reference is made is determined by the type of applicative[861].

In the case of Russell's theory of reference, or more exactly theory of denotation[862], what a denoting phrase like 'some man' or 'every man'[863] denotes, which can be understood as an applicative with a common term, is not directly individual men. In Geach's view this is a shortcoming. For such denotating phrases Russell envisioned as a referent or denotatum combinations[864]. In Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, these combinations are explained as combinations of terms, conjunctions or disjunctions lists, which pertain to a class-concept: *All a*'s denotes a numerical conjunction of a_1 and a_2 and … a_n; *Every a* denotes a propositional conjunction, that is, denotes *all a*'s separately, since denotes a_1 and denotes a_2 and ... and denotes a_n; *Any a* denotes a variable conjunction or a disjunction of the form a_1 or a_2 or ... or a_n , where only one *a* is taken but is irrelevant which one; *An a* denotes a variable disjunction of the form a_1 or a_2 or ... or a_n where no particular *a* must be taken; *Some a* denotes a constant disjunction of the form a_1 or denotes a_2 or ... or denotes a_n where a particular *a* must be taken[865]. Geach identifies these modes of denotation established according to Russell's theory with types of medieval suppositions. The confused and distributive supposition has according to him the mode of reference of "any A"; the determine supposition has the mode of referring of "some A", while merely confused supposition has the mode of referring of "an A".[866] With only minor differences, Geach argues that both Russell and the medieval logicians advocated for the same

[861] See GEACH (1980), p. 79. For the fact that the relation between words and object is indirect both for the medieval authors and Russell see p. 81.
[862] For Russell as can be seen in *On denoting* and other works, reference is understand as denotation. Thus, a denoting phrase is the same think as a referring phrase.
[863] RUSSELL, "On Denoting" in *Mind, New Series*, vol. 14, No. 56 (1905), p. 479: "by a 'denoting phrase' I mean phrase such as any of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, the present king of England, the present king of France". In Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* published in 1903: "A denoting phrase, we may now say, consists always of a class-concept preceded by one of the above six words [*all*, *every*, *any*, *a*, *some* and *the*] or some synonym of one of them" RUSSELL, *Principles of Mathematics*, (2010), p. 57.
[864] See GEACH (1980), p. 82.
[865] See RUSSELL (2010), p. 59-60; see DAO, "Russell's First Theory of Denoting and Quantification" in *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1986), p. 138.
[866] See GEACH (1980), p. 81, 91, 92. Geach states that the medieval supposition theory does not establish a clear difference between the 'any' and 'every' applicative.

referential function of referring phrases which ultimately entails the following truth conditions[867]:

"f(an A)" is true iff "f(a1 or a2 or a3 …)" is true (eq. with merely confused supposition)

"f(some A)" is true iff "f(a1) or f(a2) or f(a3) or …" is true (eq. with determinate supposition)

"f(any A)" is true iff "f(a1) and f(a2) and f(a3) and …" is true (eq. with confused and distributive supposition)

"f(every A)" is true iff "f(a1 and a2 and a3 and …)" is true[868]

As the title of his fourth chapter suggests, *The shipwreck of a theory*, Geach has indeed a very negative assessment of the theory of supposition. He considers supposition to be a bad or faulty theory of reference full of ambiguities and problems. These problems are identified in particular cases of propositional constructs where the difference between the four mentioned modes of reference cannot be made so clearly as Geach would say that Russell and the medievals would want. One of the most direct attack of the medieval doctrine of supposition is made from what he calls 'the order of procedures', which looks as something partially similar with what will be later called 'priority of analysis'. Geach seems to understand a propositional context as made of a two-place predicable of the form 'f(— , …)'. Each empty space will be replaced by two referring phrases, identical or not, '*A' and '†B', by starting either with the first or second position as follows: (1.) 'f(*A, …)' or (2.) 'f(— , †B)', in order to finally arrive at 'f(*A, †B)'. The fact is that the procedure in which the filling up of empty spaces takes place matters, since according to Geach, it ends up offering different propositional results[869]. An example is given in the proposition "Some girl is loved by every boy". There is a difference between "saying of some girl that she is loved by every boy", thus 'f(some girl, …)', and "saying of every boy that some girl is loved by him", thus 'f(— , every boy)'[870]. Geach states that the medieval supposition theory is unable to render such differences, although William of Sherwood seemed to offer some hints in such direction but without establishing a general rule[871]. In fact, according

[867] Here 'A' is a general term for a complete list of proper names: 'a1, a2, a3…' which are names for or of A; 'f()' represent a propositional context.
[868] GEACH (1980), p. 97.
[869] See the voting example GEACH (1980), p. 127-128.
[870] See GEACH (1980), p. 130.
[871] See GEACH (1980), p. 131.

to Geach's position, once we have established a difference of punctuation or a rule which establishes the scope of the applicatives or quantifiers in question, then, the difference between the confused and determined supposition is superfluous and the theory of supposition or the theory of the different modes of reference can be discarded[872].

But besides Geach's specific interpretation, supposition theory was considered in general a theory of reference for at least two reasons: either for the fact that the theory of supposition tells us for what kind of thing a term stands for in the propositional context[873] or for the fact that, similar to Geach's account, the theory of the supposition modes tells us how a common term in a proposition refer to the individual entities that fall under it[874].

Generally speaking, the entire endeavor of interpreting supposition theory as a theory of reference is problematic. First of all, we have a multiplicity of theories of supposition with various degrees of maturity and formality. To refers to 13th and 14th century logicians as providing a unitary theory of supposition without their specificity is at least problematic. To take only the modes of personal supposition as representatives for the whole supposition theory in order to fit a specific interpretation is entirely misleading, since it reduces the whole object of interpretation to a particular part. Besides the multiplicity of the supposition theory, there is another multiplicity to be taken into account, that of the reference theories. Reference can be considered under different models (descriptive, historical-causal, character, intentional, hybrid[875]). If we are to identify the theory of supposition with a theory of reference, we are indebted to specify which one is our candidate and why the other options should be rejected. In front of those options, Geach seems to be rather a reference skeptic.

Besides these general observations, more or less contemporary authors offered specific arguments against Geach's reference thesis. Although certain similarities can be correctly established between the two theories in question, there are a series of difference which must be

[872] See GEACH (1980), p. 131-132; see also Geach, "Distribution and Suppositio" in *Mind, New Series*, Vol. 85, No. 339 (1976), p. 432-435.
[873] See for example SPADE, "The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent" in KRETZMANN (ed.), *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in memory of Jan Pinborg* (1988), p. 190 and Scott, "Geach on Supposition Theory" in *Mind, New Series*, Vol. 75, No. 300 (1966), p. 586 apud MATTHEWS, "Two Theories of Supposition?" in *Topoi*, 16 (1997), p. 35.
[874] See MATTHEWS (1997), p. 40.
[875] For a short introduction into the different theories of reference see MICHAELSON, REIMER, "Reference" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/>.

noted. In fact, Catarina Dutilh Novaes constructed her thesis by starting with the refutation of the reference interpretation. According to her, the supposition theories do not explain the mechanics of reference, that is, the relation between signs and objects, since this aspect is studied within the medieval theories of signification[876]; moreover, supposition theories are not able to determine the referent and guarantee its uniqueness but capitalize on semantical ambiguity[877]. It is especially this inability of supposition theory of determining a unique referent that enters in direct contrast with what a reference theory should do. As Dutilh states again, "theories of supposition will determine the ontological kind(s) of the possible supposita of a term in a given proposition"[878] and not the exact referent of a term or expression.

Another notable intervention against Geach's interpretation can be seen at no less than four years after the appearance of *Reference and generality.* In his short two-page article, T. K. Scott Jr. offers some reasons to consider Geach's reference thesis as a misinterpretation of the supposition theory. First of all, since personal supposition is established as a relation between a term and its inferiors, it has nothing to do with a theory of reference that describes, according to Geach, a relation between a term and its denotated individuals[879]. Secondly, the type of supposition does not depend only on the type of the applicative applied to a term. What Geach calls a 'referring phrase', has according to the theory of supposition, different interpretations according to the propositional context[880]. If we are to offer and example, in the case of Ockham, a common term put as predicate with no sign, which amounts to a common term with a particular sign (some), has merely confused supposition in a universal affirmative proposition, confused and distributive supposition in a universal or particular negative proposition and determinate supposition in a particular affirmative proposition. Thirdly, Scott states that the quantifiers used by Ockham do not have an effect only on the term which follows it, such that a theory of referring phrases can be made, but that the medieval quantifiers affect the whole proposition in which they are put[881].

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[876] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 19.
[877] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 20-19.
[878] DUTILH, "Ockham's Supposition Theory as Formal Semantics" in Kann, Loewe, Rode, Uckelman (eds.), *Modern views of medieval logic* (2018), p. 96.
[879] See SCOTT (1966), p. 586.
[880] See SCOTT (1966), p. 587.
[881] See SCOTT (1966), p. 588; see also on the same topic SAGAL, "On refuting and Defending Supposition Theory" in *The New Scholasticism*, Vol. XLVII (1973), p. 84-87.

In conclusion, although similarities can be found between the supposition theory and the theory of reference, the parallelism between those two theoretical constructs are not so straightforward as Geach would want. The arguments put forward by Catarina Dutilh Novaes and T. K. Scott Jr. show us that Geach applies an inaccurate interpretation of the suppositing terms through his referring phrases, such that the real function of supposition theory, its difference from signification and the role of syncategorematic signs are missed out. In fact, Geach applied his understanding on Russell's denotation theory, a theoretical construct with its own degree of formality, to a portion of the theory of supposition in order to make it a bad theory of reference. In our, view this endeavor is problematic, since it transforms the theory of supposition in something it was never meant to be.

2.3.2. The theory of supposition as a theory of quantification

The interpretation of the theory of supposition as a theory of quantification is traced by the scholarship, like the reference interpretation, right at the very beginning of the revival of interest in medieval logic that happened in the middle of 20th century. This time the person that may be considered responsible for this tradition is Philotheus Boehner.

At this point of our work, we have seen how the personal modes of supposition, especially the 14th century versions, are defined in function of descending and ascending inferences. In the case of Ockham, this means that: determined supposition takes place when from the suppositing term we can descend to singulars by a disjunction of propositions in which the suppositing term is replaced with its inferiors and from any singular proposition we can ascend to the original proposition; confused and distributive supposition takes place when from the suppositing term we can descend to a conjunction of propositions where the suppositing term is replaced by one of its inferiors and from no single proposition we can ascend back to the original one; merely confused supposition takes place when from the suppositing term we can descend to a proposition where the predicate is a disjunction of the inferiors contained by the suppositing term, and from any such singular term we can ascend back to the original proposition[882].

[882] For the three definitions see OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 70, p. 200-202.

The fact that personal types of supposition are explained by a process of correctly inferring from a proposition which contains a common term with a particular or universal sign a proposition or concatenation of propositions where the common term and its corresponding sign are replace with their logical interpretation, makes Boehner to think that supposition is a theory of quantification. In his own words "the theory of personal supposition admits of a direct comparison with the Quantification theory since it studies the relation of a common term to its individuals or subjects"[883]. This means that the supposition theory will offer a method of explaining and interpreting quantified terms by means of logical relations between non-quantified ones. Although, Boehner hints in many places of his works for such an approach to supposition theory[884], his 1958 article *A Medieval Theory of Supposition* seems to show more clearly what he meant. Here, in the second subsection, he is offering a contextual definition of quantifiers according to the medieval doctrine of supposition. In his own symbolized rendering[885] the definitions run as follows:

Def. I (üS c P) = $[(S_1 \text{ c } P) \cdot (S_2 \text{ c } P) \ldots \cdot (S_n \text{ c } P)]$

Def. Ia (S c üP) = $[(S \text{ c } P_1) \cdot (S \text{ c } P_2) \ldots \cdot (S \text{ c } P_n)]$

Def. II (aS c P) = $[(S_1 \text{ c } P) \vee (S_2 \text{ c } P) \ldots \vee (S_n \text{ c } P)]$

Def. IIa (S c aP) = $[(S \text{ c } P_1) \vee (S \text{ c } P_2) \ldots \vee (S \text{ c } P_n)]$

Def. III (iS c P) = $[(S_1 \cdot S_2 \cdot \ldots \cdot S_n) \text{ c } P]$

Def. IIIa (S c iP) = $[S \text{ c } (P_1 \cdot P_2 \cdot \ldots \cdot P_n)]$

Def. IV (öS c P) = $[(S_1 \vee S_2 \vee \ldots \vee S_n) \text{ c } P]$

Def. IVa (S c öP) = $[S \text{ c } (P_1 \vee P_2 \vee \ldots \vee P_n)]$[886]

According to Boehner, Def. I and Def. Ia corresponds to confused distributive supposition, Def. II and Def. IIa to determinate supposition, Def. III and Def. IIIa, to collective supposition, which does not interest us for the moment, and Def. IV and Def. IVa corresponds to merely confused

[883] BOEHNER (1952), p. 35.
[884] See for example BOEHNER (1952), p. 28: "On this point, the theory of supposition is, to a very large extent, one with the modern theory of quantification.", BOEHNER (1946), p. 266: "Let us simply affirm here they [i.e. the modes of personal supposition] contain the elements of a scholastic quantification theory".
[885] Here 'S c P' stand for a categorical proposition where 'S' is the subject, 'P' the predicate and 'c' the copula. 'ü' is taken for the universal quantifier, 'a' for the particular quantifier, 'i' for the collective quantifier and 'ö' for the disjunctive quantifier.
[886] BOEHNER, "A Medieval Theory of Supposition" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3/4 (1958), p. 279. These eight definitions will be applied to fully analyze the A, E, I, O categorical propositions. See PERREIAH (1971), p. 384.

supposition[887]. This formalization offered by Boehner is not entirely different from Geach's consideration, with the exception of a higher fidelity to the context dependence of supposition. But if we take Boehner's endeavor by its own standards, we will face some difficulties. Boehner states that personal supposition theories offer definitions of quantifiers. This means that the *definiens* and *definitum*, that is, the proposition which contains a personal supposition and the proposition or concatenation of propositions obtained by a descending inference according to the rules of supposition, should be equivalent and interchangeable. But this fact, as many scholars have showed, is simply false and brings a series of problems.

Before entering in the particular debate that Boehner's interpretation has generated, we can make the following doctrinal observations which renders false the equivalence between the proposition with a personal supposition and its corresponding product obtain by descending under the suppositing term[888]. For such and equivalence, for every descending inference we will need a corresponding ascending inference. In the case of confused and distributive supposition such ascending inference is forbidden, since is "impossible to infer the original proposition from any of the elements in the conjunction"[889]. Thus, Def. I and Def. Ia will go against Ockham's doctrine. Moreover, in the case of merely confused and determinate supposition, cases in which the needed ascending to the original proposition is possible, the ascending takes place from a proposition containing only one of the inferiors of the suppositing term, and not from the entire interpretation of the original proposition.

In the aforementioned considerations we are only scratching the surface of the problems involved with the quantification interpretation. The scholarship has not remained indifferent to the quantification thesis. One critic is Gareth B. Matthews, who attacks some of the parallels made by Boehner in *Medieval logic. An outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400*, between Ockham's interpretation of propositions from his supposition theory and modern logic. Matthews' arguments go against Boehner's statement according to which, the particular affirmative proposition is interpreted in medieval logic in the same way as in modern logic[890].

[887] BOEHNER (1958), p. 279.
[888] Such an argument against the equivalence between a categorical proposition and its interpretation according to supposition rules can be found in MATTHEWS, "Suppositio and Quantification in Ockham" in *Noûs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1973), p. 13-24. The equivalence is a requirement for a quantification interpretation of supposition.
[889] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 70, p. 201.
[890] See MATTHEWS (1964), p. 92-93.

The interpretations are different since Boehner's modern rendering, that is, (∃x) (Fx·Gx) to $Fx_1 \cdot Gx_1 \vee Fx_2 \cdot Gx_2 \vee \ldots$, cannot account for both the descending under the subject term and under the predicate term as a full analysis of the proposition requires[891]. This argument is doubled by the fact that medieval logic presupposes a quantification of terms, both the subject and the predicate one, while the modern rendering offered by Boehner presupposes a quantification over variables[892]. This will mean that the descending inferences in medieval logic happen towards the inferiors of the suppositing term, limiting the number of individuals, while in modern logic a descending inference that will eliminate the quantified variable will happen towards all the individuals within the universe of discourse[893].

Boehner's and Geach's interpretation did not only generate arguments against a quantification approach but had also the effect of reassessing the integrity of Ockham's supposition theory. One point that is worth mentioning is that highlighted by John J. Swiniarski in his 1970 article. Swiniarski gives credit to Geach when he considers merely supposition to be an unnecessary development of personal supposition, especially when a priority rule is considered[894]. Such priority rule will state that in the process of analyzing a proposition by descending to its suppositing term, the first descending must take place under the subject term. But we may ask why such a priority rule must be taken into account in the first place? The answer is offered by the way the particular negative categorical proposition behaves under analysis. According to Ockham, the subject term of an O-form categorical proposition has determinate supposition while the predicate term has confused and distributive supposition. Swiniarski shows that descending according to Ockham's rules under the subject term conserves the truth value of the proposition while descending under the predicate term does not. The examples where Socrates and Plato are the only men which exist run as follows[895]:

a. Descending under the subject term

   Some man is not a man (proposition false)

[891] See MATTHEWS (1964), p. 94.
[892] See MATTHEWS (1964), p. 95.
[893]See MATTHEWS (1964), p. 95-96. A formalization of Ockham's supposition theory comprised as a theory of quantification which addresses some of these problems can be seen in PRICE, "William of Ockham and Suppositio Personalis" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 30 (1970). A further argumentation against the quantification thesis can be found in Matthews (1973), p. 13-24.
[894] See SWINIARSKI (1970), p. 209.
[895] See SWINIARSKI (1970), p. 211.

(Socrates is not a man) or (Plato is not a man) (according to the rules of determinate supposition)

[(Socrates is not Socrates) and (Socrates is not Plato)] or [(Plato is not Socrates) and (Plato is not Plato)] (according to the rules of confused and distributive supposition) (proposition false)

b. Descending under the predicate term

Some man is not a man (proposition false)

(Some man is not Socrates) and (Some man is not Plato) (according to the rules of confused and distributive supposition)

[(Socrates is not Socrates) or (Socrates is not Plato)] and [(Socrates is not Plato) or (Plato is not Socrates)] (according to the rules of determinate supposition) (proposition true)

Thus, to avoid obtaining a true proposition from a false one by descending copulatively under the predicate term in a O-form proposition, a rule of priority of analysis is needed. But, first of all, surely Ockham did not have in mind such a rule and establishing one goes against the object of interpretation. Secondly, such a rule will have side effects. Swiniarski shows that accepting such a rule, will make Geach's observation regarding the futility of merely confused supposition correct[896]. The argument is the following: if a priority rule of the subject term is established, then in a universal affirmative proposition first we must descend under the subject term according to the rules of confused and distributive supposition; only after this we can descend under the predicate terms of the conjunction, not according to merely confused supposition but according to determinate supposition, since the subject term with its universal sign was already replaced by an inferior[897].

While no proper priority rule can be found in the Ockham's text, it seems that a rule of analysis according to the types of supposition has appeared a few centuries later. E. J. Ashworth shows that in 16th century such a rule was already at use and that, according to the way it was formulated, made merely confused supposition to still be a useful concept, in contrast to the priority rule discussed by Geach and Swiniarski. Thus, this rule, which is tracked back to Domingo de Soto's *Introductiones dialectice*, states that one must descend first under the term

[896] See SWINIARSKI (1970), p. 209, 213. We cannot hold back from quoting Swiniarski's comic conclusion: "In conclusion we might say that Geach was successful in shaving Ockham with his own razor".
[897] See SWINIARSKI (1970), p. 209-210.

with determinate supposition, then under the one with distributive supposition and only after that under the term with merely confused supposition[898].

A further step in the discussion of the proper interpretation of supposition theory has been made by Paul Vincent Spade. In his 1976 article he reviews Swiniarski's and Matthews' positions and tries to come with his own solution to the problem raised by the quantification interpretation of Ockham supposition theory. On the one hand, he states that although Ockham does not admit an equivalence between the categorical propositions and those obtain by descending under the subject and predicative terms, such an equivalence must be granted if we want supposition to be used in an account of the truth conditions[899]. On the other hand, Spade rejects the solution offered by the priority rule suggested by Swiniarski. The reason for the latter is that there are other propositional contexts in which merely confused supposed can be used in analysis and thus we cannot renounce at this personal mode[900]. Accordingly, to avoid the problem of the analysis of the O-form proposition by descending under the predicate, he must find a different solution. His solution comes from the following argument: since the A-form categorical proposition has a predicate in merely confused supposition, and by negating an A-form proposition we obtain an O-from proposition and if we additionally accept that the negation does not affect the merely confused supposition of the predicate, this means that the predicate of a O-form proposition will have merely confused supposition and not confused and distributive supposition[901]. As Spade itself recognizes, this is a compromise solution: "while this certainly violates Ockham's explicit doctrine, it inevitably follows from the equivalence-view I have said was probably his intention"[902]. But, if we take a closer look to the doctrinal content, the fact of admitting a merely confused supposition for the O-form predicate, goes directly against Ockham's rule:

[898] See ASHWORTH, "Priority of Analysis and Merely Confused Supposition" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 33 (1973), p. 39. See also the discussion in ASHWORTH, "Descent and Ascent from Ockham to Domingo de Soto: An Answer to Paul Spade" in *Vivarium*, Vol. 51 (2013), p. 385-410.
[899] SPADE, "Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of "O"-form Sentences" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 36 (1976), p. 265.
[900] SPADE (1976), p. 265. Spade's example is 'I promise you a horse'. Even Spade recognizes that is debatable if we can speak about a supposition in this propositional context. He argues that 'horse' can be analyzed with merely confused supposition.
[901] See SPADE (1976), p. 269.
[902] SPADE (1976), p. 270.

> "First, where a common term mediately follows an affirmative sign of universality, it has merely confused supposition. That is, in an affirmative universal proposition the predicate has merely confused supposition. Thus, the predicates in 'Every man is an animal' and 'Every man is white' have merely confused supposition. But where a sign of universality is placed on the subject-side but where the proposition is not a universal affirmative proposition or where the sign of universality does not distribute the whole subject, the predicate does not have merely confused supposition"[903]

It is clear that Spade's interpretation goes way beyond Ockham's doctrinal and textual limits, in order to make his supposition theory more relevant to modern or contemporary logic. Moreover, another step in the debate of the relation between supposition and its modern interpretation is made by Graham Priest and Stephen Read. In their 1977 paper they show that Ockham's supposition theory can be formalized in modern logic. The formalization is put to use in order to argue that: Ockham was wrong in his approach of O-form predicate, he does not offer too many or few modes of supposition, and that his theory is capable of dealing with multiple quantification[904]. Without entering into details, we can note that they obtained in fact the same result regarding the O-form predicate as Spade did a year earlier, that is, the predicate of the O-form has merely confused supposition and not confused and distributive supposition[905].

A big part of the aforementioned scholars argue that inconsistences are to be found in Ockham's articulation of supposition theory, especially if a quantification interpretation will be applied. In contrast to them, John Corcoran in collaboration with John Swiniarski tried to defend Ockham's position in front of the error charges. In doing so, they showed the logical structure of Ockham's supposition theory and how it differs from the structure imposed on it by the modern interpretations. First of all, they understand the personal modes of supposition as being defined by four conditions: (*DD) descent to disjunction, (DC) descent to conjunction, (DDP) descent to disjunctive predicate and (A) ascent from an arbitrary singular*[906]. Secondly, according to these four conditions and Ockham's textual evidence, they reconstruct each personal mode, among which the most important are: determinate supposition (DD & A); merely confused supposition (~DD & A & DDP) and confused and distributive supposition (DC

[903] OCKHAM, *Summa log.*, (transl. Loux, 1974), 73, p. 211-212.
[904] See PRIEST, READ (1977), p. 109.
[905] See PRIEST, READ (1977), p. 112.
[906] See CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI, "Logical Structures of Ockham's Theory of Supposition" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 38 (1978), p. 164.

& ~ A)[907]. This formalization has the merit of trying to be as faithful as possible to Ockham's text and to actual offer only abbreviations of the conditions that we find in the already familiar definition of Ockham's personal modes. Moreover, by making the supposition condition explicit, Corcoran and Swiniarski show that the predicate of O-form supposition does not have neither determined nor merely confused supposition. The first, since the A condition does not take place in the case O-form predicate, although the DD condition of determinate supposition does[908]. The latter is obtained from the first, since in merely confused supposition too the ascending from an arbitrary singular must be possible and we have seen that in the case of the predicate of O-form proposition we cannot have such ascent[909]. Regarding the Priest-Read formalization from 1977, the Corcoran-Swiniarski paper states that it is in fact a misrepresentation of Ockham's doctrine since it did not take into account the A and ~A conditions of the personal modes and thus assumed am illegitimate double entailment or equivalence thesis[910]. Comprised under Corcoran-Swiniarski structure, Ockham's four conditions imply a "one-way entailment", three by descending and one by ascending, and not a mutual entailment or equivalation between the original proposition and the product of analyzing it according to types of supposition the terms have, as the quantification theory would want[911]. The only supposition where we can talk about such a double entailment or equivalation is determined supposition, in which, according to Corcoran-Swiniarski, the converse of DD (CDD), needed for the mutual entailment, is the same as the A condition[912]. Priest and Read had a reaction to Corcoran-Swiniarski's paper. In their 1980 article *Merely Confused Supposition: A Theoretical Advance or a Mere Confusion?* the project of relating supposition theory to its modern interpretation continued. Here they explicitly connected the theory of quantification with that of reference, since, in a wide sense, the study of reference is the study of the extension of the general terms. Thus, supposition seems to be a theory of reference in this last particular sense[913]. According to them, the specific function of supposition theory was to offer truth

[907] See CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 169-170; 173.
[908] CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 175: "'Some P is not Q' does entail 'Some P is not this Q or some P is not this Q or etc.' However, the ascent is not possible: 'Some man is not this animal' (e.g., Socrates) does not entail 'Some man is not an animal.'
[909] CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 175.
[910] See CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 181. Surely their critique of Priest-Read model goes further.
[911] For this conclusion see CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 181-182.
[912] See CORCORAN, SWINIARSKI (1978) p. 169, 182.
[913] See PRIEST, READ (1980), p. 266.

conditions in function of the extension of the terms which formed the proposition under analysis. Under this account, the equivalence thesis is again reinforced:

> "We have described supposition theory as essentially a theory of reference in terms of which an account of truth conditions could be given, and have claimed in particular that the descended form analysing a sentence (where one exists) is to be understood as giving the truth conditions of the original sentence in terms of sentences with discrete supposition. If this interpretation is correct then the descended form must be materially equivalent to the original sentence. That the descended forms are materially equivalent to the forms before descent is part of the folklore, normally unargued for, about supposition theory."[914]

Being forced to face the anti-equivalence critique, Priest and Read state that the Corcoran-Swiniarski account is "*importantly incorrect*". The main argument seems to be of a historical nature. Defining supposition in function of descending through an equivalent inference is said to be a property of later and more mature versions of supposition theory. The supposition theory has developed, according to our authors, from offering descending inferences to a singular as examples of particular suppositions, to offering the said truth conditions through disjunctions or conjunctions of singulars within the very definition of supposition[915]. Ockham is seen as one of the first representatives of the final form of development of the supposition theory, but still having some aspects from the earlier articulations as the ascending from only a singular and not from the entire analysis of proposition[916]. In this way Priest and Read try to escape the non-equivalence critique, by employing a historical model of medieval supposition theory, in which what a medieval author might have intended and the general evolutive direction of a theory is more important than what that author has actually written.

If we have brought into discussion the quantification interpretation debate of the theory of supposition, we cannot move on without presenting some of Terence Parsons' contributions to this topic. In his 1997 paper he acknowledges that when we speak about supposition theory we must speak about stages of development, such that we can make a distinction between an early stage represented by authors like William of Sherwood, Lambert of Auxerre and Peter of Spain, and a later stage represented by Walter Burley, Ockham, Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Paul of Venice. For him, the difference between the two author clusters represents a difference

[914] PRIEST, READ (1980), p. 268.
[915] See PRIEST, READ (1980), p. 269-270.
[916] See PRIEST, READ (1980), p. 271

between two modes of dealing with quantifiers. The early supposition theories are for Parsons theories of quantificational terms similar to modern semantics of quantifiers. The later theories are an account of the global quantificational effect that entails an analysis under prenex normal forms[917]. For the theory of supposition this means that in the early accounts the supposition of the term does not change *per se* when embedded in a more complex context like a negation - the subject term of an A-form proposition remains with a confused and distributive supposition even after the proposition is negated; in the later accounts, such embedding has an effect on the type of supposition the term has - the subject of an A-form proposition will change its supposition from confused and distributive to determinate after the proposition is negated, thus having an existential effect[918]. As a sidenote, we may state that the fact according to which in early supposition theories the supposition does not change is debatable, since even Parsons admits a change in its mobility, although not in the modes of supposition[919]. Accordingly, we may state that such a point of view depends on whether we consider the difference between mobility and immobility to be a mode of supposition or not.

Further, Parsons extracts the definitions of the personal modes of supposition and forms what he calls a 'syntactic test' for determining each type of supposition in function of the quantifiers[920]. Then, it proceeds in arguing that no early account of supposition presents a global quantificational effect. The cause for this is consider to be the small role of the *ascensus* and *descensus* notions that played during the early period in contrast to the later one. Surely, the presence of a theory of descending and ascending inference does not guaranty the presence of a global quantificational effect theory. At this point, we have seen what problems imply such a theory of inference. Parsons is explicitly ready to ignore some of them[921]. Without entering in further details about Parsons' argumentation and the connection that he makes between supposition and opacity theory, we can ask ourselves if such a global quantificational effect can

[917] See PARSONS (1997), p. 42-43.
[918] See PARSONS (1997), p. 43. Regarding the modes of supposition, in the early stage ∀xPx and ¬∀xPx have the same supposition, while in the later stage the supposition changes since ¬∀xPx is interpreted as ∃x¬Px, thus under determined supposition.
[919] See PARSONS (1997), p. 44: „but in 'Not every man is running' the negation *immobilizes* that inference, so that one is not able to descend from 'Not every man is running' to 'This man is not running'. On this account the mode of supposition of 'man' (that is, its quantification semantics) remains unchanged when the 'not' is added, but the 'not' affects what inferences can be drawn, because mobility has entirely to do with inferences."
[920] See PARSONS (1997), p. 45.
[921] See PARSONS (1997), p. 49-48.

be studied in wider areas of medieval logic, not supposition theory exclusively. For instance, according to Parsons, Peter of Spain does not account for a global quantificational effect in his theory of supposition. But we can see that in his first tract, *SL* I.18, he offers, as most of the medieval logician in 13th century, equivalences of propositions or signs. There the equivalence between *'non omnis homo currit'* and *'quidam homo non currit'* is given. This will account exactly for the inference from ¬∀xPx to ∃x¬Px that are entailed by the prenex normal forms and the global quantificational effect, although a full account of the supposition theory in relation to this equivalation is not made in *SL*.

In this sub-part we have seen that the interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of quantification occupied and important part of the scholarship. Starting with Boehner and arriving at Parsons, supposition theory was seen as a way of analyzing and interpreting quantified expressions. According to Ockham, from a proposition with a personal suppositing term we can obtain inferentially a proposition or a concatenation of propositions, where the suppositing term and its sign is replaced with the inferiors of the suppositing term. The process of correctly descending with its possible corresponding ascending was seen as an interpretation of quantifiers or as an evaluation of the truth conditions of quantified propositions. However, this interpretation has faced serious challenges. First, there are some basic dissimilarities imposed by the difference between medieval and modern logic as shown by Matthews. Second, for the quantification interpretation to take place, the proposition with a personal suppositing term and the proposition(s) obtained by descending under it must be equivalent. This fact was known as the 'equivalation thesis', a thesis regarding supposition that goes directly against Ockham's doctrine. Third, to obtain form a categorical proposition with personal types of supposition a proposition or a concatenation of propositions with discrete suppositions, that is, form a quantified proposition an unquantified expression, the first proposition must be fully analyzed. This full analysis is nowhere to be found in Ockham's doctrine, and, as showed, renders the interpretation of O-form proposition erroneous. To avoid this problem Swiniarski establishes a priority rule, according to which the supposition of the subject term must be analyzed first. But this rule has the effect of rendering merely confused supposition useless. Spade avoids this problem by stating, against Ockham, that the predicate of O-form proposition has merely confused supposition, a position defended also by Priest and Read. Ultimately Corcoran and Swiniarski shows that a temperate formalization of Ockham's theory, only

according to the conditions of each type of personal supposition, can refute the quantification interpretation. It shows how the equivalence thesis, the priority rule and the fact that the O-form proposition must have merely confused supposition are erroneous interpretation of Ockham's theory. Further, Parsons' interpretation of supposition theory as a theory about the local vs. global quantificational effect, has the merit of highlighting the difference between the 13th century and 14th century articulations of supposition theories. However, by claiming that supposition theory is a theory of quantification, his interpretation may be accused of the same shortcomings debated already by the scholarship.

In conclusion, we can state that the interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of quantification brings up the same problem of changing the object of interpretation by means of formalizing. This time, the inaccuracies between the object to be formalized and the product of formalization are evident, since they often enter in direct contradiction with Ockham's doctrine. Moreover, once again, only a part of the theory, the personal modes of supposition, is taken into account, disregarding the whole conceptual articulation of the supposition doctrine.

2.3.3. The theory of supposition as a hermeneutical theory

One of the most fully articulated interpretation of supposition theory which takes into account both the medieval and the contemporary traditions is offered by Catarina Dutilh Novaes in a significant series of her works[922]. As we have seen in the previous sections, her analysis has as prerequisites, on the one hand, the enquiry regarding the historical notion of formality[923], and on the other hand, the explicit refutation of the tradition according to which supposition is interpreted as a theory of reference[924].

Dutilh's analysis takes into account in some occasions the development of the theory of supposition in multiple stages, subscribing to historical explanations as those offered by Ebbesen, De Libera and especially De Rijk[925]. However, her proper interpretation of the theory of supposition is mostly confined to the later and more mature versions of this theory, predominantly to that of William Ockham. The main thesis regarding her interpretation of

[922] DUTILH (2007a), (2007b), (2008), (2011a), (2011b), (2015), (2018).
[923] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 215-292; (2011a), p. 303-332; Dutilh (2015), p. 253-270.
[924] See for example DUTILH (2007a), p. 18-29; DUTILH (2018), p. 26; DUTILH (2007b).
[925] See for example DUTILH (2011b), p. 1231-1234.

supposition is that it could be better understand as a theory of propositional meaning[926]. Since supposition is not able to offer an explanation of the way in which propositional terms are referring to individual and unique external objects, that is, an extensional account of the theory cannot be applied on supposition, Dutilh is opting for an intensional account. Accordingly, focusing on meaning instead on reference, supposition theory has the role of establishing the possible suppositions of terms within specific propositions and, according to those suppositions, of establishing the possible meaning or reading of the entire proposition[927]. In doing so, supposition becomes a specific instrument of interpretation or hermeneutics. The arguments offered By Dutilh for this thesis are both historical and conceptual. Under the first, the connection between the theories of fallacies and supposition theory is considered. As we have seen, the suppo-terminology started to emerged within the fallacy's commentary tradition which preoccupied itself with different types of fallacious reasoning and the methods of detecting it. Accordingly, for Dutilh, the supposition theory can be understood as "a semantic system codifying these ambiguities"[928], that were studied in the fallacy literature, which had the purpose to bring the ambiguity of language under control[929]. Moreover, in a more general way, the supposition theory is considered to be by Dutilh a theory of propositional meaning since it can be considered a devise born out of the way the medievals related to authoritative texts. Two authoritative texts often expressed contradictory points of view on the same object of enquiry. Since none would be allow to interpret one of them as false *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid*, supposition is a tool which analyzes according to its modes under what particular interpretation of terms a proposition can be true or false[930]. Under the second type of arguments, the conceptual ones, Ockham's expressions of '*denotatur'* and '*propositio est distinguenda*', which both concerns only propositions, are taken into account. The first is used by Ockham to point out what is asserted or meant by a specific proposition independently of its truth-value, that is, that a predicate is predicated about a subject which can have such and such types of suppositions and that according to those types, the proposition can finally be considered of a certain truth

[926] See for example DUTILH (2007a), p. 30; DUTILH (2008), p. 366.
[927] See DUTILH (2008), p. 366. For her hybrid characterization as "an extensional theory of intensions" see p. 368.
[928] Dutilh (2007a), p. 32.
[929] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 370.
[930] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 31-35; DUTILH (2008), p. 371-373. See also the hermeneutic dimension raised by the concept of "*de virtute sermonis*" in Ockham and Buridan.

value; this notion reinforces the idea of a need of an interpreter to assign in the first place a supposition for a term[931]. The second expression refers to the principle found in supposition theory that conserves the ambiguity within language but renders it comprehensible under an analysis of the explicit multiple reading that a proposition can undergo[932]. Thus, a proposition must be distinguished in order to state its different possible meanings[933]. Such act of distinguishing between different readings could be found during the practices of dialectical disputations[934], fact that makes again the process of establishing a supposition dependent on the human intentions.

Catarina Dutilh Noves' interpretation of supposition theory does not limit itself to this general framework of interpretation. She in not only interpreting suppositing theory as a theory of meaning which establishes possible readings or interpretations of propositions in function of the supposition of its terms, but does something more which eliminates any subjective aspect from her hermeneutics. She considers that Ockham's supposition theory is formal, such that it can be considered within a computational semantics or algorithmic hermeneutics account[935]. This means that the supposition theory offers a set of rules and a procedure of mechanically applying those rules to a propositional context in order to obtain each time the same result[936]. The entire schema of this machinery goes as follows: a proposition is offered as input, quasi-syntactical rules are applied in order to establish the different kinds of supposition of terms; semantic rules are applied in order to determine the possible *supposita* for each term; then follows the combination of each alternative analysis of the propositional terms; the result, or output, is the possible propositional meanings or readings[937]. By quasi-syntactic rules of supposition Dutilh understands those formal rules, not fully syntactical, stated by Ockham according to which we can distinguish between personal, simple and material supposition in

[931] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 35-40; DUTILH (2008), p. 374-378.
[932] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 40-46; DUTILH (2008), p. 378-383.
[933] See Dutilh (2008), p. 379: "Of '*Homo est species*', two readings are possible. According to the first, it is asserted (*denotatur*) that a man is a species, in which case '*homo*' has personal supposition; according to the second, it is asserted that a concept is a species, in which case '*homo*' has simple supposition. under the first reading, the proposition is false; under the second, it is true. however, the first reading is just as legitimate as the second, despite its truth-value"
[934] See DUTILH (2008), p. 380-81
[935] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 8.
[936] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 52.
[937] See DUTILH (2008), p. 384 for a schematic representation.

function of "semantical type" of the other propositional extreme[938]. Under the same category it seems to enter also Ockham's rules of personal modes of supposition which tell us how we can distinguish between determinate, merely confused, and confused and distributive supposition in function of the presence and absence of the distributive signs[939]. The semantic rules tell us "what it means, with respect to the supposita (on the level of entities), for a term to have such-and-such supposition"[940]. They include the definitions of personal, material and simple supposition given by Ockham according to whether the term is taken significantly or not and according to the type of entity for which the terms stand (extra-menta and extra linguistic, linguistic and mental). Moreover, under the same semantic rules are comprised also the three now famous definitions of the modes of personal supposition which are given according to ascending and descending inferences to conjunctive and disjunctive concatenations[941].

To support her algorithmic interpretation and show how the aforementioned procedure is functioning, Dutilh is also offering a formalization[942] in which the entire supposition theory of Ockham is symbolically rendered. While we will not go in further details, it must be mentioned that problems regarding the equivalence between the A-form proposition and Not-O-form proposition, its contradictory, is found (again), since according to Ockham's theory, the supposition of the predicate term in both propositions are different and not the same as should be[943]. Dutilh resorts to a solution taken from outside of Ockham's system, originated in the 17th century solution offered by John of St. Thomas regarding the distribution of terms that were previously distributed[944].

Without question, Dutilh endeavor has the merit of taking into account Ockham's entire theory of supposition, signification included, and not only its theory of personal modes. Strangely enough, what the reference and quantification interpretations have considered to be the most formal aspect of supposition theory, that is, the part of supposition theory dedicated to defining the personal modes according to the descents and ascents, is considered under Dutilh's analysis an aspect which pertains to semantic rules and not to the quasi-syntactical ones. The

[938] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 47;
[939] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 47-49.
[940] DUTILH (2007a), p. 46.
[941] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 49-51
[942] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 53-75.
[943] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 74.
[944] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 75.

author does not intend to offer an interpretation of the theory of supposition in general, but only of the theory articulated by Ockham. In fact, she explicitly states some reserves regarding the way such interpretation can be applied on 13th century theories or on more pragmatic oriented articulations like that of Buridan[945]. Nevertheless, a particular aspect of the hermeneutical interpretation must be addressed. If the supposition theory is to be understood as a process of obtaining possible interpretations of propositions by mechanically applying sets of rules, why the supposition theory was not formulated or perceived as such in Middle Ages? We know that important portions of medieval logic which implied something similar to mechanical reasoning, for example, reasoning according to certain schemata or rule following theoretical constructs, benefited from articulations developed in the art of memory which facilitated both their assimilation as doctrine and their application in specific domains of knowledge. The theory of syllogistic moods is the most famous example. But regarding 13th and 14th century, no similar systematization of the theory of supposition can be found. This begs the question if supposition theory was really perceived as an automatic regimented procedure of applying rules in order to obtain possible propositional meanings or whether it was a mere tool to accept or reject a certain proposition on the basis of its partial and not complete analysis.

2.3.4. The theory of supposition as a theory of inference

The historical explanations of the origins of supposition theory formed from their very beginning a close proximity between the notion of supposition and that of inference. For example, De Rijk's main thesis in his *Logica modernorum* states that, supposition theory has emerged from the texts of 12th century fallacy tradition. In these texts the concept of supposition was used to explain and detect certain types of fallacies which can be considered invalid inferences. If the supposition theory can be used to refute certain inferences by showing how a difference in the supposition of the terms can cause certain fallacies, then the way to an interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of inference is already paved.

An example of embracing the inferential interpretation of supposition theory can be found in the works of Elizabeth Karger. In her article *Modes of Personal Supposition: The Purpose and Usefulness of the Doctrine within Ockham's Logic*[946], she rejects some of the

[945] See DUTILH (2007a), p. 77.
[946] KARGER (1984), p. 87-106.

interpretations of Ockham's supposition and their corresponding formalizations. Invoking the lack of evidence in and congruity with the Ockham's text, she distances from what seems to be a quantification interpretation: the interpretation according to which the theory of modes has the purpose to operate reductions of propositions containing quantifying general terms to combinations of singular propositions which function as truth-conditions for the first[947]. After defining the "background concepts" of the theory of modes, Karger proceeds in offering formalized definitions of the personal modes. They seem very similar to the Corcoran-Swiniarski conditions in which the theory of personal modes was explained. Karger's definitions are rewritten versions of ascending and descending conditions, comprised as entailments (→) from a simple proposition S to a proposition or a concatenation of propositions where the quantified word from S is substituted (/) with a discrete term T_n which is a member of a list of the ultimate inferiors of the quantified term (QT) from S. Thus, the definitions run as follows:

$S \rightarrow S^{QT/hoc\ T1}$ & … & $S^{QT/illud\ Tn}$ but not $S^{QT/hoc\ Tm} \rightarrow S$ (confused and distributive supposition)

$S^{QT/hoc\ Tm} \rightarrow S$ and $S \rightarrow S^{QT/hoc\ T1}$ V … V $S^{QT/illud\ Tn}$ (determinate supposition)

$S^{QT/hoc\ Tm} \rightarrow S$ and $S \rightarrow S^{QT/hoc\ T1\ v\ \dots\ v\ illud\ Tn}$ and not $S \rightarrow S^{QT/hoc\ T1}$ V … V $S^{QT/illud\ Tn}$ (merely confused supposition)[948]

A second step is made by establishing rules for the assignment of personal modes drawn from ch. 71 and 74 of Ockham's handbook of logic. These rules are established in function of the *syncategoremata* (implicit or explicit) which are put in front of a personal suppositing term and which are systematized in three classes according to the "quantificational sequence" (qs) they form[949]. Each term in the proposition will have its corresponding quantified sequence which will include all the quantifying words that appear in the proposition before the suppositing term[950]. After we have the list of quantificational sequence for each term, we can apply the two

[947] See KARGER (1984), p. 87-88.

[948] KARGER (1984), p. 93. For these definitions the terms must not be vacuous or empty. On this problem see Karger (1978), p. 46-55, where she identifies a first logic of descending which can be comprised as a theory of quantification, and which presupposes its terms as being non-empty, and a second logic in which each categorical proposition can be understood as a molecular one, such that propositions with empty terms can be true.

[949] See KARGER (1984), p. 95-96: "Let a "quantificational sequence" (hereafter 'qs') be define as a sequence of universal and particular qws which include no negation. I distinguish three different types of such sequences: (1) qs' of type A: all those which contain only particular qws (2) qs' of type B: all those the last member of which is a universal qw (3) qs' of type C : all those which contain qws of both sorts the last member of which is a particular qw".

[950] See KARGER (1984), p. 96.

sets of rules which establishes a personal supposition in function of the type of quantificational sequence: (I) qs of type A corresponds to determinate supposition; type B, to distributive; type C, to merely confused[951]. This first set of rules is reserved to categorical propositions where the suppositing term is not preceded by verbal negation. The second set of rules is offered for the case in which the term in question is preceded by verbal negation. In this instance we have: (II) qs of type A or C corresponds to distributive supposition, qs of type B corresponds to determinate supposition[952].

From Ockham's treatment of the fallacy of consequent, which presupposes and invalid inference, Karger states that a converse inference can be obtained which is valid. The way in which these immediate inferences can be obtained are explained through the theory of modes. They concern propositions which have the same terms, but in which, through the inferential transition from premise to conclusion, there is a "*potentially suppositional modification*"[953]. This makes Karger to reformulate the aforementioned rules of mode assignment in a single one. This rules states:

> "Whenever a categorical (alternatively, an elementary categorical) sentence S undergoes a potentially suppositional modification, yielding a sentence S' and the mode of at least one personally suppositing term common to both S and S` differs in both sentences, then S' is a consequence of S if, for any such term, the change in mode incurred from S to S` is either: (a) from distributive to determinate or confused or (b) from determinate to confused"[954]

This particular rule is followed with a slightly different one, "the reciprocal TM rule", where, in the modifications suffered by S to obtain S`, there is no modification of personal modes, such that the inferences from S to S` and from S` to S are valid[955]. All those rules of the theory of modes apply to standard categorical propositions (A, E, I, O) but are meant, according to Karger, to function on more complex propositional forms. Moreover, according to the same author, the

[951] See KARGER (1984), p. 96.
[952] See KARGER (1984), p. 97. In fact Karger is offering the second set of rules on the basis of the first. For an easier understanding we opted to define them according to qs. For the historical tracking of those rules see Karger (1993) and DUTILH (2007a), p. 75 for its application in her analysis.
[953] See KARGER (1984), p. 100-101, such modifications are based on potentially suppositional differences between the premise and conclusion which can be: the position of the verbal negation, the quantificational sequence, the positions of the terms in propositions.
[954] See KARGER (1984), p. 101. This is named "the non-reciprocal TM rule"
[955] See KARGER (1984), p. 102. "The reciprocal TM rule […]: whenever a categorical (alternatively, an elementary categorical sentence S undergoes a potentially suppositional modification, yielding a sentence S', and S' does not differ from S in the mode of any of the contained suppositing terms, then inferences both from S to S' and from S' to S are valid".

general merit of supposition theory is that of offering an apparatus of detecting valid immediate inference on the basis of the modes of personal supposition. Without this theory of modes, such endeavor could not be possible for Ockham's logic[956].

Like in almost all cases of specific interpretations of supposition theory, Karger's position does not go uncontested. Ned Markosian in his 1988 article, *On Ockham's Supposition Theory and Karger's Rule of inference*, offers two interpretations of Karger's *non-reciprocal TM rule*. Under the first, the weak version, the phrase "for any such term" from the definition is interpreted as "for every such term". But the definition does not hold for an inference that takes place from an A-form proposition (*Omnis homo est animal*) to an I-form proposition (*Aliquis homo est animal*), because, according to Karger, a term with merely confused supposition in S - the predicate of the universal affirmative - cannot be transformed into a term with determined supposition in S` - the predicate of the particular affirmative[957]. Under the strong interpretation, the phrase "for any such term" is interpreted by Markosian as "for some such terms". Under this reading the A-form proposition is a consequence of an I-form proposition since at least one term, the predicate of the I-form proposition is following Karger's b) rule of transformation, that is, from determinate supposition in S to merely confused in S`[958]. The points highlighted by Markosian wakens the power of Karger's rule to offer valid inferences in an exhaustive manner and makes her ultimate conclusions about the personal modes of supposition debatable. The effects can be read in Markosian's final remarks:

> "far from being either a theory of quantification or a part of a theory of inference, TM is simply an account of certain linguistic phenomena that medieval philosophers took to be primitive. Supposition in general, and TM in particular, are not to be analyzed in terms of some further notions, nor is the medieval writer's interest in them to be accounted for in terms of some further project"[959]

[956] See KARGER (1984), p. 106.
[957] See MARKOSIAN, "On Ockham's Supposition Theory and Karger's Rule of Inference" in *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 48 (1988), p. 50
[958] See MARKOSIAN (1988), p. 49. It is worth noting that Markosian is rendering Karger's non-reciprocal TM rule as a biconditional while Karger, as cited above, is not using a biconditional (iff) but only a conditional (if), at least in the article accessed by us.
[959] MARKOSIAN (1988), p. 52.

Thus, any fully assumed equivalence between the theory of supposition and the theory of inference is problematic and it seems that the medieval authors of 13th and 14th century did not have such a project in their minds.

What Karger achieved, was to establish the types of supposition a term has on the basis of the sequence of signs that apply to the term in question. Then, according to the TM non-reciprocal rule, if two propositions which have the same terms are given, S and S`, which may differ only regarding to the quantifying sequence or the position of the terms, then S` can be considered a consequence of S if, in the transition from S to S`, there is a specific modification of the personal modes of supposition. But this formalization is once again an instance of interpreting a part of the theory of supposition, the theory of personal modes. Moreover, besides Markosian's contra-arguments, such a systematization of the immediate inference through supposition theory can be considered foreign to the 13th and 14th century accounts. Supposition theories had indeed a connection with immediate inferences, but they were never put to use, at least in our period of interest, in such an extensive formal analysis.

2.3.5. The theory of supposition as a theory of conceptual notation

The last modern interpretation that we will take into account refers to an attempt of understanding the theory of supposition as a theory of conceptual notation. This particular endeavor can be traced back to the works of Alan R. Perreiah and especially to his 1986 paper *Supposition Theory: A new approach*. Although this interpretation can be considered an isolated case, since, as far as we know, has not generated any substantial debates, his solution to the conundrum regarding the supposition theory comes after critically assessing the interpretative options that were already posited by some of the scholars before him.

Perreiah's classification of the interpretations offered by the scholarship is made within the threefold division of semiotics: syntax ("a system regulating inferences between propositions"), semantics ("a doctrine about the meaning and/or truth of expressions") and pragmatics ("an investigation of the use of language")[960]. He sees Philotheus Boehner and Ernest A. Moody as defenders of the syntax interpretation, Peter Geach and Desmond P. Henry,

[960] PERREIAH (1971), p. 382.

of the second, and finally, William Kneale and De Rijk, of the third interpretation[961]. Regarding the syntactic interpretation, Perreiah shows how the classical A, E, I, O propositions can be rewritten under the complete analysis of quantified terms according to the interpretation of quantifiers[962]. This interpretation parallels the rules of defining the personal supposition of the subject and predicate terms. Although Perreiah's methods of deriving the full analysis of A, E, I, O propositions according to the interpretation offered by Boehner and Moody are debatable at least, he concludes that the fully analyzed propositions where the quantified terms were replaced by individual subject and predicates in conjunctive and disjunctive concatenations, either do not preserve the relations within the square of opposition or offer stronger or weaker expressions than the initial A, E, I, O propositional forms. It is especially this interpretation of supposition as a theory of quantification that will be explored in more details in his 1986 article. There he shows that the lack of an equivalence between the propositions with the quantified terms and the propositions resulted from descending under the personal suppositing terms, along with the problems brought by the O-form proposition, are reason to dismiss the quantification interpretation[963]. Moreover, comprised as a theory of quantification, supposition will concern syncategorematic terms and not categorematic ones as the medieval logicians pointed out. The notions of descending and ascending inferences are not considered to be the central points of supposition theory since there are types of suppositions - or, we may add, versions of supposition theory - which do not rely on them[964].

Regarding the semantical interpretations, he considers Henry's model offered through Lesniewski's epsilon scheme as in need of argumentation since it reduced the modes of supposition to discrete supposition by explaining supposition as an "inter-nominal property"[965]. Regarding Geach's extensional account, Perreiah shows that if the E and O propositions must be analyzed, Geach is forced to admit, contrary to its formalization, negated terms[966]. According to the pragmatic paradigm, Perreiah rejects William C. Kneale's account on supposition. For

[961] See PERREIAH (1971), p. 382. Perreiah acknowledges that in certain cases the scholars appeal to all three kinds of interpretation. However, a predominant one can be ascribed to each.
[962] See PERREIAH (1971), p. 384-385; 388-389.
[963] See PERREIAH (1986), p. 214-221.
[964] See PERREIAH (1986), p. 220.
[965] PERREIAH (1971), p. 393.
[966] See PERREIAH (1971), p. 397. From our short reading of *Reference and generality*, it seems that Geach does not subscribe to the formalization of supposition that he offered there and he criticizes both Russell and the medieval account of "reference".

the former, the use of 'supposition' term is not equivocal, figurative or metaphorical, as for the latter, if we take into account the systematic mode in which supposition has been defined, which ultimately made possible the semantic and syntactic interpretations[967]. Moreover, taking into account De Rijk's historical analysis from *Logicam modernorum*, Perreiah states that although supposition is defined according to the pragmatic notions of '*usus*', '*acceptio*' etc. and plays a role in the doctrines of fallacy, obligations, sophism and insolubilia, all having a performative character, the specific connections of pragmatics to supposition theory are missing[968]. Finally, our authors concludes that all those interpretations are in fact reformulations of supposition theory which are exploiting a certain degree of parallelism between supposition and modern semiotics. By doing so they rather generate more issues that offering solutions[969].

Perreiah's solution is born out of the understanding of supposition as having a role to differentiate between material and formal aspects of language, in a similar way as Frege's *Begriffschrift* was intended[970]. Understood as a conceptual notion which describes how a categorematic term stands for some things in a proposition, he establishes that the main concept that underlies the supposition theory is that of substitution[971]. After describing the already known rules of descent and ascent for the personal modes and after connecting them with the theory of inference, he is offering three general principles which govern the theory of supposition:

I. A certain term can in principle have any kind of supposition
II. The kind of supposition must be accepted or rejected by the participants of a context
III. If a specific kind of supposition has been accepted for a term, it must retain it throughout the same context[972]

[967] See PERREIAH (1971), p. 398-401.
[968] See PERREIAH (1971), p. 404.
[969] PERREIAH (1971), p. 407-408: "Syntacticists need to determine whether supposition-theory is a part of signification-theory. Semanticists must resolve whether supposition is part of the theory of meaning, the truth theory, or both. Pragmatists should say precisely what counts as "use" and "context". Supposition may indeed be found to exhibit all of the facets noted by modern commentators. But until issues like these are faced squarely, and so far as possible resolved, Semiotic will remain, as I. M. Bochenski first suggested, an instrument ill-adapted to the examination of supposition-theory".
[970] See PERREIAH (1986), p. 222.
[971] See PERREIAH (1986), p. 223.
[972] See PERREIAH (1986), p. 224-225.

Although the first principle is debatable, since supposition depends, as we have seen, on both the type of the suppositing term and the syncategorematic words, II and III are important. II links the supposition to the way it was used in dialectical confrontations and thus highlights the pragmatic dimension. III marks the benefit of using supposition theory to evaluate fallacies through the fact of detecting the change of supposition. Accordingly, by differentiating between logical and non-logical notion which will help to establish types of supposition in particular context that ultimately will enter in a theory of argumentation, supposition theory is considered by Perreiah a conceptual tool. This conceptual tool is for him the oral version, which accidentally was persevered in written form, of the conceptual writing that can be found in modern logic[973]. Since supposition is conceived as a way of rendering logical phenomena in oral contexts where no proper conceptual apparatus is available, a link between supposition and the art of memory is further made. The art of memory is based, according to Perreiah, on two principles: "I. Items to be remember must be replaced by concrete representations; II. Concrete representations must be organized in some easily recognizable and familiar way"[974]. Thus, the art of memory is based on the concept of place, on a property of substitution and of organizing items according to schemata. According to the same author, the same aspects are to be found in a theory of supposition:

> "The basic function of substitution which we have recognized as essential to suppositio is also fundamental to the art of memory. The replacement of an object by a spoken or written word is a first step in the memorative process. The assertion that a categorematic term has a definite kind of supposition signals that the term represents either a word (*suppositio materialis*), a concept (*suppositio simplex*) or a thing (*suppositio personalis*). A further specification of the type of personal supposition locates the term within one of the schemata for determinate or distributive supposition. These schemata function as place systems onto which terms having personal supposition are mapped"[975]

Thus, the theory of supposition has the main function the recalling in the mind of its user different objects for which the terms stand, with variation in quantity in case of the personal supposition (a certain individual, any of the individuals or all the individuals), or variation in quality in case of the difference between material, simple and personal supposition.

[973] See PERREIAH (1986) p. 225.
[974] PERREIAH (1986) p. 228.
[975] PERREIAH (1986) p. 228

It cannot be denied that Perreiah's interpretation is quite unique among the already presented versions; and neither can be denied that his interpretation is among the few that recognizes the importance of the concepts of substitution and place in the theory of supposition. By saying that supposition is a conceptual notation he is pointing out that this theory is a conceptual tool used for explaining logical and linguistic phenomena in a formal manner. However, some contra-arguments for Perreiah's interpretation can be easily found. In a first place, schematic letters and representations were already in used in the 13th and 14th century in some other parts of logic. Even Aristotle in his Analytics made use of such schematic letters. Supposition theory made little to no progress in this sense in the 13th and 14th century. No actual schematic rendering has been done in the exposition of supposition theory in order to consider it a conceptual notation. In a second place, supposition was not assimilated by medievals with the art of memory and was not studied as a part of it. No actual wide use of mnemotechnics was used in the teaching of 13th and 14th century like in the case of syllogistic moods. Surely a few centuries later someone like Thomas Murner will apply the art of memory on supposition, but this happens much more later than the time when the theories studies by Perreiah were articulated. Supposition is not a theory pertaining to the art of memory, since no medieval author ascribed to it such a purpose and since it is obvious that its general purpose is not to memorize expressions of language but to analyze them according to specific rules. In a third place, Perreiah's interpretation is very general. By stating that supposition is merely a tool which serves to memorize mappings of words with objects in function of the propositional context, we tend to reduce the complexity of the theory of supposition, to ignore its possible true purpose and to reduced its importance in the history of logic.

Conclusion

The third part of the current section was dedicated to the analysis of the different interpretations of supposition theory that we could find in the modern scholarship. Here we have seen that different responses were given to the question related to the nature of supposition. In this regard, supposition was considered to be: a theory of reference, a theory of quantification, a computational hermeneutical theory, a theory of inference and a theory of conceptual notation Almost in all cases, Ockham's doctrine was the main object of interpretation and not the less mature versions of the theory that were articulated in the 13th century.

In the first part, we saw how Peter Geach applied Russell's theory of denotation in order to understand supposition theory as a bad and faulty theory of reference. This particular endeavor was heavily criticized by authors like Catarina Dutilh Novaes and T. K. Scott Jr. In the second part, we showed how, starting from Philotheus Boehner, supposition theory was considered an analysis of quantified expressions. The quantificational interpretation was attacked by authors like Gareth B. Matthews and Corcoran, but supported by others. John J. Swiniarski, Spade, Priest, Read and Parsons argued in different degrees for the quantificational thesis. In doing so, they had either to admit some inconsistences of the quantificational approach, or to offer artificial solution to problems foreign to Ockham's account in order to fit the quantificational interpretation. Thus, the equivalence thesis, the priority rule, the full analysis of the proposition and the change of the predicate of the O-form proposition were all different solution offered to make this interpretation viable. The third part was dedicated to Catarina Dutilh Novae's hermeneutical interpretation. According to it, supposition theory is a formal construct such that it presents a set of rules, semantical and quasi-syntactical ones, that can be mechanically or computational applied in order to obtain possible readings of propositions. The fourth interpretation, represented by Elizabeth Karger, conceived the theory of supposition as a theory of inference. The modes of supposition can be defined in terms of quantifying sequences. According to the type of personal modes that vary in two propositions with the same terms, the valid entailment of one from another can be established. Regarding this inference thesis, we also seen Markosian's objections regarding how the relations in the square of opposition are not properly preserved. In the fifth part, we explained Perreiah's interpretation of supposition as a conceptual notation. Under it, supposition is conceived on the basis of the notions of substitution and place with a direct link to the art of memory. Accordingly, supposition seems to have the role of establishing schemata, which can be represented formally, for the mapping of words with objects depending on the propositional context.

All the aforementioned theses regarding supposition were proposed by the scholarship within the systematic tradition. This systematic tradition seems to presuppose and endorsement of ThMl1, according to which medieval and contemporary logic are similar in regard to their formality. This formality allows them to apply the formal structure of the theories of reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation upon the theory of supposition in an interpretative process. Besides the critical remarks that were formed within

their own systematic tradition, which should be enough for contesting if not rejecting such interpretations, there are some further generic problems. The reference, quantification and inference theses do not address in their formalization of the supposition the whole theoretical construct but only parts of it, especially the modes of personal supposition. The computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation theses are misreading the whole purpose of the medieval theoretical construct, since a mechanical application and a memorative function was never intended in the 13th and 14th century. Moreover, in all the five aforementioned theses, there seems to be a common methodology that challenges their whole argumentative endeavor. They take formal theories from contemporary logic or from theories of language and apply them on the theory of supposition. In this process the theory of supposition is unrooted from its own historical development, its theoretical framework and its own purpose. By saying that the relation of supposition describes the same thing as reference, quantification, inference, propositional meaning or conceptual notation, our object of interpretation is transformed, due to the conceptual frameworks which are rendering it in a more formal construct, different from the initial object.

Conclusion

The first section of our work analyzed the theory of supposition according to a historical and doctrinal approach, having its main purpose the understanding of it in its own context and limits. The second section of our study made a step forward, by offering an analysis of the theory of supposition integrated in, but not limited to, what Catarina Dutilh Noves calls "the systematic approach". Our systematic analysis had the main and general purpose the assessment of the theory of supposition in relation with the property of formality, which was differentially instantiated in medieval and modern logic or theories of language. This step was considered necessary due to the very nature of supposition theory. In the case of Peter of Spain, for example, supposition was conceived as a logical notion constructed on the physical relation of substitution. This fact, along with a lack of explicit examples and statements for its purpose and use, made it an ambiguous theoretical construct approachable from different perspectives of the contemporary thought. Thus, since the supposition theory itself has often failed to offer a proper answer regarding what it really is, starting with the 20th century, the modern scholarship tried to fill up the missing blanks. In doing so, the theory of supposition was identified with different

post-Fregean theoretical constructs, in virtue of a parallelism in the property of formality, defended by authors like Philotheus Boehner. Our whole endeavor was dedicated towards analyzing the concept of formality, assessing the degree of generic formality in Peter of Spain's theory and assessing the various interpretations of supposition theory offered by the contemporary scholarship.

The first part of the current section was a preliminary investigation of the notion of formality. Since both medieval and contemporary logic have been considered by different authors as having a formal character, an investigation of the different acceptances of the formal notion was necessary. Relating mainly on the works of Sven Ove Hansson, John Gordon MacFarlane and Catarina Dutilh Novaes, we tried to see the origins of the notion of formality, the mechanics that this concept implies in its use and the different types of formality identified by the current scholarship.

For the first aspect, we argued for a distant origin of the notion of formality in Aristotle's philosophical considerations, more exactly in his form-matter conceptual pair. Although his hylomorphic considerations are not linked directly to logic, some hints in this sense are offered in his theory of the four causes, for example, in *Physics* 195a 16-21. Besides the explicit use of the notion of form in relation to logic, we can speak, in Aristotle's case, about other different instances of formality as argued by Jan Łukasiewicz or Terence Parsons. Aristotle's use of schematic letters and its systematic program established in *Prior analytics* bare witness for the property of formality. However, as John Gordon MacFarlane shows, a proper tradition of describing logic as being formal or a tradition of "logical hylomorphism" can be found only after Aristotle, in the later peripatetic tradition.

For the second aspect, the mechanics implied by the concept of formality in its use, our study tried to show how formality can be understood in such a way that could be applied to the theories developed in logic or language considerations that were articulated in different times throughout their history. In this sense, our study was focused, on the one hand, on Hansson's understanding of formalization as a successive process of idealization; and, on the other hand, on Dutilh's account. She conceives formality as an interpretation that implies a mechanism of formalization, which as we understood it, involuntary integrates Aristotle's theory of four causes. Accordingly, we have showed, especially following Dutilh's account but avoiding her agent-oriented understanding, that formality presupposes: (1.) an action of formalization or of

rendering a theoretical construct in a formal manner, (2.) an object of formalization or a theoretical construct which can be in itself formal or not, (3.) the means by which an object is formalized or the conceptual tools that are applied to a theoretical object in order to formalize it and (4.) the product of formalization or the result of applying the means of formalization on the theoretical object in question. Understood in this way, formality becomes a more manageable concept, such that it can be used in the assessments of different theoretical constructs and their interpretations. Regarding our main purpose, we showed that the formalizations can have the effect of changing the theoretical object on which they are applied in the act of interpretation. Accordingly, we conceived a series of points according to which this change can be tracked. First, a theoretical object can vary in quantity and quality, which means that in the act of formalization only a part of the object can be taken into account and not the whole and that the object in question can have before the formalization different degrees of formality on its own. Second, the means of formalization can vary themselves in terms of degree of formality, fact that influenced the theoretical objected which is formalized. Third, the product of formalization can be different from the initial theoretical object, in such a way that, in some cases, a contradictory relation can be put between them.

For the third aspects, our inquiry showed on the basis of the considerations offered by Dutilh and MacFarlane, the different senses of formality conceived in two cluster. A theoretical construct was conceived as formal if it had some specific characteristics. According to MacFarlane analysis, we may consider that these characteristics are: independence from a particular domain of conceptual application (M1), independence from particular objects or individuals (M2), independence from semantic content (M3), absence of reference to the meaning of expressions (M1*), schematic laws (M2*) and grammatical structures (M3*). According to Dutilh, formality can be tracked in the following aspects of a theoretical object: regimentation (D1), algorithmic reasoning (D2), structure and abstraction from content (D3), absence of meaning (D4), variation (D5) and indifference to particular objects (D6). We have showed that these characterizations are reducible between them, such that a theoretical object can be consider formal if: (a.) is constructed by means of abstracting from the actual meaning of expressions; (b.) it presents schemata that can be represented by symbolic or abstract notations in which different objects can variate under placeholders; (c.) it is constructed on structural notions, such as the structure of abstract reasoning or language, and not on the

semantical ones that take into account the relation with the world; (d.) it is constructed as an abstraction from the accidental or particular characteristics of the object it considers; and (e.) is constructed with rules, set of norms or laws which constrain its formulation and applies a normative character.

The second part of the current section was devoted to the manner in which a generic formality articulated in the aforementioned points can be ascribed to medieval logic and especially to the Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. In a first step, we have showed that medieval logic can be conceived under two theses: ThMl1, according to which medieval logic is similar to contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of their formality; and ThMl2, according to which medieval logic is entirely different from contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of its lack of formality. We argued in view of the positions offered by Laurent Cesalli and others, that ThMl1 and ThMl2 may be considered as two extremes. We showed that medieval logic is characterized by two tendencies towards: lack of formality, since Latin is not a formal language but an ordinary one and since the theoretical object is not articulate through a symbolic rendering; formality, since the Latin language is regimented by grammatical and logical notions, by sets of normative rules, and put to use in order to articulate abstract theories of logico-linguistic phenomena. Being conceived as such, the status of medieval logical theories in relation to formality rests in details and in the degree of formality certain theoretical features can have.

The degree in which Peter of Spain's theory can be considered formal at a generic level was sought in a second step. There we argued for a degree of syntactic formality on the basis of two arguments. The first argument comes from the fact that, Peter differentiates between a syntactical and semantical level of a proposition. On the basis of the distinction between categorematic terms, that is, words which have signification by themselves and are constitutive and essential parts of a proposition, and syncategorematic terms, that is, words void of any proper signification, Peter seems to configurate a propositional form using types of logico-grammatical entities in contrast with concrete entities. The second argument comes from the division of supposition, which is understood as a relation between words and things. Discrete-common, natural-accidental, simple-personal, determinate-confused, movable-immovable, are pairs which describe levels of division in a series of successive definitions of supposition, according to a combination of semantical (types of terms, types of objects and the relation

between them) and syntactical or formal conditions (presence or absence of categorematic and syncategorematic terms, the possibility of a descending inferences). On the basis of those two arguments, Peter of Spain's supposition theory seems to have a low degree of generic formality or to be considered as syntactically formal in a weak sense.

In an additional step, the weak formality of Peter of Spain's supposition was argued in a parallel analysis with Ockham's homonymous doctrine. There we showed how the two theories of supposition can be applied in the analysis of the classical categorical propositions of A, E, I, O forms and how the version articulated by Ockham can be considered more formal. Our argument rest on the fact that: Peter does not use only personal types of suppositions for the extremes of the categorical form; there is no proper analysis of the supposition corresponding to the extremes of the O-form proposition and to the predicate of the I-form proposition; where confused supposition is considered, only the notion of descending inferences are taken into account and no proper and consistent examples or explanations are offered concerning how these descending inferences should take place. In turn, Ockham's account ascribes a personal kind of supposition for each simple categorical form and describes each proposition in function of the suppositing term. By doing so, each categorical proposition can be rewritten, depending on the type of the suppositing term, as a disjunctive or conjunctive concatenation of propositions or as a proposition which has disjunctive terms, all obtained inferentially. This process takes place through the rules of supposition which can be described schematically, thus making Ockham's doctrine more formal, especially in parallel with Peter's version.

The third part of our second section was dedicated to the contemporary interpretations of supposition theory that we were able to find in the contemporary scholarship. We tried to show that the so-called 'systematic' tradition does not limit itself to the fact of interpreting the theory of supposition as a theory of reference, as Dutilh seems to suggest, but it has all kinds of different options on the basis of a methodological assumption. This methodological assumption was based on the ThMl1 thesis, according to which medieval and contemporary logic has a common property, that of formality. If this similarity in formality is assumed, the interpretation of the supposition theory through the contemporary theories of language and logic may seem a legitimate project. In order to fit this endeavor, the systematic tradition formalized or interpreted more formal instances of supposition like Ockham's version. What we tried to achieve in the rest of the sub-section was an explanation of the different interpretation of supposition and an

exploration of some of their shortcoming. The first sub-part considered Peter Geach's interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of refence constructed on Russell's model of denotation, along with Dutilh's and Scott's critical observations. The second showed how supposition was interpreted as a theory of quantification through the works of Boehner, Swiniarski, Spade, Priest, Read and Parsons and how Matthews, Corcoran and again Swiniarski contested this interpretation. The third was dedicated to Dutilh's interpretation of supposition as a theory of propositional meaning or a theory of computational hermeneutics. The fourth sub-part was concerned about Karger's interpretation of supposition as a theory of inference and about the criticism advanced by Markosian. The fifth and the last sub-part has explained Perreiah's interpretation of supposition as a conceptual notation or a theory related to the art of memory. Besides the particular objections that were formulated regarding those five different interpretative endeavors, we have tried to show that they all bare some common features. They can be characterized as being formal theories that are applied to a theoretical object, the supposition theory, with the results of rendering it more formal than it was. Thus, the object of interpretation suffers a change in the act of formalization, resulting in the product of formalization which it seems to be an entirely different theoretical object: a theory of reference, quantification, computational hermeneutics, inference or an art of memory. Accordingly, this change can be assessed in relation to the criteria established by us in part 2.1.2. *The mechanics of formality*: (1) the quality and quantity of the supposition theory is changed since supposition was less formal initially then after the interpretation and since in the cases of reference, quantification and inference, only a part of the theory is taken into account, which is the personal supposition, and not the whole; (2.) the means of formalization presupposes the interpretation of supposition theory through another theory which can be considered more formal and (3.) the product of formalization becomes an entirely different object from what the medieval theory of supposition really was initially.

Those being showed, we consider that the 'systematic tradition' is problematic at the very core of its methodology and cannot stand on its own in an inquiry of the nature of the medieval theory of supposition. However, it can be considered a necessary step in a full analysis, that starts with the historical and doctrinal account and ends in assimilating the systematic account in a third synthetic step. During the systematic analysis, we have seen how the supposition theory is articulated according to different conditions which can be considered

syntactical and semantical. In Peter of Spain's case, these conditions are less formal than in other more mature and later version of supposition. Moreover, by understanding the notion of formality and the mechanics implied by it, supposition itself can be considered a kind of formalization. In its endeavor of offering an account on how the *supponens* relates to the *suppositum*, supposition, in Peter's version, can be conceived as an abstract understanding of the way in which words relate to objects according to the propositional context and the types of words. In doing so, set of rules and logico-grammatical concepts are offered according to the limits imposed by the language in which the theory is expressed and the stage of the conceptual development of the human thought. In the last section of our work, we will try to see how the historical and doctrinal analysis along with the systematical one can be combined in an applied assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition.

3. Section III: Assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition

Thus far, for the purpose of explaining Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, we have conducted two types of analyses. In the first section of our work, we tried to establish the doctrinal framework in which Peter's account emerged. First, we approached a series of problems related to the author, context and diffusion of *SL*. Then we offered a description of the content of Peter's worked which tried to show the centrality of supposition theory in the logical corpus. Ultimately, we have discussed the problems related to the origins of the supposition theory and how those origins had as results different theoretical products in 13th and 14th century. This first section was meant to be a historical and doctrinal analysis, that had as purpose the understanding of supposition theory in the interpretative limits imposed by its context and origins. In the second section of our work, we tried to push our analysis a step further. Within the systematic analysis, we mainly tried to address the problem of the modern or contemporary interpretations of supposition theory on a general level. It has been argued by us that all those interpretations are made by capitalizing on some partial formal similarities between the supposition theory and the modern or contemporary theories of logic and language. We first tried to obtain the tools for the analysis of the theoretical construct by searching for different acceptances of the concept of 'formality'. Then, we tried to see in which way Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be considered formal on a generic level. In the end, we have discussed the systematic tradition of the supposition theory with its debates, shortcomings and interpretative results.

However, these two previous steps are not sufficient for offering an answer regarding our main research question. The first section enabled us only to see the multiples conceptual layers that have merged into the concept of *suppositio* and the diversity of the theories of supposition in terminist tradition. The second one has only stressed the possible interpretations of supposition and the general problems and shortcomings that they presuppose. Accordingly, a third step is needed that will combine the previous two analyses into a third one. Thus, the third section of our work has as main purpose an applied analysis on Peter of Spain's theory of supposition which will take into account both its doctrinal limitations and the contemporary tools of understanding. What we want to obtain in this section is an assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition which will clarify what is the purpose of his doctrine and how we should understand it.

To attain our goal, the first chapter will try to have another look on Peter's theory of supposition from another point of view. First, the multiplicity of meaning of the '*suppositio*' concept from *SL* will be discussed. Then, we will try to see how different doctrines of Peter's work can come to clarify the supposition theory and to solve some of its problems that were showed in the second section. This fact will offer a possible interpretation of Peter's supposition theory that is confined between the limits imposed by *SL*.

The second chapter will take into account Peter's doctrinal commitment. It will study whether the supposition theory that he articulates can be considered a realist or conceptualist theoretical construct. This discussion will help us understand better the implications of his theory.

The third and last chapter will be dedicated to the assessment of the possible interpretations of Peter's supposition theories that were proposed by the modern scholarship. For this purpose, the specific formality of Peter's theory will be sought. First, in relation with Sherwood's and Lambert's theories and then in relation with the types of formality identified according to Dutilh and MacFarlane in the second section of our work. The last chapter of the third section will try to see if Peter of Spain's supposition theory from *SL* can be considered a theory of: reference, quantification, computational hermeneutics, inference or conceptual notation.

3.1. Supposition theory once again

In the previous two sections we tried to offer, on the one hand, a descriptive analysis of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, and, on the other hand, a systematic analysis which made a preliminary assessment of its formality. The results pointed out that Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be understood as a relation between a propositional term and one or more extramental and extra-propositional entities or objects. This relation is understood almost as an analogy based on the relation of substitution between physical objects. The systematic part has showed that Peter of Spain's doctrine leaves many problems unresolved. We were not able to pinpoint the specific type of supposition for each extreme of the A, E, I, O categorical propositional forms or to find relevant and uniform examples for them. Inasmuch as formality is concerned, his theory can be considered on a generic level less syntactically formal than other more mature versions of supposition. Constructed on signification and defined through

combinations of syntactic and semantic conditions, the modes of supposition do not comply with the formal aspects identified by the modern interpretations. Moreover, the way in which the doctrine is formulated and its lack of specificity beg the question on the very possibility of such interpretations. Overall, the personal modes of supposition are not so clear, rigorous and systematical defined by means of descending and ascending inferences like in Ockham's case.

In what follows, we will inspect once again how the concepts of supposition can be understand. In doing so, a further analysis of the concept of supposition from *Tractatus* will be made. The problems regarding the extremes of the A, E, I, O propositional forms will be addressed in an effort to resolve Peter of Spain's omissions and to sketch a preliminary answer regarding the nature of Peter's theory of supposition.

3.1.1. The concept of '*suppositio*'. The multiplicity of meaning

In order to understand what exactly Peter of Spain had in mind when using the concept of 'suppositio', we must take a look at all the recurrences in *SL.* of this concept and at the occurrences of the concepts etymologically related to it. From this analysis we will see that the *suppositio* encompasses in its sphere of meaning a multiplicity of particular acceptances. They can be considered instances of the general stages of the historical evolution of the 'suppositio' concept.

We have stated that the noun '*suppositio*' comes from the verb '*pono, ponere*' preceded by the preposition '*sub*' which basically means 'to put under', 'to substitute', 'to replace'. Even understood as such, the relation comprises multiple meanings. The first meaning is that of a hierarchical or logical relation. The hierarchical relation is based on the fact that, for something to be put under means that something superior comes to be put in relation to something inferior. This acceptance of '*suppositio*' is illustrated multiple times inside and especially outside of the tract dedicated to supposition theory. In the second tract, on predicable, the relation of supposition is considered hierarchically and takes place between something considered of a higher generality and something of a lower one. Thus, genus is defined as that under which the species are subordinated "Tertio modo dicitur 'genus' cui supponitur species"[976], "Aliter autem diffinitur genus sic: genus est cui supponuntur species"[977]. This acceptance of supposition could

[976] *SL.*, II.2, p. 17, l. 20-21.
[977] *SL.*, II.6, p. 18, l. 22-23.

be extended on the entire Porphyrian tree, including the most specific species and its individuals. Moreover, the same concept is used in the explanation of the relatives of superiority and inferiority, that is, the relatives which are said according to their hierarchical position: "secundum superpositionem" or "secundum suppositionem". According to the latter ones, a 'son' is conceptually put under (*supponitur*) his farther, which is conceptually put above (*superponitur*). The same happens with the relation between a slave which is conceptually put under his master[978]. As we will see in the rest of our work, it is especially this acceptance of supposition as a hierarchical concept the one on the basis of which the personal modes of supposition are conceived.

The second meaning comes from the old grammatical use of '*suppositio'* as denoting the grammatical subject of the proposition. Usually comes either in the verbal form '*supponere'* and is contrasted with '*apponere*' or in the substantival form '*suppositio*' contrasted with '*appositio*'. A use of this kind can be found in the explanation of amphiboly. Here Peter shows that in an expression like '*scit seculum*' the noun can function as the subject of the verb (*supponere pro verbo*) or as the direct object of the verb (*apponere verbo*), rendering different meanings[979]. The supposition-apposition pair is also used in the case of composition and division and in some rules of ampliation and restriction, places where the grammatical analysis is important. Often enough, this particular acceptance of suppositio is used in combination with *suppositio* as defined in *SL.* VI[980]. Moreover, understood as the subject of the proposition, '*suppositio*' becomes synonymous with '*subiectio*'. This term along with its predicate form '*subicio, subicere*' and its derivates is used throughout the *Tractatus*, especially in the places

[978] See *SL.*, III.18, p. 34, l. 20 - 35, l. 5: "Alia vero secundum superpositionem, ut *dominus, duplum, triplum*. Alia vero secundum suppositionem, ut *servus, subduplum, subtriplum*, quia ista supponuntur aliis et alia superponuntur istis. *Dominus* enim superponitur *servo* et *pater* filio et *duplum* dimidio; *servus* vero supponitur domino et *filius* patri et *dimidium* duplo."

[979] See *SL.*, VII.47, p. 107, l. 23-2: "Et hoc ideo est quia hec dictio 'seculum' potest apponere huic verbo 'scit' vel supponere. Similiter hic: 'quod quis videt, hoc videt', quia hec dictio 'hoc' potest supponere huic verbo 'videt' secundo loco posito vel apponere. Similiter hic: 'quod quis scit, hoc scit'; hec dictio 'hoc' potest supponere vel apponere huic verbo 'scit' secundo loco posito. Et hic: 'vellem me accipere pugnantes'; hec est duplex, quia iste accusativus 'me' potest supponere huic verbo 'accipere' vel apponere; et similiter iste accusativus 'pugnantes' potest eidem supponere vel apponere".

[980] See for example *SL.*, XI.10, p. 203: "Prima talis est: terminus communis supponens vel apponens verbo presentis temporis simpliciter sumpto, non habenti vim ampliandi nec ex se nec ex alio, restringitur ad supponendum pro hiis qui sunt sub forma termini supponentis. Dico autem 'termini communis', quia terminus discretus non restringitur neque ampliatur. Dico autem 'presentis temporis' ad removendum verba aliorum temporum, quia terminus communis aliam habet suppositionem cum eis"

where the extreme which takes the place of the subject in a proposition is taken into account. But here attention should be paid since the identity between the grammatical and logical subject is not always preserved.

At this point, we can generally state that, if the hierarchical meaning of supposition describes a vertical relation, the grammatical meaning describes a horizontal one[981]. But a question remains to be asked. Are those two senses compatible with the acceptances of supposition as a property of terms? Our answer will be affirmative, at least partially. For the hierarchical understanding of supposition, the compatibility is applied only where we can talk about a relation between a superior and its inferiors, thus, strictly speaking, only in the case of personal supposition. For the grammatical understanding, at a first look, the compatibility seems to be possible since the majority of examples in which the supposition of a term is analyzed, the subject term is taken into account. However, as the further analysis of *suppositio* continues, it seems that the property of supposition is not applied only to the grammatical subjects but to the predicates as well. For example, in the analysis of simple supposition, *SL.* VI.6, the predicate term of '*omnis homo est animal*' is said to have simple supposition[982]; in discussing the distributing effect of '*Nullus*', *SL.* XII.15, the predicate of '*nullus homo est asinus*' is said to have confused and distributive supposition[983]. Moreover, some of the rules offered in the cases of ampliation, restriction and distribution, for instance *SL.* IX.6, XI.10,12, XII.9, along with many other examples offered by Peter, show us that even the *apponens* term or a direct object of a verb can have supposition. This means that, in the definition of supposition offered at the beginning of the sixth tract, "suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo"[984], the term '*substantivi*' must not be taken only for the subject of a proposition but for any term that has a grammatical substantival aspect, whether it is a participle, a pronoun or a noun or it is a subject, predicate or has other syntactical value. However, this interpretation is not so grounded.

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[981] See DUTILH (2007), p. 26. Dutilh talks about semantic ambiguities conceived as 'horizontal' and 'vertical' variations, which the supposition theory tries to keep under control.

[982] *SL.*, VI.6, p. 81, l. 19-23: "suppositionum simplicium alia est termini communis in subiecto positi, ut *'homo est species'*. Alia est termini communis positi in predicato affirmativo, ut *'omnis homo est animal';* iste terminus *'animal'* in predicato positus simplicem habet suppositionem, quia solum supponit pro natura generis."

[983] *SL.*, XII.15, p. 219, l. 10-18: "De hoc signo 'nullus' talis datur regula: quotiescumque hoc signum 'nullus' immediate adiungitur termino communi, confundit ipsum distributive et mobiliter; et similiter terminum cui adiungitur mediate. Ut 'nullus homo est asinus'. Unde potest fieri descensus sub subiecto sic: 'ergo Sortes non est asinus, neque Plato' et sic de aliis, et sub predicato sic: 'nullus homo est asinus; ergo nullus homo est Brunellus neque Fanellus', et sic de aliis."

[984] *SL.*, VI.3, p. 80, l. 8-9.

Peter of Spain seems to understand the concept of '*terminus*' in the sense offered by the old logic, where, when speaking about the terms of a categorical proposition, we speak about the subject and predicate, without any additional components. This particular understanding seems to be applied on the definition of supposition, where substantive names like '*homo*' are said to supposit and adjectival names or verbs as '*albus'* or '*currit'* are said to copulate. Whether he meant or not to restrict the property of supposition to the subject term of a proposition, is not clear. What is clear is that his understand of the '*terminus*' is extended by its own use over the subject-predicate distinction and that supposition is applied on such terms as the direct object of a verb.

For the moment, we can state that the two meaning of 'suppositio', the hierarchical and the grammatical one, converge ultimately in the theory of supposition, but this thing happens only partially. Moreover, all these acceptances of '*suppositio*' do not reject the general understanding of supposition as substitution, that is, the replacement of an object with another, according to which something is said to stand in the place of another[985]. Under the hierarchical understanding, a term is said to stand for its inferiors; under the grammatical interpretation a term stands for those entities for which its grammatical position dictates according to the other components of the proposition. However, the hierarchical notion and the grammatical one do not seem sufficient to explain the whole mechanism of supposition. Genealogical speaking, what really happens regarding the concept of supposition is an overlap or combination of grammatical, logical and physical ontologies. The concept of grammatical subject overlaps with the concept of the logical subject which has as its corresponding entities particular or universal objects.

3.1.2. What is the theory of supposition according to Peter of Spain?

Thus far, we have showed the principal components which combine in Peter of Spain's understanding of '*suppositio*': an analogy with the relation of substitution between physical objects, a relation of subordinating an inferior under a superior and a grammatical relation which puts the accent on the role played by a substantival term (which may be identical with the subject

[985] Surely, we can find distinguishable uses of supp-terms connected with the meaning of 'assumption' or 'presupposition', for example, *SL.* VII, 104 ("Errabant etiam quia supponebant unum modum accidentis exigi ad hanc fallaciam, quod falsum est, cum, sicut diximus, ad ipsam semper duplex accidens exigatur"), but they play no role in the actual theory of supposition.

term) in the propositional context. However, as already stated in the first part of our work, the concept of supposition is based on the ante-propositional property of signification.

Peter understands signification as a relation between a *dictio* and a *res*. At the most fundamental level, a *dictio* is a word which has signification on its own, by convention, and this signification corresponds to a representation of either a universal or a particular thing[986]. Peter seems to have in mind for this relation a kind of modist account. There is a *modum rerum* according to which objects are either substantival or adjectival. This could mean that they behave either as something subsistent on their own or as something added to a subsistent thing. This fact may presuppose a connection between the onto-logical notion of substance and the other nine categories. Although he does not specify this particular connection, what is clear is that the mode of things is replicated by the mode of words, since he parallels *res substantiva* and *res adjectiva* with *nomen substantivum* which has supposition and *nomen adjectivum* which has copulation. However, signification understood as such does not clarify for what type of entity the words are representative of. If we would remain on the level of signification, the language would present certain ambiguities. For example, the word '*homo*' can be taken as a universal, understanding by it the species which is defined according to the genus '*animal*' and difference '*rationalis*'; as a particular, a certain man capable of being pointed out; a collection of particulars, all or some men, which are comprised under the concept of man taken as a whole in quantity; or, finally, a combination of all the mentioned options. It is the job of supposition theory to clarify the *res* for which a term can stand in a propositional context.

Supposition is defined as a property of a term that already has signification, that is, that already has a relation of representation with an unspecified entity or unspecified res[987]. This will mean that supposition can be understood as a relation between a word, which happens to be a term, and a thing/things or *res*. If this fact is not evident from the dependence of supposition on the notion of signification, it can be understood from the explicit definition of supposition. The definition basically states that '*suppositio est acceptio termini pro aliquo*'[988], which means that supposition is the act of taking a term, the *supponens*, in the place of/for another, which is the

[986] Cf. *SL*., VI.2, p. 79, l. 11-14: "Significatio termini, prout hic sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio. Quare cum omnis res aut sit universalis aut particularis, oportet dictiones non significantes universale vel particulare non significare aliquid."
[987] Surely, it can be multiple entities not only one.
[988] See for example *SL*., VI.3, p. 80, l. 8-9, 10-11.

suppositum; while '*aliquo*' does not specify directly the status of the *suppositum*, further instances of the definition of supposition confirm that the entities in question are those included in an ambiguous manner in the relation of signification. In a number of passages[989] which deal with various subjects connected to supposition theory, the previous definition of supposition, that is, '*acceptio termini pro aliquo'*, is rendered in a more explicit manner with '*acceptio termini pro re/rebus.*' By explicitly identifying the *suppositum* with the *res* that we found in the explanation of signification, which are universals or particulars, Peter makes the supposition a property which moves in the domain of entities established by signification. Moreover, as we know, Peter does not have in his summaries any hint related to a theory of intentions or an account of *suppositio materialis*. It seems that the linguistic items and mental ones are missing from the list of possible *supposita*. Even in the case of simple supposition, Peter talks about *res universalis* and not about *intentio*. The truth seems to be that, starting from the definition of signification and arriving to that of supposition, Peter is neglecting the entire domain of mental realities.

However, if supposition theory has the specific task of clarifying for which type of entity or *res* from the domain of signification a term can stand in a propositional context, then we can make a particular distinction within Peter of Spain's doctrine. The contemporary scholarship seems to generally agree on a principal distinction in the articulation of almost every supposition theory. On the one hand, we can speak about a proper theory of supposition according to which we are told what is the general definition of supposition; on the other hand, we can speak about the theory of modes, in which the general concept of supposition is divided and each of its species is individually defined[990]. While this architectonic division holds true, at least in the case of Peter of Spain we can make a further distinction regarding the modes of supposition in connection to their use. On the one hand, we will have modes of supposition that are only treated

[989] See for example *SL* VI.5 - definition of simple supposition: "Simplex suppostio est acceptio termini comunis pro re universalis significata per ipsum", X.1 - definition of appellation: "Appellatio est acceptio termini communis pro re existente […] Differt autem appellatio a suppositione et a significatione, quia appellatio est tantum de re existente, sed significatio et suppositio tam de re existente quam non existente.", XI.18 - explanation of restriction: "Ut cum dicitur *'nichil est in archa'*, quamvis sit plena aere, quia iste terminus *'nichil'* supponit ab usu pro rebus solidis sive firmis", XII.10 - resolving particular sophismata: "'*differens ab omni homine'* in minus est quam *'differens a Sorte'*, quia *'differens ab omni homine'* supponit tantum pro rebus aliis ab homine, sed *'differens a Sorte'* supponit pro eisdem et etiam pro omnibus aliis hominibus a Sorte".

[990] The interpretation of supposition theory as composed of two parts has produced debates around the specific function of each, see MATTHEWS (1997), p. 35-40.

insofar as they clarify either how supposition theory generally works or help at defining further specific modes of supposition through its specific semantical or syntactical conditions; on the other, we will have modes that are treated in connection with the theory of fallacies or, more generally, are used in identifying fallacious reasoning. For the first, we can identify common, accidental and natural modes of supposition. The common supposition is used only to highlight the difference in the kind of terms with discrete supposition; the natural supposition is only posited to show the full range of *supposita* a term can have in contrast with the accidental supposition, which has this maximal range limited by the other elements of the proposition. To this extent, these modes can be considered auxiliary. For the rest, whenever a use for the theory of supposition is in question, that is, supposition is called to reveal and explain a fallacious reasoning, only three modes of supposition are involved: simple, discrete and personal supposition. For confused supposition Peter does not have an explicit treatment in connection with fallacious reasoning. Under personal supposition, in contrast to the division of modes offered in *SL.* VI, Peter treated both determinate and discrete supposition. As we already showed in the first section of our work, this applies in the cases of *figura dictionis*. The two rules, *a pluribus determinatis ad unam determinatam* and *a simplici ad personalem* seem to represent erroneous changes of the supposition a term has in the premise of a reasoning in contrast to conclusion. Thus, for example, is erroneous to infer a proposition in which the subject term has determinate supposition from a series of premises where the subject terms have all determinate supposition; likewise, is erroneous to infer a proposition in which, for example, the subject term has determinate supposition, from the same proposition in which the term had simple supposition. At least this is the line of reasoning that Peter suggests in the tract of supposition, especially *SL.* VI.6 and *SL.* VI.8.

Surprisingly enough, when *figura dictionis* is treated in the seventh tract, the cause of this fallacy is not attributed solely like in *SL.* VI to the change of the type of supposition the term has. For the case of the rule of determinate supposition, Peter states:

> "solent appellare istum paralogismum et consimiles 'a pluribus determinatis suppositionibus ad unam determinatam suppositionem', quia 'animal' in premissis et in conclusione determinatam habet suppositionem. Sed istud nichil est, quia procedere a determinata suppositione ad determinatam nullam facit fallaciam, nisi defectus aliquis concomitetur."[991]

[991] *SL.*, VII.99, p. 144, l. 16-21.

This means that for *figura dictionis* to appear does not suffices a transition from multiple determinate suppositions to a single determinate supposition but there needs to be an addition defect. For the case of simple supposition Peter states "ubicumque ipsi dicunt processum fieri a simplici ad personalem, aut istud non faciet fallaciam figure dictioni, aut oportet quod interpretetur ibi quale quid hoc aliquid"[992]. Thus, either what was states in *SL*. VI is false, and the transition from simple to determinate/discrete/confused[993] supposition does not produce a *fallacia dictionis*, or the cause of this fallacy should be attributed to the distinction *quale quid - hoc aliquid*. Does Peter distances himself here from the use of supposition theory in the theory of fallacy? It is not clear. What is clear is that here he is very evasive in the direction of such a use, especially since he uses expressions like "*solent appellare*" and "*ipsi dicunt*", fact that marks a position different from its own, a position that can be found in earlier works as *Dialectica Monacensis*[994]. But regardless of his own position, supposition can indeed be used in detecting and explaining fallacies, as it is suggested in *SL*. VI. If for Peter of Spain this thing brings nothing new to the theory of fallacies, but only adds new names for denoting the same fallacious reasonings that were explained before with the conceptual apparatus of the old logic, is another problem. In fact, Peter could have very easy insisted on the use of supposition theory on the theory of fallacy by showing, for example, how from simple supposition no personal or discrete supposition can be inferred and by explicitly stating that some fallacies have as their cause a difference in the type of supposition. Regardless of Peter's option, we consider that the difference between auxiliary modes of supposition and modes that have an actual interpretative roll in analyzing arguments can be made.

We have seen that confused supposition is somehow missing from the analysis of *figura dictionis* although it might be presupposed by the generality of *a simplici ad personalem* rule. But the way confused distributive and mobile supposition functions offer us some hints on the possible usefulness of the supposition theory in its entirety. Personal confused distributive mobile supposition is defined as the acceptance of a common term in the place of many by means of the universal sign, that is, in the place of each of its *supposita* or inferiors[995]. The

[992] *SL* VII.99, p. 144, l. 26-29.
[993] Here the example is offered regarding the discrete supposition but the rule states explicitly "*ad personalem*". Also, the example from *SL*., VI is offered with determinate supposition, thus a personal kind of supposition.
[994] See *LM*. II.2, p. 582-583.
[995] See *SL*., VI.9, p. 82, l. 29 - 83, l. 4.

mobility of this kind of supposition is defined through the possibility of descending under the suppositing term to any or each of its inferiors. This means, according to Peter, that confused and mobile supposition would allow from a proposition like "*omnis homo est animal*" an inference to: (1.) any of its inferiors separately "*Plato est animal*" or "*Sortes est animal*" and so on[996] and (2.) every of its inferiors through a concatenation of conjunctive propositions where the universal sign along with the suppositing term are replaced in every proposition with its inferiors, as suggested in *SL.* XII.15 '*Plato est animal et Sortes est animal' et sic de aliis*. While the inference to any of its inferiors is somehow obvious, the inference to every inferior is more importance since it seems to offer the truth conditions for the A-form proposition. We already seen how that works in the case of Ockham and how he explicitly states that a convers inference, that is, an ascending from the concatenation of propositions to the A-form proposition is impossible. Peter does not discuss regarding the confused mobile supposition the problem of ascending and thus his explanation is lacking some important elements. But what can be observed is that a somehow parallel account of the A-form proposition is offered by Peter in another place of *Summulae logicales*.

In *De locis*, the 15th paragraph of the fifth treatise of *SL*, Peter explains how a *locus* from a whole in quantity can be made. The considerations offered here can be considered an explanation for how confused and mobile supposition works. First of all, a whole in quantity is considered to be a universal taken universally. Its *locus* is defined as relation or disposition (*habitudo*) from the whole in quantity to its part. This relation can be conceived in a constructive way, that is, affirmatively, and in a destructive one, that is, negatively. For the first, the example is "*omnis homo currit; ergo Sortes currit*", while for the latter "*nullus homo currit; ergo Sortes non currit*"[997]. The exact two examples can be used to exemplify how confused, distributive and mobile supposition work for the subject term. The enthymemes obtained through the locus form a whole in quantity are the same as the inferential process of descending under a term with confused mobile supposition to any of its inferiors contained under it. The sole difference is a theoretical one. Since enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, for the conclusion of the enthymeme to be valid, there needs to be a maxim: "*quicquid predicatur de toto in quantitate, et de qualibet eius parte*"/"*quicquid removetur a toto in quantitate, et a qualibet eius parte*" or

[996] See *SL*., VI.9, p. 83, l. 15-16.
[997] See *SL*., V.15, p. 64, l. 24-p. 65, l. 4.

"*si universalis est vera, quelibet singularis eius est vera*"[998]. For the theory of supposition there is no such needs for a maxim since we would have the rule of distribution for the universal affirmative and negative distributive signs. In the case of *SL*, the rule of the affirmative distributive sign of substance is missing but it can be considered presupposed. As stated in *SL* XII.5 the universal affirmative sign signify that the common term is taken for every of its inferiors. The rule for negative distributive sign is offered explicitly: "quotiescumque hoc signum 'nullus' immediate adiungitur termino communi, confundit ipsum distributive et mobiliter; et similiter terminum cui adiungitur mediate"[999].

We have pointed out that Peter does not mention the problem of ascending inferences in his account of confused mobile and distributive supposition and that Ockham is denying the possibility to ascend from a proposition which contains an inferior of a distributive suppositing term. The theory of locus from the whole in quantity addresses indirectly this problem by speaking about a place from the part in quantity. This type of enthymeme is considered both constructive and destructive and is conceived as the relation or disposition (*habitudo*) form the parts in quantity taken simultaneous to the whole. For the first, the example is "*Sortes currit, Plato currit et sic de singulis; ergo omnis homo currit*", for the latter, "*Sortes non currit, Plato non currit et sic de singulis; ergo nullus homo currit*"[1000]. In this way, it is explained how from a conjunction of propositions which contain every part of a whole in quantity, an inference can be made to a universal proposition, affirmative or negative, about the whole. The maxima in use are the following: "*quicquid predicatur de omnibus partibus in quantitate simul sumptis, et de suo toto*"/"*quicquid removetur ab omnibus partibus in quantitate simul sumptis, et a suo toto*" or *"si quelibet singularis est vera, et sua universalis est vera*"[1001]. This way of understanding the *locus* from the part in quantity offers us a possibility of ascending from the entire collection of the propositions obtained from the previous descending under the confused, distributive and mobile suppositing term to its inferiors. This aspect, integrated to the theory of supposition will entail the following schema:

[998] *SL*., V.15, p. 65, l. 1-11.
[999] *SL*., XII.15, p. 219, l. 10-15.
[1000] *SL*., V.15, p. 65, l. 14-15, 23-24.
[1001] *SL*., V.15, p. 65, l. 17-22, 26-28.

Categorical proposition	A proposition Universal affirmative		E proposition Universal negative	
Structure	Every S are P Omnis S est P		No S is P Nullus S est P	
Supposition of the extreme S/P	Confused and distributive supposition (VI.9)	Simple supposition (VI.6)	Confused and distributive supposition (XII.15)	Confused and distributive supposition (XII.15)
Ad literam examples	Omnis homo est animal	Omnis homo est animal	*Nullus homo est asinus*	*Nullus homo est asinus*
Descending under the suppositing term	'ergo Sortes' vel 'ergo Plato' ['Sortes est animal, Plato est animal' et sic de aliis]	X	*ergo Sortes non est asinus, neque Plato*	*ergo nullus homo est Brunellus neque Fanellus',* et sic de aliis
Ascending to the original proposition through the theory of locus	*'Sortes est animal, Plato est animal' et sic de singulis*	-	*'Sortes non est asinus, Plato non est asinus' et sic de singulis*	*'nullus homo est Brunellus, nullus homo est Fanellus' et sic de singulis*

5. Table of the suppositions of the extremes for A and E categorical propositional forms according to Peter of Spain's theory of places

In this way, by supplementing the theory of supposition with the theory of places, a new clarification has been added. According to it, the original proposition in which the term has distributive, confused and mobile supposition can be considered equivalent to the conjunctive concatenation of propositions obtained by descending under the suppositing term due to the mutual entailment. This idea along with the way in which confused distributive mobile

supposition and determinate supposition are verified - by constructing an inference in the conclusion of which the common term with the particular or universal sign is replace with one or many of its inferiors - opens a possible interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of immediate inference and can be used in an argument for the so-called 'equivalation thesis'. This possibility will be explored a little more latter. What we will want to address now, are the problems related to the supposition of the predicates in I and O categorical forms of propositions.

In the second section dedicated to the formal analysis of Peter of Spain's supposition theory, we have seen that the predicate term of the particular affirmative and particular negative propositions, has no assignment of a special mode of supposition. In what follows we will try to see if Peter of Spain's doctrine would allow a specific mode of supposition for them.

Terence Parsons, in his exposition of the early account of supposition considers that the suppositions of A, E, I, O propositional forms can be summarized in the following manner:

> "the subjects of universals and the predicates of negatives have distributive supposition; the subjects and predicates of particular affirmatives, and the subjects of particular negatives, have determinate supposition; the predicate of a universal affirmative has merely confused supposition."[1002]

The only major exception from this general situation that Parsons identifies is Peter of Spain. For Parsons, Peter of Spain considers that the predicates of the categorical propositions do not have any personal suppositions at all; Parsons believes that the supposition ascribed to all the predicates of the categorical propositions are of *suppositio simplex* type[1003]. His account is offered on the basis of Peter's explanations from *SL.* VI.6 where the simple supposition is discussed. Here Peter shows that both the subject and the predicate of a proposition can have simple supposition in virtue of the fact that the term stands for a universal object. While examples are offered for both cases, there are some considerations that beg the question about their level of generality. For instance, Peter states that "*terminus communis in predicato positus*

[1002] PARSONS (2008), p. 223.
[1003] PARSONS (1997), p. 59: "(This was discussed in §2.4.) So the predicate of a particular negative cannot have distributive supposition for Peter; instead, he says that such predicates have simple supposition."; p. 62 note 37 "The non-nominalists (including Peter) thought that a term can also be used to stand for the associated universal; an example is 'man' in 'Man is a species'. This is called *simple* supposition. Peter thought that all predicate terms tend to have simple supposition; he needn't determine which mode of personal supposition they have, because they don't have *personal* supposition at all"; PARSONS (2008), p. 222, note 75: "Exception: Peter of Spain *T* VI.6 (70-71) held that all predicates have simple supposition, and do not have any mode of personal supposition. Some authors did not discuss the predicates of particular negatives.";

simpliciter teneatur"[1004]. A consideration like this made Parsons interpret Peter's doctrine of simple supposition as applying generally, to all the predicates of categorical propositions, and not locally, to the examples used in *SL* VI.6. Is this sort of interpretation correct? The answer seems to be negative. While for the predicate term of an A-form proposition like '*omnis homo est animal'* Peter states explicitly[1005] that simple supposition is the case and arguably the same can be said about its subordinate proposition of I-form, for example '*aliquis homo est animal*', in the case of E-form propositions Parsons' interpretation does not apply. As it was shown, Peter establishes for both the subject and the predicate of the E-form propositions a confused, distributive and mobile supposition on the basis of a specific rule followed by examples[1006]. This fact renders Parsons' interpretation as impossible to endorsed.

A different point of view regarding the predicates of the four categorical propositions can be observed in Swiniarski's 1970 paper. Swiniarski is not offering any doctrinal details from the *Summulae logicales* regarding his interpretation. He only lists his interpretation on Peter of Spain's options in order to be contrasted with the options offered by William Ockham. In Peter's case, according to Swiniarski, the predicate of A type and I type propositions have simple supposition while the predicates of E type and O type propositions have distributive, confused, mobile supposition[1007]. We surely agree with Swiniarski on the interpretation of the predicates in the affirmative propositions. Regarding the negative proposition forms, the E type goes uncontested in virtue of the rule from *SL.* XII.15, which shows how the universal negative sign distribute both of the extremes; but the O type proposition presents some problems. For the predicate of O type proposition to have confused, distributive and mobile supposition as the predicate of E-type proposition, there needs to be a cause for distributing the predicate term. The particular sign '*aliquis*' has not power to distribute and thus, the distributive effect must depend on the negation 'non'. But regarding the negative sign 'non' Peter has a small *quaestio* in the twelfth tract[1008]. The object of the *quaestio* is whether a negation has the power to distribute or to confuse. For the affirmative response he is quoting Aristotle in stating that *'homo est iustus'* and '*non homo est iustus*' are contradictories. Since the first proposition is a particular

[1004] *SL.*, VI.6, p. 82, l. 3-4.
[1005] See *SL.*, VI.6, p. 81, l. 21-23.
[1006] See *SL.*, XII.15, p. 219, l. 10-18.
[1007] See SWINIARSKI (1970), p. 203.
[1008] See *SL.*, XII.24, p. 224, l. 20-p. 225, l. 24.

affirmative the second one is a universal negative proposition[1009]. Since the only difference between the two is the negative sign '*non*', this means that '*non*' has the power to distribute or to confuse '*homo*'. Against this, Peter states that it is forbidden for every distributive sign to be put in front of a singular or discrete term; but the negative sign can be put correctly in front of such term. Thus, the negative sign does not have the power to distribute. It is this position which Peter will finally endorse. The negative sign only negates something and does not distribute. But if the negation does not distribute, Peter needs an explanation for the fact that '*non homo est iustus*' is a universal proposition. His explanation given in the solution states that the proposition is not universal due to the distributive nature of negation but due to the fact that '*homo*' in its generality is negated[1010]. His explanation is a little bit strange since it entails that a proposition of the form '*non quidam S est P*' is universal without the negation having the power to distribute. The reality is that, if we apply the rule from the first tract "*si alicui signo preponatur negatio, equipollet suo contradictorio"*[1011], the proposition in question will be equivalent to a proposition of the form '*nullus S est P*' in which the universal negative distributive sign confuses and distributes both terms. If the negation '*non*' has no distributive effect whatsoever, it is hard to make a case for Swiniarski's interpretation of the predicate contained by an O-form proposition as having a distributive, confused and mobile mode of supposition. But then, without the distribution effect of negation, it is also hard to explain why the extremes contained by the E form proposition have distributive, confused and mobile supposition. In Ockham's case, the option for the extremes of E type proposition and for the predicate of O type proposition having distributive, confused and mobile supposition comes with the endorsement of the distributive nature of the negation. In Peter case, the option for the extremes of E type proposition having distributive, confused and mobile supposition comes with a rejection of the distributive nature of the negation and an unspecified supposition for the predicate of O form proposition. How Peter's position which incorporates two opposed views on negation can be harmonized is not clear. However, a concession can be made towards embracing Swiniarski's interpretation. Since the distributive nature of the negative universal sign shown in the E-type proposition is offered by an explicit rule and this distributive effect

[1009] See also *SL* 1.18.
[1010] See *SL*., XII.24, p. 225, l. 21-24. For this to be true 'homo' needs to be interpreted as 'omnis homo' and not 'aliquis homo' as he explicitly stated in the tract on supposition
[1011] *SL*., I.18, p. 10, l. 5-7.

could be extrapolated to its subaltern proposition of O-type, then we can consider this a stronger argument for the distributive nature of negation than the ambiguous one made in its *solutio* against it.

Conclusion

The first sub-part of the third section tried to take another look on Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, in an effort of combining the two previous steps of our analysis. First, we argued that Peter uses the concept of 'suppositio' in different ways, such that we can speak about a multiplicity of meanings. Two different uses were identified which, at a first look, seemed to differ from the terminist property of supposition. The first is an acceptance of supposition that can be understood as a relation between a superior and one or more inferiors. We have showed that this hierarchical acceptance is based on the relations represented by the Porphyrian tree structure, doubled by the notion of relatives of superiority and inferiority. The second is an acceptance in which supposition is understood as a grammatical subject of the proposition, in contrast with the notion of *appositio*. Moreover, we argued that those two notions partially enter in the conceptual building structure of the terminist notion of supposition. On the one hand, supposition, as a relation between a *supponens* and a *suppositum*, is conceived on the same conceptual scheme as the relatives; the specific hierarchical acceptance can be seen in the case of confused distributive supposition, where the *supponens*, a distributed and confused term which is explicitly considered a superior, is put in relation to its inferiors, the *supposita*, which are the individuals contained under the common suppositing term. On the other hand, in a minimal propositional structure, formed by a subject and a predicate, the one which has the terminist property of supposition is the substantival name, which, in the majority of cases, corresponds with the *supponens* taken grammatically or the subject term. However, this last conceptual overlapping is not entirely correct, since almost every part of speech that has a substantival form can have the property of supposition, whether it is a subject or not, as can be seen from the numerous examples that we provided. However, it is undeniable that both acceptances enter in the constitution of the terminist theory of supposition. The first, as a general structure, in the vertical relation between the *suppones* and *supposita* or as a specific one, in the confused and distributive supposition; the second, only partially, as a horizontal relation, for the instances in which the suppositing term is identical with the propositional subject. But even for

the grammatical acceptance, there is another link with the terminist one, through the hierarchical acceptance: the *supposita* or the inferiors of a suppositing term are logical and grammatical subjects in respect to their superior, which is correctly predicated about them.

The second part addressed once again the problems related to the extremes of the A, E, I, O categorical propositional forms, in an attempt to sketch an answer regarding the nature and purpose of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. In a first step, we showed the dependence of the supposition to the notion of signification. We showed that, in Peter's account, signification is a pre-propositional property of words to represent objects in an unspecified manner. It does not specify if the represented object is a universal, an individual, a collection of individuals, all or some, or if it represents all these entities in the same time. In this sense, supposition comes as a tool to supplement this function of clarifying for which type of entity or *res*, from the domain of signification, a term can stand in a propositional context.

Further, we have explored how the theory of fallacies and that of places can contribute to the clarification of the concepts of supposition and to the problem related to the supposition of the extremes in the classical categorical propositions. Accordingly, we have showed that, although simple, personal and, to a certain extent, discrete supposition seems to have a role in determining the fallacious reasoning, as showed in *SL.*VI through the rules *a pluribus determinatis ad unam determinatam* and *a simplici ad personalem*, the situation seems to be different. In the seventh tract, Peter does not consider the transition from one type of supposition in the premises to another in conclusion, as indicated by the two rules, a cause for fallacious reasoning, but attributes this position to others. This fact hinders the interpretation of supposition as a theory with applications in the fallacy theory, at least in Peter's case.

In relation with the theory of places, we have argued how the theory of the place from the whole in quantity presented in the fifth tract of *SL.* can be used to supplement the theory of personal confused supposition and the lack of explicit examples. We showed how the theory of places describes enthymemes which are exactly the same as the enthymemes formed by descending under a personal, mobile and confused suppositing term. The difference from the supposition theory is that, the theory of places does not offer only a more comprehensive method of descending under the suppositing term, but it adds a method of ascending back to the original proposition from the concatenation of propositions or collection of the inferiors contained by

the suppositing term. In this way, an argument for the 'equivalation thesis' can be made, since we have a mutual entailment.

Aside from the clarifications offered through the theory of fallacies and especially the theory of places, Peter of Spain's theory still presents some challenges in relation to the supposition of the predicates in the proposition of I and O forms. In an attempt to clarify them, we showed that Parsons's position according to which all the predicates must have simple supposition in the simple categorical forms, cannot be held. A much better option was identified in Swiniarski's position, according to which the predicate of I-type proposition has simple supposition, while that of O-type proposition has confused and distributive supposition. But even under this position, the case of the O-type proposition presents some problems. For a term to have a confused and distributive supposition, there needs to be a cause of confusion. In the case of the O-type proposition, the only cause can be the negation. But Peter rejects in *SL.* XII.24 the property of negation to confuse or distribute the term. This fact makes the attribution of a confused and distribute supposition to the predicate of O-type proposition problematic; moreover, it begs the question about the supposition of the extremes in E-type propositions.

In conclusion we can state that, our analysis developed in this sub-section explained Peter's theory of supposition in a more comprehensive manner, through the assessment of the different occurrences of the 'suppositio' concept and through its connections with the theory of signification, places and fallacies. However there seems to be some inherent problems with Peter's account. The role negation plays in the simple categorical propositions is unclear, since, in some instances, it looks that it has the power to distribute, but in others, not. The same can be said regarding his account related to the use of supposition in the theory of fallacies. These aspects beg the question regarding the doctrinal coherence between different tracts which offer different positions about the same object.

3.2. Doctrinal orientation

In the previous part of the current section, we showed how Peter's supposition theory can be better understood through the analysis of the different meanings of 'suppositio' and through its connection with other doctrinal structures of *SL*. In a further step, Peter's doctrinal commitment expressed in his supposition theory will be addressed. Based on the analogy of substitution or replacement of a physical object with another, supposition is understood as a relation according to which a linguistic entity, that is, a term, stands for or replaces one or more individual objects, that is, *res*. Formulated in this particular manner Peter of Spain seems to be of a realist orientation, fact confirmed in general lines by its posteriority. However, when we speak about some particular author bearing the label of realism, nominalism or idealism orientations, we have the obligation to state regarding which aspect of his doctrine one of these specific denominations can be used.

First of all, in order to see the degree in which Peter of Spain can be considered an endorser of realism, we will explore some relevant passages of his doctrine. Secondly, we will focus on some points of his general approach towards logic that may offer a different alternative to realism.

3.2.1. Peter of Spain's realism

Generally speaking, what may differentiate the medieval nominalism from the medieval realism is the account on universals. If for the former the universal is a reality of the mind and the only one that has an extra-mental and extra-linguistic reality in the concrete individual, for the latter, the extra-linguistic and extra-mental reality is composed by both kinds of entities: universals and individuals. Is such a realist position traceable to Peter of Spain's doctrine? Our first answer will be affirmative, since there are a number of passages in *Summaries of logic* that allow such an interpretation.

The first important passage is offered at the beginning of the second tract, *De predicabilibus*. There, Peter offers a first hint for the nature of the universal in a parallel definition with the notion of predicable: "'predicabile' proprie sumptum et 'universale' idem sunt, sed differunt in hoc quod predicabile diffinitur per dici, universale autem per esse. Est enim predicabile quod aptum natum est dici de pluribus. Universale autem est quod aptum est esse in

pluribus."[1012] According to this passage, the universal is the existing counterpart of the predicable such that, putting aside their ontological difference (pertaining to language vs. pertaining to reality) they can be considered the same. As the predicable is said of many, so the universal exists in many. As we already showed in a certain degree in the first section, the universal can be in (*esse in*) multiple individuals in different ways as Peter states in *SL.* III.2[1013]. From the eight modes offered there, only two of them are of interest to us, the fourth and the fifth mode. The fourth tells us that there is a way of being in something as the genus is in its species, for example as the *animal* is in *homine*[1014]. The fifth bring forward the hylomorphic concepts, since it tells us that there is a way of being in as the form in the matter. Regarding this mode, Peter differentiates between a substantial and accidental form. The substantial form, for example, the soul, is said in a proper way to be in something material, for example, a body, while the accidental form, for example, the quality of being white, is said in an improper or accidental way to be in another[1015]. Those considerations let us understand that a universal is an entity that exists in many particulars and it is represented in language and logic by a predicable. Understood through the hylomorphic elements, a universal seems to be the same thing with and bares the same ontological matter-dependence as the form, be it substantial or not. But although the mode of *being in* has been explained to certain extent, these considerations beg the question on the problem regarding how the universal exists in many. It is multiplied in each individual according to its unique configuration such that we can speak about a multiplicity of different universals that pertain to a same general genus? This would mean that there would exists different and multiple universals of humanness for each individual human. Or there is a unique, identical and undifferentiated universal in all the individuals? This would mean that the same humanness is in every particular human. We will try to identify an answer later.

The second set of paragraphs which point towards a realist interpretation are offered in the tract dedicated to supposition theory. Since some of them were already explored, we will

[1012] *SL*., II.1, p. 17, l. 7-11.
[1013] See *SL*., III.2, p. 27, l. 7-p. 28, l. 13.
[1014] See *SL*, III.2, p. 27, l. 19-20: "Quartus modus essendi in est sicut genus in specie, ut animal in homine et unumquodque diffiniens in sua diffinitione et unequeque diffinitiones in suo diffinito."
[1015] Cf. *SL*, III.2, p. 27, l. 22-p. 28, l. 4: "Quintus modus essendi in est sicut forma in materia. Et iste quintus modus subdividitur, quia est quaedam forma substantialis, ut anima est forma substantialis homini; alia autem est forma accidentalis, ut album homini. Et prima harum dicitur proprie esse in sicut forma in materia, ut anima in corpore; alia autem dicitur esse in sicut accidens in subiecto, ut albedo in pariete et color in corpore."

limit ourself in offering just some relevant points to our argument. First of all, signification is conceived as a representation of a *res* which can be either a universal or a particular[1016]. Moreover, as it was noted, Peter talks about substantival and adjectival objects. This fact straightens the inclusion of the universal in the ontology of extra-mental and extra-propositional realm. Secondly, simple supposition is defined as the taking of the propositional common term in the place of the universal thing signified by it ("*pro re universali significata per ipsum*")[1017]. Since signification would represent undistinguishably through a word a particular, a universal, or both, by integrating signification under the simple supposition, a specific relation of representation between certain propositional terms and extra-mental and extra-propositional universal objects has been made. This once again is a further proof for Peter's realist commitment regarding universals.

3.2.2. The conceptual approach?

The considerations offered above are not the only analysis of Peter of Spain doctrinal orientation. Gyula Klima made a parallel assessment of both Peter of Spain's and Buridan's ontology[1018]. He considers Peter's realism and Buridan's nominalism as different versions of conceptualism, where the second position can be theoretically obtained from the first through an act of 'adverbialization of semantic'. This means that the syntactical and ontological categories remain the same but what changes in the conceptual movement from a realist account to a nominalist one is the different way in which those categories relate[1019]. Now, what interests us is Peter of Spain. Regarding him, Klima shows that his position is very closed to an "extremely extreme realism". This kind of realism is conceived in the following manner:

> "extremely extreme realism' would be the kind of semantic theory in which different syntactical categories distinguished in terms of their different semantic functions would be taken to be in a one-to-one correspondence with different ontological categories, given that the different semantic functions of the different syntactical categories would be explained precisely in terms of being related to entities in those different ontological categories"[1020]

The fundamental thing that softens Peter's hard realism is a theoretical distinction that, according to Klima, introduces a "layer of *things-as-conceived and their modes*"[1021] which does

[1016] See *SL*., VI.2, p. 79, l. 11-14.
[1017] See *SL*., VI.5, p. 81, l. 12-13.
[1018] See KLIMA (2011), p. 109-126.
[1019] See KLIMA (2011), p. 109-110.
[1020] KLIMA (2011), p. 111.
[1021] KLIMA (2011), p. 124.

not comprise *per se* real existing objects. It is important to insist more than Klima did on this particular theoretical aspect which, although does not make Peter a nominalist, makes his account on universals less ontological committed. Moreover, this particular theoretical distinction will offer and answer for the way in which a universal exists in its individuals.

In the *solutio* section of *SL.* VI, where Peter is explaining how the confused supposition works in contrast to the simple supposition, an important distinction is made between *via logicae* and *via naturae*. The example in question is "*omnis homo est animal*". What is at stake here is basically the ontological status of the universal. Since in this proposition a universal distributive sign is applied on the subject term, the proposition speaks about a multiplicity of humans of which a genus or universal is predicated. Peter tells us that although we have a simple supposition in the predicate extreme, according to this proposition the term "*homo*" does not stands only for all the humans but for all the humans which are animals. This means that as many universals of humanity we will have in each individual, we will have equal as many universals of animality. This is the case, since, it is pointed out that the expression "*omnis homo*" from the previous proposition is understood as "*omnis animal rationale mortale*". Moreover, the way the universal exists in each individual is such that, each type of universal is essentially different from the other. Thus, the humanity or animality of one individual is essentially (*per se*) different from the humanity or animality of another: "natura humanitas mea est per se et alia est ab humanitate tua, sicut anima mea per quam est humanitas mea in me, alia est ab anima tua, per quam causatur humanitas tua in te"[1022]. It is important to note here that the universal conceived in this manner refers to the universal understood as a form of a particular matter. This fact is pointed out in *SL.* XII.7, where distribution is discussed. On the one hand, Peter distinguishes a form which is a form of a matter. This form is a part of the whole and is not predicable about it. It is the case of the soul which is considered the form of the body. This form is different in each individual like the soul is different in each individual human. On the other hand, there is a predicable form which has as matter individuals. It is the case of genus, species and difference, like '*animal*' and '*homo*'[1023]. Accordingly, the animality multiplicated

[1022] *SL.*, VI. 12, p. 87, l. 27-p. 88, l. 88.
[1023] See *SL.*, XII.7, p. 213, l. 25-31: "Duplex est forma, quia quedam est que est forma materie, ut anima mea est forma corporis mei et tua tui, et ista forma est pars et non predicatur de eo cuius est forma. Alia autem est forma que est forma predicabilis, et sic omnia superiora, ut genera et species et differentie, dicuntur forme inferiorum, ut homo, equus, animal, et consimilia."

differently in each individual human is of the form of the first kind. It is the animality presupposed by the subject term of "*omnis homo est animal*". The animality which pertains to the second type of form is the animality implied by the predicate with simple supposition. But regardless of the differences between types of forms, Peter makes a distinction between a way of considering the universal according to nature and according to logic. Whenever matter comes into question and the way in which the universal actually exist in a particular matter, the universal multiply according to matter in each individual. This corresponds to the natural way of dealing with the universals. According to logic, the situation is different. Although the universal seems to be ontologically present, it is the same in each individual. Thus, the humanity will be the same in each individual human: "eadem est humanitas, secundum viam logice, non nature, in quolibet individuo hominis; sicut homo in communi idem est"[1024].

Those consideration open the possibility for a less realist interpretation. According to logic, although the universal is not made a concept or an intention of the soul, it is made numerically one for all the individuals in which it exists. But regardless of this fact, according to nature, the universal still multiplies according to the requirements of matter.

Moreover, in some parts of his doctrine, Peter seems to soften his ontological commitments of the *supposita*. There seems to be[1025] a difference between *supposita praesentia* and *supposita existentia*, meaning that, for example, if the verb *esse* is used in a propositional context, it does not restrict the supposition to existing *supposita* but to present ones, which can be non-existing. In addition, in the cases of names for nonbeings, like 'chimera', 'Antichrist' and 'Cesar', a relation to a *significatum* and a *suppositum* can be made but not to an existing object[1026]. This fact would seemingly place the *supposita* in a strange ontological taxonomy. However, in the doctrine of appellation, in which the *appellata* are existing objects by definition, the ontological commitment regarding the universals is fully assumed, since Peter clearly states that:

(1.) Proper names or singular terms signify, supposit and appellate the same existing object;

[1024] *SL*., VI. 12, p. 87, l. 24-25.
[1025] See for example *SL*, XI.16
[1026] See *SL*., X.1, p. 197, l. 5-14.

(2.) Terms with simple supposition signify, supposit and appellate the same universal existing object;

(3.) Terms with personal supposition signify the universal, but supposit and appellate for particular existing objects[1027].

With the exception of terms which signify non-beings, the theory of appellation seems to imply that the *appellata*, being either universal or particular, are existing *res* which are identical with the *supposita*[1028]. The fact that a term with simple supposition appellates, that is, establishes a semantical relation to an existing universal or common nature, is clear from the second points. This fact reinforces once again Peter's commitment to a strong realist thesis regarding universals.

Conclusion

This short part of our work tried to show the ontological implications of Peter of Spain's doctrine. In a first step, we argued that his logical doctrines imply a realist account regarding the universals. On the one hand, the definition of the universal as an object defined *per esse* in the tract of predicables is a first argument towards the realist commitment. On the other, the theory of signification that enters into the construction of the simple supposition, which is defined as a relation between a term and the universal object signified by it, represents the second argument towards such a position.

In a second step, we tried to assess the extent to which Peter of Spain may be considered a conceptualist. This path of reasoning was suggested by Gyula Klima, who, although considered Peter's position close to an "extremely extreme realism", acknowledged an ontological domain of "*things-as-conceived and their modes*", which softens the ontological commitment. In support for his conceptual approach, we explained Peter's distinction between

[1027] See *SL*., X.2, p. 197, l. 15 - X.4, p. 198, l. 9: "Terminus singularis idem significat et supponit et appellat, quia significat rem existentem, ut 'Petrus' vel 'Iohannes' […] Appellationis termini communis alia est termini communis pro ipsa re in communi, ut quando terminus communis habet simplicem suppositionem. Ut cum dicitur 'homo est species' vel 'animal est genus'. Et tunc terminus communis idem significat et supponit et appellat, ut 'homo' significat hominem in communi et supponit pro homine in communi et appellat hominem in communi […] alia autem est termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut quando terminus communis habet personalem suppositione. Ut cum dicitur 'homo currit', tunc 'homo' non idem significat et supponit et appellat, sed significat hominem in communi et supponit pro particularibus et appellat particulares homines existentes."

[1028] It is not clear if in the case of common terms with personal supposition, the *appellata* and *supposita* are ontologically identical or not.

via logicae and *via nature* from *SL.* VI. According to it, logic may be conceived as preoccupied with the conceptual realm and not with material entities, fact that makes the universal an existing and numerical plural entity only according to the sciences which study the matter and its movement, like physics. However, this position fades out in front of Peter's supposition doctrine and especially in front of his doctrine of appellation. There is stated that a term with simple supposition signifies, supposits and appellates the same universal existing object. Since appellation is defined as the taking of a term for an existing object, the realist commitment regarding the universal is once again stated on much stable grounds.

In conclusion, we may say that Peter of Spain has a realist account on logic, although some small portions of his doctrine may imply a weak tendency towards conceptualism. Since the domain of concepts and mental realities is completely missing from his doctrinal framework, his commitment to realism can be considered natural.

3.3. The formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory and its interpretation

The second section of our work showed that, in case of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, the general degree of formality is much lower than in the case of other later versions of supposition theory like that of Ockham. For Peter, supposition is defined semantically on the basis of the theory of signification, and the conditions for each particular mode pertain to semantics, although some syntactic or formal elements are involved. Our task for this section is to address the problem of the specific types of formality that can be found in Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, in order to test its compatibility with the modern interpretations that usually were applied to Ockham.

We have already showed that Peter's account integrates the multiple meanings of supposition that were historically formed in the tradition which predated the terminist logic, fact that renders ThMl1 debatable. However, since Peter himself makes some specific connections between the supposition theory and the theory of places and fallacies, there are certain features developed outside of *SL.* VI, which may allow a comparison with its modern counterparts.

At this point, we want to see the extent to which Peter's supposition theory can be considered, in virtue of its formal elements, a specific post-Fregean theoretical construct. In order to do so, first, a comparative analysis will be made with the 13th century versions of supposition theory. This will allow us to determine if the degree of formality found in Peter's account is common for the generic evolution of terminist logic or not. Secondly, we will show in what particular and specific sense from those identified in the second section of our work, Peter's supposition theory can be considered formal. Thirdly, we will test the degree in which his account can be considered a theory of: reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics or conceptual notation.

3.3.1. Preliminaries. Peter of Spain, Sherwood and Lambert

Before discussing the specific formality of Peter's theory and the way in which this formality allows a specific interpretation, a preliminary comparison between the definition of the three practical modes of supposition in 13th century will be done. This comparison wants to show the measure in which Peter of Spain's way of dealing with supposition theory can be attribute to a historical stage of evolution or to a particular auctorial conception. In other words,

what we want to see is, whether the apparent lack of formality for the articulation of supposition theory can be attributed to the whole 13th century or only to our author.

The first mode of supposition that we will take into account is determinate supposition. The three versions of its definition are:

> Peter: "'Determinata' suppositio dicitur quam habet terminus communis indefinite sumptus vel cum signo particulari, ut 'homo currit' vel 'aliquis homo currit'. Et dicitur utraque istarum 'determinata', quia licet in utraque illarum iste terminus 'homo' supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente vere sunt. Aliud enim est supponere et aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo. In predictis enim, ut dictum est, iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, sed reddit locutionem veram pro currente."[1029]
>
> Sherwood: "Et est determinata, quando poterit exponi locutio per aliquod unum. Et hoc est, quando dictio supponit pro aliquo uno, ut cum dico: 'Homo currit.' Ista potest esse vera, quolibet currente."[1030]
>
> Lambert: "Determinata est illa quam habet terminus communis quando indifferenter potest sumi pro uno vel pro pluribus, ut cum dicitur : «homo currit»; in hac «homo» habet determinatam suppositionem. Est enim ista vera uno homine currente, vel pluribus. Dicitur autem determinata quia ad veritatem propositionis in una ponitur terminus communis talem suppositionem habens, sufficit quod pro aliquo supposito teneatur de necessitate iste terminus communis, nec exigitur quod pro pluribus teneatur de necessitate, licet possit in tali suppositione teneri pro pluribus. Necesse est ergo quod terminus communis in tali suppositione teneatur pro uno determinate; si autem pro pluribus, hoc accidit."[1031]

The way determinate supposition is considered by the three authors apparently vary. According to Peter of Spain, for a term to have determinate supposition means to stand for all the individuals contained under the suppositing term whether they fulfil the action described by the verb or not. To render the proposition true only for one individual indicated by the predicate term seems to be a different property. However, the difference between *supponit* and "*reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo"* may be interpreted as highlighting the fact that the suppositing term does not stand for only one individual but for many, while it is sufficient to stand only for one pointed out by the predicate to make the proposition true. Although, for Peter, the property

[1029] *SL*. VI.8, p. 82, l. 13-22.
[1030] SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.7., p. 266, l. 29-31.
[1031] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210

of supposition is delimitated from the notion of truth, is hard to conceive how one should properly understand determinate supposition and differentiate it from other modes, if one does not appeal to the verification of the proposition for at least one individual. On the other hand, Sherwood seems to consider supposition more directly truth dependent. For him to supposit determinately for something means to render the expression with the suppositing term true for at least one individual (*pro aliquo uno*)[1032] although this can be done for any of the inferiors which satisfy the proposition. Lambert explicitly states that the suppositing term can stand either for only one individual or for many. The determinate supposition marks the fact that, for the truth of the proposition which contains the suppositing term it is sufficient and necessary that the term to stand only for one individual while it can stand in a non-necessary way for many. In this manner, the Lambert definition of determinate supposition is truth-dependent and more rigorous logically articulated.

From the aforementioned definitions we can see that, only Peter of Spain insists on the syntactic condition of presence or absence of the particular sign and that only him distances himself from conceiving determinate supposition as stating clearly the truth condition for a proposition. Although the insistence on the syntactic notion is a plus, not stating clearly the truth condition of the proposition which contains a determinate supposition is a minus. By stating clearly that the term with determinate supposition stands for at least one individual that makes the proposition true, a step forward is made towards defining determinate supposition in a more rigorous manner as a possibility to descend under the term trough a concatenation of disjunctives, where each disjunct is formed by replacing the common suppositing term with one of its inferiors. However, not even Lambert talks about the theory of descent in the case of determinate supposition. Although personal supposition is associated with the fact that a term stands for its inferiors, in 13th century descending under those inferiors is more directly associated to distribution. Accordingly, in the case of defining determinate supposition no descending is taken into account, since we have to deal only with a particular sign and not a universal one.

The second mode of interest is personal confused mobile supposition. The three versions of its definition are:

[1032] See also PARSONS (2008), p. 226

Peter: "Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro pluribus mediante signo universali. Ut cum dicitur 'omnis homo est animal', iste terminus 'homo' mediante signo universali tenetur pro pluribus, quia pro quolibet suo supposito[…] Sed confuse et distributive supponit, quia tenetur pro omni homine; mobiliter vero, quia licet descensum fieri pro quolibet suo supposito, ut 'omnis homo; ergo Sortes' vel 'omnis homo; ergo Plato'."[1033]

Sherwood: "Distributiva autem, quando supponit pro multis, ita quod pro quolibet, ut haec dictio 'homo', cum dico: 'Omnis homo est animal.' Mobilis autem, quando potest fieri descensus, ut in praedicto exemplo in hoc termino 'homo'[1034] […] Habetur ergo pro regula, quod omne signum distributivum confundit terminum sibi immediate adiunctum confuse et distributive. Sed signum affirmativum confundit terminum remotum confuse tantum. Signum autem negativum confundit terminum remotum confuse et distributive. Unde sequitur: 'Nullus homo est asinus; ergo nullus homo est iste asinus'"[1035]

Lambert: "Confusa est illa quam habet terminus communis quando de necessitate tenetur pro omnibus suis suppositis vel pro pluribus. Dicitur autem confusa a multitudine suppositorum pro quibus tenetur terminus talem suppositionem habens: ubi enim est multitudo ibi est confusio.[…] Vehemens mobilis est illa quam habet terminus communis quando tenetur pro omnibus suis suppositis de necessitate, et potest fieri descensus sub eo, et hoc fit quando signum universale affirmativum immediate additur termino communi, ut cum dicitur: «omnis homo currit» ; et similiter quando signum universale negativum mediate vel immediate additur termino communi, ut cum dicitur : « nullus homo est lapis »: in hac enim terminus cui immediate additur hoc signum «nullus», scilicet «lapis», et similiter cui additur immediate, habent confusam suppositionem vehementer mobilem; nam signum universale affirmativum terminum cui immediate additur confundit et distribuit; mediate autem adiunctum confundit sed non distribuit; signum vero universale negativum terminum communem sibi adiunctum immediate et mediate confundit et distribuit. Similiter hanc suppositionem habet terminus communis cui additur negatio immediate"[1036]

Regarding the confused mobile supposition all three authors seems to envision the same relation of supposition where a term stands in the place of many objects, but with different degrees of details. The confused distributive mobile supposition is marked by the syntactic element of the universal sign. For a term to have this kind of supposition means to stand for every inferior

[1033] *SL*. VI.9, p. 82, l. 29-p. 83, l. 4; l. 13-16.
[1034] SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.7, p. 266, l. 32-36.
[1035] SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.14, p. 270.
[1036] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210

contained under the term, that is, for every of its *supposita* or individuals. For Lambert, the fact that the term is taken for every one of the inferiors is given by necessity. In each case, the mobility is understood as the possibility of a descending inference to each individual contained under the common term. The examples used show that this descending takes place separately for each inferior. The idea of necessity expressed by Lambert is once again a step forward towards the conjunctive concatenation of all the propositions resulting from the separate descents, concatenation that will be found in the works of Ockham. The difference between the three authors consists in the regulations offered regarding the distributive sign. While Sherwood and Lambert explain clearly through rules that the universal affirmative sign confuses distributively only the immediate term and the universal negative sign both the immediate and mediate term, Peter of Spain offers a rule only for the negative sign in the tract of distribution. Moreover, Lambert seems to consider a distributive effect even for negation, mediated or not![1037] However, all three have in common the rejection of any descending or mobility for the case in which the universal affirmative sign is put mediately to a term. For this case, Sherwood and Lambert choose a merely confusion, while Peter of Spain a simple supposition. Accordingly, in contrast to Ockham, all three reject to address the possibility of a descending inference for the case in which the universal affirmative sign is put mediately to a term.

The third mode, the simple supposition, run as follows:

> Peter: "Simplex suppositio est acceptio termini comunis pro re universalis significata per ipsum. Ut cum dicitur 'homo est species' vel 'animal est genus', iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro homine in communi et non pro aliquo inferiorum, et iste terminus 'animal' pro animali in communi et non pro aliquo inferiorum."[1038]
>
> Sherwood: "Et est simplex, quando dictio supponit significatum pro significato, ut: 'Homo est species.'[…] accipitur pro forma significata et tunc est simplex suppositio.[…] cum supponit simpliciter, praesentat ad intellectum formam significatam per nomen"[1039]
>
> Lambert: "Simplex suppositio est illa secundum quam tenetur terminus pro se vel pro re sua, non habito respectu ad supposita sub se contempla.[…] Dicitur autem illa suppositio simplex que est

[1037] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 210: "Similiter hanc suppositionem habet terminus communis cui additur negatio immediate, ut cum dicitur : « non homo currit», hoc est dicere: «nullus homo currit»; vel mediate, ut cum dicitur: « non video hominem », hoc est dicere: « nullum video hominem »".
[1038] *SL*. VI.5, p. 81, l. 12-15.
[1039] SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.3, p. 266, l. 11-12; 5.1.7, p. 267, l. 74-75.

> in termino ratione forme sue et quia forma de se simplex est et indivisibilis, ideo illa suppositio que inest termino a forma, simplex dicitur"[1040]

Regarding the simple supposition, we can see that for all three authors a suppositing term has no relation to inferiors, at least in its proper sense[1041]. The term is standing for a universal object, for its significate/signified form or for itself/for its object. However, only in Peter's case the universal or the form is conceived as existing outside the soul, as a res. In the case of Sherwood, the form is an abstracted entity conceived by the intellect and its explicitly contrasted to the signified res which carry that form. A similar thing can be said for Lambert. As we have seen in the first part of our work, for Lambert terms signify primarily a concept of a thing (*intellectus rei*) and not objects outside the soul. For him too, a term with simple supposition stands for the form logically contained by the term and abstractly conceived by the intellect. However, if one would object that we cannot strictly speak about a rejection of the realism regarding the universals in the case of Lambert and Sherwood, at least we consider that we can speak about a more relaxed realism than that found in Peter of Spain. Another difference that contrasts Peter of Spain's doctrine is that, the other two seem to not use simple supposition for the predicate extremes of A and I propositional forms as Peter did[1042]. Instead, they will choose an immobile supposition, where the descending inferences cannot be made. All these small differences add up, making Sherwood's and Lambert's positions less strange to the theoretical developments of supposition theory that took place in 14th century.

In conclusion, we may say that Peter of Spain's theory of supposition has a low degree of formality even according to the other 13th century versions. This fact was argued on the basis of the different ways determinate, confused and distribute and simple supposition were conceived. For the first, Sherwood and Lambert conceived determinate supposition as a way of verifying the truth value of a proposition for a certain *suppositum*. Peter of Spain does not integrate directly this function in his account of determinate supposition, but rather considers it as something different, since supposition and the fact of rendering the proposition true for a certain *suppositum* are considered to be different by him[1043]. For the second mode, in

[1040] LAMBERTUS, *Logica*, VIII, p. 209.
[1041] The details of supposition theory for each author are discussed in part I. Some of them admit in certain species of simple supposition a special relation to inferiors.
[1042] See SWINIARSKI (1970, p. 203).
[1043] See *SL*. VI.8, p. 82, l. 13-22.

Sherwood's and Lambert's case, when discussing confused and distributive supposition, rules of distribution are offered for the universal signs and even for the negation, in function of their immediate or mediate relation with a term. In Peter's case, those rules are missing in his chapter on supposition and only a rule for the negative distributive sign can be found in his twelfth tract, on distribution. Regarding the third aspect, the simplex supposition, the differences are more pronounced. On the basis of their more careful account of the old Aristotelian relation between words, concepts and things, Sherwood and Lambert consider simple supposition to be a relation between a word and an object conceived by the intellect, that is, the form of an object grasped by the intellect or the concept of an object, and not directly as a relation between a word and an object outside the soul like in Peter's case. Moreover, the two seem to prefer a personal immobile supposition for the predicates of A and I propositional categorical forms, while Peter seems to choose a simple supposition.

The fact of establishing a connection between supposition and the truth-conditions of a proposition, that of offering rules for explaining the distributive effect in function of the syntactical elements and the fact of avoiding purely semantical concepts, that is, simple supposition as understood by Peter, in the analysis of the simple categorical forms, are all elements towards the property of formality. They are more presents in Sherwood's and Lambert's account than in Peter's.

3.3.2. Peter of Spain's theory of supposition and the specific notion of formality

At this point we have seen the main articulations of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition in contrast to both 13th century theories and Ockham's much later version of supposition. While the distance from Ockham regarding the degree of formality is evident, the difference in formality from Sherwood and Lambert is less explicit but is still there. We also have seen from the study of generic formality that Peter's supposition theory presents some serious shortcomings. However, we may ask in the following lines what kind of specific formality can be attributed to Peter of Spain in accordance to the specific acceptances identified by Catarina Dutilh Novaes and MacFarlane that were discussed in the second section.

From the very beginning we must state that Peter of Spain supposition theory, like any other supposition theory, is formal in a certain degree. It can be said to be formal in the sense that it has the intention of representing in an abstract manner a logico-linguistical relation. What

the theory of supposition does, is to interpret a logical phenomenon and to render it in an abstract way but limited by the conceptual apparatus of a quasi-formal language. In order to see in what way Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be considered formal according to the modern standards we will try to trace in it the different elements of formality identified in the second section of our work.

The first notion that comes into analysis is D1, formal as regimentation, which reflects in a certain degree upon the M1 notion. According to our understand, and probably interpreted in a broad way, formal as regimentation presupposes that a theory is considered formal when it offers normative rules regarding its constitution or application. As we seen, in general, medieval logic and supposition theories are governed by explicit rules that are obviously expressed in a natural language. Supposition theories use constitutive rules of descending and distribution to define its modes and applicative rules which show what valid inferences can be made from a proposition with a certain kind of supposition. In the case of Peter of Spain, we have seen that the rules of distribution are offered in an incomplete manner. Only in the case of the negative distributive sign, in *SL.* XII.15, such a rule is given, while the rule for the negation and the affirmative universal sign is missing. The rule of descending is also missing, since, regarding mobility, Peter opts for particular examples of inferences and not for general rules. Although rules are offered in many places of his logic, in the part dedicated to supposition they are missing or offered in an incomplete way. Although an intention of dealing with the rules of inference according to the types of supposition is expressed by mentioning the rules *a simplici ad personalem* and *a pluribus determinatis ad unam*, he ultimately rejects such an endeavor. Thus, the formality as regimentation either applies in a very small extent to Peter of Spain or does not apply at all. This hinders from the very beginning the possibility of considering an algorithmic or computational notion of formality (D2), in which those rules can be applied mechanically. Surely, we observed the tendency of defining supposition and offering rules in function of the syntactical elements, syncategorematic elements, void of any proper meaning, but this program is not developed in its full extent.

Regarding the formality understood as structure and abstraction from content (D3) and its proximal notion of formality as absence of meaning (D4), Peter of Spain's supposition theory is ambivalent. On the one hand, supposition theory is conceived as a property of a substantival term to stand for something or to substitute for that thing. In its accidental modes, it is defined

in function of the syntactical or structural relation that a term has with a sign, an entity void of any proper meaning, and the other elements of the proposition. But, on the other hand, Peter of Spain's supposition is not conceived entirely on the basis of structural and abstract element. In dealing with types of terms, type of linguistic and ontological entities a degree of abstraction is made, but not a proper abstraction from content or semantical meaning. In the end, supposition is defined on the basis of the semantical concept of signification and is conceive as a tool to explore the semantical content of a propositional term, in function of the propositional context and the semantical content of other elements of the proposition. According to Peter, we know that the subject term in "*homo est species*" has simple supposition only if we analyze the semantical content of both the subject and the predicate. We know that the predicate has simple supposition in virtue of the fact that it stands for a universal entity and not in virtue of the fact that it stands in the syntactical relation of being a predicate. The subject term of "*Omnis homo est animal*" has distributive, confused and mobile supposition both in virtue of a syntactical element '*omnis*' and in virtue of its semantical content that tells us the domain of inferiors from which we may choose to descend to. Any type of supposition presupposes from the very beginning a semantical or content-dependent relation to signification. Moreover, supposition is perceived as a semantical relation between a term and one or more *res* that have a form of existence outside the soul. Being as such, any rigorous structural formality or formality which abstracts from meaning/content is hard to maintain.

The formal as variation (D5) and as indifference to particular objects (D6) are closely connected together. The modern logic using variables, logical constants and functions can represent in a symbolic manner expressions void of any semantical content and its objects in a variable way, void of any particular or accidental characteristics. Peter does not even use schematic letters to express this kind of variance or indifference of particular objects, although since Aristotle such option was available. What Peter does is to use a system of term-types that can be said to parallel the variation and indifference of particular objects. Accordingly, we can say that supposition is a logical relation oriented towards type-token distinction. By defining particular modes of supposition in function of the discrete and common term-types, the theory ranges over all the tokens or particular terms and their represented particular objects. Peter of Spain's theory of supposition states in an abstract manner that, a *supponens* of a certain type stands for *supposita*, which are either universal or particular objects, in a specific *modum*

supponendi, without being necessary to specify which particular object is in question and which specific characteristics it has. Thus, we can ascribe in certain degrees, obviously not in the degree found in modern logic, a variation and indifference to particular objects type of formality.

In conclusion, we can state that, the properties established by us in section two, that are needed to be present in a theoretical object in order to be considered formal, can be found in Peter's supposition theory only partially. The theory of supposition uses notions which partially abstract from the actual meaning of expressions by considering types of terms and their syntactical position in the proposition, but this abstraction is not fully assumed. Accordingly, a variation of the objects under *schemata* may be considered for the function of supposition, but those *schemata* are not fully explained and are not rendered symbolically. Although supposition depends on syntactical notions, the theory is basically founded on the semantical relation of signification. However, it can be said that, the objects comprised by the relations of supposition, the *supposita*, are not pinpointed with their individual characteristics and accidents, fact that offers a certain degree of abstraction. Moreover, we have seen that a certain tendency towards formality understood as regimentation, that is, construction of set of rules, norms and laws, can be attributed, although this project is not taken to its full extent.

3.3.3. Interpretations of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition

The second section tried to show that, following ThMI1 - the thesis according to which medieval logical theories are similar to contemporary theories of logic or language in virtue of their formality - the scholarship has interpreted the theory of supposition in various ways. Theories of reference, quantification, hermeneutics, inference and conceptual notion were all candidates that tried to answer the question regarding what the theory of supposition really is. In each case we tried to show some specific shortcoming of their interpretative procedure especially in connection to Ockham's theory of supposition. Generally speaking, we have shown that the proponents of these methods of understanding supposition tend to distort the object of their interpretation through an act of formalization: they often take into account a specific part of the theory, the theory of personal modes, and not the whole construct; they use a much more abstract and formal language than that present in the theory of supposition; the result is that they focus only at those elements of supposition theory which show some formal features and, by an interpretative endeavor through the conceptual tools of modern logic, they render them even

more formal than they really were. If this seems to be true in versions of the supposition theory that can be consider more mature, rigorous defined and ultimately more formal, like the one developed by Ockham, then, in the case of Peter of Spain's articulation, we have an *a priori* incompatibility with such interpretative projects. If the multiple interpretations fail in the case of Ockham which has a more developed and coherent account, they will fail in a greater extent in the case of Peter of Spain which has a less developed and coherent account. Why then should we discuss if such theories of interpretation will apply in the case of Peter? An answer could consist in the fact that, by showing that the theory of reference, quantification, inference, hermeneutics and conceptual notation cannot apply to Peter of Spain theory, not event in the degree in which they can be applied to Ockham, they fail to offer a response to the question regarding to the nature of supposition theory in Middle Ages on a more general level. Accordingly, the purpose for the following lines will be to examine the manner in which Peter of Spain's theory of supposition can be understood as one of the five aforementioned modern theories.

The interpretation of supposition as a theory of reference basically suggest that supposition is a property which pertain to an extensional semantic, that describes a relation between a term and a number of objects which can be included under it. For a theory of supposition to be considered a theory of reference, the universal or particular sign along with the suppositing term is understood as a referring phrase which refer in specific ways a number of individual objects. The way the referring phrase is put in connection with individual referents is described by the type of applicative applied to the common name. Thus, the modes of referring are an interpretation of the modes of descending under the common suppositing terms. Moreover, according to Dutilh's criticism, for the reference relation to function properly, the reference interpretation needs a conceptual tool that is able to establish the uniqueness of each individual object as a theory of definite description will do.

In the case of Peter of Spain's theory such interpretation is hard to be achieved for the following reasons. First of all, in the cases of the predicates contained by the propositions of the A and I propositional forms, there is no descending under the common term, and thus, since we have a simple supposition, there is no referential function of the referring phrase. Secondly, in the cases where a personal supposition is established, that is, where a descending inference is possible, we do not have a description of the way in which the reference takes place or the way

in which individual objects are combined. To illustrate this fact, we can take the example of distributive confused mobile supposition. Ockham's confused and distributive supposition takes place when we can descend from the suppositing term copulatively and from no singular we can infer the original proposition[1044]. The descending is exemplified as an inference from a proposition of the form '*omnis S est P*' with the subject term suppositing confusedly and distributively, to a conjunctive concatenation of propositions where the subject is replaced with its inferiors, resulting in a complex proposition of the form '*iste S_1 est P et ille S_2 est P et …*'. According to this understanding, putting aside all the objections mentioned in the second section, Geach's interpretation can be applied: the initial proposition could be rewritten as a referring phrase embedded in a context "f(any A)" and the result of descending can be rewritten as a conjunctive concatenation of a list of proper names, each embedded in the same context, and each making reference to an individual object "f(a_1) and f(a_2) and f(a_3) and …". In Peters of Spain's case, this is not possible. He defines distributive confused and mobile supposition of a common term as the one according to which a descending could be made to any of its inferiors separately[1045]. The example offered in *SL* VI.8 suggests an inference from a proposition of the form '*omnis S est P*' where the subject term supposits distributively, confusedly and mobile, to a proposition of the form '*iste S_1 est P*' and not to a concatenation of propositions. However, an exception could be made from such a narrow understanding of Peter of Spain's doctrine, if we take into account the passages from XII.15, as shown at the beginning of this section[1046]. But even so, the other modes of personal supposition still present some problems. The lack of an explicit descending in the definition of determinate supposition shows us that, Peter of Spain did not understand determinate supposition as a disjunctive concatenation of propositions, in which each proposition contains an inferior of the suppositing term. In this way, Geach interpretation of determinate supposition as an referential expression of the form "f(some A)"

[1044] OCKHAM, *Summa logicae,* p. 211, l. 63-66"Suppositio confusa et distributiva est quando contingit aliquo modo descendere copulative, si habeat multa contenta et ex nullo uno formaliter infertur. Sicut est in ista 'omnis homo est animal, cuius subiectum supponit confuse et distributive: sequitur enim 'omnis homo est animal, igitur iste homo est animal et ille homo est animal, et sic de singuhs."
[1045] *SL*., VI.8, l. 13-16: "Sed confuse et distributive supponit, quia tenetur pro omni homine; mobiliter vero, quia licet descensum fieri pro quolibet suo supposito, ut *'omnis homo; ergo Sortes'* vel *'omnis homo; ergo Plato'*".
[1046] Interesting enough, the considerations which makes Peter of Spain's supposition theory conceptually closer to that formulated by Ockham are put outside of the tract which deals mainly with supposition, outside of *SL* VI.

which describes the mode of referring of the form "f(a1) or f(a2) or f(a3) or …" cannot be applied.

Moreover, the other problem of the reference interpretation needs to be addressed. The theory of reference needs to establish a unique referent for its referring phrase. Geach shows that supposition theory is in fact offering combinations of referents for a referring phrase. But are those referents identifiable as unique? Surely, the entire theory of personal supposition functions as a system of rules that dictates how common terms standing for collections of individuals are to be replaced with discrete terms which stand for individuals. But through this, the theory of supposition does not have a conceptual tool that helps us to substitute a common term with a certain discrete term different from another, such that it represents a certain and specific individual and not another. No matter if it is discrete supposition "*Ille homo/Sortes currit*", distributive, mobile supposition '*Omnis homo currit*' or determinate supposition '*Aliquis homo currit*', supposition theory does not offer the appropriate tools to fix a unique individual. Even in the case of discrete supposition a meta-theoretical act of indicating or pointing out a particular individual will be needed or a discursive description of which Socrates are we talking about. In the case of personal supposition, we can replace the 'referring phrase' with any discrete term without being possible to fix a specific individual for that particular human. This fact is truer in the case of Peter of Spain, which seems to differentiate between rendering a proposition true for a certain inferior and the property of supposition, as we already pointed out.

The interpretation of supposition as a theory of quantification will be next taken into account. This interpretation implies that supposition theory offers a semantic for quantifiers: a method for interpreting quantified expression as non-quantified ones. As we have seen in the second section, the quantification interpretation has at its basis what can be called 'the equivalence thesis'. This thesis states that the relation between the propositions which contain the quantified expressions and the propositions obtained by descending according to the rules of personal supposition under the quantified terms, is one of equivalence or double entailment. This means that for the simple categorematic propositional forms (A, E, I, O) we can obtain equivalent propositions in which the quantified terms are replaces with their interpretation. We have already showed that such interpretation goes against Ockham's doctrine and has a number of methodological issues as the exclusive focus on the personal modes. Moreover, even if we

are to admit the 'equivalence thesis' as a compromise, a number of problems will still arise as: the supposition of the predicate in an O-form proposition, the priority rule and the complete analysis. However, regardless the many critical points that were made, for the equivalence thesis to have doctrinal grounding, and thus the quantification interpretation to be possible, for every descending under a suppositing term there needs to be a corresponding ascending. This will ensure in a certain degree the double entailment.

Regarding Peter of Spain supposition theory, the quantification interpretation is hard to be achieved, although he makes a further step towards it that cannot be found in Ockham. In the case of Ockham's doctrine, when he discusses confused and distributive supposition, we have seen that any ascending inference from the conjunctive descent of the supposition term is forbidden. Peter makes this ascending inference possible implicitly, if we supplement his theory of supposition with the theory of *locus* as shown in the previous section. This means that from '*Omnis homo currit*' we can descend to '*Sortes currit, Plato currit et sic de allis*' and from the collection of all the proposition which contains all the inferiors of 'homo', '*Sortes currit, Plato currit et sic de allis*', we can ascend back to '*Omnis homo currit*'. This will theoretically make a proposition of the form (üS c P) equivalent to a concatenation of the form $[(S_1 \text{ c } P) \cdot (S_2 \text{ c } P) \ldots \cdot (S_n \text{ c } P)]$, as Boehner quantification theory will imply. However, even if we are able to find a solution for the distributive confuse mobile supposition, we still have two problems that reject a quantification interpretation applied to the simple categorical forms. The first is the simple supposition for the predicates of affirmative categorical propositions (A and I forms), where no ascending or descending inference can be made. The second is the cases in which we have a determinate supposition, that is, the subject terms of particular categorical propositions (I and O forms), where no ascending inference from the inferiors is taken into account by Peter and no proper and systematic descending scheme is offered like in the case of Ockham. All those aspects stop us in interpreting Peter of Spain's theory of supposition as a theory of quantification.

The third option for interpreting the theory of supposition is that of algorithmic hermeneutics advanced by Dutilh regarding Ockham. Her account comprises supposition as an intentional theory of meaning in contrast to the reference interpretation. Being as such, the supposition theory consists of a set of quasi-syntactic and semantic rules which are applied mechanically in a process of propositional analysis in order to obtain possible meanings. This

process implies establishing possible suppositions for the terms of a proposition and then combining these possibilities in a propositional calculus, in order to obtain possible propositional meanings. Those meanings can then be used in a dialectical practice, in arguing for a certain truth value, *secundum quid*, of the analyzed proposition.

Although Dutilh's hermeneutical interpretation pays more attention to the historical notion of supposition and to its dialectical use, in the case of Peter of Spain we are facing some difficulties. First of all, Peter has an entirely different ontology from that of Ockham and, more important, the syntactical rules for the propositional calculus are missing. As it was showed, a proper rule is offered only for the universal negative sign, while the universal affirmative sign, the particular one and the negation remain without a proper treatment. Secondly, like in the case of Ockham, Peter of Spain offers no doctrinal hint for such a specific procedure in which certain rule must be applied in a certain order. It is evident that supposition is based on signification and, thus, signification must be analyzed first and then the rules of supposition may be applied, but the distance to a specific set of rules applied recursively and mechanically in a specific order is a very long one. Moreover, at least in the case of Peter of Spain's theory, no full analysis of a proposition according to supposition can be found. Whenever an analysis of a proposition according to supposition is in question, the supposition of the term is analyzed successively and separately and not simultaneously according to the propositional calculus of the sincategorematic terms. These facts make the interpretations like the one offered by Dutilh's formalizations, which modify the initial object of their interpretation in the sense of making it more formal, untraceable in Peter's text.

As it was shown up to this point, it seems that supposition theory has always been considered by the medieval logicians in close connection with immediate inferences. Ockham offers the definition of the personal modes according to the possibilities and ways of descending and ascending through immediate inferences. Peter of Spain often uses immediate inferences to exemplify a certain mode of personal supposition and hints a possible usefulness of supposition theory in detecting fallacious reasonings. Accordingly, an inferential interpretation that will bridge the gap between theory of supposition and the theory of consequence will be a natural step forward. The inference interpretation of supposition theory, as formulated by Karger, states that a proposition S* can be considered the consequence of another proposition S, if in the inferential process from the latter to the former, a suppositional modification can be detected

either from distributive to determinate or merely confused supposition or (b) from determinate to merely confused supposition[1047]. Surely, for establishing the type of supposition for each term, syntactic rules are offered in function of the types of quantifying sequences.

We already showed some problems regarding how this interpretation can be applied on Ockham's theory. Regarding Peter of Spain, the situation is not more favorable. Disregarding the possibility to form rules for quantifying sequences, fact which is an entirely different problem, Peter of Spain's supposition has no extensive account of the way the modes of supposition relate within the process of inference. Surely, we can speak about two exceptions: (1.) the theory of places from the whole in quantity developed in *SL* V.15, which can be considered to explain confused, distributive and mobile supposition in function of ascending and descending inferences, and (2.) observations from *SL* VI.8 and VI.6 which offer two rules for invalid types of inferences in function of the modes of supposition. But, as showed, (2.) is ultimately reject within the theory of fallacies and (1.) does not tell anything about how different types of supposition relate within a theory of inference. Other 13th century logicians did more in the sense of an inference interpretation than Peter did. For example Sherwood is offering a set of rules which tries to regulate inferences according to different types of supposition: from a merely confused supposition does not follow confused and distributive supposition; from multiple determinate suppositions does not follow one determinate supposition; from determinate supposition does not follow confused and distributive supposition but merely confused; from confused and distributive supposition it follows determinate supposition and not merely confused supposition[1048]. In Peter of Spain such rules are nowhere to be found. Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that no inferential interpretation can be applied on Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, at least in the version articulated by Karger, although he offers some hints towards comprising the personal suppositions as immediate inferences.

The last interpretation that we will take into account is that of considering supposition theory as a theory of conceptual notation. What this interpretation basically states, at least according to Perreiah, is that supposition theory is a proto-version of a conceptual writing which uses a system of substitutions or replacements done according to certain schemata. The schemata tell us with what objects certain term can be replaced according to different syntactical

[1047] See KARGER (1984), p. 101.
[1048] See SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.14-5.1.18, p. 270, l. 194-193, l. 197-198, l. 204-205, l. 209-210.

and semantical elements of the proposition. Understanding supposition as a topological concept of substitution or a place-system, where terms are replaced with different types of objects, he considers it a theory pertaining to the art of memory.

Regarding the possibility of applying such an understanding to Peter of Spain's consideration, we can offer a few remarks. First of all, Perreiah is one of few authors who highlighted the link between the concept of supposition and its spatial dimension. Almost in an involuntary manner, the author directs us to the original understanding of the *suppositio* term, the action of replacement or substitution between physical object. Surely this concept has evolved and developed different secondary meanings until the 13th and 14th century theories, but the spatial or physical act of substitution has remained the primitive and fundamental relation that describes supposition in lack of any proper abstract conceptual apparatus. However, this interpretation does not help us to understand a particular theory of supposition or another, but describes in a certain degree a general characteristic of all the theories of supposition. Secondly, if we are to apply this understanding on Peter's theory, the task will be made with some difficulties regarding the obvious lack of specificity in what concerns the schemata of substitutions. On the one hand, in Peter's case, we have no proper schemata for describing the relation between terms and mental or linguistic objects. On the other, the schema for the relation presupposed by the particular and negation signs are not addressed. The third aspect and the one that makes us reject Perreiah's interpretation, is the understanding of supposition as a theory that pertain to the art of memory. Usually, the doctrines within the art of memory are auxiliary methods or techniques to encode and arrange information for a systematic learning and remembering of particular blocks of doctrinal content. Conceived as such, *ars memorativa* has nothing to do with supposition theory. Supposition theory has nothing to do with memorizing doctrines or with the methods of converting them in a structured and easily accessible mental content. In this regard, the art of memory and dialectics or logic were independent arts. Although mnemotechnics was frequently use in memorizing logical doctrines, it is wrong to say that in virtue of the fact that both are using topological relation based on schemata, they are the same thing. Peter's doctrine of supposition has the function of specifying the range of entities for which a term can stand in a propositional context according to semantical and syntactical constrains and not to describe mental processes by which certain terms are schematically associated with certain entities for a memorative purpose.

In conclusion, we can state that, although Peter of Spain's doctrine can have a variety of theoretical aspects similar to the modern theories of reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation, it is wrong to assume that it can be interpreted as one of them. Peter of Spain's supposition theory is not compatible with the main theoretical frameworks of the aforementioned theories and differs substantial from them in the degree of formality. Peter's doctrine is integrated in an historical evolution of logic and has a specific conceptual articulation which do not allow an equivalation with none of the five candidates we considered.

Conclusion

The last part of the third section of our analysis tried to assess the different possibilities of interpreting Peter of Spain's supposition theory, through the options provided by the modern scholarship. This was a three-step process which had as purpose the understanding of Peter's doctrine at the intersection of both the historical and the systematic accounts. To obtain such an understanding, the problem of the degree of specific formality present in Peter's account was addressed, in connection with the 13th century version of supposition and with the modern theories of language and logic.

In the first sub-part, we argued that, although Peter's supposition theory presents some common features with Lambert's and Sherwood's doctrines, the degree of formality differs. While Lambert and Sherwood link directly the definition of determine supposition with the process of verifying the truth of a proposition for a certain *suppositum*, Peter of Spain seems to reject this use and considers supposition as something different from rendering a proposition true for a certain individual. While Lambert and Sherwood offer rules and explanations for the distributive effect of the universal signs and the negation in the definition of personal confused and distributive supposition, in Peter's case, they are missing. While the two medieval logicians consider simple supposition a relation between a word and a concept, that is, an object or form of an object as conceived by the intellect, and they do not ascribe this mode of supposition to the predicates of A and I categorical propositional forms, Peter considers simple supposition a relation between a term and a universal outside the soul and ascribes this mode of supposition to the aforementioned categorical propositional forms. These differences show us once again

that Peter was more committed to a realist ontology than Lambert and Sherwood, and that his account on supposition may be considered less formal than Lambert's and Sherwood's versions.

After we saw that Peter of Spain's level of generic formality is very low, both in comparison with Ockham's account[1049] and even with Sherwood's and Lambert's accounts, we tried to point out the specific way in which it can be called 'formal'. Accordingly, we applied the different senses of formality identified in part 2.1.3. *Types of formality*. We have argued that we can identify in Peter's doctrine certain elements which resemble: the process of abstraction from the meaning of an expression, the variation under *schemata* of the objects considered by the theory, syntactical structures, objects which are not considered according to their individuality or accidents and set of rules or laws with a normative character. However, these formal aspects are not fully assumed and we are only allowed to speak about a tendency towards formality. Supposition does indeed consider types of terms with their syntactic propositional positions, generic *supposita* and not unique and identifiable individuals, syntactical notions like syncategorematic elements, set of rules for the modes of supposition and for the propositional effects of the syncategorematic elements. All these elements are not fully developed in Peter's supposition theory. Instead of the needed schemata for the personal modes of supposition, we have problematic examples. Instead of rules for descending and for the effect of signs and negation, we have silence. Instead of a syntactical account of supposition, we have a semantical one, committed to the existence of the universal outside the soul.

The third sub-part tried to see if the theory of supposition can be interpreted as a theory of: reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics or conceptual notation. We have argued that all these options fail to capture the nature of supposition theory, since their main conceptual framework are not traceable in Peter of Spain's doctrine.

First, we have argued that the reference interpretation cannot be applied, since the descending inferences from the predicates of A and I propositional forms are blocked by the ascription for them of a simple supposition and since supposition cannot pinpoint unique individuals. Regarding the quantification interpretation, we have showed that, although Peter, through the theory of places, can be said to accept an ascending inference for the confused and distributive supposition, he does not offer one for the determine supposition. Moreover, the

[1049] See 2.2.2 The generic formality of Peter of Spain's supposition theory.

explicit rules and examples for the way the descending must take place are lacking. This fact, along with the use of simple supposition for the affirmative categorical propositions, makes the understanding of supposition as a theory that offers an analysis of quantified expressions unsupported. The computational hermeneutics approach, seemed again unapplicable to Peter's account, since the rules necessary for Dutilh's formal reconstruction are missing altogether from the original doctrine. Regarding the inferential interpretation, we have argued that Peter is offering indeed some hints towards such an account. He links explicitly supposition to the theory of fallacies and, implicitly, to the theory of places. However, the first link is then explicitly rejected in his treatment of fallacy; the second, is not enough for an inferential interpretation. For Peter, there is no systematic account to show how certain modifications of the modes of supposition in an inference can vouch for the correctness of the inferential process. The interpretation of supposition as a conceptual notation is indeed a plausible explanation, but not in the way in which Perreiah articulates it, that is, as an art of memory. Peter of Spain's supposition can be conceived as a conceptual notation, that is, as a particular system of formalizing according to the tools available at that time the semantical relation between terms and objects, on the basis of semantical and syntactical propositional features. However, it was not a system of memorizing topological relations between terms and objects through schemata.

Conclusion

The third section of our worked tried to put Peter of Spain's theory of supposition into a new perspective, by combing the previous results obtained from the *historical and doctrinal analysis* and the *systematic analysis*. By doing so, we tried to offer an answer regarding our main research question, that is, 'what exactly is the supposition theory?'. This answer tried to bridge the gap between the two traditions of interpreting supposition theory and their implied methodologies, while trying to remain faithful to Peter's text. Thus, our purpose was double: to understand in a more systematic manner Peter's doctrine with its inherent problems and solutions and to assess the degree in which the different interpretations proposed by modern scholarship can be applied to it. To arrive at the second point, first a better understanding of Peter's supposition theory was necessary. Then, a reconsideration of the theory with a focus on the notion of formality in connection with both the other 13th century versions of supposition and with the modern interpretations was made.

In the first part of our assessment, we first showed that the terminist concept of 'suppositio' presupposes a multiplicity of meaning, by combing a logical or hierarchical acceptance and a grammatical one, both taken from the conceptual apparatus of old logic. In this way, supposition can be understood as a relation of subordination between a *supponens*, a term which is represented in language by a substantival form, and a *suppositum*, one or more objects conceptually subordinated under the suppositing term. Thus, describing a vertical and horizontal relation, the hierarchical and grammatical acceptances of supposition are reflected with different degrees in the conditions of the suppositing modes, rendering semantical and syntactical criteria. Further, Peter's notion of supposition was clarified by showing its dependence to signification theory. Being a pre-propositional notion, signification theory in not able to differentiate between the different types of entities represented by a word. Thus, supposition theory can be considered a tool which fulfils this function by specifying the type of entity, both quantitively and qualitatively, for which a term stands. Depending on the propositional context, supposition tells us if a certain propositional term is put in the place of a universal, an individual or a collection of individuals, all or some, disposed in a certain manner. However, trying to clarify what supposition theory is in the case of Peter of Spain, we have faced some problems since his account is not so coherent as we would want. In trying to resolve some of them, we highlighted the relation between the theory of supposition and the theory of

fallacies and places. The first, according to the authorial intentions, seemed to be an unreliable point of argumentation for clarifying the status of supposition. It is true that Peter hints towards a practical use of supposition in detecting fallacious reasoning through the rules of *a pluribus determinatis ad unam determinatam* and *a simplici ad personalem*. However, we showed that, in the end, he distances himself from such an account by ascribing to others the use of supposition in defining and detecting fallacies. Regarding the theory of places, the situation is a little bit different. We have showed that both the examples offered in the place from the whole in quantity, presented in the fifth tract of *SL,* and those of personal distributive supposition are enthymemes that run in parallel. The theory of places, in contrast with the personal distributive mobile supposition, offers a more comprehensive method of descending conjunctively under a common distributed term and, more important, an ascending method from the collection of the inferiors, fact that is missing even from Ockham's account. Providing a method of ascending from the concatenation of propositions formed by the inferiors of a common distributed term, the theory of places can supplement the theory of confused, distributive and mobile supposition with the missing element for an 'equivalation thesis'. This equivalation thesis, needed especially for the quantification interpretation, states that the proposition which contains the personal suppositing term and the proposition obtained by applying the rules of supposition, are equivalent. Surely, in the case of Peter of Spain, this thesis can be applied only for the A and E propositional forms, without any grounding in the auctorial intensions. However, the theory of places is not able to resolve some inherent problems of Peter's doctrine. As we have showed, no comprehensive and explicit ascription of a supposition type for the predicates of the I and O propositional forms is offered. While in case of I-form the simple supposition can be accepted, the ascription of a confused and distributive supposition to the O-form, as proposed by Swiniarski, is problematic, since Peter seems to reject the distributive power of the negation sign.

The second part of the current section tried to assess Peter's ontological commitment. We offered arguments for both a realist and a conceptualist view point. We have showed that no strong arguments can be made for Peter's conceptualism, besides the distinction between *the way of logic* and *the way of nature*, that presupposes, according to Klima, a domain of "*things-as-conceived and their modes*". This distinction fades away since Peter does not give any priority in his logic to the mental language. Moreover, his account of signification, the status of

supposition and the account on the appellation of the terms having simple supposition, point towards a fully embraced realist commitment towards universals.

In the third and final part, we tried to assess the manner in which the modern interpretations of supposition theory can be applied to Peter's account. We can now conclude that, for the purpose of testing the viability of the modern interpretations, Peter is not such a good candidate. His theory is less formal even than the other 13th century accounts. We have showed that both Lambert and Sherwood are more diligent in connecting supposition theory with the notion of truth, in offering more comprehensive and systematic rules of distribution, negation and supposition, in subscribing to a much more conceptualist-oriented position regarding the universals and in not using the simple supposition for the predicates of A and I propositional forms. However, Peter's doctrine is not entirely lacking formal aspects. By considering types of terms with their syntactic propositional positions, generic *supposita* and not unique and identifiable individuals, syntactical notions like syncategorematic elements, set of rules for the modes of supposition and for the propositional effects of the syncategorematic elements, we can speak about a formal tendency. But, since we do not have proper schemata that can be drawn out of the definitions of personal modes, since we do not have proper syntactic rules for descending under the suppositing terms, since the extensive rules which describe the effects of negative or distributive signs are all missing, we can say that no specific formality from the types identified in section 2.1.3. can be ascribed to Peter's account. His supposition theory is defined within a semantical framework regimented by syntactical conditions. Although arguments can be made for the existence of: a process of abstraction from meaning, variation under schemata, syntactical structures and notions, existence of laws and rules and variation of objects, all these aspects are not fully taken in an extensive and comprehensive program. Only not fully assumed tendencies towards the types of formalities identified by Dutilh and MacFarlane can be found. This fact is manifest in the applicability of the modern or contemporary interpretations of supposition theory to Peter of Spain's version. We have showed that all these interpretations are implicitly relying on the proximity between the formality of medieval and post-Fregean logic or theories of language, as posited by ThMl1 thesis. Since Peter's version lacks basic formal notion or, when they are not lacking, they are not fully integrated in a systematic account which should explain how supposition works and what its purpose is, the conclusion is obvious; the theories of reference, quantification, inference,

computational hermeneutics or conceptual notation are not viable theoretical constructs for interpreting supposition theory. This conclusion was supported by a series of arguments. The ascription of simple supposition to the predicates of A and I types of propositional forms and the inability of pointing out specific individuals, make Peter's supposition theory unable to be understood as a theory of reference. Since Peter does not offer explicit rules for showing how under the determine and confused-mobile supposition we can obtain systematic and equivalent concatenations of propositions for the A, E, I, O simple categorical forms, the quantification interpretation cannot be obtained. The lack of a comprehensive account for the distributive effect of negation strengthens this conclusion. The computation hermeneutical approach has a system of rules for the determination of the possible meaning of a proposition that is nowhere to be found in Peter's case, not even at an implicit level. The inferential interpretation of supposition has a very limited application as well. Although some connections were pointed out by us between supposition, on the one hand, and the theories of fallacies and places, on the other, the inferential interpretation as proposed by the modern scholarship cannot be held. Peter does not offer a systematic account that shows how certain modifications of the modes of supposition in an inference can vouch for the correctness of the inferential process. All we can say is that the process implied by the personal confused and mobile mode of supposition rune in parallel to a certain degree with the way in which the places from the whole in quantity are described. Regarding the conceptual notation interpretation, we can find the same impossibility as in the previous cases. Peter's theory is not a system which has as purpose the process of memorizing through specific logical schemata topological relations between terms and objects. While Peter's supposition theory can indeed be considered a type of conceptual notion which formalizes in a regimented Latin language the semantical relation between linguistic and extra-linguistic entities under syntactical conditions, it cannot be considered the type of conceptual notion proposed by Perreiah.

Final conclusions

During the three sections of our work, we tried to offer a new understanding of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition, if not of supposition in general, by employing a methodology which had as purpose the bridging of the gap between the two traditions of relating to Medieval logic doctrines: the historical and systematical one. The necessity of our study was founded on status of the contemporary scholarship. In general, *suppositio* was considered either a self-explanatory concept able to be grasped through the understanding of the medieval logical doctrines and their historical framework, or was considered to be similar to a specific theory traceable in the post-Fregean philosophy of language and logic: reference, quantification, inference, computational hermeneutics/theory of propositional meaning or conceptual notation. The variety of sources for supposition theory in the Middle Ages, the authorial and doctrinal particularities of the terminist logicians, the particularity of Peter of Spain's doctrine and the lack of extensive studies on it, the variety of answers offered by the modern literature regarding the nature of supposition and the general disagreement in the scholarship regarding its status, made us reconsider both, the solutions offered thus far and the methodologies of approaching this subject.

Our main task was to clarify the concept of supposition by exploring the already existing explanations. During this endeavor, we tried to propose possible answers to our main research question related to the nature and status of supposition theory, that is "what really is the theory of supposition?", both in the Middle Ages and in the specific case of Peter of Spain's *Summaries of logic*. Often enough, we were able to offer negative answers and thus to show what the theory of supposition is not. However, the thesis that we tried to demonstrate during the whole process was that Peter of Spain's supposition theory can be better understood in its own terms, without being equated with its contemporary interpretations or with other medieval theoretical constructs; any such equation will generate a series of doctrinal inadvertencies that can be highlighted through the notion of *formality*. Such an approach was possible due to the fact that we have subscribed to an intermediate position between ThMl1 and ThMl2, according to which, medieval logic, and consequently Peter of Spain's supposition theory, does not have the formal characteristics of post-Fregean theories of language and logic, but has a tendency, conditioned by the Latin language, towards them.

Thus, in order to defend our position, we proposed a three-step argumentative process. In the first one, that is, the first section of our work, we tried to offer a historical and doctrinal analysis of Peter of Spain's supposition theory. The purpose of this endeavor was to obtain an understanding of his doctrine in its own terms and within the limits imposed by its context. In a first chapter, we discussed a series of problems related to the authorship of *Tractatus*, to its date and place of composition, to the corpus of works attributed to Peter of Spain, to the main characteristics of his logical handbook, and, ultimately, to the reception and diffusion of his work. Following mainly De Rijk, D'Ors, Meirinhos and Tugwell, we have argued that, at the current state of research, the identity of the author of *Tractatus* or *Summulae logicales* still remains unknown. However, the Byzantine and Papalist theses are to be discarded while the Dominican one, with the variants Petrus Alfonsi and Pedro Ferrando, seems to be more plausible, although was seriously contested. Whoever it is, the *auctor summularum* should also not be confused with Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis and Petrus Hispanus Medicus, as Meirinhos shows on the basis of the Petrine Corpus. It was argued on the basis of its diffusion that the *Summaries* was composed in Northern Spain or Southern France somewhere between the years of 1240's and 1270's, at a later date than the one initially proposed by De Rijk. We have showed that Peter's work can be considered a veritable handbook, which managed to summarized both the classical Boethian-Aristotelian and the terminist doctrines of logic, in a comprehensive, systematic and, to a certain degree, realist manner. Its main characteristics let us argue against its doctrinal neutrality and for the irrelevance of the originality problem. Although it is of a realist-oriented account, this fact did not stop *Tractatus* from circulating in the regions of France, Italy, Spain and Germany, where it was commented by realists and nominalists alike, by Thomists, Albertits and Scotists, and did not stop it from being critically assimilated by the humanist movement and diffused even among the Byzantine and Jewish intellectuals, as it was showed. Moreover, in virtue of the doctrinal content of *Tractatus*, we argued that Peter proposes a unitary account on logic which accomplishes a summarizing synthesis between the elements of the Aristotelian logic and those of *logica modernorum*. This is done within a general science of logic, strongly connected to dialectics, and understood as a science of language *(scientia sermocinalis)*. We argued that the main focal point of the two clusters of treatises, that is, Aristotelian-Boethian logic (I-V, VII) and terminist logic (VI, VIII-XI), is the sixth tract, that dedicated to the theory of supposition, both on the basis of its placement in *SL* and of its doctrinal

content. Conceived as an extension of the classical theory of signification and understood as a relation between a term, the *supponens*, and a thing, one or many, the *suppositum* or *supposita*, we argued that the supposition theory is connected with each individual treatise of *SL*. The first three tracts, *De introductionibus, De predicabilibus, De predicamentis*, offer the general conceptual framework for a terminist logic through its definitions of: a signifying vocal emission by convention, the categorematic words contrasted with the sincategorematic ones, categorical propositions and its constitutive parts, the different types of predicables and the logico-ontological entities implied by the predicaments. The connection of supposition theory with *De locis* and *De sillogismis*, comes from the fact that certain types of supposition are explained by showing how a direct inference, enthymeme or incomplete syllogism, can take place from a proposition containing a personal supposition to another proposition which differs from the first by its suppositing term, which was substituted with one of its corresponding *suppositum*. The connection with the tract *De fallaciis* comes from the fact that, a change of the supposition of a term in the course of syllogistic reasoning, may be considered the cause for the apparition of certain fallacies as the figure of expression. In this sense, rules as *from multiple determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition* and *from simple supposition to personal supposition*, mark fallacious types of reasonings that may be detected through the theory of supposition. The rest of the five tracts dedicated to the properties of terms, can be consider an extension of the theory of supposition. *De relativis* is dedicated to the intra-propositional property of reference or recollection of a term made usually by a pronoun and contrasted to the property of supposition. *De ampliationibus* and *De restrictionibus* account for the widening and narrowing of the domain of entities establish by the personal supposition. *De appellationibus* is preoccupied with a special kind of supposition, in which the *supposita* are actual existing entities. *De distributionibus* explains through rules how the distributive signs work and represents an explanation for the confused supposition.

Regarding his theory of supposition, we have showed that Peter conceives it as an extension of the theory of signification which implies an analysis of the relation between the language expressed propositionally and the world. Being defined as '*acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo*'[1050], the concept of supposition bares resemblances and shares common

[1050] *SL*., VI.3, l. 8-9

origins with the notion of subject, substance and subordination, since: the suppositing term has a substantival form and is frequently consider the subject of the proposition; since the *suppositum* is a certain kind of substance specified through the different types of supposition that the term can have; and since the relation between the *suppones* term and the *supposita* is often conceived as one of subordination. This overlapping and fusion of onto-logical concepts, that is, *subiectio*, *substantia*, *subpositio*, into the theory of supposition was historically explained by discussing the three folded origin of supposition theory. Following the works of De Rijk, Ebbesen, Valente, Libera and others, we argued that the 12th century logical tradition of fallacies commentaries, the 12th century grammatical tradition of commentaries to Priscian's works and the theological tradition of the Porretan school have all contributed to the apparition of the terminist property of supposition, by forming a close proximity between the notions of substance, subsistence, subject, subordination and supposition. However, we argued that at the basis of the logical, grammatical and theological traditions which are all interconnected, there might be a more basic, common and intuitive meaning of the '*suppositio*' concept. Our explanation was that '*suppositio*' primary described a relation between physical objects which can be conceived as a substitution or replacement. One object supposits another when it replaces it or substitutes for it. Under such an understanding, we can say that this relation was first regimented or conceptualized by the Roman law through the punishable crime of the supposition of children. Then, throughout the centuries, the relation of substitution has suffered different regimentations and mutations according to different disciplines, which implied a degree of abstraction. The supposition was no longer a relation that took place between physical objects but between words and physical objects, directly or indirectly. A word or term arrived at standing or substituting in language for a substance, for a subsistence which bears a form, for the grammatical subject, for the subject matter or, indirectly, for all of them. In fact, all these meanings are reflected in the construction of the 13th century supposition theory.

Regarding the theory of supposition from *SL*, the specific ways in which the *supponens* and the *suppositum* or *supposita* relate, is accounted by Peter's division of the different modes of supposition. He distinguishes between discrete and common, natural and accidental, simple and personal, determinate and confused, and mobile and immobile types of supposition, in function of: the types of terms, the other propositional elements directly or indirectly adjoined to the suppositing term and in function of the nature of entities for which the suppositing term

stands. The most important types of supposition are *suppositio simplex, suppositio determinata*, *suppositio confusa mobilis*, last two being types of personal supposition. The simple supposition is understood as a relation in which a term stands for the universal entity (*res*) signified by it. This fact, along with other doctrinal specifications from the rest of his handbook, makes Peter a realist committed logician. Personal supposition is understood as a relation in which a term stands for its inferiors. Determinate supposition is not defined as straight forwards as we would want. Yet, it may be understood as a relation, marked or not by a particular sign, in which a common term stands for a certain individual or another. Confused mobile supposition is that in which a common term stands for many by means of a universal sign which distributes and confuses the term. This means that a valid descending inference can take place form the suppositing term to its inferiors. This descending may be conceived as a conjunctive concatenation of propositions in which the suppositing term is replaced in each proposition by one of its inferiors. The hallmark of Peter of Spain's account of supposition, is his use of simple supposition. For him, even the predicate of a universal affirmative categorical proposition stands in the place of a universal object. This position is debated and then stated and defended in *Dubia* and *Solutio* sections of *SL.* VI. A consequence will be that the universal sign put on the part of the subject term has no proper effect on the predicate term. Although he seems to be a realist regarding universals and his account does not take into consideration the mental language, in this part of his work he makes a small concession by contrasting the science of logic with that of natural sciences.

The 13th century particularities and variations of supposition theory as articulated by the terminist tradition are better revealed when they are put in contrast with the theoretical constructs of the 14th century. From our analysis we argued that the 13th centuries versions of supposition theory as represented by Lambert and Sherwood present a more realist oriented ontological commitment and a certain lack of conceptual rigor in contrast to the 14th century version of supposition, as articulated by Buridan and Ockham. The 13th century logicians did not exploit the supposition theory to the extent the authors of the following century did regarding: the connection of supposition with the truth value of the proposition; the explanation of the personal modes of supposition in accordance to both ascending and descending inferences; the possibility to explain the simple supposition by resorting to a mental language and thus, to avoid the commitment to the existence of universals; the account of distribution;

the possibility to define different types of personal suppositions through schemata of conjunctive and disjunctive concatenations or of propositions with disjunctive predicates, all obtained inferentially; the possibility to highlight that a certain term can be interpreted in different ways such that it can have different suppositions, and thus, the hermeneutical role of the logician. All these aspects were put at work in 14th century theories, such that the rules for defining and determining each mode of supposition were given in a more clear, systematic and comprehensive manner.

In the second section of our work, we tried to offer a systematic analysis which helped us to address some problems raised by the modern interpretations of the supposition theory. Since the scholarship understood the medieval theory of supposition as a theory of: reference, inference, quantification, computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation, we started from the presupposition that all those interpretations are in fact formalizations of the medieval supposition theory, as Dutilh project suggests regarding the reference interpretation. This would mean that for the contemporary interpretations proposed by different theories of language and logic to work in the case of suppositio theory, there needs to be a compatibility in the degree of formality. However, as it was showed, starting from the 20th century revival of the interest in medieval logic, the scholarship has subscribed implicitly or explicitly to what we called the 'ThMl1 thesis', according to which medieval logic is similar to contemporary logic/theories of language in virtue of their formality. To attain our purpose, first we explored the concepts of formality and formalization. Then we addressed the problem of formality in the medieval theory of supposition. Finally, we analyzed the variety of contemporary interpretations of supposition theory.

According to the studies of Sven Ove Hansson, John Gordon MacFarlane, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Terence Parsons and others, we showed that the origins of qualifying logic as being formal can be traced back, if not to Aristotle, to the Aristotelian tradition. This fact made our understanding of formalization tributary to the Peripatetic thinking, and the theory of four causes it presupposes. Accordingly, we have showed, especially following Dutilh's account but avoiding her agent-oriented understanding, that formality presupposes: (1.) an action of formalization or of rendering a theoretical construct in a formal manner, (2.) an object of formalization or a theoretical construct which can be in itself formal or not, (3.) the means by which an object is formalized or the conceptual tools that are applied to a theoretical object in

order to formalize it and (4.) the product of formalization or the result of applying the means of formalization on the theoretical object in question. Along this model, the one advocated by Hansson was presented. According to him, formalization is a successive process of idealizations which can be conceived as a transition from natural language, to a semi-formal and then to a formal one. Understood in this way, formality becomes a more manageable concept, such that it can be used in the assessments of different theoretical constructs and their interpretations. We have showed that the formalizations can have the effect of changing the theoretical object on which they are applied in the act of interpretation. Accordingly, we conceived a series of points according to which this change can be tracked. First, a theoretical object can vary in quantity and quality, which means that in the act of formalization only a part of the object is taken into account and not the whole and that the object in question can have before the formalization different degrees of formality on its own. Second, the means of formalization can vary themselves in terms of degree of formality, fact that influences the theoretical objected which is formalized. Third, the product of formalization can be different from the initial theoretical object, in such a way that, in some cases, a contradictory relation can be put between them.

Regarding the different acceptances of the 'formal' concepts, we have explored Dutilh's and MacFarlane's programs. We have argued that the variety of meanings exposed by the two authors can be reduced to each other and to a series of characteristics. These characteristics will then represent a set of properties that a theoretical object must have in order to be considered formal. Thus an object might be considered formal if: (a.) is constructed by means of abstracting from the actual meaning of expressions; (b.) it presents schemata that can be represented by symbolic or abstract notations in which different objects can variate under placeholders; (c.) it is constructed on structural notions, such as the structure of abstract reasoning or language, and not on the semantical ones that take into account the relation with the world; (d.) it is constructed as an abstraction from the accidental or particular characteristics of the object it considers; and (e.) is constructed with rules, set of norms or laws which constrains its formulation and applies a normative character.

The degree in which the formal properties are present, in principle, in medieval logic is debatable. From the very beginning we subscribed to an intermediary position between ThMl1 and ThMl2, as defended by Laurent Cesalli and Parsons. According the them, we showed that medieval logic is characterized by two tendencies towards: lack of formality, since Latin is not

a formal language but an ordinary one and since the theoretical object is not articulate through a symbolic rendering; formality, since the Latin language is regimented by grammatical and logical notions, by sets of normative rules, and put to use in order to articulate abstract theories of logico-linguistic phenomena. Being conceived as such, the status of medieval logical theory in relation to formality rests in details, in the degrees of formality certain theoretical features can have. This fact was showed on a general level in Peter of Spain's theory of supposition. First, Peter differentiates between a syntactical and semantical level of a proposition. On the basis of the distinction between categorematic terms, that is, words which have signification by themselves and are constitutive and essential parts of proposition, and syncategorematic terms, that is, words void of any proper signification, Peter seems to configurate a propositional form using types of logico-grammatical entities in contrast with concrete entities. Secondly, discrete-common, natural-accidental, simple-personal, determinate-confused, movable-immovable, are pairs which describe levels of divisions in a series of successive definitions of supposition, according to a combination of semantical (types of terms, types of objects and the relation between them) and syntactical or formal conditions (presence or absence of categorematic and syncategorematic terms, the possibility of a descending inferences). On the basis of those two arguments, Peter of Spain's supposition theory seems to have a low degree of generic formality or to be considered as syntactically formal in a weak sense. The low degree of formality is more evident when is put into contrast with Ockham's version of supposition. We argued regarding the supposition of the extremes in A, E, I, O propositional forms, that Peter does not use personal types of suppositions for all of them; there is no proper analysis of the supposition corresponding to the extremes of the O-form proposition and to the predicate of the I-form proposition; where confused supposition is considered, only the notion of descending inferences are taken into account and no proper and consistent examples or explanations are offered concerning how these descending inferences should take place. In turn, Ockham's account ascribes a personal kind of supposition for each simple categorical form and describes each proposition in function of the suppositing terms. By doing so, each categorical proposition can be rewritten, depending on the type of the suppositing term, as a disjunctive or conjunctive concatenation of propositions or as a proposition which has disjunctive terms, all obtained inferentially. This process takes place through the rules of supposition which can be described schematically, thus making Ockham's doctrine more formal, especially in parallel with Peter's version.

Regarding the contemporary interpretations which were applied on more mature articulation of supposition, we showed that they generate a series of problems which enter in direct conflict with the actual doctrine of supposition. Some of those problems are: the equivalation thesis, the priority of analysis, the wrong supposition of the predicate of O-form proposition, the inability to pinpoint individuals, the full analysis and many more. First, we explored Peter Geach's interpretation of supposition theory as a theory of refence constructed on Russell's model of denotation, along with Dutilh's and Scott's critical observations. Then we showed how supposition was interpreted as a theory of quantification through the works of Boehner, Swiniarski, Spade, Priest, Read and Parsons and how Matthews, Corcoran and again Swiniarski contested this interpretation. After that, we explained Dutilh's interpretation of supposition as a theory of propositional meaning or a theory of computational hermeneutics. Karger's interpretation of supposition as a theory of inference and the criticism advanced by Markosian was also accounted. Finally, we explored Perreiah's interpretation of supposition as a conceptual notation or a theory related to the art of memory. Our main argument was that all those theories or rather interpretative equivalations of supposition theory are formalizations that are changing the initial degree of formality of their interpretative object. They do this by employing more formal means of formalizations and by taking only parts of the supposition theory, especially Ockham's theory of personal modes, that the authors considered more fit for their interpretative purpose. In this way, the product of these formalizations becomes an entirely different object from what the medieval theory of supposition really was initially.

The third section of our work made a synthetic assessment of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition in the light of the previous two analyses. This step was intended to bring us closer to the answer of our main research question regarding the nature and status of Peter's theory. Accordingly, we argued that Peter's notion of *suppositio* presupposes a multiplicity of meaning that combines a logical or hierarchical acceptance and a grammatical one. In this way, supposition can be understood as a relation of subordination between a *supponens*, a term which is represented in language by a substantival form, and a *suppositum*, one or more objects conceptually subordinated under the suppositing term.

We tried to offer a further clarification of the theory of supposition through the theory of signification, fallacies and places despite the problems already pointed out in the comparative analysis with Ockham's supposition theory from chapter 2.2.3. We argued that Peter's

supposition is strongly based on the relation of signification. Being a pre-propositional notion, signification theory in not able to differentiate between the different types of entities represented by a word. Thus, supposition theory can be considered a tool which fulfils this function by specifying the type of entity, both quantitively and qualitatively, for which a term can stand. Depending on the propositional context, supposition tells us if a certain propositional term is put in the place of a universal, an individual or a collection of individuals, all or some, disposed in a certain manner. Peter alludes for a use of the supposition in the theory of fallacies through the rules of *a pluribus determinatis ad unam determinatam* and *a simplici ad personalem*. However, as it was shown, this practical aspect of supposition is ultimately rejected, since he distances himself from such an account by ascribing the use of supposition in defining and detecting fallacies to others. In contest, the theory of places from the whole in quantity, as developed in *SL.* V.15, is more generous. Being preoccupied like the supposition theory with enthymemes, it offers a more comprehensive method of descending conjunctively under a common distributed term and, more important, an ascending method from the collection of the inferiors, fact that is missing even from Ockham's account. We have concluded that this fact, although not capitalized by Peter of Spain, provides a method of ascending from the concatenation of propositions formed by the inferiors of a common distributed term and thus can supplement the theory of confused, distributive and mobile supposition with the missing element for an 'equivalation thesis'. However, this theoretical addition is not able to resolve the many problems of Peter's account. One of them, although not the main one, is his realist commitment regarding the universals. We argued that we cannot find doctrinal grounding to make Peter a conceptualist, as Klima suggests in some portions of his works, by showing that through the difference between *the way of logic* and *the way of nature* (*SL.* VI), there is a domain of "*things-as-conceived and their modes*". The doctrinal contents of *SL*, of which we can specify the theory of signification, the general mechanics of supposition and the appellation of terms with simple supposition, are pointing towards a fully embraced realism position.

Finally, we addressed the problem of the specific formality of Peter of Spain's theory of supposition and of the degree in which the contemporary interpretations can be considered proper understandings of it. We argued that Peter's account presents a low level of formality even for the 13th century logical standards. Through a comparative analysis of the modes of supposition, it was showed that Sherwood and Lambert are more careful in: connecting

supposition theory with the notion of truth; in offering more comprehensive and systematic rules of distribution, negation and supposition; in subscribing to a much more conceptualist-oriented position regarding the universals; and in not using the simple supposition for the predicates of A and I propositional forms. This fact strengthens their degree of formality and thus the resemblance with the contemporary theories of logic and language. However, in our search for the specific formality of Peter's theory, we have tried to show that the types identified by Dutilh and MacFarlane and the characteristics extracted by us from them are present only at the level of a tendency towards formality. By considering types of terms with their syntactic propositional positions, generic *supposita* and not unique and identifiable individuals, syntactical notions like syncategorematic elements, set of rules for the modes of supposition and for the propositional effects of the syncategorematic elements, we can speak about a formal tendency. But, since we do not have proper schemata that can be drawn out of the definition of personal modes, since we do not have proper syntactic rules for descending under the suppositing terms, since the extensive rules which describe the effects of negative or distributive signs are all missing, we can say that no specific formality from the types identified in section 2.1.3. can be ascribed to Peter's account. This fact is obviously reflected in the program of identifying the theory of supposition from *SL* with a theory of: reference, inference, quantification, computational hermeneutics and conceptual notation. Besides the generic problem of the compatibility between medieval and contemporary logic in term of formality, all these interpretations or formalizations fail in the case of Peter of Spain for the particular way in which the author articulates its doctrine. Peter's supposition theory lacks basic formal notion or, when they are not lacking, they are not fully integrated in a systematic account which should explain how supposition works and what its purpose is. The ascription of simple supposition to the predicates of A and I propositional forms and the inability of pointing out specific individuals, make Peter's supposition theory unable to be understood as a theory of reference. Since Peter does not offer explicit rules for showing how under the determine and confused-mobile supposition we can obtain systematic and equivalent concatenations of propositions for the A, E, I, O simple categorical forms, the quantification interpretation cannot be obtained. The lack of a comprehensive account for the distributive effect of negation strengthens this conclusion. The computation hermeneutical approach has a system of rules for the determination of the possible meaning of a proposition that is nowhere to be found in Peter's case, not even at an implicit

level. The inferential interpretation of supposition has a very limited application as well. Although some connections were pointed out by us between supposition, on the one hand, and the theories of fallacies and places, on the other, the inferential interpretation as proposed by the modern scholarship cannot be held. Peter does not offer a systematic account that shows how certain modifications of the modes of supposition in an inference can vouch for the correctness of the inferential process. All we can say is that the process implied by the personal confused and mobile mode of supposition runes in parallel to a certain degree with the way in which the places from the whole in quantity are described. Regarding the conceptual notation interpretation, we can find the same impossibility as in the previous cases. Peter's theory is not a system which has as purpose the process of memorizing through specific logical schemata topological relations between terms and objects.

In conclusion, at the end of our study we may ask: how the supposition theory might be understood taking into account the whole analysis that we made? We thing that a proper answer must be offer according to the historical evolution of supposition theory tracked by the focal lens of the 'formality' concept.

First of all, we cannot speak about a medieval supposition theory, but about a variety of theoretical constructs that share common origins and purposes, despite their doctrinal differences. We may say that the story of the evolution of the *suppositio* concept might start with the common, intuitive and physical relation of substitution expressed by the common language. Then, this physical relation was regimented within the juridical framework of the Roman Law. Further, the concept of *suppositio* has suffered a process of abstraction in such a way that its relation did not comprise only physical objects. The grammatical tradition started by Priscian, at its very beginnings, considered it in such a way that the suppositing word will stand for or replace the subject or subject matter of the proposition. The logical tradition considered supposition that which is subordinated, the individual, or the substance. The Porretan tradition considered supposition the substrate which is capable to be the bearer of form. In the proximity of the arrival of terminist logic, all these particular acceptances were contaminated, in a such a way that the logical, grammatical and theological traditions presupposed the overlapping between the concepts of substance, subsistence, subject, subordination and supposition. This made *suppositio* a concept with logical, grammatical and ontological implications. The advent of the terminist logic marked the apparition of a formal apparatus

which integrated the notion of supposition in a system of classifications and definitions which had a purpose inherited from the grammatical, theological and especially logical tradition. We can state that its purpose was that of clarifying the entity for which a term stands based on the types of terms and the propositional context. Even within the terminist tradition we can speak about an evolution of the supposition theory and a refinement of the logical tools used in studying it. The 13th century had a more realist-oriented account, although in the case of Sherwood and Lambert we can speak about a conceptualist position. In the 14th century we can find a fully developed nominalist position which integrated the mental language into the mechanics of supposition. In the 13th century doctrines, the simple supposition is primary conceived as the property of a term to be taken for its signified form or for its objects contained under that form but without having a determinate relation to them. The doctrine of *SL*, contrasts this position, with a strong realism regarding the existence of universals. The confused mobile supposition is conceived as a property marked by a distributive sign; it takes place when the term stands for each of its individuals or bearers of form contained under the term or under the form of the suppositing term. Such a type of supposition is explained only by the possibility of a descending inference from the suppositing term to each of its *supposita*. The way this descending takes place is not fully and schematically specified, especially in Peter's case. The 14th century doctrines were more rigorous articulated with a focus on the connection between the property of a term to stand for something and the fact that the thing(s) for which the terms stand verifies or makes the proposition true. Although this connection with the truth value of the proposition was stated in the cases of Sherwood and Lambert, in Peter's case it seems to be rejected. In the 14th century, much more attention was given to the role of the logician in establishing the type of supposition that a term can have and on the conditions under which each mode of supposition is defined. They conceive what the 13th century logicians called '*suppositio simplex*', as a property according to which a term stands for a concept or notion of the soul, void of any hard ontological commitment. Determine supposition, merely confused supposition and confused supposition were explained by both ascending and descending inferences that were made: disjunctively, with a disjunctive extreme or conjunctively, fact that enables us to speak about a schematic formality. Supplemented by much more rigorous rules of distribution, the three aforementioned types of supposition are systematically explained through types of possible inferences from the original proposition that contains the suppositing term, to a

proposition or concatenation of propositions where the suppositing term is replace by its inferiors, and from those, back to the original one. Generally speaking, we can say that, starting with 14th century, the supposition was defined on more syntactical or formal grounds than in the previous century.

This specific timeline of '*suppositio*' makes us believe that the concept suffered a process of abstraction through its development. Its degree of formality grows exponentially from a concept expressed in a natural language, which implies a relation of substitution between physical objects, to a concept integrated in a terminist theory and developed within a science of language, which implies a relation between a term and a type of entity mediated or not through the realm of mental language. Made this way, 'suppositio' becomes regimented and formalized according to the requirements of medieval logic and its semi-formal language. Rules, definitions and classification are offered in order the explain the mechanics of supposition. What this theory succeeds to do, is to offer the necessary tools for analyzing the relation between language and the different domains of reality through the study of terms placed in propositional context. What Peter of Spain's theory accomplishes, is to offer the necessary tools, although often in an inconvenient manner, for analyzing the relation between language and the extra-mental and extra-linguistic world, through the study of terms placed in propositional contexts. The supposition theory tells us for what kind of entity a term can stand in a particular propositional context. Understood as such, supposition theory itself may be considered a formalization, that is, an abstract, schematic or idealized understanding of the relation between language and the different ontological domains, or, more specifically, between terms and their generic object(s). Surely, this formalization is made according to the formal tools of the 13th and 14th century and is rendered in a Latin language regimented by logical and grammatical notions and not in a symbolic manner.

Secondly, supposition theory, in general, and Peter of Spain's version, in particular, must not be understood as a theory of: reference, inference, quantification, computational hermeneutics or conceptual notation, in the specific acceptances provided by the modern scholarship. All these interpretations are formalizations which change the object of their interpretations, in such a way that the product of formalization has more theoretical content in common with the contemporary theories of language and logic than with the medieval theories. This is in a greater manner applied to Peter of Spain's case. The *auctor summularum* does not

offer extensive rules and comprehensive examples for a number of theoretical points related to supposition, such that a modern reconstruction in terms of the five aforementioned options seems to be impossible. The degree of formality and internal coherence of Peter's theory is low even for the 13th and 14th century account of supposition. The lack of an account for a systematic way of descending to the inferiors of the suppositing term, the lack of an ascription of a supposition for the predicate of I and O propositional forms, the ascription of a simple supposition for the predicates of A-type and possibly I-type propositions, the hard realist ontological orientation, the lack of rules for the effects of the distributive signs and negation in relation to supposition are arguments for considering Peter's account problematic in many aspects. However, supposition theory shares particular features with all the five aforementioned interpretations, but without permitting an identification with them. In the way in which from the suppositing term we can descend to a certain individual or collection of individuals, it resembles with the theory of reference. In the way in which the theory of supposition, through distribution, tells us what it means for a term to have a distributive sign, it resembles with the theory of quantification. The fact that the personal modes of supposition are defined through ascending and descending inferences which might be considered as preserving the truth value, and since this whole process takes the form of an enthymeme, it resembles the theory of inference. Since supposition tries to determine on the basis of rules, definitions and classification the type of entity for which a term stands, and thus the possible meaning of a proposition, it resembles the theory of meaning, as Dutilh suggest. Since supposition is formalizing and thus rendering a certain relation between the language and the world in a more abstract manner, it resembles the theory of conceptual notation, as proposed by Perreiah. However, those resemblances are not enough for determining what supposition is. From all the previous options put forward by the scholarship, the more adequate seems to be the last two. Supposition theory seems indeed to be preoccupied "to determine the range of possible supposita for a term [... to] determine the ontological kind(s) of the possible supposita of a term in a given proposition, and how many of them are required in order to verify the proposition"[1051]. Yet, we do not agree that the supposition presupposed a computational account, according to which the rules were meant to be applied mechanically, and that supposition was so truth-value focused. Our study points

[1051] DUTILH (2018), p. 96.

towards an organic development of supposition theory. In different stages of its evolution, an especially in Peter's case, the property of supposition was considered independent from the fact of rendering the proposition true. Its extensive rules for determining the types of supposition were missing or formulated in a less systematic manner. Even in Ockham's case we cannot find the degree of formality presupposed by the computational account. Regarding the conceptual notation interpretation, supposition seems indeed to be a conceptual tool for analyzing logical and linguistical phenomena, but not in the sense defended by Perreiah. Far from being a topological system of memorizing relations between terms and objects, supposition theory may be considered an attempt to offer a conceptual notation in the absence of a proper conceptual notation. Medieval logic does not have a *Begriffsschrift* at its disposal, symbolic notions and languages for rendering its theories in a proper formal manner. All it has is a Latin language regimented by logical and grammatical notions which renders its theories in a discursive but abstract manner.

Appendix I - Translation of Peter of Spain Summaries of Logic from Latin to Romanian

TRATATUL I Despre <noțiunile> introductive *372*
Despre dialectică 372
Despre sunet 372
Despre emisia vocală 372
Despre nume 373
Despre verb 373
Despre rostire 374
Despre propoziție 374
Despre propoziția categorică și diviziunea sa tripartită 374
Despre materia propozițiilor categorice 377
Despre echipolențele lor 377
Despre cele trei feluri de conversie 377
Despre propoziția ipotetică și diviziunea ei 378
Despre adevărul <propozițiilor> ipotetice 379
Despre echipolențele lor 379
Despre mod 380
Despre propozițiile modale 380
Despre echipolentele lor 381
Despre opoziția lor 383
TRATATUL II DESPRE PREDICABILE *385*
Despre predicabil 385
Despre gen 385
Despre specie 386
Despre diferență 388
Despre propriu 388
Despre accident 389
Despre cele comune și diferențele predicabilelor 390
Despre predicație 391
Despre denominative 391
Tratatul III DESPRE PREDICAMENTE *392*
Despre anumite lucruri preliminarii 392
Despre substanță 394
Despre cele comune și proprietățile substanței 394
Despre cantitate 396
Despre cele comune cantității 396
Despre <faptul de a fi> în raport cu ceva 397
Despre <aspectele> comune relației 397

Despre calitate 398
Despre proprietățile calității 399
Despre acțiune 399
Despre afectare 400
Despre cele patru feluri de opoziție 400
Despre anterior 400
Despre simultan 401
Despre mișcare 401
Despre faptul de a avea 402
Tratatul IV DESPRE SILOGISME 403
Despre propoziție 403
Despre silogism 403
Despre mod și figură 404
Despre regulile universale 404
Despre prima figură 404
Despre modurile ei 405
Despre a doua figură 406
Despre modurile sale 406
Despre reducția prin imposibil 407
Despre a treia figură 407
Despre modurile ei 407
Despre anumite reguli 408
13. Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum Cesare cambestres festino barocho darapti Felapto disamis datisi bocardo ferison 409
Despre legăturile inutile 410
TRATATUL V DESPRE LOCURI 411
Despre multipla rațiune 411
Despre argument și argumentare 411
Despre speciile argumentării 412
Despre loc în general 412
DESPRE LOCURILE INTRINSECI 414
Despre locul de la substanță 414
Despre locul de la definiție 414
Despre locul de la definit 414
Despre locul de la descriere 415
Despre locul de la interpretarea numelui 415
Despre locul de la cele concomitente substanței 416
Despre locul de la întreg 416
Despre locul de la întregul universal sau de la gen 416
Despre locul de la specie sau de la partea subordonată 417
Despre locul de la întregul integral 417
Despre locul de la întregul în cantitate 417
Despre locul de la întregul în mod 418

Despre locul de la întregul în loc 418
Despre locul de la întregul în timp 420
Despre locul de la cauză 420
Despre locul de la generare 421
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TRATATUL I
DESPRE <NOȚIUNILE> INTRODUCTIVE

Despre dialectică

1. Dialectica este arta care are calea către principiile tuturor metodelor. Și de aceea, în achiziția științelor, dialectica trebuie să fie prima. Însă se numește *'dialectică'* de la *'dia'*, care înseamnă *doi*, și *'logos',* care înseamnă *rostire*, sau de la *'lexis'*, care înseamnă *rațiune*, în sensul de rostire sau rațiune a doi <oameni>, adică a celui care se opune și a celui care răspunde, când dispută. Însă, disputa nu poate să aibă loc decât prin intermediul rostirii, și nici rostirea decât prin intermediul emisiei vocale. Dar fiecare emisie vocală este sunet. De aceea, trebuie să pornim de la sunet, ca de la cel anterior.

Despre sunet

2. Prin urmare, sunetul este tot ceea ce e perceput în mod propriu de auz. Însă spun *'în mod propriu'*, deoarece, chiar dacă este auzit omul sau clopotul, acest fapt nu se întâmplă decât prin sunet. Dintre sunete, unul este emisie vocală, altul non-emisie vocală. Emisia vocală este sunetul scos din gura viețuitorului, format cu ajutorul organelor naturale. 'Organe naturale' sunt numite cele prin care se formează emisia vocală: buzele, dinții, limba, palatul, gâtul și plămânul. Sunetul non-emisie vocală este cel generat din coliziunea corpurilor inanimate, precum frângerea copacilor, tropotul picioarelor.

Despre emisia vocală

3. Dintre emisiile vocale, unele sunt semnificative, altele non-semnificative. Emisia vocală semnificativă este aceea care reprezintă un anumit lucru în fața auzului, precum *'om',* sau geamătul neputincioșilor. Emisia vocală non-semnificativă este aceea care nu reprezintă nimic în fața auzului, precum *'buba'*. Dintre emisiile vocale semnificative, unele sunt semnificative în mod convențional, altele în mod natural. Emisia vocală semnificativă în mod natural este cea care, potrivit tuturor, reprezintă același lucru, precum geamătul neputincioșilor,<sau> lătratul câinilor. Emisia vocală semnificativă în mod convențional este aceea care reprezintă un anumit

lucru potrivit dorinței celui care o instituie, precum *'om'*. Dintre emisiile vocale semnificative în mod convențional, una este simplă sau incomplexă, precum numele și verbul, alta compusă sau complexă, precum rostirea.

Despre nume

4. Numele este emisia vocală semnificativă în mod convențional, fără <aspect> temporal, din care nici o parte separată nu semnifică, care este determinată <și este la un caz> drept. *'Emisia vocală'* este pus în definiția numelui în locul genului; *'semnificativă'* este pus pentru diferența față de emisia vocală non-semnificativă; *'în mod convențional'* este pus pentru diferența de emisia vocală care semnifică în mod natural; *'fără <aspect> temporal'* este pus pentru diferența față de verb, care semnifică împreună cu timpul; *'nici o parte a acesteia etc.'* este pus pentru diferența față de rostire, ale cărei părți semnifică separat. *'Care este determinată'* este pus pentru diferența față de numele nedeterminat, precum *'non-om'*, care nu este nume potrivit dialecticienilor, ci nume nedeterminat; *'dreaptă'* este pus pentru diferența față de numele <la un caz> oblic, precum *'a lui Cato, pentru Cato'* și tot așa despre altele, care nu sunt nume potrivit dialecticienilor, ci cazuri ale numelor, sau alte <cazuri> oblice; de aceea doar nominativul sau doar <cazul> drept se spune că este nume.

Despre verb

5. Verbul este emisia vocală semnificativă în mod convențional, împreună cu timpul, din care nici o parte separată nu semnifică, care este determinată <și este la un mod> drept. *'Împreună cu timpul'* este pus în definiția verbului pentru diferența fată de nume, care semnifică fără timp; *'care este determinată'* este pus pentru diferența față de verbul nedeterminat, precum *'non-aleargă'*, care nu este verb, potrivit dialecticienilor, ci verb nedeterminat; *'<la un mod> drept'* este pus pentru diferența față de verbele <la un mod> oblic, precum *'alerga'*, și *'alergase'* și *'va alerga'*, pe care dialecticianul nu le numește 'verbe', ci 'verbe <la un mod> oblic'. Căci doar verbul timpului prezent al modului indicativ se spune că este verb; celelalte verbe de același mod și de alte moduri se numesc 'verbe oblice'. Însă toate celelalte diferențe se pun acolo pentru aceeași rațiune ca în cazul numelui. Și trebuie cunoscut faptul că dialecticianul stabilește doar

două părți ale rostirii, precum numele și verbul, însă pe celelalte părți le numește *sincategoreme*, adică cosemnificative.

Despre rostire

6. Rostirea este emisia vocală semnificativă în mod convențional, ale cărei părți semnifică separat. *'Ale cărei părți etc.'* – acest lucru întreg este pus acolo pentru diferențierea de nume și de verb; toate celelalte sunt puse acolo prin aceeași rațiune ca în cazul numelui și al verbului. Dintre rostiri, una este completă, alta incompletă. Rostirea completă este aceea care produce un sens complet în mintea ascultătorului, precum *'omul est alb'*; rostirea incompletă este aceea care produce un sens incomplet în mintea ascultătorului, precum *'omul alb'*. Dintre rostirile complete, una este indicativă, precum *'omul aleargă'*, alta imperativă, precum *'fă foc!',* alta optativă, precum *'o, dacă aș fi un cleric bun'*, alta conjunctivă, ca *'dacă vei fi venit la mine, îți voi da un cal'*. Însă, dintre toate acestea, doar rostirea indicativă se numește 'propoziție'.

Despre propoziție

7. Propoziția este rostirea care semnifică adevărul sau falsul, precum *'omul aleargă'*. Dintre propoziții, una este categorică, alta ipotetică. Categorică este aceea care are subiectul și predicatul ca părți principale ale sale, ca *'omul aleargă'*; căci în această propoziție, numele *'omul'* este subiect, verbul *'aleargă'* este predicat, și ceea ce îl leagă pe unul cu celălalt este copulă. Ceea ce reiese reducând astfel: *'omul aleargă' - 'omul este cel care aleargă'*; numele *'omul'* este pus ca subiect, însă *'cel care aleargă'* este pus ca predicat, și verbul *'este'* îl leagă pe unul de celălalt. Și se numește *'categorică'* de la *'cathegorizo,-zas'*, care este același lucru ca *'predico, -cas'*. Subiectul este cel despre care se spune ceva; predicatul este ceea ce se spune despre un altul.

Despre propoziția categorică și diviziunea sa tripartită

8. Dintre propozițiile categorice, una este universală, alta particulară, una este nedefinită, alta singulară. Propoziția universală este aceea în care termenul comun determinat de semnul

universal este pus ca subiect, precum *'orice om aleargă'*; sau: propoziția universală este aceea care semnifică faptul că ceva este în fiecare sau în nici unul. Termenul comun este acela care e capabil de la natură să fie predicat despre mai multe, precum *'om'* despre Socrate și despre Platon și despre fiecare dintre ceilalți oameni. Semnele universale sunt următoarele: *'orice', 'nici unul'*, *'nimic'*, *'fiecare', 'fiecare <din doi>', 'nici unul <din doi>'*, și cele asemănătoare. Propoziția particulară este aceea în care termenul comun determinat de semnul particular este pus ca subiect, precum *'un anumit om aleargă'*. Semnele particulare sunt următoarele: *'un anumit', 'un oarecare', 'altul', 'celălalt'* și cele asemănătoare. Nedefinită este aceea în care termenul comun fără semn este pus ca subiect, precum *'omul aleargă'*. Propoziția singulară este aceea în care termenul singular sau termenul comun legat cu un pronume demonstrativ este pus ca subiect, precum *'Socrate aleargă'* sau *'acest om aleargă'*. Termenul singular este acela care e capabil de la natură să fie predicat despre unul singur.

9. Apoi, dintre propozițiile categorice, una este afirmativă, alta negativă. Afirmativă este aceea în care predicatul este afirmat despre subiect, precum *'omul aleagă'*. Negativă este aceea în care predicatul este îndepărtat de la subiect, precum *'omul nu aleargă'*.

10. După ce propoziția a fost împărțită în trei feluri, trebuie să știm că <rostirea> interogativă prin care punem o întrebare este de trei feluri, anume: *'ce?', 'ce fel?', 'cât?'*. *'Ce?'* întreabă despre substanța propoziției; de aceea, la întrebarea făcută prin *'ce?',* trebuie să se răspundă: *'categorică'* sau *'ipotetică'*; prin *'ce fel': 'afirmativă'* sau *'negativă'*, căci *'ce fel?'* întreabă despre calitatea propoziției; prin *'cât?'*: *'universală'*, *'particulară'*, *'nedefinită'*, și *'singulară'*, deoarece *'cât?'* întreabă despre cantitatea propoziției. De aici versurile:

que ca vel ypo
qualis ne vel aff
un quanta par in sin.

11. Apoi, dintre propozițiile categorice, unele participă <între ele> prin fiecare termen, precum *'omul este viețuitor'*, *'viețuitorul este om'*; însă altele doar prin unul, precum *'omul aleargă' 'omul dispută'*, sau *'omul aleargă' 'calul aleargă'*; altele însă prin nici unul, precum *'omul aleargă' 'calul se mișcă'*. Apoi, dintre propozițiile care participă <între ele> prin ambii

termeni, unele participă potrivit aceleiași ordini, precum *'omul aleargă' 'omul nu aleargă';* însă altele printr-o ordine inversă, precum *'omul este viețuitor' 'viețuitorul este om'*.

12. Apoi, dintre propozițiile care participă <între ele> prin fiecare termen potrivit aceleiași ordini, unele sunt contrarii, altele subcontrarii, altele subalterne. Contrarii sunt universala afirmativă și universala negativă ale aceluiași subiect și ale aceluiași predicat, precum *'orice om aleargă' – 'nici un om nu aleargă'*. Subcontrarii sunt particulara afirmativă și particulara negativă ale aceluiași subiect și ale aceluiași predicat, precum *'un anumit om aleargă' – 'un anumit om nu aleargă'*. Contradictorii sunt universala afirmativă și particulara negativă, sau universala negativă și particulara afirmativă, ale aceluiași subiect și ale aceluiași predicat, precum *'orice om aleargă' – 'un anumit om nu aleargă'* sau *'nici un om nu aleargă' – 'un anumit om aleargă'*. Subalterne sunt universala afirmativă și particulara afirmativă, sau universala negativă și particulara negativă, ale aceluiași subiect și aceluiași predicat, precum *'orice om aleargă' – 'un anumit om aleargă'*, sau *'nici un om nu aleargă' – 'un anumit om nu aleargă'*. Ceea ce reiese în această figură:



Despre materia propozițiilor categorice

13. Materia propozițiilor este de trei feluri, adică naturală, contingentă și îndepărtată. Materia naturală este aceea în care predicatul este despre ființa subiectului sau propriul său, precum *'omul este viețuitor'* și *'omul este rizibil'*. Materia contingentă este aceea în care predicatul poate fi prezent sau absent din subiect, precum *'omul est alb', 'omul nu este alb'*. Materia îndepărtată este aceea în care predicatul nu se poate potrivi cu subiectul, precum *'omul este măgar'*.

Despre echipolențele lor

14. Legea contrariilor este astfel încât, dacă una este adevărată, cealaltă este falsă, și nu invers; căci ambele pot fi false în cazul materiei contingente, precum *'orice om est alb', 'nici un om nu est alb'*. În materia naturală, întotdeauna, dacă una este adevărată, cealaltă este falsă, și invers, precum *'orice om est viețuitor', 'nici un om nu este viețuitor'*; și în cea îndepărtată, precum *'orice om este măgar'*, *'nici un om nu este măgar'*; și în cea contingentă, când se predică un accident inseparabil, precum *'orice corb este negru'*, *'nici un corb nu este negru'*; însă în accidentul separabil ambele pot fi simultan false. De aceea, în materia contingentă ambele nu sunt mereu simultan false.

Legea subcontrariilor este astfel încât dacă una este falsă, cealaltă este adevărată, și nu invers; căci ambele pot să fie simultan adevărate în materia contingentă. De aceea legea subcontrariilor se raportează printr-un mod contrar la legea contrariilor.

Legea contradictoriilor este astfel încât, dacă una este adevărată, cealaltă este falsă, și invers; căci nu pot fi simultan adevărate și false în nici o materie.

Legea subalternelor este astfel încât, dacă universala este adevărată, particulara este adevărată, și nu invers; căci universala poate fi falsă, în timp ce particulara sa să fie adevărată. Și dacă particulara este falsă, universala sa este falsă, și nu invers.

Despre cele trei feluri de conversie

15. Apoi, dintre propozițiile care participă <între ele> prin fiecare termen în ordine inversă, conversia este de trei feluri, adică simplă, prin accident și prin contrapoziție.

Conversia simplă înseamnă a face predicatul din subiect și invers, cu păstrarea cantității și a calității. Și prin acest mod se convertește universala negativă și particulara afirmativă, precum *'nici un om nu este iepure' - 'nici un iepure nu este om'; 'un anumit om este viețuitor' - 'un anumit viețuitor est om'*.

Conversia prin accident înseamnă a face predicatul din subiect și subiectul din predicat, cu păstrarea calității, dar schimbarea cantității. Și astfel se convertește universala afirmativă în particulara afirmativă, precum *'orice om este viețuitor' - 'un anumit om este viețuitor'*, și universala negativă în particulara negativă, precum *'nici un om nu este iepure' - 'un anumit iepure nu este om'*.

Conversia prin contrapoziție înseamnă a face predicatul din subiect și subiectul din predicat, cu păstrarea cantității și a calității, însă cu schimbarea termenilor determinați în nedeterminați. Și în acest mod se convertește universala afirmativă și particulara negativă, precum *'orice om este viețuitor' - 'orice non-viețuitor este non-om'*; *'un anumit om nu este iepure' - 'un anumit non-iepure nu este non-om'*.

Trebuie să știm că, dacă un semn este în subiectul propoziției care trebuie convertită, oricare ar fi el, trebuie pus deasupra întregului predicat și să fie redus la întregul subiect.

Despre propoziția ipotetică și diviziunea ei

16. Urmează <să tratăm> despre propoziția ipotetică. Propoziția ipotetică este cea care are două propoziții categorice ca părți principale ale sale, precum *'dacă omul aleargă, omul se mișcă'*. Și se numește *'ipotetică'* de la *'ypos'*, care înseamnă *'sub'*, și *'thesis'*, care înseamnă *'poziție',* în sensul de *'supozitivă'*, deoarece o parte *este pusă sub* alta.

Dintre propozițiile ipotetice, una este condițională, alta copulativă, alta disjunctivă. Condițională este cea în care sunt legate două <propoziții> categorice prin conjuncția *'dacă'*, precum *'dacă omul aleargă, omul se mișcă'*; iar cea categorică, de care se leagă nemediat conjuncția *'dacă'*, se numește *antecedent*, pe când cealaltă *consecvent*. Copulativă este cea în care se leagă două categorice prin conjuncția *'și'*, precum *'Socrate aleargă și Platon dispută'*. Disjunctivă este cea în care se leagă două categorice prin conjuncția *'sau'*, precum *'Socrate aleargă sau Platon dispută'*.

Despre adevărul <propozițiilor> ipotetice

17. Pentru adevărul condiționalei se cere ca antecedentul să nu poată fi adevărat fără consecvent, precum *'dacă este om, este viețuitor'*. De aceea, orice condițională adevărată este necesară, și orice condițională falsă este imposibilă. Pentru falsitatea acesteia, este suficient ca antecedentul să poată fi fără consecvent, precum *'dacă este Socrate, este alb'*.

Pentru adevărul copulativei, se cere ca fiecare parte să fie adevărată, precum *'omul este viețuitor și Dumnezeu există'*. Pentru falsitatea ei, este suficient ca cealaltă parte să fie falsă, ca *'omul este viețuitor și calul este piatră'*.

Pentru adevărul disjunctivei, este suficient ca o parte să fie adevărată, precum *'omul este viețuitor sau calul este măgar'*. Și este permis ca fiecare parte să fie adevărată, însă nu în sensul propriu că *'omul este viețuitor sau calul este nechezabil'*. Pentru falsitatea acesteia, fiecare parte trebuie să fie falsă, *'omul este măgar sau calul este piatră'*.

Despre echipolențele lor

18. Despre echipolențe, sunt fixate următoarele reguli:

Dacă înaintea vreunui semn se pune o negație, el este echipolent cu contradictoriul său. Și de aceea următoarele sunt echipolente: *'nu orice om aleargă'*, *'un anumit om nu aleargă'*, și tot așa despre altele.

A doua regulă este următoarea: *dacă după un anumit semn universal se pune o negație, el este echipolent cu contrariul său*. Precum următoarele: *'orice om nu este viețuitor', 'nici un om nu est viețuitor'*, sau următoarele: *'nici un om nu aleargă'*, *'orice om aleargă'*; și tot așa despre alte semne universale, afirmative și negative.

A treia regulă este următoarea: *dacă înainte sau după un anumit semn universal sau particular se pune o negație, el este echipolent cu subalternul său.* Precum următoarele: *'nu orice om nu aleargă'*, *'un anumit om aleargă'*, și la fel următoarele: *'nu un anumit om nu aleargă'*, *'orice om aleargă'*. Și tot așa despre oricare alt semn.

Din aceste reguli reiese altă regulă, <adică> următoarea: *dacă două semne universale negative sunt puse în aceeași rostire, astfel încât unul este în subiect și celălalt în predicat, primul este echipolent cu contrariul său, al doilea cu contradictoriul său.* De aceea,

<propoziția> *'nimic este nimic'* este echipolentă <propoziției> *'fiecare este ceva anume'* deoarece prin a doua regulă *'fiecare nu'* și *'nimic'* sunt echipolente, deoarece, precum *'fiecare nu'* și *'nici unul'* sunt echipolente, tot așa *'fiecare nu'* și *'nimic'* sunt echipolente, iar prin prima regulă *'nu nimic'* și *'ceva anume'* sunt echipolente. De aceea, <propoziția> *'nimic este nimic'* este echipolentă <propoziției> *'fiecare este ceva anume',* deoarece *'nu nimic'* și *'ceva anume'* sunt echipolente. Și fie suficiente acestea despre echipolențe.

Despre mod

19. Modul este o determinare care se alătură unui lucru. Și are loc prin adjectiv. Însă, deoarece adjectivul este de două feluri (căci unul este adjectiv al numelui, precum *'alb'* și *'negru'* și altele asemănătoare, însă altul al verbului, precum adverbul; căci, potrivit lui Priscian, adverbul este ca un adjectiv al verbului), din același motiv, modul este de două feluri: unul nominal, care are loc prin adjectivele numelui, altul adverbial, care are loc prin adjectivele adverbiale, precum *'omul alb aleargă repede'*.

Apoi, dintre adverbe, unele determină verbul în scopul compunerii, precum următoarele șase: *'necesar'*, *'contingent'*, *'posibil'*, *'imposibil'*, *'adevărat'* și *'fals'*; altele determină verbul în scopul obiectului verbului, precum *'acționează curajos'*, *'aleargă repede'*; altele determină verbul prin sensul timpului, precum adverbele temporale; altele prin sensul modului, precum adverbele optative și hortative, și tot așa despre altele. Și potrivit acestora, modul este luat în mai multe feluri prin adverbe.

Despre propozițiile modale

20. Însă, lăsând deoparte toate celelalte <moduri>, se cuvine spus despre acel mod care determină compunerea, că există acestea șase: *'necesar'*, *'contingent'* etc. Căci, atunci când se spune *'omul aleargă în mod necesar'*, se semnifică faptul că această compunere este necesară. Însă, atunci când se spune *'omul aleargă bine sau repede'*, se semnifică faptul că alergarea omului este bună sau rapidă. Și astfel, în aceasta se determină obiectul verbului, însă în prima compunerea. Și astfel se cuvine înțeles despre celelalte adverbe menționate. De aceea, doar

modul care determină compunerea face propoziția modală și doar la unul ca acesta ne referim aici.

21. Și se cuvine știut că aceste șase moduri uneori sunt luate adverbial, alteori nominal. Adverbial, precum *'în mod necesar'*, *'în mod contingent'*, *'în mod posibil'*, *'în mod imposibil'*, *'în mod adevărat'* și *'în mod fals'*; nominal, precum *'necesar'*, *'contingent'*, *'posibil'* și *'imposibil'*, *'adevărat'* și *'fals'*. Propoziția modală este cea care este determinată de unul dintre aceste șase moduri, <precum> *'faptul că Socrate aleargă este posibil'* și *'faptul că Socrate aleargă este imposibil'*.

22. Și se cuvine știut că, în <propozițiile> modale, verbul trebuie să stea ca subiect, însă modul să se predice. Dar toate celelalte propoziții se numesc *'despre faptul de a fi în'*. Însă acele propoziții care sunt făcute modale de moduri precum *'în mod adevărat'* și *'în mod fals'*, datorită modului sunt lăsate deoparte, deoarece, în acestea opoziția este luată în același fel precum în cele *privitoare la faptul de a fi în*, și la fel consecința. Însă în celelalte patru moduri opoziția nu este luată astfel, precum va reieși ulterior.

23. Însă se cuvine știut că fiecare dintre aceste patru moduri face patru propoziții și astfel, fiindcă există patru moduri, vor fi de patru ori câte patru propoziții, și astfel sunt șaisprezece. De exemplu, modul care este *'posibil'*, dacă este luat fără negație, face o singură propoziție, precum *'este posibil ca Socrate să alerge'*. Dacă este luat cu negația pusă în fața verbului, face alta, precum *'este posibil ca Socrate să nu alerge'*. Dar a treia propoziție este luată printr-o negație pusă înaintea unui mod, precum *'nu este posibil ca Socrate să alerge'*. Însă a patra propoziție este luată printr-o negație pusă înaintea verbului și alta înaintea modului, precum *'nu este posibil ca Socrate să nu alerge'*. Și astfel se iau patru propoziții potrivit fiecăruia dintre celelalte moduri.

Despre echipolentele lor

24. Însă echipolentele acestor patru propoziții se cunosc prin patru reguli.

Prima regulă este următoarea: *oricărei rostiri afirmate i se atribuie 'posibil', tot ei i se atribuie 'contingent' și de la ea se îndepărtează 'imposibil', iar de la opusa sa contradictorie se îndepărtează 'necesar'*.

A doua regulă este următoarea: *oricărei rostiri negate i se atribuie 'posibil', tot ei i se atribuie 'contingent' și de la ea se îndepărtează 'imposibil', iar de la opusa sa contradictorie se îndepărtează 'necesar'.*

A treia regulă este următoarea: *de la oricare rostire afirmată se îndepărtează 'posibil', tot de la ea se îndepărtează 'contingent', ei i se atribuie 'imposibil', iar opusei sale contradictorii i se atribuie 'necesar'.*

A patra regulă este următoarea: *de la oricare rostire negată se îndepărtează 'posibil', tot de la aceeași se îndepărtează 'contingent' și tot ei i se atribuie 'imposibil', iar opusei sale contradictorii i se atribuie 'necesar'.* Ceea ce reiese în ordonarea sau figura următoare:

I	II
Este posibil să fie	Este posibil să nu fie
Este contingent să fie	Este contingent să nu fie
Nu este imposibil să fie	Nu este imposibil să nu fie
Nu este necesar să nu fie	Nu este necesar să fie
III	**IV**
Nu este posibil să fie	Nu este posibil să nu fie
Nu este contingent să fie	Nu este contingent să nu fie
Este imposibil să fie	Este imposibil să nu fie
Este necesar să nu fie	Este necesar să fie.

Însă toate acele propoziții ce sunt în prima linie sunt echipolente prin prima regulă și se convertesc între ele; însă cele ce sunt în a doua linie, prin a doua și se convertesc între ele; cele din a treia, prin a treia și cele din a patra, prin a patra.

Apoi, consecința și echipolența modalelor poate fi obținută prin regula: *toate propozițiile despre posibil și imposibil sunt echipolente când verbul se comportă la fel iar modul diferit. Și toate despre posibil și necesar sunt echipolente când verbul și modul se comportă diferit. Și toate despre imposibil și necesar sunt echipolente când verbul se comportă diferit și modul la fel*.

Și să se înțeleagă că modul se comportă la fel și diferit în raport cu afirmația și negația încât să se spună că modul se comportă la fel, când el se afirmă în ambele, sau se neagă în ambele,

însă diferit când este afirmat în una și negat în cealaltă. Și în același fel trebuie înțeles despre verb ca și despre mod. Și trebuie știut că în regula pomenită nu se face vreo mențiune despre contingent, deoarece *'contingent'* se convertește cu *'posibil'*. De aceea, judecata este aceeași cu privire la ambele propoziții. Să căutăm însă exemplele în figura de mai sus în prima, a doua, a treia și a patra ordonare, deoarece regula generală se aplică tuturor.

Despre opoziția lor

25. Apoi, dintre propozițiile modale, unele sunt contrare, altele subcontrare, altele contradictorii, altele subalterne. A patra ordine și a treia sunt contrare, sau sunt contrare propozițiile care sunt în al patrulea și al treilea șir. De aici versul: *a treia ordine este întotdeauna contrară celei de-a patra.* Prima ordine și a doua sunt subcontrarii. De aici versul: *fie primul tău șir subcontrar celui de-al doilea.* Apoi, prima ordine este contradictorie celei de-a treia și a doua celei de-a patra. De aici versul: *cea de-a treia ordine est contradictorie primea/ cea de a doua intră luptă cu a patra prin contradicție.* Apoi, primul șir este subaltern celui de-al patrulea și al doilea celui de-al treilea. De aceea versul: *prima se supune celei de-a patra, comportându-se la rândul său ca o particular/ cea de-a doua se raportează la seria următoare prin această lege*; sau astfel: *ordinea subalternă este prima sau a doua*. Și totul reiese potrivit figurii următoare:


CONTRARE
Nu este posibil să nu fie
Nu este contingent să nu fie
Este imposibil să nu fie
Este necesar să fie
Nu este posibil să fie
Nu este contingent să fie
Este imposibil să fie
Este necesar să nu fie
A treia ordine este întotdeauna contrară celei de-a patra
CONTRA DICTORII
CONTRA DICTORII
SUBALTERNE
Prima se supune celei de-a patra comportându-se la rândul său ca o particulară
Cea de-a doua se raportează la seria următoare prin această lege
SUBALTERNE
Fie primul tău șir subcontrar celui de-al doilea
Este posibil să fie
Este contingent să fie
Nu este imposibil să fie
Nu este necesar să nu fie
SUBCONTRARE
Este posibil să nu fie
Este contingent să nu fie
Nu este imposibil să nu fie
Nu este necesar să fie

TRATATUL II
DESPRE PREDICABILE

Despre predicabil

1. *'Predicabil'* este luat uneori în mod propriu; și astfel se numește *'predicabil'* doar ceea ce se predică despre mai multe. Alteori este luat în mod comun; și astfel se numește *'predicabil'* ceea ce se predică despre unul singur sau despre mai multe. De aceea, *'predicabil'* luat în mod propriu și *'universal'* sunt același lucru, însă diferă în faptul că predicabilul se definește prin *faptul de a fi spus*, însă universalul prin *faptul de a fi*. Căci este predicabil ceea ce are capacitatea naturală de a fi spus despre mai multe. Însă universalul este ceea ce are capacitatea naturală de a fi în mai multe. Însă predicabilul sau universalul se împarte în gen, diferență, specie, propriu și accident. Și aici ne referim doar la acestea cinci.

Despre gen

2. *'Gen'* se spune în trei moduri. În primul mod, o colecție a mai multe lucruri care se raportează într-un anumit fel unele la altele și la un principiu unic; precum colecția celor care sunt de aceeași paternitate, pentru că descind dintr-un singur strămoș. În al doilea mod se numește *'gen'* ceea ce este principiul fiecărei generări, precum tatăl sau patria. În al treilea mod se numește *'gen'* acela sub care este pusă specia. Și în acest ultim mod este luat aici *'gen'*. Și se definește astfel: genul este ceea ce este predicat *întrucât <el este> ceva* despre mai multe care diferă ca specie; precum *'viețuitor'* se predică despre cal, om și leu, care diferă prin specie.

3. Însă pentru a cunoaște acest membru, adică cele *'care diferă prin specie'*, trebuie să știm că *'cel ce diferă'* se spune în tot atâtea moduri în câte se spune *'același'*. Însă *'același'* se spune în trei moduri: același ca specie, același ca gen, același ca număr. Aceleași ca gen sunt oricare sunt cuprinse sub același gen, precum *om* și *măgar* sub *viețuitor*. Aceleași ca specie sunt oricare sunt cuprinse sub aceeași specie, precum *Socrate* și *Platon* sub *om*. Însă *'același ca număr'* se spune în trei moduri: căci într-un mod, același prin nume sau definiție, în alt mod același prin propriu, în al treilea mod același prin accident. Aceleași prin nume se numesc cele pentru care lucrul este unul singur, însă numele mai multe, precum *Marcus Tullius*. Aceleași prin definiție se numesc cele în cazul cărora unul este definiția celuilalt, precum *viețuitor rațional muritor* și *om*. Aceleași prin propriu sunt cele în cazul cărora unul este propriul celuilalt, precum *omul* și *faptul de a putea râde*.

Aceleași prin accident sunt cele în cazul cărora unul este accidentul celuilalt, precum *Socrate* și *albiciunea* care este în el.

4. În mod similar se spune *'care diferă ca gen'*, *'care diferă ca specie'*, *'care diferă ca număr'*. Însă cele diferite ca gen sunt oricare sunt sub genuri diferite, precum *omul* este sub acest gen care este *viețuitor*, și *arbore* este sub acest gen care este *plantă*. Cele diferite ca specie sunt oricare sunt din specii diferite, precum *Socrate* și *Brunellus*. Cele diferite ca număr sunt oricare constituie un <anumit> număr, precum *Socrate* și *Platon*.

5. Însă acela se spune a fi predicat *întrucât <este> ceva* cu care se răspunde în mod adecvat la întrebarea produsă prin *'ce <este>?'*. Precum atunci când se întreabă *'ce este omul?'*, se răspunde în mod adecvat: *'viețuitor'*. Și de aceea *'viețuitor'* se predică *întrucât <este> ceva* despre *om*.

6. Însă altfel genul se definește așa: genul este acela sub care sunt puse speciile.

7. Genul se împarte în genul cel mai general și genul subaltern. Genul cel mai general este acela peste care nu există un alt gen care să vină deasupra, precum substanța. Sau astfel: genul cel mai general este acela care, deoarece este gen, nu poate să fie specie. Și se împarte în zece. Acestea sunt: substanța, cantitatea, relația, calitatea, acțiunea, pasiunea, situarea, când-ul, unde-le, dispoziția. Însă acestea zece se numesc cele mai generale, deoarece nu au nici un gen deasupra lor. Căci, deși *'ființa'* se spune despre acelea zece, totuși se spune despre ele însele în mod echivoc sau în mai multe feluri, și de aceea nu este gen. Însă despre acestea zece nu vom spune acum nimic, ci despre ele însele se va determina în <*Despre*> *predicamente*. Genul subaltern este acela care, deși este gen, poate să fie specie, precum *viețuitor* este genul *omului* și este specia *corpului însuflețit.*

Despre specie

8. Specia este cea care este predicată *întrucât ea este ceva* despre mai multe care diferă ca număr. Însă în această definiție, verbul *'este predicată'* numește o aptitudine și nu un act – la fel și cazul altora, precum *'om'* este predicat despre Socrate și despre Platon și despre alți oameni particulari, care sunt mai multe și chiar sunt diferiți ca număr, precum a reieșit mai înainte. Și este predicat *întrucât <este> ceva* despre acestea. Precum atunci când se întreabă: *'ce este Socrate? sau Platon?'* se răspunde în mod adecvat: *'om'*. Ba chiar se definește astfel: specia este cea care se pune sub gen. Ba chiar astfel: specia este cea despre care genul este predicat *întrucât este ceva*.

9. Și se împarte în specia cea mai specifică și specia subalternă. Specia cea mai specifică este cea care, deoarece este specie, nu poate fi gen, precum *om* și *cal* și ceea ce e asemănător. Sau: specia cea mai specifică este cea sub care nu există altă specie inferioară. Specia subalternă este cea care, deși este specie, poate să fie gen. De aceea, oricare sunt între genul cel mai general și specia cea mai specifică sunt genuri și specii luate în raport cu unul și altul. Căci sunt genuri în raport cu cele inferioare și sunt specii în raport cu cele superioare. Însă, pentru ca aceasta să fie mai clar, să luăm un exemplu cu privire la un singur predicament. Precum substanța este primul gen; însă sub aceasta <se află> corpul; sub corp corpul animat, sub acesta viețuitorul, sub viețuitor viețuitorul rațional; sub acesta omul; sub om sunt indivizii, precum Socrate, Platon și Cicero.

10. Individualul este acela care se predică despre unul singur.

11. Și toate acestea reies potrivit figurii care se numește *'arborele lui Porfir'*:



Despre diferență

12. *'Diferența'* se spune în trei moduri, adică în mod comun, în mod propriu, și în mod mai propriu. Diferența este comună când unul diferă de un altul printr-un accident separabil, precum *Socrate care șade* diferă de *el care nu șade* sau de altul. Diferența este proprie când unul diferă de un altul printr-un accident inseparabil. Accidentul inseparabil este precum *cârn*, *acvilin*. Diferența este mai proprie când unul diferă de un altul printr-o diferență specifică, precum *om* de *cal* prin *rațional*. Și în acest ultim mod se ia aici *'diferență'*.

Și se definește astfel: diferența este cea care este predicat *întrucât <este> cumva* despre mai multe care diferă ca specie. Precum *'rațional'* este predicat despre *om* și despre *zei*, care sunt raționali; căci suntem raționali, precum dorește Porfir, noi și zeii; însă *'muritor'* adăugat nouă ne separă de ei. Însă acela se spune a fi predicat *întrucât <este> cumva* cu care se răspunde în mod adecvat la întrebarea pusă prin *'cum <este> ?'*. Precum atunci când se întreabă: *'cum este omul?'*, se răspunde în mod adecvat *'rațional'*; și de aceea *'rațional'* este predicat *întrucât <este> cumva* despre *om*. Ba chiar se definește astfel: diferența est aceea care abundă în specii în raport cu genul, precum *omul* abundă în raport cu *viețuitor* în aceste diferențe, care sunt *rațional* și *muritor*.

13. Și trebuie știut că aceeași diferență este divizivă și constitutivă, însă divizivă pentru gen și constitutivă pentru specie, precum *rațional* divide *viețuitor* cu diferența opusă ei înseși. Căci spunem: *în cazul viețuitorului, unul este rațional, altul irațional*; și aceste două diferențe constituie speciile diferite sub *viețuitor*. Căci orice diferență care i se alătură genului constituie specia, și de aceea se numește 'constitutivă' sau 'specifică'. Căci *'muritor'* adăugat peste acest gen, adică *viețuitor rațional*, constituie *omul*. Și din acest motiv spune Boethius că doar specia este definită. Căci definiția trebuie să fie <formată> din gen și diferențe; însă doar specia are gen și diferențe; deci doar specia este definită.

Despre propriu

14. *'Propriu'* se spune în patru moduri. Căci, într-un mod *'propriu'* se numește ceea este inerent unei anumite specii și nu oricăreia, precum faptul de a fi medic este inerent unui om și nu oricăruia, sau faptul de a fi geometru. În al doilea mod, *'propriu'* se numește ceea ce este inerent oricăruia, dar nu unuia singur, precum faptul de a fi biped este inerent oricărui om, dar nu unuia singur. În al treilea mod, *'propriu'* se numește ceea ce este inerent oricăruia și unuia singur, dar nu

întotdeauna, precum faptul de a încărunți este inerent oricărui om și unuia singur însă nu întotdeauna, deoarece <faptul are loc> doar la bătrânețe. În al patrulea mod, *'propriu'* se numește ceea ce se cheamă în mod propriu *'propriu'*, și se definește astfel: propriu este ceea ce este inerent oricăruia și unuia singur și întotdeauna; precum faptul de a putea râde este inerent oricărui om și unuia singur și întotdeauna; căci nu se spune că omul poate să râdă deoarece râde întotdeauna în act, ci deoarece este născut apt pentru a râdă.

Și în acest al patrulea mod, unul dintre cele cinci predicabile se numește *'propriu'*. Căci este definit chiar de către Aristotel astfel: "propriu este ceea ce este inerent doar speciei și se predică în mod convers despre lucru și nu indică ce anume înseamnă faptul de a fi", precum faptul de a putea râde este inerent omului. *'Nu indică ce anume înseamnă faptul de a fi'* se pune în descrierea propriului pentru diferența față de definiție. Căci definiția este predicată în mod convers despre lucru și indică ce anume înseamnă faptul de a fi, precum *'substanță însuflețită sensibilă'* se convertește cu *'viețuitor'* și indică faptul de a fi al acestuia, deoarece orice definiție are loc prin cele substanțiale; căci orice superior este despre esența inferiorului său. – Definiția este definită de către Aristotel astfel: "definiția este rostirea care semnifică ce anume înseamnă faptul de a fi". Însă propriul nu semnifică ce anume înseamnă faptul de a fi.

Despre accident

15. Accidentul este ceea ce este prezent și este absent fără coruperea subiectului, precum *alb, negru, faptul de a ședea*. Căci acestea pot fi inerente omului și să îi fie absent fără coruperea lui. Ba chiar se definește astfel: accidentul este ceea ce nu este nici gen, nici specie, nici diferență, nici propriu, însă este inerent lucrului. Sau astfel: accidentul este ceea ce se întâmplă să fie inerent și să nu fie inerent aceluiași, precum *alb <sau> faptul de a ședea* pentru om. Iar despre aceste două definiții Aristotel spune: "însă a doua definiție a accidentului este mai bună, deoarece, pentru înțelegerea primeia este necesar a ști dinainte ce este genul și ce este diferența și la fel despre celelalte; însă a doua a fost limitată prin sine să cunoască ce este ceea ce se spune prin ea însăși."

16. Dintre accidente, unul este separabil, altul inseparabil. Separabil, precum *albul*, *faptul de a ședea* pentru om. Inseparabil, precum *negrul* pentru corb și pentru etiopian, și *albul* pentru lebădă. Și deși *negrul* îi revine în mod inseparabil etiopianului și corbului, totuși acest fapt nu este împotriva definiției în care se spune că poate să fie <prezent> și să fie absent fără coruperea

subiectului, deoarece, precum dorește Porfir, corbul poate fi înțeles ca alb și etiopianul <poate să fie înțeles> ca strălucind de albiciune fără coruperea subiectului. Apoi, dintre accidente, unul <este> comun, precum albul, cârnul; altul propriu, precum albiciunea lui Socrate și cârnia lui.

Despre cele comune și diferențele predicabilelor

17. Comun este pentru toate cele cinci predicabile să fie predicate despre mai multe. Însă diferă, deoarece genul este predicat despre mai multe lucruri decât celelalte; și prin acest fapt diferă de celelalte. Însă diferența se deosebește de gen în măsura în care este predicată *întrucât <este> cumva*, însă genul *întrucât <este> ceva*. Apoi, diferența se deosebește de specie și de propriu, deoarece diferența este predicată despre mai multe specii, însă cele <din urmă> nu. Și se mai deosebește de accident, deoarece accidentele suportă o intensiune mai mare și mai mică, însă diferența nu suportă mai multul și mai puținul. Însă specia diferă de gen, deoarece genul conține toate speciile, însă nu este conținut de ele.

18. Însă specia se deosebește de diferență, deoarece din mai multe diferențe poate fi produs un singur lucru, precum aceste două diferențe *rațional* și *muritor* se alătură pentru constituirea speciei *om*. Însă specia nu se alătură speciei, încât să creeze o anumită specie diferită. Căci o anumită *iapă* particulară se împreunează cu un anumit asin particular pentru nașterea unui catâr, și nu iapa și asinul în general. De asemenea, specia diferă de propriu, deoarece specia prin natură este anterioară propriului, iar propriul este posterior speciei. Mai mult, cele a căror limite sau definiții sunt diferite, sunt ele însele de asemenea diferite; însă definițiile propriului și speciei sunt diferite; deci ele însele sunt diferite. Însă specia diferă de accident, deoarece specia este predicată *întrucât <este> ceva*, însă accidentul *întrucât <este> cumva* sau sub ce raport se află. Iar specia prin natură este anterioară accidentului. Însă orice accident este posterior prin natură subiectului său.

19. Însă propriul diferă de accident, deoarece propriul este predicat despre o singură specie, însă accidentul despre mai multe specii. Accidentul este inerent în sens prim indivizilor și în sens posterior genurilor și speciilor. Căci *omul* sau *viețuitorul* nu aleargă decât pentru că Socrate sau Platon <aleargă>. Însă propriul este inerent în sens prim speciei și prin specie individului. Apoi, genul, diferența, specia, propriul sunt participate în mod egal de toate cele despre care sunt

predicate. Apoi, genul, diferența, specia, propriul sunt predicate în mod univoc, însă accidentul nu este predicat în mod univoc, ci în mod denominativ.

Despre predicație

20. Însă *a fi predicat în mod univoc* înseamnă a fi predicat potrivit unui singur nume și unei singure rațiuni care este luată potrivit acelui nume. Precum *'om'* potrivit numelui său este predicat despre Socrate și despre Platon, – precum *'Socrate este om'*, *'Platon este om'* –, iar rațiunea lui potrivit acelui nume este una singură – precum viețuitor rațional muritor – potrivit căreia este predicată despre inferiorii săi, precum *'Socrate este viețuitor rațional și muritor'*, *'Platon este viețuitor rațional și muritor'*, și tot așa despre alții. Și din acest motiv ființa nu poate fi gen, deoarece, deși ar fi predicată potrivit unui singur nume despre toate, totuși nu potrivit unei singure rațiuni. Căci rațiunea ființei, întrucât se spune despre substanță, este ființa prin sine; însă întrucât se spune despre celelalte nouă predicamente, este ființa în altul. Și astfel este predicată potrivit cu diferite rațiuni. Și de aceea nu este predicată în mod univoc, ci mai degrabă în mod echivoc sau în mai multe moduri.

Însă *a fi predicat în mod echivoc* înseamnă a fi predicat printr-un singur nume și rațiuni diferite care sunt luate potrivit acelui nume, precum *'câine'* este predicat printr-un nume unic despre cel care poate să latre, despre cel marin, și despre cel celest; însă rațiunea potrivit acelui nume nu este aceeași când este rostită despre toate, ci <tot> alta și alta.

Despre denominative

21. Denominative se numesc toate cele care au denumirea de la un altul potrivit acelui nume, deși diferă datorită unui singur caz, precum de la *'gramatică' 'gramatician',* și de la *'curaj' 'curajos'*. De aceea, *'gramatician', 'curajos', 'alb'* și cele asemănătoare sunt predicate în mod denominativ. Și de aceea accidentul se spune că este predicat în mod denominativ.

Tratatul III
DESPRE PREDICAMENTE

Despre anumite lucruri preliminarii

1. Pentru cunoașterea predicamentelor, stabilind anumite preliminarii ca necesare, vom distinge mai întâi împreună cu Aristotel trei moduri de a predica: prin urmare, dintre cele ce se spun, unele sunt echivoce, altele univoce, iar altele denominative. Echivoce sunt cele al căror nume este comun și potrivit acelui nume rațiunea substanței este diferită. Precum atunci când *'viețuitor'* semnifică un viețuitor adevărat și un viețuitor pictat, numele le este comun și rațiunea substanței fiecăruia potrivit acelui nume este diferită. Univoce se numesc cele al căror nume este comun și potrivit acelui nume, rațiunea substanței este aceeași. Precum numele *'viețuitor'* este comun omului și boului și la fel rațiunea lui potrivit acelui nume este aceeași. Denominative se numesc toate cele ce au denumirea potrivit acelui nume, deși diferă datorită unui singur caz, precum de la *'gramatică' 'gramatician'*. Diferă doar datorită cazului – adică doar datorită căderii care provine din partea lucrului – și potrivit acelui nume are o denumire. Prin urmare, un nume denominativ trebuie să corespundă cu un nume univoc la începutul <lui>, precum *'*gramatic*a'* și *'*gramatic*ianul'*, și *'*alb*ul'* și *'*alb*iciunea'*.

2. Dintre cele ce se spun, unele se spun fără compunere, precum *'om'* sau *'aleargă'*, altele cu compunere, precum *'omul aleargă'*. Însă înainte ca celălalt membru al acestei diviziuni să se subdividă, trebuie distinse modurile *de a fi în*, care sunt necesare pentru a cunoaște diviziunea următoare și pentru altele care vor fi discutate mai apoi. Deci, în primul mod, se spune că ceva este în ceva ca partea integrală în întregul său, precum degetul în mână și peretele în casă. Însă în al doilea mod, ca întregul integral în părțile sale, precum casa în perete, acoperiș și fundație. În al treilea mod, ca specia în gen, precum om în viețuitor, și în mod universal oricare inferior în superiorul său. Al patrulea mod de a fi în este ca genul în specie, precum viețuitor în om și orice definește în definiția sa și oricare definiții în definitul lor. Al cincilea mod de a fi în este ca forma în materie. Și acest al cincilea mod se subdivide, deoarece una este forma substanțială, precum sufletul este forma substanțială a omului; însă alta este forma accidentală, precum albul omului. Și prima dintre acestea se spune în mod propriu că *este în* ca forma în materie, precum sufletul în corp; însă cealaltă se spune că *este în* ca accidentul în subiect, precum albiciunea în perete și

culoarea în corp. Al șaselea mod de *a fi în* este ca ceva în <cauza> eficientă primă, precum guvernarea în cel care guvernează. Al șaptelea mod de a fi în este ca ceva în scop, precum virtutea în fericire. Al șaptelea mod de a fi în este ca ceva într-un vas, și în mod universal ca cel care locuiește în loc. Iar Aristotel distinge aceste opt moduri de a fi în. Însă Boethius desemnează nouă, deoarece îl divide pe al cincilea așa cum s-a spus.

3. Dintre cele ce sunt, unele se spun despre subiect, însă nu sunt în niciun subiect, precum genurile și speciile substanței și diferențele substanței, care toate se numesc *'substanțe universale'*, datorită numelui de *'substanță'* luat în sens larg, precum *om, viețuitor* și *rațional*. *'A fi spus despre subiect'*, precum este luat aici, înseamnă a fi spus despre inferior, precum viețuitor despre om, și om despre Socrate, și culoarea despre albiciune; însă *'a fi în subiect'* este luat potrivit faptului că accidentul este în subiect. Însă altele nici nu se spun despre subiect, nici nu sunt în subiect, precum substanțele individuale. Însă altele se spun despre subiect și sunt în subiect, precum genurile și speciile celorlalte nouă predicamente se spun despre inferiorii lor și sunt în substanță ca accidentul în subiect, precum culoarea se spune despre albiciune ca despre inferior și este în corp ca în subiect. Însă altele sunt în subiect, dar nu se spun despre nici un subiect, precum această știință este în suflet ca accidentul în subiect și nu se spune despre un anumit inferior, și această culoare este în subiect și nu se spune despre subiect; căci orice culoare este într-un corp.

4. Atunci când unul se predică despre un altul ca despre un subiect, toate cele care se spun despre cel care se predică, se spun și despre subiect. Precum dacă Socrate este om, și omul este viețuitor, atunci Socrate este viețuitor. Speciile și diferențele acelora care au genul diferit și care nu sunt subalternate sunt diferite, precum ale viețuitorului și ale științei, care sunt genuri diferite. Căci diferențele viețuitorului sunt *rațional* și *irațional*; căci se divide prin aceste diferențe. Însă diferențele științei sunt: *naturală*, *morală* și *sermocinală*; căci știința se împarte prin aceste diferențe: dintre științe, una este naturală, alta morală, alta sermocinală.

5. Dintre acelea care se spun fără nici o compunere, fiecare în parte ori semnifică substanța, ori cantitatea, ori calitatea, ori <faptul de a fi> în raport cu ceva, ori unde-le, ori când-ul, ori faptul de a fi situat, ori faptul de a avea, ori faptul de a face, ori faptul de a fi afectat. Însă substanța este, precum se spune cu titlu de exemplu, ca omul și calul; cantitatea, precum de doi coți și de trei coți; calitatea, precum albul și negrul; <faptul de a fi> în raport cu ceva, precum dublul și triplul; unde-le, precum într-un loc; când-ul, precum ieri, mâine; faptul de a fi situat, precum a șade și a sta întins; faptul de a avea, precum faptul de a fi încălțat sau faptul de a fi înarmat; faptul de a face,

precum a tăia, a arde; faptul dea fi afectat, precum a fi tăiat, a fi ars. Însă, acestea fiind deprinse, trebuie să vorbim despre fiecare dintre aceste predicamente. Și mai întâi despre substanță, deoarece este anterioară față de celelalte predicamente.

Despre substanță

6. Substanța se divide prin substanța primă și substanța secundă. Substanța primă este cea care se spune în mod propriu și principal și maximal; sau: substanța primă este cea care nici nu se spune despre subiect și nici nu este în subiect, precum un anumit om, un anumit cal. Substanțele secunde sunt speciile în care sunt substanțele prime și dintre aceste specii genurile, precum om și viețuitor; căci un anumit om este în omul care este specie, precum om în viețuitor care este gen. Substanțele individuale se numesc *'substanțe prime'*, deoarece substau altora în mod prim; însă genurile și speciile acestora se numesc *'substanțe secunde'*, deoarece substau în mod secund. Căci *un anumit om* se numește *gramatician* și *care aleargă* și *viețuitor* și *substanță*, de aceea *om* se numește *gramatician* și *care aleargă* și *viețuitor* și *substanță*.

7. Apoi, acelea care se spun despre subiect, toate sunt predicate ca nume și rațiune, precum *om* despre *Socrate*. Însă dintre acelea care se spun despre subiect, în cele mai multe cazuri, nici numele și nici rațiunea nu vor fi predicate despre subiect, precum *această albiciune* sau *acest alb*; însă în anumite cazuri nimic nu împiedică ca numele să fie predicat uneori despre subiect, însă ca rațiunea <să fie predicată> este imposibil; precum *albul* este predicat despre subiect, însă rațiunea albului nu va fi predicată niciodată despre subiect. Apoi, dintre substanțele secunde specia este în mai mare măsură substanță decât genul, deoarece specia este mai aproape de substanța primă decât genul, ba chiar pentru că stă sub mai multe. Căci sub toate cele sub care stă genul, sub aceleași stă specia, ba chiar sub genul însuși. Însă speciile cele mai specifice sunt în mod egal substanțe, precum *om*, *cal*, și cele asemănătoare.

Despre cele comune și proprietățile substanței

8. Odată ce acestea au fost considerate, trebuie să vorbim despre <aspectele> comune și cele proprii substanțelor. Însă oricărei substanțe îi este comun faptul de a nu fi în subiect, deoarece faptul de a fi în subiect îi revine doar accidentului. Și acest lucru reiese privitor la substanțele prime

prin definiția substanței prime. Însă privitor la cele secunde reiese prin inducție și prin silogism. Prin inducție astfel: *Omul nu este în subiect, calul nu este în subiect și nici viețuitorul, și tot așa privitor la celelalte substanțe secunde; deci, nici o substanță secundă nu este în subiect*. Prin silogism astfel: *nimic din cele care sunt în subiect nu este predicat ca nume și rațiune; însă orice substanță secundă este predicată ca nume și rațiune; deci nici o substanță secundă nu este în subiect*. Însă acest lucru nu este propriu substanței, ci revine și diferențelor. Și acest lucru se înțelege despre diferențele substanței. Și nici nu există o obiecție privitoare la părțile substanței care sunt în întreg. Și ele par că sunt în subiect, deoarece unul este modul de a fi în ca accidentul în subiect și altul ca partea în întreg, precum a reieșit mai înainte.

9. Apoi, tuturor substanțelor secunde și diferențelor substanței le revine faptul de a fi predicate univoc. Căci toate acestea sunt predicate despre substanțele prime ca nume și rațiune, deoarece sunt predicate univoc.

10. Apoi, orice substanță primă semnifică *acest ceva anume*, adică individualul și unul singur ca număr. Însă substanța secundă pare că semnifică *acest ceva anume* întrucât este în cea primă și despre esența sa, totuși nu semnifică *acest ceva anume*, ci mai degrabă ceva comun. Căci ceea ce este semnificat prin substanța secundă nu este unul singur precum este unul singur ceea ce este semnificat prin cea primă.

11. Apoi, nimic nu îi este contrar substanței. Și acest lucru nu este propriu substanței, deoarece îi revine oricărei substanțe și oricărei cantități și anumitor altor <predicamente>.

12. Apoi, substanța nu suportă mai multul și mai puținul. Însă nu spun că o substanță nu ar substa în mai mare măsură decât alta, ci spun că fiecare substanță, potrivit faptului ei de a fi, nu suportă o intensiune în creștere și în scădere, precum *albul uneori este mai alb, alteori mai puțin*. Însă *Socrate nu este în mai mare măsură om într-un timp decât în altul, și nici nu este în mai mare măsură om decât Platon*.

13. Apoi, este propriu substanței ca potrivit schimbării sale să fie susceptibilă de contrarii, precum *același om uneori este negru, alteori alb, alteori cald, alteori rece și ticălos și studios*. Și nici nu există o obiecție cu privire la rostire, deoarece, deși aceeași rostire, precum propoziția *'Socrate șade'*, uneori este adevărată și alteori falsă, totuși acest lucru nu are loc potrivit schimbării sale, ci potrivit schimbării lucrului, precum că Socrate se ridică sau aleargă. Și reține faptul că adevărul și falsul sunt în lucruri ca în subiect, iar în rostire ca în semn. De aceea, *modul de a fi în* este echivoc atunci când se spune că adevărul și falsul sunt în lucruri și în rostire. Și în mod

asemănător *'susceptibil'* devine echivoc atunci când se spune: *urina susceptibilă de sănătate* și *viețuitorul susceptibil de sănătate*. Căci una este susceptibilă sănătății, deoarece o semnifică; însă cealaltă, deoarece este subiectul ei. Și astfel acest propriu nu îi revine rostirii, ci doar substanței.

Despre cantitate

14. Dintre cantități, una este continuă, alta discretă. Însă există cantitatea discretă precum numărul și rostirea. De aceea speciile ei sunt două. Căci în număr nu există o anumită limită comună la care să se lege părțile numărului, precum *în zece cinci și cinci*, sau *trei și șapte*; nu se leagă de nici o limită comună, ci întotdeauna sunt discrete și separate. Însă numărul este o mulțime agregată din unități. În mod asemănător, în rostire silabele nu se leagă la o anumită limită comună, ci fiecare în parte este separată de alta.

15. Dintre cantitățile continue, una este linie, alta suprafață, alta corp, alta timp, alta loc. De aceea, cinci sunt speciile ei. Însă, faptul că linia este continuă reiese deoarece părțile ei se leagă la o limită comună, adică la punct. Și părțile suprafeței la linie, și părțile corpului la suprafață. Însă părțile timpului <se leagă> la clipă, precum trecutul și viitorul de prezent. Însă părțile locului se leagă la aceeași limită la care <se leagă> părțile mici ale corpului.

Despre cele comune cantității

16. Odată ce acestea au fost considerate, trebuie să vorbim despre cele comune cantității. Primul <aspect> comun este faptul că nimic nu este contrar cantității, precum nimic nu este contrar pentru *doi coți* și pentru *trei coți* sau chiar pentru o *suprafață*, deoarece contrarietatea este mai întâi inerentă calităților, și nu tuturora, ci unora; însă cantitatea nu este calitate, motiv pentru care contrarietatea nu este în cantitate. Apoi, cantitatea nu suportă mai multul și mai puținul. Căci *o anumită linie* nu este în mai mare măsură cantitate decât *altă linie*, și *al treilea* nu este în mai mică măsură număr decât *al patrulea*. Apoi, cantității îi este propriu ca egalul sau inegalul să fie numite potrivit cu ea, precum *numărul* este egal sau inegal altui număr și *corpul* altui corp și *linia* altei linii și tot așa despre fiecare.

Despre <faptul de a fi> în raport cu ceva

17. Însă *'<a fi> în raport cu ceva'* se spune că sunt toate cele în privința cărora se spune că ceea ce ele sunt aparține altora ba chiar în orice alt fel s-ar raporta la altul, precum *dublul* este dublul jumătății și *jumătatea* este jumătatea dublului și *tatăl* este tatăl fiului și *fiul* este fiul tatălui și *mai marele* este mai marele celui mai mic, și *asemănătorul* este asemănătorul asemănătorului.

18. Dintre relative, unele se rostesc potrivit echiparenței, precum cele care se rostesc cu același nume, precum *asemănătorul* este asemănătorul asemănătorului și *egalul* este egalul egalului și *vecinul* este vecinul vecinului. Însă altele potrivit supra-punerii, precum *stăpân, dublu, triplu*. Însă altele potrivit *sub-punerii*, precum *sclav, sub-dublu, sub-triplu*, deoarece acestea sunt sub-puse altor și acelea sunt supra-puse acestora. Căci *stăpânul* este supra-pus sclavului și *tatăl* fiului și *dublul* jumătății. Însă *sclavul* este sub-pus stăpânului și *fiul* tatălui și *jumătatea* sub dublu.

Despre <aspectele> comune relației

19. Însă după acestea urmează <aspectele> comune relației. Și primul este că contrarietatea se regăsește în relație, precum virtutea est contrară viciului, deoarece oricare dintre cele două este în raport cu ceva. Însă acest lucru nu revine oricărei relații; căci nimic nu îi este contrar dublului, nici triplului. Apoi, relativele suportă mai multul și mai puținul, precum asemănătorul se numește *'mai mult'* sau *'mai puțin asemănător'* și *'la fel de asemănător'*. Însă acest lucru nu revine tuturor relativelor; căci dublul nu se numește *'mai mult'* sau *'mai puțin dublu'* și nici triplul *'mai mult'* sau mai *'puțin triplu'* și nici tatăl *'mai mult'* sau *'mai puțin tată'*. Apoi, toate relativele se rostesc în mod convers, precum, dacă tatăl există, fiul există, și invers; și dacă stăpânul există, slujitorul există și invers; și dacă dublul există, jumătatea există și invers. Apoi, relativele par să existe simultan în natură; căci dublul și jumătatea există simultan, și tatăl și fiul. Apoi, odată ce relativele sunt asumate ele însele se asumă reciproc și atunci când sunt distruse, ele însele se distrug reciproc, precum dacă dublul nu există, jumătatea nu există; și dacă tatăl nu există, fiul nu există.

20. Apoi, definiția relativelor este următoarea: în raport cu ceva sunt cele al căror fapt însuși de a fi înseamnă a se raporta într-un anumit fel. Și această definiție este proprie relativelor. Apoi, este propriu relativelor faptul că, dacă cineva cunoaște în mod definit unul dintre corelativi, îl cunoaște în mod definit și pe celălalt. Precum dacă cineva cunoaște în mod definit dublul, îl

cunoaște în mod definit și cel căruia îi este dublu. Căci este necesar ca în fiecare din cele două rațiuni <ale lor> să se folosească de ambele.

Despre calitate

21. Calitatea este aceea potrivit căreia suntem numiți de un anume fel. Precum potrivit albiciunii suntem numiți 'albi' și potrivit culorii 'colorați' și potrivit dreptății 'drepți'. Însă speciile calității sunt patru. Prima este habitus-ul și dispoziția. Însă habitus-ul diferă de dispoziție, deoarece habitus-ul este mai persistent și mai durabil, precum virtuțile și științele; căci știința este greu de schimbat, dacă nu are loc cumva o schimbare mare, fie din pricina bolii, fie dintr-o anumită cauză diferită de acest fel cu privire la cel care cunoaște, sau chiar la cel care deține virtuțile; căci dreptatea sau chiar castitatea nu sunt schimbate cu ușurință. Însă se numesc *'dispoziții'* cele care sunt schimbate cu ușurință, precum căldura și răceala, boala și sănătatea și cele asemănătoare. Totuși habitus-urile pot fi numite dispoziții, însă nu și invers. Căci aceia care au un habitus, au fost dispuși într-un anumit fel, sau mai bine, sau mai rău, în raport cu cele pe care le dețin. Însă dispozițiile nu sunt habitus-uri. De aceea, habitus-ul poate să fie definită astfel: habitus-ul este calitatea dificil de schimbat, însă dispoziția este calitatea ușor de schimbat.

22. A doua specie a calității este putința naturală sau neputința de a face sau de a fi afectat de ceva cu ușurință. Precum se numește 'sănătos' întrucât are putința naturală ca să nu fie afectat cu nimic de către niciun accident; însă se numește 'bolnav' întrucât are neputința naturală de a nu fi afectat de nimic; și durul are putința naturală de a nu fi tăiat repede. Însă se numesc 'alergători' și 'luptători' în mod asemănător nu deoarece ar practica acele activități, ci deoarece au putința naturală de a face acest lucru cu ușurință.

23. A treia specie a calității este afectarea și calitatea care poate să fi afectată. Precum acele calități care provoacă afectele în simțuri, precum în gust dulcele sau amarul și cele asemănătoare. Ba chiar acele calități sunt sub această specie, care sunt generate de către anumite afecte care se pot schimba cu dificultate și care sunt persistente. Căci negrul, fie că este produs de un anumit afect natural, fie de boală, fie de căldură, se numește 'calitate'.

24. A patra specie a calității este forma sau figura care corespunde cu ceva ca o dispoziție a corpului, precum triangularea sau cvadrangularea și rectiliniaritatea și curbura.

25. Însă se numesc *'de un anume fel'* acelea care potrivit unui lucru determinat se numesc în mod denominativ, precum de la *'gramatică' 'gramatician'* și de la *'dreptate' 'drept'*, sau care se numesc de la o anumită calitate <dar> nu în mod denominativ. Și acest lucru în două moduri, deoarece unele se spun în mod denominativ de la o anumită calitate, întrucât numele nu a fost dat calității însăși, precum *'alergător'* nu se spune în mod denominativ, întrucât numele nu a fost dat calității. Însă altele se numesc *'de un anumit fel'* non-denominativ, întrucât nu participă la numele calității de la care sunt numite, deși un nume a fost dat, precum *'studios'* de la virtute. Și astfel sunt trei moduri de a lua *'de un anume fel'* de la calitate.

Despre proprietățile calității

26. Însă contrarietatea este inerentă calităților, precum sunt contrarii albul pentru negru, dreptatea pentru nedreptate. Însă acest lucru nu este propriu calității, deoarece nu revine oricărei calități; căci figura nu are contrariu și nici o anumită culoare intermediară. Apoi, dacă unul dintre contrarii ar fi fost de un anume fel, și celălalt va fi de un anume fel. Precum dreptatea este contrară nedreptății; însă dreptatea este o calitate; deci nedreptatea este o calitate; și cel drept este de un anume fel; deci și cel nedrept este de un anume fel. Apoi, calitatea suportă mai multul și mai puținul; căci se spune *'mai mult sau mai puțin drept, gramatic și alb'*. Însă acest lucru nu este propriu calității, deoarece pătrat nu suportă mai multul și mai puținul și nici cercul și nici cvadrangulația și circularitatea. Apoi, îi este propriu calității să fie numită *'asemănătoare'* sau *'neasemănătoare'* în raport cu ea. Precum cel alb se numește *'asemănător albului'* și cel drept *'asemănător dreptului'*, însă cel alb se numește *'neasemănător negrului'*.

Despre acțiune

27. Acțiunea este aceea potrivit căreia se pune despre noi că acționăm asupra a ceea ce este subiect. Precum cel care taie se spune că realizează o acțiune, întrucât taie. De aceea, tăierea este o acțiune și cel care taie acționează potrivit tăierii asupra celui care este tăiat. Și percuția este o acțiune. Îi este propriu acțiunii ca din ea însăși să apară afectul. Însă a face și a fi afectat primesc contrarii. Căci a încălzi este contrar acelui lucru care este a răci și a deveni cald față de a deveni

rece, și a se desfăta față de a se întrista. Apoi, primesc mai multul și mai puținul. Căci se spune *'a încălzi mai mult și mai puțin'* și *'a fi încălzit'* și *'a se desfăta'* și *'a se întrista mai mult și mai puțin'*.

Despre afectare

28. Afectul este efectul și rezultatul acțiunii, precum faptul a deveni cald este efectuat și rezultat din faptul de a încălzi. Însă propriul afectării este mai întâi faptul de a rezulta din acțiune. Apoi, afectul nu este în cel care acționează, ci în cel care este afectat. Însă despre restul <predicamentelor> să fie suficiente acum cele care au fost discutate mai înainte.

Despre cele patru feluri de opoziție

29. Însă se spune că unul se opune altuia în patru moduri. Căci dintre cele opuse, unele sunt opuse în mod relativ, precum tatăl și fiul, dublul și jumătatea, sau stăpânul și slujitorul. Altele sunt opuse în mod privativ, precum privația și habitusul, precum vederea și faptul de a fi orb sau auzul și faptul de a fi surd. Altele sunt contrarii, precum albul și negrul. Altele sunt opuse în mod contradictoriu, precum afirmarea și negarea, ca *'șade'* și *'nu șade'*. Însă care sunt opuse în mod relativ s-a spus mai înainte. Contrarii sunt acelea care puse sub același gen se distanțează maxim una față de alta și se resping mutual și sunt inerente în același susceptibil pe rând, dacă nu este inerent celuilalt de la natură, precum albul zăpezii și căldura focului. Sunt opuse în mod privativ cele care cu privire la același lucru trebuie să apară într-o ordine ireversibilă, precum faptul de a ajunge la privație provine de la habitus și nu invers. Căci este imposibil să aibă loc un regres de la privație la habitus, precum faptul de a fi orb și vederea trebuie să aibă loc cu privire la ochi și mișcarea se întâmplă să fie de la văz la faptul de a fi orb, și nu invers, prin natură.

Despre anterior

30. Însă *'anterior'* se spune în patru moduri. În primul și propriul mod se spune că ceva este anterior față de altul potrivit timpului, precum cineva este numit *'mai bătrân'* și *'mai vârstnic'* decât altul, precum un om care are 40 de ani este numit *'mai bătrân'* și *'mai în vârstă'* decât acela care are 20. Însă în al doilea mod, *'anterior'* se numește ceea ce nu se convertește potrivit consecinței

de a subzista, precum unul este anterior față de doi; căci de îndată ce sunt doi, consecința este că unul există; precum dacă sunt doi, unul există, și nu invers. Însă în al treilea mod, *'anterior'* se spune potrivit ordinii, precum în discipline principiile sunt anterioare față de concluzii și în gramatică literele sunt anterioare față de silabe și în discurs prefața este anterioară față de narațiune prin ordine. Însă în al patrulea mod, se numește *'anterior'* ceea ce este mai bun și mai onorabil; căci cei mai mulți s-au obișnuit să îi numească pe aceia mai onorabili și în mai mare măsură iubiți dintre ei *'priori'*. Însă în afară de cele patru moduri deja menționate există un alt mod al anteriorului. Căci dintre acelea care se convertesc potrivit consecinței esenței și unul este cauza altuia, în orice mod ar fi, acesta se numește în mod demn *'anterior'* prin natură, precum lucrul este cauza adevărului propoziției sau rostirii care a fost făcută despre lucru însuși. Precum *faptul că omul aleargă* se convertește cu rostirea: *'omul aleargă'*, încât, dacă *faptul că omul aleargă* este adevărat, <atunci> și *'omul aleargă'*, și invers. Căci lucrul este cauza rostirii adevărate care este produsă despre el. Însă rostirea adevărată nu este cauza faptului că lucrul există. Căci datorită faptului că lucrul este sau nu este, rostirea se numește *'adevărată'* sau *'falsă'*.

Despre simultan

31. *'Simultan'* se spune în trei moduri. În primul, *'simultane'* sunt numite cele a căror generare are loc în același timp și nici unul dintre ele nu este nici anterior și nici posterior. Și acestea sunt numite *'simultane'* potrivit timpului. În al doilea mod, sunt numite *'simultane'* toate cele care se convertesc și nici unul nu este cauza de a fi a celuilalt, precum orice relative, precum dublul și jumătatea, și tot așa despre altele. În al treilea mod, sunt numite *'simultane'* toate cele care împart împreună prin contrarietate un anumit gen, precum *om*, *cal*, *leu* și tot așa despre celelalte care împart împreună genul *viețuitor*; ba chiar și diferențele, precum *rațional* și *irațional*. Însă aceste două ultime moduri sunt numite *'simultane'* potrivit naturii, însă primul este numit *'simultan'* potrivit timpului.

Despre mișcare

32. Însă speciile mișcării sunt șase: generarea, coruperea, creșterea, scăderea, alterarea și schimbarea potrivit locului. Generarea este ieșirea din faptul de a nu fi spre faptul de a fi.

Coruperea este plecarea de la faptul de a fi spre faptul de a nu fi. Creșterea este adăugirea la o cantitate preexistente. Scăderea este reducerea la o cantitate preexistentă. Alterarea este schimbarea de la o calitate contrară la contrara ei sau la <calitatea> intermediară, precum atunci când ceva se schimbă de la alb la negru sau la culorile intermediare. Însă mișcarea potrivit locului este schimbarea de la un loc la altul. Însă speciile sau diferențele mișcării potrivit locului sunt șase, precum sus, jos, înainte, înapoi, dreapta, stânga; căci mișcarea potrivit locului se realizează spre toate aceste părți.

Despre faptul de a avea

33. Însă *'a avea'* se spune în multe moduri. În primul, se spune că are o anumită calitate, precum învățătura sau virtutea. În al doilea mod, se spune că are o cantitate, fapt care îi revine aceluia care are o anumită mărime, precum de doi coți sau de trei coți. În al treilea mod, se spune că are acele lucruri care sunt în jurul corpului, precum pelerina sau tunica, sau pe un membru, precum un inel pe deget. Și habitus-ul, atunci când este luat în acest al treilea mod, este unul dintre cele zece predicamente. Și se definește astfel: habitus-ul îi revine corpurilor și celor care sunt alăturate corpului, precum faptul de a purta arme și faptul de a fi încălțat; și în același fel se închipuie nume pentru altele; și potrivit acestei alăturări, acestea se spune că au, însă acelea că sunt avute. În al patrulea mod se spune că are un membru, precum o mână sau un picior. În al cincilea mod se spune că are conținut, precum lagena are vin sau o măsură boabe de grâu. În al șaselea mod se spune că are posesiune, precum casă sau pământ. În al șaptelea mod <se spune> că are nevastă. Și despre acest ultim mod Aristotel spune că este cel mai străin cu privire la ceea ce înseamnă faptul de a avea. Și spune că poate vor apărea alte moduri despre ceea ce înseamnă faptul de a avea, însă cele care s-au obișnuit să se spună, aproape toate au fost enumerate.

Tratatul IV
DESPRE SILOGISME

Despre propoziție

1. Propoziția este rostirea afirmativă sau negativă a ceva despre ceva sau a ceva <îndepărtat> de la ceva. Termenul este cel în care se descompune propoziția, precum subiectul și predicatul. *Faptul de a fi spus despre fiecare* are loc atunci când nimic nu trebuie luat sub subiect despre care să nu fie spus predicatul, precum *'orice om aleargă'*; aici alergarea se spune despre fiecare om și nimic nu trebuie luat sub om despre care nu este spusă alergarea. *Faptul de a nu fi spus despre niciunul* are loc atunci când nimic nu trebuie luat sub subiect de la care să nu fie îndepărtat predicatul, precum *'niciun om nu aleargă'*; aici alergarea este îndepărtată de la fiecare om.

Despre silogism

2. Silogismul este rostirea în care după ce anumite lucruri au fost presupuse este necesar ca un altul să reiasă prin acelea care au fost presupuse. Precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om este substanță'*. Acest întreg este o anumită rostire în care după ce anumite lucruri au fost presupuse, adică două propoziții <care au valoarea de> premise, este necesar ca prin acelea să reiasă altceva, adică concluzia.

Însă orice silogism este alcătuit din trei termeni și două propoziții. Dintre aceste propoziții, prima se numește *'propoziție majoră'*, a doua *'minoră'*. Însă din trei termeni nu pot să rezulte două propoziții, decât dacă unul dintre ei este luat de două ori; și atunci, acel termen sau va fi subiect în una și va fi predicat în cealaltă, sau va fi predicat în ambele, sau va fi subiect în ambele. Însă dintre acești termeni, unul se numește *'mediu'*, altul *'extrem major'*, altul *'extrem minor'*. Mediul este termenul luat de două ori înainte de concluzie. Extremul major este termenul luat în propoziția majoră împreună cu cel mediu. Extremul minor este termenul luat în propoziția minoră împreună cu cel mediu.

Despre mod și figură

3. Însă pentru silogism modul și figura sunt cerute. Figura este ordonarea celor trei termeni potrivit faptului de a deveni subiect și faptului de a se predica. Însă această ordonare are loc în trei feluri, precum s-a spus. Și potrivit acestui fapt există trei figuri.

Prima figură are loc atunci când acela care este subiect în prima propoziție este predicat în a doua, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, orice om este viețuitor'*.

A doua figură are loc atunci când același este predicat în ambele, precum: *'orice om este viețuitor, nici o piatră nu este viețuitor'*

A treia figură are loc atunci când același este subiect în ambele, precum: *'orice om este viețuitor, orice om poate să râdă'*. Modul este ordonarea adecvată a celor două propoziții în calitate și cantitate.

Despre regulile universale

4. De aceea se dau următoarele reguli universale pentru orice figură: *un silogism nu poate fi produs doar din <termeni> particulari, indefiniți sau singulari*. De aceea, una dintre premise trebuie să fie universală.

Apoi: *în nici o figură, un silogism nu poate fi produs doar din <premise> negative*. De aceea, una dintre premise trebuie să fie afirmativă.

Apoi: *dacă una dintre premise este particulară, concluzia trebuie să fie particulară și nu invers*.

Apoi: *dacă una dintre premise este negativă, concluzia este negativă și invers*.

Apoi: *dacă una dintre premise este particulară, și concluzia trebuie să fie particulară și nu invers.*

Apoi: *<termenul> mediu nu trebuie pus niciodată în concluzie*

Despre prima figură

5. Prima figură are nouă moduri, primele patru concluzionează direct și următoarele cinci indirect. A concluziona direct înseamnă ca extremul major să fie predicat despre cel minor în

concluzie. A concluziona indirect înseamnă ca extremul minor să fie predicat despre cel major în concluzie.

Apoi, pentru cele patru moduri care concluzionează direct ale primei figuri, regula este: *când minora este negativă, nu reiese nimic*.

Apoi, cu privire la aceleași <moduri>: *când majora este particulară, nu reiese nimic*

Despre modurile ei

6. Însă primul mod al primei figuri constă din două universale afirmative, care concluzionează o universală afirmativă, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om este substanță'*

Al doilea constă dintr-o universală negativă și o universală afirmativă, care concluzionează o universală negativă, precum: *'nici un viețuitor nu este piatră, orice om este viețuitor; deci nici un om nu este piatră'*.

Al treilea constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o particulară afirmativă, care concluzionează o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, un anumit om este viețuitor; deci un anumit om este substanță'*.

Al patrulea constă dintr-o universală negativă și o particulară afirmativă, care concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'nici un viețuitor nu este piatră, un anumit om este viețuitor; deci un anumit om nu este piatră'*.

Al cincilea constă din două universale afirmative, care concluzionează indirect o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, orice om este viețuitor; deci o anumită substanță este om'*. Și se probează prin primul <mod> al primei <figuri> care concluzionează o universală afirmativă, care se convertește în una particulară, adică particulara care este concluzionată în acest al cincilea <mod>.

Al șaselea <mod> constă dintr-o universală negativă și o universală afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează indirect o universală negativă, precum: *'nici un viețuitor nu este piatră, orice om este viețuitor; deci nici o piatră nu este om'*. Și se reduce la al doilea <mod> prin conversiunea simplă a concluziei.

Al șaptelea <mod> constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o particulară afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează indirect o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, un anumit*

om este viețuitor; deci o anumită substanță este om'. Și se reduce la al treilea <mod>, dacă concluzia a fost convertită simplu.

Al optulea <mod> constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o universală negativă, căci ele concluzionează indirect o particulară negativă, precum: *'orice viețuitor este substanță, nici o piatră nu este viețuitor; deci o anumită substanță nu este piatră'.* Și se reduce la al patrulea <mod>, dacă majora este convertită prin accident și minora este convertită simplu și prin transpoziție.

Al nouălea <mod> constă dintr-o particulară afirmativă și o universală negativă, căci ele concluzionează indirect o particulară negativă, precum: *'un anumit viețuitor este substanță, nici o piatră nu este viețuitor; deci o anumită substanță nu este piatră'*. Și se reduce la al patrulea <mod>, dacă majora și minora au fost convertite simplu și prin transpoziție.

Despre a doua figură

7. Urmează <să tratăm> despre a doua figură. Acesteia i se dau regulile următoare: *în a doua figură, nu reiese nimic când majora este particulară.*

Apoi: *în a doua figură, nu reiese nimic doar din afirmative.*

Apoi: *în a doua figură, se concluzionează întotdeauna negativ.* Însă cea de a treia regulă poate fi înțeleasă prin a doua.

Despre modurile sale

8. Însă a doua figură are patru moduri. Primul constă dintr-o universală negativă și o universală afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o universală negativă, precum: *'nici o piatră nu este viețuitor, orice om este viețuitor; deci nici un om nu este piatră'.* Și se reduce la al doilea <mod> al primei <figuri>, dacă majora a fost convertită simplu.

Al doilea <mod> constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o universală negativă, căci ele concluzionează o universală negativă, precum: *'orice om este viețuitor, nici o piatră nu este viețuitor; deci nici o piatră nu este om'.* Și se reduce la al doilea <mod> al primei <figuri>, dacă minora și concluzia au fost convertite simplu și prin transpoziție.

Al treilea <mod> constă dintr-o universală negativă și o particulară afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'nici o piatră nu este viețuitor, un anumit om este*

viețuitor; deci un anumit om nu este piatră'. Și se reduce la al patrulea <mod> al primei <figuri>, dacă majora a fost convertită simplu.

Al patrulea <mod> constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o particulară negativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'orice om este viețuitor, o anumită piatră nu este viețuitor; deci o anumită piatră nu este om'.* Și se reduce la primul <mod> al primei <figuri> prin imposibil.

Despre reducția prin imposibil

9. Însă faptul de a reduce prin imposibil însemnă a infera din opusul concluziei împreună cu una dintre premise opusul celeilalte premise. Căci se ia opusul concluziei, adică: *'orice piatră este om'*, împreună cu majora celui de al patrulea <mod> și se va forma un silogism în primul <mod> al primei <figuri> astfel: *'orice om este viețuitor, orice piatră este om; deci orice piatră este viețuitor'.* Această concluzie se opune minorei celui de al patrulea <mod>. Și acesta înseamnă a proba prin imposibil.

Despre a treia figură

10. Urmează <să tratăm> despre a treia figură. Însă a treia figură este cea în care același <termen> este subiect în ambele <premise>. Acesteia i se dau regulile următoare: *în a treia figură, nu reiese nimic când minora este negativă.*

Apoi: *a treia figură nu concluzionează decât o particulară.*

Despre modurile ei

11. Cea de a treia figură are șase moduri. Primul constă din două universale afirmative, căci ele concluzionează o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'orice om este substanță, orice om este viețuitor; deci un anumit viețuitor este substanță'.* Și se reduce la al treilea <mod> al primei <figuri> dacă minora a fost convertită prin accident.

Al doilea <mod> constă dintr-o universală negativă și o universală afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'nici un om nu este piatră, orice om este viețuitor;*

deci un anumit viețuitor nu este piatră'. Și se reduce la al patrulea <mod> al primei <figuri> dacă minora a fost convertită prin accident.

Al treilea <mod> constă dintr-o particulară afirmativă și o universală afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'un anumit om este substanță, orice om este viețuitor; deci un anumit viețuitor este substanță'.* Și se reduce la al treilea <mod> al primei <figuri> dacă majora și concluzia au fost convertite simplu și prin transpoziție.

Al patrulea <mod> constă dintr-o universală afirmativă și o particulară afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară afirmativă, precum: *'orice om este substanță, un anumit om este viețuitor; deci un anumit viețuitor este substanță'.* Și se reduce la al treilea <mod> al primei <figuri> dacă minora a fost convertită simplu.

Al cincilea <mod> constă dintr-o particulară negativă și o universală afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'un anumit om nu este piatră, orice om este viețuitor; deci un anumit viețuitor nu este piatră'.* Și se reduce la primul <mod> al primei <figuri> prin imposibil. Căci se ia opusul concluziei împreună cu una dintre premise și se inferează opusul celeilalte premise, precum: *'orice viețuitor este piatră, orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om este piatră'.* Această concluzie care este produsă în primul <mod> al primei <figuri> contrazice majora celui de al cincilea mod.

Al șaselea <mod> constă dintr-o universală negativă și o particulară afirmativă, căci ele concluzionează o particulară negativă, precum: *'nici un om nu este piatră, un anumit om este viețuitor; deci un anumit viețuitor nu este piatră'.* Și se reduce la al patrulea <mod> al primei <figuri>, dacă minora a fost convertită simplu.

Despre anumite reguli

12. Însă se dă regula următoare a silogismelor care concluzionează indirect o particulară negativă: *nici un silogism care concluzionează o particulară negativă indirect nu poate să o concluzioneze direct; și cel care o concluzionează direct nu poate să o concluzioneze indirect.*

Apoi: *prima figură concluzionează toate genurile de propoziții, adică universala și particulara, afirmativa și negativa. Însă a doua - universala și particulara. Iar a treia - particulara, afirmativa și negativa, dar nu universala*.

13. Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton
Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum
Cesare cambestres festino barocho darapti
Felapto disamis datisi bocardo ferison

În aceste patru versuri sunt nouăsprezece cuvinte, care slujesc celor nouăsprezece moduri ale celor trei figuri, astfel încât prin primul cuvânt se înțelege primul mod al primei figuri și prin al doilea, al doilea, și tot așa despre celelalte. De aceea, primele două versuri slujesc modurilor primei figuri, însă cel de al treilea vers în afară de ultimul cuvânt al său slujește modurilor celei de a doua figuri, astfel încât primul cuvânt al celui de al treilea vers slujește primul mod al celei de a doua figuri și al doilea cuvânt al doilea mod și tot așa despre celelalte. Însă ultimul cuvânt al celui de-al treilea vers, împreună cu celelalte cuvinte ale celui de-al patrulea, slujește modurilor celei de a treia figuri pe rând.

Însă trebuie știut că prin vocalele: *'A', 'E', 'I', 'O'* se înțeleg patru tipuri de propoziții. Prin vocala *'A'* se înțelege universala afirmativă, prin *'E'* universala negativă, prin *'I'* particulara afirmativă și prin *'O'* particulara negativă.

Apoi, în fiecare cuvânt există trei silabe și dacă mai rămâne ceva, este superfluu, cu excepția lui *'M'*, precum va reieși ulterior. Și prin prima dintre acele trei silabe se înțelege propoziția majoră a silogismului, prin a doua minora, prin a treia concluzia. De exemplu, primul cuvânt, *'Barbara'*, are trei silabe; în fiecare dintre ele este pus *'A'*, și prin *'A'* care este pus de trei ori se semnifică faptul că primul mod al primei figuri constă din două universale afirmative, căci ele concluzionează o universală afirmativă. Și tot așa trebuie să înțelegem cu privire la celelalte cuvinte, potrivit vocalelor care au fost puse acolo.

Apoi, trebuie știut că primele patru cuvinte ale primului vers încep cu consoanele: *'B', 'C', 'D', 'F'*, precum și toate celelalte cuvinte care urmează. Prin acest lucru trebuie înțeles că toate modurile au fost înțelese prin cuvântul care începe cu *'B'* trebuie reduse la primul <mod> al primei figuri și toate modurile care sunt semnificate prin cuvântul care începe cu *'C'* la al doilea <mod> și prin *'D'* la al treilea, și prin *'F'* la al patrulea.

Apoi, oriunde *'S'* este pus în aceste cuvinte, el semnifică faptul că propoziția înțeleasă prin vocala imediat precedentă trebuie să se convertească simplu. Iar prin *'P'* semnifică faptul că propoziția trebuie să se convertească prin accident. Și oriunde *'M'* este pus, el semnifică faptul că trebuie să se producă o transpoziție în premise. Însă transpoziția înseamnă a face o minoră dintr-o

majoră și invers. Însă acolo unde *'C'* este pus, el semnifică faptul că modul care este înțeles prin acel cuvânt trebuie probat prin imposibil.

Despre legăturile inutile

14. Aristotel arată în *Analiticele prime* că legăturile în care concluzia nu reiese din premise sunt inutile; <el arată acesta> prin găsirea de termeni în care o legătură de acest fel nu ține. Din acest motiv găsirea unor astfel de termeni este utilă.

Prin urmare, oriunde se produce o legătură inutilă împotriva acelor regulilor ale silogismelor care au fost fixate mai înainte, obiecțiile trebuie căutate luând două specii împreună cu un singur gen, precum *om, măgar, viețuitor*; sau două specii împreună cu propriul unuia, precum *om, măgar, care poate să râdă*; sau o singură specie împreună cu genul său sau împreună cu propriul său, precum *om, viețuitor, care poate să râdă*. Căci în acestea se va găsi o obiecție.

Iar faptul de a descoperi obiecții înseamnă a lua termenii cu privire la care premisele sunt adevărate și concluzia falsă, în timp ce propozițiile rămân de aceeași cantitate și calitate. Aceasta, de exemplu, este o legătură inutilă: *'nici un om nu este măgar, nici o piatră nu este om; deci nici o piatră nu este măgar'.* Împotriva acestei legături inutile obiecția se inferează astfel: *'nici un măgar nu este om, nici unul care poate să râdă nu este măgar; deci nici unul care poate să râdă nu este om'.* Aceste premise sunt adevărate și concluzia falsă, în timp ce propozițiile rămân de aceeași calitate și cantitate în ambele silogisme false.

TRATATUL V
DESPRE LOCURI

Despre multipla rațiune

1. *'Rațiune'* se spune în mai multe moduri. Într-unul, este identică cu definiția sau descrierea, precum aici: „univoce sunt cele al căror nume este comun și rațiunea substanței potrivit acelui nume este aceeași". Însă în alt mod este identic cu o anumită facultate a sufletului. Însă în alt mod este identică cu rostirea care arată ceva, precum *'rațiunile'* celor care dispută. Însă în alt mod este identică cu forma materiei, precum fierul este materia într-un cuțitaș, însă forma este o dispoziție care este introdusă în fier. Însă în alt mod, rațiunea este identică cu esența comună predicabilă despre mai multe, precum esența genului sau a speciei sau a diferenței. Însă în alt mod, rațiunea este identică cu <termenul> mediu care inferează concluzia. Și în acest din urmă mod se ia <termenul de> *'rațiune'* în definiția următoare a argumentului:

Despre argument și argumentare

2. Argumentul este rațiunea unui lucru dubitabil care produce încredere, adică <termenul> mediul care probează concluzia care trebuie întărită prin argument. Căci concluzia este o propoziție probată prin argument sau prin argumente. Însă, înainte să fie probată este dubitabilă; și atunci este identică cu o întrebarea. Căci întrebarea se definește astfel: o întrebare este o propoziție dubitabilă. Termenul mediul este ceea ce are două extreme.

Argumentarea este desfășurarea unui argument prin rostire, adică rostirea care explică un argument. Însă argumentul diferă de <termenul> mediu și de argumentație, deoarece *'mediu'* se numește acela care are două extreme, însă argumentul adaugă pe lângă <termenul> mediu puterea de a proba concluzia (de aceea, pentru ca acela să fie argument, se cere să existe <termenul> mediu și să aibă puterea de a proba concluzia); însă *'argumentație'* se numește întreaga rostire compusă din premise și concluzie; și în ea se arată puterea argumentului. Căci o anumită rostire întreagă poate infera o universală afirmativă, alta însă doar o particulară afirmativă, alta doar o universală negativă și alta doar o particulară negativă.

Despre speciile argumentării

3. Speciile argumentării sunt patru: silogismul, inducția, entimema, exemplul. Definiția silogismului a fost dată mai înainte. Inducția este trecerea de la <propozițiile> particulare la cea universală, precum: *'Socrate aleargă, Platon aleargă, Cicero aleargă,* și tot așa despre fiecare în parte. *deci orice om aleargă'*

Entimema este un silogism incomplet, adică rostirea în care, deși nu toate propozițiile au fost admise dinainte, este inferată o concluzie pripită, precum: *'orice viețuitor aleargă deci orice om aleargă'*. Căci în această argumentare, atunci când este rostită, se subînțelege propoziția: *'orice om este viețuitor'*, și nu se adaugă acolo, deoarece, dacă ar fi fost adăugată acolo, silogismul ar fi fost complet.

Însă trebuie știut că orice entimemă trebuie redusă la un silogism. Deci în oricare entimemă există trei termeni precum în silogism. Dintre acești termeni, doi sunt puși în concluzie și sunt extreme, și altul este mediu și nu se pune niciodată în concluzie. Însă dintre acele extreme, una este luată de două ori în entimemă, cealaltă o singură dată. Iar din acel extrem luat o singură dată și din <termenul> mediu trebuie să se producă o propoziție universală potrivit cerinței modului și astfel va fi produs un silogism. De exemplu, în această entimemă: *'orice viețuitor aleargă*; *deci orice om aleargă'*. *'om'* și *'aleargă'* sunt extremi, *'viețuitor'* este <termenul> mediu. Însă acest extrem, adică *'om'*, a fost luată o singură dată; deci din aceasta și <termenul> mediu se produce propoziția universală *'orice om este viețuitor'*; și atunci silogismul este complet: *'orice viețuitor aleargă*, *orice om este viețuitor*; *deci orice om aleargă'*

Exemplul are loc atunci când printr-un singur particular se probează alt particular din pricina asemănării care se regăsește în ei. Precum: *'este rău ca cei din León să lupte împotriva celor din Astorga*; *deci este rău ca cei din Astorga să lupte împotriva celor din Zamora'* căci ambele cazuri sugerează că afinii luptă împotriva afinilor.

Despre loc în general

4. Însă un argument se întărește printr-un loc. De aceea trebuie dată definiția locului, așa cum este luat aici. Căci locul este sediul argumentului sau acela de unde se obține argumentul potrivit pentru întrebarea propusă. Însă ce este o întrebare, s-a spus mai înainte.

Însă trebuie știut că propoziția, întrebarea și concluzia sunt identice potrivit substanței, însă diferă potrivit rațiunilor; căci au rațiuni sau definiții diferite, precum a reieșit mai înainte. Căci potrivit lucrului supus dubiului <rostirea> este întrebare, în măsura în care a fost probată deja prin argument, este concluzie, însă potrivit lucrului care este presupus pentru un altul, încât să îl probeze pe el însuși, este propoziție. De aceea se numește *'propoziție'* potrivit cu ceea ce se presupune în premise pentru probarea concluziei.

Locul se divide în locul <care este> o maximă și locul <care este> o diferență a unei maxime. Locul <care este> o maximă este identic cu maxima însăși. Însă maxima este o propoziție decât care nu există alta anterioară, adică mai cunoscută, precum *'orice întreg este mai mare decât partea sa'*, *'despre orice se predică definiția, <se predică> și definitul', 'despre orice se predică specia, <se predică> și genul'*.

Locul <care este> o diferență a unei maxime este cel în care o maximă diferă de cealaltă. De exemplu, aceste două maxime: *'despre oricare se predică definiția, <se predică> și definitul', 'despre oricare se predică specia, <se predică>și genul'* diferă prin termenii din care sunt compuse; căci una este compusă din *'gen'* și *'specie'*, însă cealaltă din *'definiție'* și *'definit'*; de aceea, acești termeni simpli se numesc *'diferențe ale maximei'*.

Însă atât locul <care este> o maximă cât și locul <care este> o diferență a unei maxime se numesc *'loc'*, deoarece fiecare dintre cele două conferă tărie argumentului. De aceea *'loc'* se ia aici prin raportare la locul din cazul lucrurilor naturale, deoarece, precum locul conferă acolo tărie lucrurilor naturale și le conservă pe ele în faptul de a fi, în mod similar aici locul întărește argumentul.

Locul <care este> o diferență a unei maxime se împarte în locul intrinsec, extrinsec și mediu. Locul intrinsec se realizează atunci când argumentul este luat de la acelea care sunt despre substanța lucrului ca de la o definiție. Locul extrinsec se realizează atunci când argumentul este luat de la cele care au fost cu totul separate de substanța lucrului ca de la niște opuse; precum dacă s-ar întreba *'oare Socrate este alb?'* și s-ar încheia: *'Socrate este negru; deci nu este alb'*. Locul mediu se realizează atunci când argumentul este luat de la cele care, parțial, se potrivesc cu termenii care au fost puși în întrebare, și, parțial, diferă de ei, precum este în cazul univocului și denominativului, care se numesc *'înrudite'*. Precum dacă s-ar întreba *'oare dreptatea este bună?'* și s-ar încheia: *'cel drept este bun; deci dreptatea este bună'*.

DESPRE LOCURILE INTRINSECI

Locul intrinsec se divide în locul de la substanță și în locul de la cele concomitente cu substanța.

Despre locul de la substanță

5. Locul de la substanță se realizează atunci când argumentul se ia de la substanța termenilor care sunt puși în întrebare. Și acest loc se divide în locul de la definiție și de la descriere și în locul de la interpretarea numelui.

Despre locul de la definiție

6. Definiția este rostirea care semnifică ce înseamnă faptul că ceva este. Locul de la definiție este raportarea definiției la definit. Și conține patru argumente și patru maxime. Primul trebuie să pună ca subiect o definiție în mod afirmativ; al doilea trebuie să o predice în mod afirmativ; al treilea trebuie să o pună ca subiect în mod negativ; al patrulea trebuie să o predice în mod negativ. Exemplele tuturor acestora sunt: *'viețuitorul rațional muritor aleargă; deci omul aleargă'*. De unde este locul? De la definiție. Maxima: *tot ceea ce se predică despre definiție, <se predică> și despre definit*. Al doilea <argument>: *'Socrate este viețuitor rațional și muritor; deci Socrate este om'*. De unde este locul? De la definiție. Maxima: *despre tot ceea ce se predică definiția, <se predică> și definitul*. Al treilea: *'viețuitorul rațional și muritor nu aleargă; deci omul nu aleargă'*. De unde este locul? De la definiție. Maxima: *tot ceea ce se îndepărtează de la definiție, <se îndepărtează> și de la definit.* Al patrulea *'piatra nu este viețuitor rațional și muritor; deci piatra nu este om'*. De unde este locul? De la definiție. Maxima: *de la tot ceea ce se îndepărtează definiția, <se îndepărtează> și definitul.*

Despre locul de la definit

7. Locul de la definit este raportarea definitului la definiție. Și conține în mod similar patru argumente și patru maxime. Primul argument are loc punându-l ca subiect pe definit în mod afirmativ, precum *'omul aleargă; deci viețuitorul rațional și muritor aleargă'*. De unde provine

locul? De la definit. Maxima: *orice se predică despre definit, <se predică> și despre definiție*. Al doilea argument, punându-l ca predicat în mod afirmativ, precum *'Socrate este om; deci Socrate este viețuitor rațional și muritor'*. De unde provine locul? De la definit. Maxima: *despre orice se predică definitul, <se predică> și definiția.* Al treilea punându-l ca subiect în mod negativ, precum *'omul nu aleargă; deci viețuitorul rațional și muritor nu aleargă'*. De unde provine locul? De la definit. Maxima: *orice este îndepărtat de la definit, <este îndepărtat>și de la definiție.* Al patrulea, punându-l ca predicat în mod negativ, precum: *'piatra nu este om; deci piatra nu este viețuitor rațional și muritor'*. De unde provine locul? De la definit. Maxima: *de la orice se îndepărtează definitul, <se îndepărtează> și definiția.* Și trebuie știut că în cazul tuturor locurilor, locul este numit de la cel care inferă și nu de la cel inferat. De aceea, atunci când definiția este cea care inferă, locul provine de la definiție; însă atunci când definitul este cel care inferă, locul provine de la definit. De ce? Deoarece locul sau diferența unei maxime trebuie să fie numită de la cel care inferă și nu de la cel inferat.

Despre locul de la descriere

8. Descrierea este rostirea care semnifică ființa lucrului prin cele accidentale, precum *'viețuitor care poate să râdă'* este descrierea omului. Sau astfel: descrierea este rostirea care constă din gen și propriu, precum *'viețuitor care poate să râdă'*.

Locul de la descriere este raportarea descrierii la ceea ce este descris. Și conține patru argumente și patru maxime ca precum locul de la definiție. Iar argumentele și maximele se formează aici în același mod ca și acolo, cu excepția că unde se pune acolo *'definiție'*, aici se pune *'descriere'*. Și în mod similar despre ceea ce este descris.

Despre locul de la interpretarea numelui

9. Interpretarea este de două feluri. Căci una este cea care nu se convertește, precum *'care rănește piciorul'* este interpretarea a ceea ce numesc *'piatră'*. Însă alta este cea care se convertește, precum *'iubitor de înțelepciune'* este interpretarea a ceea ce numesc *'filosof'*. Și în acest mod se ia aici *'interpretare'*. Și se definește astfel: interpretarea este expunerea unui nume printr-un altul anume.

Locul de la interpretarea numelui este raportarea interpretării la ceea ce este interpretat. Și conține tot atâtea argumente și maxime precum și cele menționate înainte. Precum *'iubitorul de înțelepciune aleargă; deci filosoful aleargă'*. De unde provine locul? De la interpretarea numelui. Maxima: *orice se predică despre interpretare, <se predică> și despre ceea ce este interpretat*. Și în mod similar de partea predicatului. Maxima: *despre orice se predică interpretarea, <se predică> și ceea ce este interpretat.* În mod negativ astfel: *'iubitorul de înțelepciune nu invidiază; deci filosoful nu invidiază'*. De unde provine locul? De la interpretarea numelui. Maxima: *orice este îndepărtat de la interpretare, <este îndepărtat> și de la ceea ce este interpretat*. Și în mod similar în cazul predicatului. Maxima: *de la orice îndepărtează interpretarea, <se îndepărtează> și ceea ce este interpretat.*

Despre locul de la cele concomitente substanței

10. Urmează <să tratăm> despre locul de la cele concomitente substanței. Acesta are loc atunci când argumentul se ia de la aceia care însoțesc termenii care sunt puși în întrebare. Și se divide, deoarece unul este de la întreg, altul de la parte, altul de la cauză, altul de la generare, altul de la corupere, altul de la întrebuințări, altul de la accidentele <care au loc> în mod comun.

Despre locul de la întreg

11. Locul de la întreg se divide precum întregul. Căci unul este întreg universal, altul întreg integral, altul este întreg în cantitate, altul întreg în mod, altul întreg în loc, altul întreg în timp. La fel se divide locul de la întreg, deoarece unul este de la întregul universal, altul de la întregul integral, și tot așa despre celelalte.

Despre locul de la întregul universal sau de la gen

12. Întregul universal, precum este luat aici, este superior și substanțial. Partea care îi este subordonată este un inferior sub universal. Locul de la întregul universal sau de la gen este raportarea lui însuși la partea sa sau la specia sa. Și este întotdeauna destructiv, precum: *'piatra nu*

este viețuitor; deci piatra nu este om'. De unde provine locul? De la gen. Maxima: *când genul sau întregul universal este îndepărtat, specia sau partea care îi este subordonată este îndepărtată*

Despre locul de la specie sau de la partea subordonată

13. Locul de la specie sau de la partea subordonată este raportarea ei înseși la genul său sau la întregul său. Și este întotdeauna constructiv. Și conține două argumente. Primul argument punându-l ca subiect specia, precum *'omul aleargă; deci viețuitorul aleargă'*. De unde provine locul? De la specie sau de la partea subordonată. Maxima: *tot ce se predică despre specie, <se predică> și despre gen*. Al doilea <argument> predicând specia astfel: *'Socrate este om; deci Socrate este viețuitor'*. De unde este locul? De la specie. Maxima: *despre orice se predică specia, <se predică> și genul.*

Despre locul de la întregul integral

14. Întregul integral este cel compus din părți care au cantitate iar partea lui se numește *'integrală'*. Locul de la întregul integral este raportarea lui însuși la partea sa. Și este întotdeauna constructiv, precum: *'casa există; deci peretele există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la întregul integral. Maxima: *când se pune întregul integral, se pune și oricare parte a sa*.

Locul de la partea integrală este raportarea ei înseși la întregul ei. Și este întotdeauna destructiv, precum *'peretele nu există; deci casa nu există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la partea integrală. Maxima: *când partea integrală se distruge, se distruge și întregul ei.*

Despre locul de la întregul în cantitate

15. Întregul în cantitate este universalul luat în mod universal, precum *'orice om'*, *'nici un om'*. Locul de la întregul în cantitate este raportarea lui însuși la partea sa. Și este constructiv și destructiv, precum *'orice om aleargă; deci Socrate aleargă'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la întregul în cantitate. Maxima: *orice se predică despre întregul în cantitate, <se predică> și despre oricare parte a sa;* sau: *dacă universala este adevărată, oricare singulară a sa este adevărată.* În mod destructiv astfel: *'nici un om nu aleargă; deci Socrate nu aleargă'*. De unde <provine> locul?

De la întregul în cantitate. Maxima: *orice se îndepărtează de la întregul în cantitate, <se îndepărtează> și de la oricare parte a sa*; sau: *dacă universala este adevărată, oricare singulară a sa va fi adevărată.*

Locul de la partea în cantitate este raportarea tuturor părților în cantitate luate simultan la întregul lor. Și este constructiv și destructiv, precum *'Socrate aleargă, Platon aleargă,* și tot așa despre fiecare; *deci orice om aleargă'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la părțile în cantitate. Maxima: *orice se predică despre toate părțile în cantitate luate simultan, <se predică> și despre întregul lor;* sau: *dacă fiecare singulară este adevărată, și universala sa este adevărată.* În mod negativ astfel: *'Socrate nu aleargă, Platon nu aleargă,* și tot așa despre fiecare, *deci nici un om nu aleargă'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la părțile în cantitate. Maxima: *orice se îndepărtează de la toate părțile în cantitate luate simultan, <se îndepărtează> și de la întregul lor;* sau: *dacă fiecare singulară este adevărată, și universala sa este adevărată.*

Despre locul de la întregul în mod

16. Întregul în mod este universalul însuși luat fără determinare. Și deoarece argumentele și maximele se formează cu totul la fel în cazul acestui întreg și al părții sale precum în cazul genului și al speciei, exemplele sunt lăsate deoparte.

Despre locul de la întregul în loc

17. Întregul în loc este rostirea care cuprinde orice loc în mod adverbial, precum *'pretutindeni'*. Partea în loc este rostirea care cuprinde un singur loc în mod adverbial, precum *'aici'*. Locul de la întregul în loc este raportarea lui însuși la partea sa. Și este constructiv și destructiv, precum *'Dumnezeu este pretutindeni; deci Dumnezeu este aici'*; *'Cezar nu este nicăieri; deci Cezar nu este aici'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la întregul în loc. Maxima: *oricui îi revine întregul în loc, <îi revine> și oricare parte a sa;* sau: *orice se îndepărtează de la întregul în loc, <se îndepărtează> și de la oricare parte a sa*.

Locul de la partea în loc este raportarea ei înseși la întregul său, precum *'Cezar nu este aici; deci Cezar nu este pretutindeni'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la partea în loc. Maxima: *oricui nu îi revine partea în loc, <nu îi revine> nici întregul său.*

Despre locul de la întregul în timp

18. Întregul în timp este rostirea care cuprinde orice timp în mod adverbial, precum *'întotdeauna'* și *'niciodată'*. Partea în timp este rostirea care semnifică un anumit timp în mod adverbial, precum *'acum'*, *'atunci'*, *'ieri', 'azi'* și *'mâine'*. Exemplele acestuia se iau ca și în cazul întregului în loc.

Despre locul de la cauză

19. Cauza este aceea în raport cu a cărei ființă urmează altceva potrivit naturii. Și se divide în cauză eficientă, materială, formală și finală. Cauza eficientă este cea de la care provine principiul mișcării, precum constructorul de case este principul care mișcă și operează astfel încât casa să existe, și făurarul astfel încât cuțitașul să existe.

Locul de la cauza eficientă este raportarea ei înseși la efectul său. Și este constructiv și destructiv, precum *'constructorul de case este bun; deci casa este bună';* sau: *'făurarul este bun; deci cuțitașul este bun'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la causa eficientă. Maxima: *lucrul a cărui cauză eficientă este bună, chiar și el însuși este bun*; sau: *când se pune cauza eficientă, se pune imediat efectul ei.* Însă invers este locul de la efectul cauzei eficiente.

20. Materia este cea din care, împreună cu altceva, ceva devine. Însă materia este de două feluri, una care persistă, precum fierul în cuțitaș, și alta trecătoare, precum făina și apa în pâine, și soda și silexul în sticlă. Materia se mai definește astfel: materia este ceea ce este doar în potență.

Locul de la cauza materială este raportarea ei înseși la efectul său. Și este constructiv și destructiv. Constructiv astfel: *'există fier sau făină; deci pot să existe arme de fier sau pâine'.* De unde <provine> locul? De la cauza materială. Maxima: *când se pune cauza materială, este posibil să se pună și ceea ce este determinat de materie*. În materia persistentă, în mod destructiv, astfel: *'fierul nu există; deci armele din fier nu există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cauza materială. Maxima: *când cauza materială persistentă este îndepărtată, se îndepărtează și efectul ei*.

De la efectul ei astfel, și este constructiv: *'armele din fier există; deci fierul există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la efectul cauzei materiale. Maxima: *când se pune efectul cauzei materiale persistente, se pune și însăși materia care persistă*. De la efectul materiei trecătoare astfel: *'există*

sticlă sau pâine; deci a existat silex sau făină'. Căci materia trecătoare nu persistă, ci se transsubstanțiază în altă natură. Maxima: *când se pune efectul materiei care trece, este necesar să fi fost și <materia> însăși*.

21. Forma este ceea ce dă ființă lucrului și îl conservă pe el în ființă. Locul de la cauza formală este raportarea ei înseși la efectul său. Este constructiv astfel: *'albiciunea există; deci albul există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cauza formală. Maxima: *când se pune cauza formală, se pune și efectul ei.* În mod destructiv astfel: *'albiciunea nu există; deci albul nu există'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cauza formală. Maxima: *când se îndepărtează cauza formală, se îndepărtează și efectul ei.* Însă invers va fi locul de la efectul ei.

22. Scopul este cel în vederea căruia ceva devine. Locul de la cauza finală este raportarea ei înseși la efectul său, precum *'fericirea este bună; deci virtutea este bună'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cauza finală. Maxima: *lucrul al cărui scop este bun, este și el însuși bun*. Sau astfel: *'pedeapsa este rea; deci păcatul este rău'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la scop. Maxima: *lucrul al cărui scop este rău, și el însuși este rău.* Însă invers va fi locul de la efectul cauzei finale.

Despre locul de la generare

23. Generarea este ieșirea de la a nu fi spre a fi. Locul de la generare este raportarea ei înseși la generatul său, precum *'generarea casei este bună; deci casa este bună'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la generare. Maxima: *cel a cărui generare este bună, și el însuși este bun*, și *cel a cărui generare este rea, și el însuși este rău.* Însă invers va fi locul de la cel generat. Și maximele sunt acestea: *dacă ceea ce este generat este bun, generarea sa este bună* și *dacă ceea ce este generat este rău, generarea sa este rea.*

Despre locul de la corupere

24. Coruperea este plecarea de la a fi către a nu fi. Locul de la corupere este raportarea coruperii la ceea ce este corupt, precum *'coruperea casei este rea; deci casa este bună';* sau *'coruperea Anticristului este bună*; *deci Anticristul este rău'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la corupere. Maxima: *cel a cărui corupere este rea, el însuși este bun* și *cel a cărui corupere este bună, el însuși este rău.* Însă invers va fi locul de la cel corupt.

Despre locul de la întrebuințări

25. Întrebuințarea, așa cum este luată aici, este acțiunea unui lucru sau exercitarea lui, precum faptul de a tăia pentru secure și faptul de a călări pentru cal. Locul de la întrebuințări este raportarea acțiunii înseși la acela căruia îi revine acțiunea sau întrebuințarea, precum *'faptul de a călări sau a despica este bun; deci calul este bun sau securea este bună'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la întrebuințări. Maxima: *cel a cărui întrebuințare este bună, și el însuși este bun;* sau astfel: *'a ucide este rău; deci ucigașul este rău'*. De unde <provine> locul? Da la întrebuințări. Maxima: *cel a cărui întrebuințare este rea, și el însuși este rău*.

Despre locul de la accidente <care au loc> în comun

26. *'Accidentele <care au loc> în comun'* sunt luate în două feluri. Căci unele sunt acelea care uneori se însoțesc reciproc și alteori nu, precum *elegant* și *adulterin*; iar de la acestea nu se ia locul dialectic, ci cel sofistic. Însă altele sunt cele în cazul cărora unul îi urmează întotdeauna celuilalt, precum *a regreta* urmează *a fi greșit*. Și de la acestea se ia locul dialectic, precum *'regretă; deci a greșit'*; De unde <provine> locul? De la accidentele <care au loc> în comun. Maxima: *pentru accidentele <care au loc> în comun, dacă cel posterior este inerent, și cel anterior.* Este destructiv astfel: *'nu a greșit; deci nu regretă'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la accidentele <care au loc> în comun. Maxima: *pentru accidentele <care au loc> în comun, dacă cel anterior nu este inerent, nici cel posterior.*

DESPRE LOCURILE EXTRINSECI

27. Ce este un loc extrinsec s-a spus mai înainte. Dintre locurile extrinseci, unul este de la opuși, altul de la mai mare, altul de la mai mic, altul de la asemănător, altul de la analogie, altul de la transumpție, altul de la autoritate.

Despre locul de la opuși

Apoi, speciile opoziției sunt patru, adică opoziția relativă, contrarietatea, opoziția privativă, contradicția. Opuși relativ sunt cei în cazul cărora unul nu poate să stea fără celălalt, precum tatăl și fiul. Contrarietatea este opoziția contrariilor, precum a albului și a negrului. Opuși privativ sunt cei care trebuie să aibă loc cu privire la același lucru, precum vederea și cecitatea cu privire la ochi. Contradicția este opoziția pentru care, potrivit ei înseși, nu există un intermediar; căci nu există intermediar între faptul de a fi și faptul de a nu fi.

Despre locul de la cei opuși relativ

28. Locul de la cei opuși relativ este raportarea unuia dintre corelativi la celălalt. Și este constructiv sau destructiv, precum *'tatăl există; deci fiul există'* și invers; *'tatăl nu există; deci fiul nu există'* și invers. De unde <provine> locul? De la cei opuși relativ. Maxima: *când unul dintre corelativi este pus, celălalt este pus* și *când unul este distrus, și celălalt este distrus.*

Despre locul de la contrarii

29. Dintre contrarii, unele sunt mediate, precum album și negrul între care sunt culorile medii; alte nemediate, precum sănătos și bolnav față de viețuitor. Locul de la contrarii este raportarea unuia dintre contrarii la celălalt. Are loc în mod constructiv astfel: *'viețuitorul este sănătos; deci nu este bolnav'*, sau *'acest corp este alb; deci nu este negru'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la contrarii. Maxima: *când unul dintre contrarii este pus, celălalt este îndepărtat de la același lucru*. Are loc în mod destructiv în cazul contrariilor nemediate împreună cu păstrarea subiectului, precum *'acest viețuitor nu este sănătos; deci este bolnav'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la contrariile nemediate. Maxima: *când unul dintre contrariile nemediate este îndepărtat, celălalt este pus, însă subiectul rămâne*.

Despre locul de la cei opuși privativ

30. Ce sunt cei opuși privativ s-a spus mai înainte. Locul de la cei opuși privativ este raportarea unei privații la un habitus sau a unui habitus la o privație. Precum *'este văzător; deci nu este orb'* sau *'este orb; deci nu este văzător'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cei opuși privativ.

Maxima: *când unul dintre cei opuși privativ este pus, celălalt este îndepărtat de la același lucru.* Nu are loc în mod destructiv, decât cu păstrarea subiectului și atunci când timpul este determinat de la natură. Căci un cățeluș nu se numește *'orb'* sau *'văzător'* înainte de a noua zi; și nu se spune că un copil are sau nu are dinți înainte de un timp determinat.

Despre locul de la cei opuși contradictoriu

31. Locul de la cei opuși contradictoriu este raportarea unuia dintre cei opuși contradictoriu la celălalt, precum *'Socrate șade este adevărat; deci Socrate nu șade este fals'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la cei opuși contradictoriu. Maxima: *dacă unul dintre cei opuși contradictoriu este adevărat, celălalt este fals, și invers.*

Despre locul de la mai mare și despre locul de la mai mic

32. Mai marele, precum este luat aici, este ceea ce este supra-pus altuia în potență sau în putere. Însă mai micul este ceea ce i se sub-pune. Locul de la mai mare este raportarea mai marelui la mai mic. Și este întotdeauna destructiv, precum *'regele nu poate cuceri cetatea, deci nici soldatul'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la mai mare. Maxima: *dacă acel lucru care pare în mai mare măsură că este inerent nu este, <nu este inerent> nici acela care pare în mai mică măsură.* Locul de la mai mic este raportarea mai micului la mai mare. Și este constructiv, precum *'soldatul poate cuceri cetatea, deci și regele'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la mai mic. Maxima: *dacă acel lucru care pare în mai mică măsură că este inerent este, atunci <este inerent> și acela care pare în mai mare măsură.*

Despre locul de la asemănător

33. Locul de la asemănător este raportarea unui asemănător la celălalt, precum *'așa cum faptul de a putea râde este inerent omului, tot așa faptul de a putea necheza este inerent calului; însă faptul de a putea râde este propriul omului; deci faptul de a putea necheza este propriul calului'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la asemănător. Maxima: *despre cele asemănătoare judecata este aceeași*. Destructiv astfel: *'așa cum faptul de a putea râde este inerent omului, tot așa faptul de a putea necheza <este inerent> calului; însă faptul de a putea râde nu este propriul omului ca*

gen; deci nici faptul de a putea necheza nu este inerent calului ca gen'. De unde <provine> locul? De la asemănător. Maxima a fost spusă mai înainte. Sau astfel: *dacă unul dintre asemănători este inerent, <este inerent>și celălalt;* sau *dacă unul nu este inerent, <nu este inerent> nici celălalt.*

Despre locul de la analogie

34. Locul de la analogie este raportarea unuia dintre cele analoage la celălalt, precum *'așa cum se raportează conducătorul unei nave la navă, tot așa se raportează rectorul școlilor la școală; însă în cazul navei care trebuie condusă, conducătorul nu trebuie ales la întâmplare, ci printr-o artă; deci în cazul școlilor care trebuie conduse rectorul nu trebuie ales la întâmplare, ci printr-o artă '*. De unde <provine> locul? De la analogie. Maxima: *despre cele analoage judecata este aceeași*. Însă acest loc diferă de locul de la asemănător, deoarece în locul de la asemănător comparația se ia potrivit asemănării inerenței, precum *'așa cum faptul de a putea râde este inerent omului, tot așa faptul de a putea necheza <este inerent> calului'*; însă în locul de la analogie nu se urmărește asemănarea inerenței, ci comparația raportării, precum *'așa cum marinarul se raportează la vas, tot așa doctorul se raportează la școli'*.

Despre locul de la transsumpție

35. Transsumpția este de două feluri. Căci una are loc atunci când numele sau rostirea care semnifică un singur lucru este supusă unei transsumpții pentru a semnifica ceva diferit printr-o anumită asemănare, precum *'a râde'* este supus unei transsumpții pentru <a semnifica> *'a înflori'* atunci când se spune *'pajiștea râde'*. Însă rostirea este supusă unei transsumpții atunci când se spune *'se ară țărmul'* în loc de *'pierzi timpul'*, așa cum se obișnuiește să se spună cuiva care lucrează în van. Și această transsumpție îi revine sofistului și nu dialecticianului. Însă cealaltă transsumpție are loc atunci când se ia un nume cunoscut în mai mare măsură în locul altui nume cunoscut în mai mică măsură, precum dacă trebuie să se probeze că filosoful nu invidiază și se produce transsumpția către acesta, adică: *'înțeleptul nu invidiază'*. Și astfel îi revine dialecticianului.

Locul de la transsumpție este raportarea unuia supus transsumpției la celălalt, precum *'înțeleptul nu invidiază; deci filosoful nu invidiază'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la transsumpție.

Maxima: *ceea ce i se potriveşte cuiva sub un nume mai cunoscut, i se potriveşte lui şi sub un nume mai puţin cunoscut.*

Însă acest loc diferă de locul de la interpretarea numelui, deoarece în locul de la interpretarea numelui se ia definiția sau descrierea numelui sau expunerea lui, precum *'filosof'* este expus prin faptul că îl numesc *'iubitor de înțelepciune'*; însă în locul de la transsumpție nu se caută expunerea numelui, ci în locul unui nume mai puțin cunoscut se ia unul mai cunoscut sau vreunul diferit prin care să se probeze mai ușor ceea ce este propus.

Despre locul de la autoritate

36. Autoritatea, cum este luată aici, este judecata celui înțelept în știința sa. De aceea, acest loc obișnuiește să fie numit *de la judecata lucrului*. Locul de la autoritate este raportarea autorității la ceea ce se probează prin ea, precum *'astronomul spune că cerul se roteşte; deci cerul se roteşte'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la autoritate. Maxima: *trebuie crezut fiecare expert în știința sa*.

DESPRE LOCURILE MEDII

37. Urmează <să tratăm> despre locurile medii. Însă ce este locul mediu s-a spus mai înainte. Dintre locurile medii, unul este de la cuvintele înrudite, altul de la cazuri, altul de la diviziune. Cuvintele înrudite și cazurile diferă, deoarece <un cuvânt> univoc sau principal sau abstract, care este același lucru, se numește *'înrudit cu denominativul său'*, precum *'dreptate'* și *'drept'*; însă sunt numite *'cazuri'* toate cele ce cad de la <cuvântul> principal, precum *'drept'* și *'în mod drept'*. Și pe această diferență o fixează Aristotel în *Topica* 2.

Despre locul de la <cuvintele> înrudite

38. Locul de la <cuvintele> înrudite este raportarea unuia dintre <cuvintele> înrudite la celălalt, precum *'dreptatea este bună; deci dreptul este bun'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la <cuvintele> înrudite. Maxima: *ceea ce îi este inerent unuia dintre <cuvintele> înrudite, <îi este inerent> şi celuilalt* sau *dacă unul dintre cuvintele înrudite este inerent, <este inerent> şi celălalt.*

Despre locul de la cazuri

39. Locul de la cazuri este raportarea unui caz la alt caz, precum *'ceea ce este drept, este bun; deci ceea ce are loc în mod drept, are loc și în mod bun'* și invers. De unde <provine> locul? De la cazuri. Maxima: *ceea ce i se potrivește unui caz, <i se potrivește> și celuilalt.*

Despre locul de la diviziune

40. Dintre diviziuni, una are loc prin negație, precum *'Socrate fie este om, fie nu este om; însă nu este non-om, deci este om'*. De unde <provine> locul? De la diviziune. Maxima: *dacă două lucruri anume divid împreună ceva, când unul este pus, celălalt este îndepărtat* sau *când unul este îndepărtat*, *celălalt este pus.* Alta este diviziunea care nu are loc prin negație. Și aceasta are loc în șase moduri: trei prin sine și trei prin accident. Primul, al genului în specii, precum *'dintre viețuitoare, unul este rațional, altul irațional'*. Al doilea, al întregului în părți integrale, precum *'din casă, o parte este perete, alta acoperișul, alta fundația'*. Al treilea, a expresiei în semnificații, precum *'câinele <poate fi>: unul care poate lătra, altul marin, altul stea celestă'*. Dintre cele trei <diviziuni> prin accident, una este a subiectului în accidente, precum *'dintre viețuitoare, unul este sănătos, altul bolnav'.* A doua, a accidentului în subiecte, precum *'dintre cei sănătoși, unul este om, altul animal'*. A treia, a accidentului în accidente, precum *'dintre cele sănătoase, unul este cald, celălalt rece'*.

Locul de la diviziune este raportarea unuia dintre cei care divid împreună <ceva> la celălalt, precum *'dacă Socrate este viețuitor, fie este rațional, fie irațional; însă nu este irațional; deci este rațional'.* De unde <provine> locul? De la diviziune. Maxima aceasta a fost menționată mai sus. Și în mod similar cu privire la oricare altă diviziune se formează un argument în mod constructiv sau destructiv.

TRATATUL VI
DESPRE SUPOZIȚII

1. Dintre cele care se rostesc, unele se rostesc cu compunere, altele fără compunere. Cu compunere, precum *'Omul aleargă'*, *'Omul alb'*; fără compunere, precum *'omul'*, care este un termen necompus. Însă fiecare dintre termenii necompuși fie semnifică substanța, fie cantitatea, fie calitatea, fie <faptul de a fi> în raport cu ceva, fie faptul de a face, fie faptul de a fi afectat și tot așa cu privire la celelalte.

Despre semnificație

2. Semnificația termenului, așa cum este luat aici, este reprezentarea unui lucru prin emisia vocală potrivit convenției. Motiv pentru care, de vreme ce orice lucru fie este universal fie particular, cuvintele care nu semnifică universalul sau particularul trebuie să nu semnifice ceva anume. Și astfel nu vor fi termeni așa cum *'termen'* este luat aici; precum sunt semnele universale și particulare.

Dintre <felurile> de semnificație, una îi revine lucrului <cu rol> substantiv și poate să se producă prin numele <cu rol> substantiv, precum *'om'*; alta îi revine lucrului <cu rol> adjectiv și poate să se producă prin numele <cu rol> adjectiv sau prin verb, precum *'alb'* sau *'aleargă'*. Motiv pentru care semnificația nu are în mod propriu <rol> substantiv sau adjectiv, ci un anumit lucru este semnificat în mod substantiv și un anumit lucru în mod adjectiv, deoarece adjectivarea sau substantivarea sunt moduri ale lucrurilor care sunt semnificate, și nu ale semnificației.

Însă numele <cu rol> substantiv se spun că stau în raport de supoziție, pe când numele <cu rol> adjectiv și chiar verbele se spun că stau în raport de copulare.

Despre supoziție și copulare

3. Însă supoziția este luarea termenului <cu rol> substantiv în locul a ceva anume. Dar supoziția și semnificația diferă, deoarece semnificația are loc prin instituirea unui emisii vocale pentru un lucru care trebuie semnificat, însă supoziția este luarea în locul a ceva anume a termenului însuși, care deja semnifică un lucru. Ca atunci când se spune *'omul aleargă'*, termenul *'omul'* stă în relație de supoziție în locul lui Socrate sau în locul Platon și tot așa cu privire la alții.

Motiv pentru care semnificația este anterioară supoziției. Și nici nu sunt de același fel, deoarece faptul de a semnifica îi revine emisiei vocale, însă faptul de a sta în relație de supoziție îi revine termenului ca și cum a fost compus deja din emisie vocală și semnificație. Prin urmare, supoziția nu este semnificație.

Copularea este luarea termenului <cu rol> adjectiv în locul a ceva anume.

Despre diviziunea supoziției

4. Dintre supoziții, una este comună, alta discretă. Supoziția comună este cea care se realizează printr-un termen comun, precum *'omul'*. Supoziția discretă este cea care se realizează printr-un termen discret, precum *'Socrate'* sau *'acest om'*.

Apoi, dintre supozițiile comune, una este naturală, alta accidentală. Supoziția naturală este luarea termenului comun în locul tuturor celor de care a fost făcut capabil de la natură să fie participat, precum *'omul'* luat prin sine potrivit naturii sale *stă în locul* tuturor oamenilor care au fost, sunt și care vor fi. Însă supoziția accidentală este luarea termenului comun în locul celor pe care îi cere cel ce i se adaugă, ca *'omul este'*; termenul *'omul' stă în locul* celor prezenți; însă când se spune *'omul a fost'*, *stă în locul* celor din trecut; însă când se spune *'omul va fi'*, *stă în locul* celor din viitor. Și astfel <termenul> are supoziții diverse potrivit diversității acelora care îi sunt adăugați lui.

5. Dintre supozițiile accidentale, una este simplă, alta personală. Supoziția simplă este luarea termenului comun în locul lucrului universal semnificat prin el. Precum atunci când se spune *'omul este specie'* sau *'viețuitorul este gen'*, termenul *'omul'* stă în locul omului în comun și nu în locul unuia dintre inferiori, și termenul *'viețuitorul'* <stă> în locul viețuitorului în comun și nu în locul unuia dintre inferiori. Și în mod similar despre oricare alt termen comun. Precum *'*care poate să râdă *este un propriu', '*rațional *este o diferență', '*alb *este un accident'*.

6. Apoi, dintre supozițiile simple, una îi revine termenului comun care a fost pus în subiect, ca *'omul este specie'*. Alta îi revine termenului comun care a fost pus în predicatul afirmativ, ca *'orice om este viețuitor'*; termenul *'viețuitor'* care a fost pus în predicat are supoziție simplă, deoarece stă doar în locul naturii genului. Alta îi revine termenului comun care a fost pus după expresia exceptivă, ca *'orice viețuitor, cu excepția omului, este irațional'*; căci aici, termenul *'om'* care a fost pus în predicat are supoziție simplă. De aceea nu reiese: *'orice viețuitor cu excepția*

omului este irațional, deci orice viețuitor cu excepția acestui om', ci acolo este o *figura dictionis*, trecând de la o <supoziție> simplă la <una> personală. În mod similar aici: *'omul este specie, deci un anumit om este specie';* și aici: *'orice om este viețuitor, deci orice om este acest viețuitor'*. Căci în toate acestea are loc trecerea de la supoziția simplă la cea personală.

Însă, faptul că termenul comun care a fost pus în predicat se păstrează în mod simplu, reiese, deoarece se spune: *'toate contrariile țin de aceeași învățătură'.* Căci dacă acest termen *'învățătură'* nu ar fi avut o supoziție simplă, <propoziția> ar fi fost falsă, deoarece toate contrariile nu țin de o disciplină particulară. Căci medicina nu revine tuturor contrariilor, ci doar sănătății și bolii, și gramatica potrivirii și nepotrivirii, și tot așa despre altele.

7. Supoziția personală este luarea termenului comun în locul inferiorilor săi, precum atunci când se spune: *'omul aleargă'*, termenul *'omul' stă în locul* inferiorilor săi.

8. Apoi, dintre supozițiile personale, una este determinată, alta confuză. Supoziția pe care o are un termen comun luat în mod nedefinit sau împreună cu semnul particular se numește *'determinată'*, precum *'omul aleargă'* sau *'un anumit om aleargă'*. Și în oricare dintre aceste cazuri se numește *'determinată'*, deoarece, deși în oricare dintre acele <propoziții> termenul *'om' stă în locul* oricărui om, atât în locul celui care aleargă cât și în locul celui care nu aleargă, totuși ele sunt adevărate doar pentru un singur om care aleargă. Căci una este *a sta în locul* <a ceva anume> și alta este a reda expresia adevărată pentru ceva anume. Căci în <propozițiile> precedente, precum s-a spus, termenul *'om' stă în locul* oricărui om, atât în locul celui care aleargă cât și în locul celui care nu aleargă, însă redă expresia adevărată pentru cel care aleargă. Însă faptul că în oricare dintre acele <propoziții supoziția> este determinată reiese, deoarece, când se spune: *'viețuitor este Socrate, viețuitor este Platon, viețuitor este Cicero,* și tot așa despre alții; *deci viețuitor este orice om',* aici are loc *figura dictionis* de la mai multe determinate la una singură. Și astfel termenul comun care a fost luat în mod nedefinit are supoziție determinată; și la fel cu semnul particular.

9. Supoziția confuză este luarea unui termen comun în locul mai multora prin intermediul semnului universal, precum atunci când se spune *'orice om este viețuitor'*, termenul *'om'* este ținut în locul mai multora prin intermediul semnului universal, deoarece *<stă> în locul* fiecărui supozit al său.

Apoi, dintre supozițiile confuze, una este confuză prin necesitatea semnului sau a modului, alta este confuză prin necesitatea lucrului. Precum atunci când se spune: *'orice om este viețuitor',* termenul *'om'* este confuz sau distribuit prin necesitatea semnului pentru orice supozit al său, și,

fiindcă fiecare om are esența sa, verbul *'este'* este ținut prin necesitatea lucrului pentru tot atâtea esențe pentru câți oameni <este ținut termenul> *'om'*; și deoarece fiecărui om îi este inerentă natura sa de viețuitor, de aceea *'viețuitor'* este ținut prin necesitatea lucrului pentru tot atâtea viețuitoare pentru câți oameni <este ținut> *'om'*, și pentru câte esențe <este ținut> verbul *'este'*. De aceea termenul *'om'* se spune că *stă în locul* a ceva în mod confuz, mobil și distributiv. Însă stă în locul a ceva în mod confuz și distributiv, deoarece este ținut în locul oricărui om; dar în mod mobil, deoarece este permis să se producă o coborâre pentru fiecare supozit al său, precum *'orice om; deci Socrate'* sau *'orice om, deci Platon'*. Însă termenul *'viețuitor'* se spune că este confuz în mod imobil, deoarece nu este permis să se producă o coborâre sub el, ca *'orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om este acest viețuitor'*: însă aici există o trecere de la <o supoziție> simplă la una personală. Precum aici: *'omul este cea mai demnă dintre creaturi; deci un anumit om'*; și *'trandafirul este cea mai frumoasă dintre flori; deci un anumit trandafir'*. Însă <propozițiile> diferă, deoarece în acestea supoziția simplă este de partea subiectului, însă în acelea de partea predicatului.

Îndoieli

10. Și nici ceea ce s-a spus nu pare să se opună, având în vedere că în <propoziția> *'orice om este viețuitor'*, termenul *'viețuitor'* care a fost pus în predicat are supoziție simplă, în timp ce mai întâi se spusese că ar avea <supoziție> confuză, deoarece potrivit faptului că acolo genul este predicat despre specie și astfel termenul *'viețuitor'* este ținut în locul comunului însuși, care este genul, astfel are supoziție simplă; însă potrivit faptului că acea natură comună a genului însuși se multiplică prin <acei> supoziți ai omului, astfel se spune că are <supoziție> confuză, nu în mod mobil, ci în mod imobil. Căci supoziția confuză în mod mobil nu poate să existe simultan cu cea simplă, nici potrivit identicului, și nici potrivit celor diferite; însă supoziția confuză în mod imobil poate să existe simultan cu cea simplă, nu potrivit identicului ci potrivit celor diferite, precum s-a spus.

Astfel trebuie să se rezolve contrarietatea care le apărea celor care susțin că termenul comun care a fost pus în predicat ar fi avut o supoziție simplă și ar fi fost confuză în mod imobil, când există un semn universal afirmativ în subiect, ca *'orice om este viețuitor'*.

11. Însă eu cred că este imposibil ca termenul comun care a fost pus în predicat să fie confuz în mod imobil sau mobil datorită semnului universal afirmativ care a fost pus în subiect, precum

'orice om este viețuitor', și în altele asemănătoare. Deoarece, precum vrea Porfir, tot ceea ce este predicat despre altul, fie este mai marele aceluia, fie <este> egalul aceluia însuși despre care este predicat; și o susține despre predicația prin sine; însă în <propoziția>: *'orice om este viețuitor'* predicația este prin sine și nu este predicat egalul; prin urmare, este predicat mai marele; însă nu în mod accidental; deci în mod substanțial sau esențial; deci genul sau diferența; însă nu diferența; deci genul. Însă natura genului care a fost multiplicată în mod mobil sau imobil nu este gen. Deci, când se spune: *'orice om este viețuitor'*¸ deoarece acolo este predicat genul, nu este posibil ca termenul comun, care semnifică natura genului, să se multiplice nici în mod mobil și nici imobil, deoarece deja nu ar mai fi gen, așa cum dacă *'om'* este confuz în mod mobil sau imobil, deja nu va fi specie.

Apoi, se observă același lucru prin Aristotel în *Topica I*. Căci el spune că este necesar ca tot ceea ce este predicat despre un altul, fie este predicat în mod convers despre el, fie nu; dacă <este predicat> în mod convers, este o definiție sau un propriu; însă dacă nu este predicat în mod convers despre lucru, fie cade în definiția lucrului, fie nu; dacă nu, atunci este accident; dacă cade în definiție, fie este gen, fie diferență. Și Aristotel susține acolo că are loc o predicație directă și că specia este pusă ca subiect potrivit ei înseși sau multiplicată. Însă în <propoziția>: *'orice om este viețuitor'* predicația este directă și specia este pusă ca subiect și nu este predicat egalul sau accidentul; deci <este> gen sau diferență; însă nu diferența; deci gen. Și astfel răspunde la fel ca primul. Motiv pentru care nu este posibil ca termenul comun care a fost pus în predicat să fie confuz nici în mod imobil și nici mobil.

Apoi, întregul universal care este gen și întregul în cantitate se raportează ca fiind opuse. Însă întregul în cantitate este de două feluri. Deoarece există un anume întreg complet în cantitate, așa cum oriunde termenul comun este confuz în mod mobil. Și există un alt întreg incomplet în cantitate sau diminuat, așa cum oriunde termenul comun este confuz în mod imobil. Motiv pentru care, dacă termenul comun este multiplicat în mod absolut, el și devine în mod absolut un întreg în cantitate; și dacă <este multiplicat> într-un anumit fel, el și devine într-un anumit fel. Așadar, dacă este imposibil ca întregul în cantitate să fie gen în măsura în care este de acest fel, nu este posibil ca termenul comun care a fost pus în predicat să fie confuz, precum spuneau ei.

Apoi, relația potrivit căreia cele inferioare sunt reduse la superiorul lor este opusă acelei relații potrivit căreia superiorul este redus la cele inferioare. Însă potrivit primeia, *'comun'* se ia în rațiunea comunului; căci astfel comunul însuși conține în sine toate cele care sunt sub el însuși.

Potrivit celeilalte, se ia *'ceea ce este multiplicat'* sau *'confuz'*, fie comunul este multiplicat pentru toți, fie pentru unele. Așadar, dacă genul stă prin sine în rațiunea a ceea ce este comun, nu este posibil ca el însuși să se multiplice în măsura în care este de acest fel. Și concedem toate acestea.

Soluția

12. Însă rațiunea datorită căreia fuseseră mânați este ușor de dezlegat. Căci ei spun că atunci când se spune *'orice om este viețuitor'*, de vreme ce fiecărui om îi corespunde esența sa și natura sa de viețuitor, întrucât nu este posibil să fie om fără să fie viețuitor, - deci termenul *'viețuitor'* va fi ținut pentru tot atâtea viețuitoare pentru câți oameni <va fi ținut> *'om'*. Căci noi spunem că în acest argument nu există ceva care să reiasă. Căci, atunci când spun: *'orice om este alb'* sau *'orice om este negru'*, fiindcă este imposibil să fie om fără să fie viețuitor, este necesar ca atâtea viețuitoare sau atâtea naturi de viețuitor să se înțeleagă în subiect, câți sunt oamenii pentru care este ținut termenul *'om'*.

Totuși este prostesc a spune că multitudinea acelor naturi de viețuitor este acolo din cauza multiplicării predicatului, când acolo se predica *'albul'* sau *'negrul'*. De aceea, eu spun că *'om'* îl are de la sine pe *'viețuitor',* deoarece *'omul'* este constituit – vorbind logic, nu în mod natural - din *'viețuitor'* și *'rațional'*. De aceea, când *'om'* este multiplicat, are în sine multitudinea acelor naturi de viețuitor. Precum atunci când spun: *'orice om este alb'* sau *'orice om este negru'*, în nici un fel el nu are aceste naturi de viețuitor de la predicat.

La fel în cazul de față, atunci când este predicat genul, precum *'orice om este viețuitor'*. Căci *'om'* este pus ca subiect, în propoziția în care se înțelege multitudinea acelor naturi de viețuitor, precum s-a spus, și este predicat genul *'viețuitor'*, care nu este confuz în nici un fel, nici mobil și nici imobil, ci stă acolo în locul esenței înseși a genului comun predicabil despre mai multe. De aceea, *'viețuitor'* este predicat și *'viețuitor'* este înțeles în subiect precum aici: *'orice viețuitor, rațional, muritor este viețuitor'.*

La fel spun că verbul *'este'* nu este confuz nici mobil și nici imobil, deoarece faptul că ar fi fost viețuitor sau că el ar fi exista în om îl conținuse subiectul însuși de la sine, înainte să fi fost pus ca subiect în propoziție pentru predicația actuală sau potențială.

Și datorită acestui fapt distrugem o anumită diviziune anterioară, anume: *dintre supozițiile confuze una este confuză datorită necesității semnului sau a modului, alta datorită necesității*

lucrului. Căci spunem că orice <supoziție> confuză are loc datorită necesității modului. Precum este: *'orice viețuitor rațional muritor este viețuitor'*; termenul *'viețuitor'* este ținut în virtutea semnului în locul oricărui viețuitor care este om. La fel și: *'orice om este viețuitor'*; termenul *'om'* este ținut nu doar în locul oricărui om, ci în locul oricărui viețuitor care este om. Și de aceea, sunt acolo tot atâtea naturi de viețuitor câte umanități – vorbind în mod natural, deoarece umanitatea este identică – potrivit căii logice, <însă> nu celei naturale – în oricare individ uman; precum omul în <sens> comun este identic. De aceea, faptul că este această natură de viețuitor sau alta se datorează materiei. Însă, potrivit căii naturii, umanitatea mea este prin sine și este diferită de umanitatea ta, precum sufletul meu, prin care umanitatea mea este în mine, este diferit de sufletului tău, prin care umanitatea ta este cauzată în tine. Și din pricina acestui semn sau mod, când *'om'* este confuz, *'viețuitor'* nu este confuz, ci *'viețuitor'* este restrâns la *'om'* prin diferențele sale. De aceea, orice <supoziție> confuză are loc prin necesitatea semnului sau a modului.

TRATATUL VII
DESPRE <RAȚIONAMENTELE> FALACIOASE

Introducere
Despre definiția disputării

1. Disputarea este actul silogistic al cuiva spre altul în vederea unui subiect propus care urmează să fie lămurit. Însă, deoarece pentru disputare se cer cinci lucruri – adică cel de la care provine actul de a disputa, adică oponentul, cel către care se îndreaptă actul de a disputa, adică respondentul, subiect propus despre care se dispută, actul însuși de a disputa și instrumentul disputei –, toate acestea cinci sunt atinse în descrierea precedentă a *'disputării'*. Căci prin ceea ce numește *'act'*, ea atinge însăși acțiunea de a disputa; prin diferența *'silogistic',* atinge faptul că acest act provine de la silogism și astfel, se înțelege acolo silogismul, care este instrumentul disputării; prin diferența *'al cuiva'* se înțelege cel de la care provine actul de a disputa; prin diferența *'spre altul'* se înțelege cel spre care se îndreptă actul de a disputa și acesta este cel împotriva căruia se dispută; însă prin diferența *'în vederea unui subiect propus'* se înțelege lucrul despre care se dispută, care este obiectul disputării.

2. Și astfel, în descrierea pomenită sunt reținute cinci lucruri. Și se poate reține chiar un al șaselea prin diferența *'care urmează să fie lămurit'*, adică unirea actului de a disputa cu obiectul său, și anume, *'unirea'* se înțelege din alăturarea actului însuși de a disputa la obiectul disputării, precum din alăturarea actului *<de> a vedea* la *vizibil*, care este obiectul său, se înțelege unirea lui *a vedea* însuși cu *vizibilul*, încât nu este doar deja vizibil, ci este văzut în act. De aceea, atunci când actul de a disputa se unește cu obiectul său, nu este doar deja disputabil sau determinabil, ci este disputat sau determinat în act.

3. Dacă cineva obiectează că, de vreme ce inducția este instrumentul pentru a disputa, deci silogismul nu este instrumentul propriu pentru a disputa, deoarece aceluiași lucru nu îi revin mai multe instrumente, trebuie spus că instrumentul actului este de două feluri, desăvârșit și diminuat. Așa cum în gramatică se întâmplă ca rostirea simplă și corectă să fie instrumentul desăvârșit al faptului de a vorbi, însă rostirea figurativă este un instrument diminuat, în mod similar, silogismul este instrumentul desăvârșit și complet al faptului de a disputa, însă cel diminuat, – inducția, entimema și exemplul. De aceea, unuia singur îi revine un singur instrument complet și nu mai multe, însă cele incomplete și deficiente față de cel complet pot fi mai multe.

Despre diviziunea disputării

4. Însă speciile disputării sunt patru. Căci una este doctrinală, alta dialectică, alta tentativă, alta sofistică.

5. <Disputa> doctrinală este cea care formulează silogisme din principiile proprii fiecărei discipline și nu din cele ce i se par <potrivite> respondentului. Și instrumentul acestei dispute este silogismul demonstrativ. Un silogism demonstrativ are loc când a fost format fie din <premise> adevărate și prime fie din cele care și-au luat principiul cunoașterii lor din anumite <premise> adevărate și prime. Și împotriva acestuia se ia altul, care se numește *'falsigraful'* și se produce din aceleași principii, însă luate într-un mod fals.

6. Disputa dialectică este cea care realizează o colecție de contradicții din <propoziții> ce pot fi probate. Și instrumentul acesteia este silogismul dialectic. Însă silogismul dialectic este cel care a fost format din <propoziții> ce pot fi probate.

7. Disputa tentativă are loc din <premisele> care i se par <potrivite> respondentului și este necesar ca el să <le> cunoască, deși el simulează că are știință. Însă instrumentul acestei dispute este silogismul tentativ. Însă silogismul tentativ este cel care a fost format din <premisele> care, potrivit respondentului, pot fi probate. De aceea, dacă uneori are loc din <premise> necesare sau din cele false, sau din cele ce pot fi probate în mod absolut, acest lucru nu i se datorează faptului că sunt astfel, ci deoarece, potrivit respondentului, pot fi probate. Și despre acest <silogism> tentativ determină Aristotel la începutul *Topicii*, atunci când împarte silogismul litigios în trei părți, despre care spune apoi: “deci, primul dintre cele care au fost menționate este silogismul litigios și se spune că este silogism”.

8. Și prin aceasta reiese falsitatea întrebării pe care unii o pun, atunci când Aristotel, la începutul *Respingerilor* determină cu privire la disputa tentativă, atunci când determină speciile disputei: “de ce la începutul *Topicii* nu determină cu privire la silogismul tentativ, de vreme ce acolo determină celelalte specii ale silogismului?” Căci tentativ este acela pe care ei înșiși obișnuiesc să îl numească *'cel care greșește în materie'*; dar nu greșește în materia silogismului dialectic întrucât pornește de la <premise> false (precum ei înșiși spun), ci greșește contra <propoziției> care poate fi probată. Însă <silogismul> dialectic ia ceea ce poate fi probat în mod absolut. Însă ceea ce poate fi probat în mod absolut este ceea ce pare <adevărat> tuturora, sau mai

multora, sau celor înțelepți, și celor <din urmă>, fie celor mulți, fie tuturora, fie celor foarte cunoscuți. Însă <silogismul> tentativ nu ia ceea ce poate fi probat astfel, ci doar lucrul care poate fi probat potrivit respondentului și astfel ceea ce poate fi probat potrivit cu ceva anume. Și astfel greșește împotriva a ceea ce poate fi probat.

9. Însă disputa sofistică este cea care formează silogisme din <premisele> ce par că pot fi probate, dar nu sunt. Însă instrumentul acestei dispute este silogismul sofistic. Dar silogismul sofistic este cel care, deși pare silogism, totuși nu este, pentru că cel despre care se spune în *Respingeri* că, deși este silogism, el este ceva litigios, dar nu pare să îi corespundă lucrului, este <silogismul> tentativ, despre care tocmai am vorbit.

10. Și reține că *'dispută'* se rostește despre aceste patru dispute potrivit sensului anterior și celui posterior, și la fel descrierea disputei menționată mai sus. Și Aristotel nu definește disputa în *Respingeri,* ci o divide, deoarece definiția îi revine celui care se rostește într-un singur mod și nu celui care se rostește în mai multe moduri potrivit sensului anterior și celui posterior. Totuși, celui care se rostește potrivit sensului anterior și celui posterior poate să i se pună o descriere, care să se rostească potrivit sensului anterior și celui posterior, precum <obiectul> său descris.

11. Dacă se întreabă despre care dintre cele patru dispute pomenite anterior se rostește *'dispută'* printr-un sens anterior, și despre care printr-un sens posterior, trebuie spus că, dacă s-ar examina diferențele stabilite în descrierea precedentă a disputei, <acest fapt> s-ar vedea cu ușurință. Căci, dacă luăm *'dispută'* din perspectiva acestor diferențe, adică *'al cuiva spre altul'*, (deoarece prin aceste diferențe se înțeleg persoanele care dispută între care există o opoziție, întrucât opoziția este mai mare între un sofist care se opune și unul respondent), *'dispută'*, luat din această perspectivă, se rostește în sens anterior despre disputa sofistică și pe urmă despre cea tentativă, în care încă există o opoziție, însă nu atât de mare, și apoi despre disputa dialectică, în care există o opoziție mai mică, și în ultimul rând despre disputa doctrinală, deoarece nu interoghează, ci asumă ceea ce arată; însă toate celelalte interoghează. Însă, dacă *'dispută'* se ia din perspectiva a ceea ce este actul silogistic, totul se petrece invers, deoarece în sens anterior <se rostește> despre cea doctrinală, pe urmă despre cea dialectică, apoi despre cea tentativă, iar în ultimul rând despre cea sofistică. Și în mod similar dacă *'dispută'* se ia din perspectiva obiectului său, care era ceva propus pentru a fi lămurit, deoarece cea doctrinală lămurește și probează într-un mod mai adevărat, și cea dialectică mai puțin decât cea demonstrativă, și cea tentativă mai puțin decât cea dialectică, și cea sofistică mai puțin decât celelalte.

12. Apoi, o specie a disputei doctrinale este disputa matematică și alta cea naturală; și fiecare dintre acestea are mai multe specii. Și în mod similar se divide silogismul demonstrativ.

Apoi, speciile prime ale disputei doctrinale sunt trei. Căci una este pentru întâmpinări, și aceasta se numește *'dispută de întâmpinare'*; alta este pentru exerciții, și aceasta se numește *'dispută de exercițiu'*; a treia este pentru cunoașteri potrivit filosofiei. Și la fel există trei specii ale silogismului dialectic. Însă cea de a treia are patru specii. Prima este către accidentul care trebuie construit sau distrus, a doua este către gen, a treia către propriu, a patra către definiție. Și la fel sunt patru specii ale silogismului dialectic, dacă este luat în acest al treilea mod.

Apoi, speciile prime ale disputei tentative sunt două. Prima este disputa tentativă de la cele comune către cele comune, precum cel care încearcă să convingă în <disputele> dialectice sau în cele sofistice. Cealaltă este disputa tentativă de la cele comune către cele proprii, precum cel care încearcă să convingă în disciplinele speciale, precum în geometrie, sau aritmetică, sau medicină. Și la fel, doua sunt speciile prime ale silogismului tentativ. Unul, care este <silogismul> tentativ din cele comune la cele comune și celălalt ce este din cele comune la cele proprii.

Despre disputa sofistică și scopurile sale

13. Apoi, speciile disputei sofistice sunt cinci. Acestea sunt luate prin ordonarea disputei sofistice către cinci finalități sau scopuri. Aceste scopuri sunt: respingerea, falsul, inopinabilul, solecismul și frivolitatea.

14. Respingerea este negarea a ceea ce a fost înainte admis sau admiterea a ceea ce a fost înainte negat în aceeași dispută prin puterea argumentării.

15. Însă *'falsul'* se spune în două feluri, deoarece unul este falsul contradicției, precum *faptul că Socrate aleargă și nu aleargă* și altul este falsul propoziției, precum *'Etiopianul este alb'*. Și primul este cel mai evident dintre toate falsurile, și ține de respingere. Însă al doilea ține de o finalitate a falsului, atunci când el este patent. De aceea, falsul, întrucât este o finalitate, este un fals al unei propoziții ce a fost demonstrat ca evident prin dispută, deoarece, deși sofistul oponent îl duce pe sofistul respondent la un fals ascuns, – precum că pământul este mai mare decât cea mai mică dintre stelele cognoscibile prin văz – el nu își atinge scopul său, deoarece falsitatea acestei propoziții nu este evidentă, ci ascunsă. Însă, dacă <respondentul> va fi admis în mod voluntar o

propoziție falsă în mod evident și nu este constrâns de un anumit <termen> mediu care o inferă cu adevărat sau în mod aparent, oponentul încă nu își atinge scopul său.

16. Inopinabilul este ceea ce e împotriva opiniei tuturora sau a celor mulți sau a celor înțelepți, și dintre aceștia sau <împotriva opiniei> tuturora sau a celor mulți sau a celor foarte cunoscuți. De aceea, inopinabilul și improbabilul sunt același lucru în substanță, însă diferă în rațiune, deoarece *'improbabilul'* se rostește cu privire la rațiunile contrare care sunt evidente; *'inopinabilul' se rostește* în măsura în care sufletul nu vrea să cuprindă acel lucru însuși și nici să consimtă cu privire la el, ci se retrage și îi refuză asentimentul.

17. Solecismul este greșeala făcută în punerea laolaltă a părților de vorbire împotriva regulilor artei gramaticii, precum *'bărbat albă'* sau *'oamenii alerg'*.

18. Trivialitatea este repetarea inutilă a aceluiași lucru și din aceeași parte, precum *'omul omul aleargă'* sau *'omul rațional'*. Însă spun *'din aceeași parte'*, deoarece, dacă același lucru s-ar pune în părți diferite, nu este trivialitate, precum *'omul este om'* sau *'omul este rațional'*. Însă se spune *'repetarea inutilă'*, deoarece, dacă același lucru se repetă pentru o expresivitate mai mare, nu este trivialitate, precum *'Dumnezeule, Dumnezeul meu'*.

19. Prin urmare, disputa sofistică în vederea respingerii este prima specie a disputei sofistice; a doua specie a sa este disputa sofistică în vederea falsului; a treia este disputa sofistică în vederea inopinabilului; a patra, disputa sofistică în vederea solecismului, iar a cincea este disputa sofistică în vederea trivialității. Și în mod similar speciile silogismului sofistic sunt cinci, luate în același mod.

20. Și trebuie știut că speciile se constituie sub gen în două moduri, deoarece într-un mod diferența formală care îi este adăugată genului constituie specia, precum *'rațional'*, *'muritor'*, când sunt adăugate lui *'viețuitor'* constituie *'omul'*. Însă în alt mod, diferențele ultime care sunt adăugate genului constituie specia sub gen. Și în acest mod se constituie speciile disputei sofistice. Aristotel remarcă acest lucru în *Respingeri*, când după diviziunea disputei în mod simplu prin patru specii, el subordonează aceste cinci scopuri, prin care disputa sofistică, despre care intenționează <să trateze>, se subdivide din nou în cinci specii, precum s-a spus.

21. Odată ce disputa a fost divizată în patru specii și fiecare dintre acele specii au fost din nou subdivizate prin speciile sale prime, și astfel disputa sofistică a fost divizată prin cele cinci specii menționate mai sus, care sunt completate și constituite prin ordonarea disputei sofistice către cinci scopuri sau finalități, precum s-a spus, – deoarece aceste cinci scopuri sau finalități nu sunt

scopuri proxime ale disputei sofistice, ci ale speciilor ei, precum reiese din cele spuse mai înainte; de aceea scopul proxim al disputei sofistice reiese: acesta este înțelepciune aparentă, deoarece sofiștii doresc mai mult să pară înțelepți și să nu fie, decât să fie și să nu pară. De aceea, în orice dispută sofistică se urmărește înțelepciunea aparentă ca un scop proxim și principal al disputei sofistice înseși potrivit cu sine.

Despre cele treisprezece raționamente falacioase

22. Însă, odată ce scopul disputei sofistice este cunoscut, trebuie să le luăm în considerare pe acelea care sunt în vederea acestui scop, adică raționamentele falacioase. Căci scopul este întotdeauna anterior în intenție, însă posterior în acțiune; căci mai întâi intenționăm o casă și apoi lemnele, cărămizile și mortarul; însă în acțiune invers, deoarece mai întâi se iau cărămizile și mortarul iar apoi lemnele pentru construirea părților casei și în ultimul rând se obține casa. În disputa sofistică este la fel: mai întâi intenționăm un scop principal și apoi cele ce sunt în vederea scopului; însă când deja disputăm în vederea a ceea ce este ultim, e invers. De aceea, trebuie să știm că, așa cum opinia, care este scopul în <disputele> dialectice, se obține prin argumente care sunt luate de la locurile dialectice, la fel înțelepciunea aparentă, care este scopul în disputele sofistice, se obține prin argumente care sunt luate de la locurile sofistice.

23. Însă locuri sofistice în general sunt treisprezece raționamente falacioase. Dintre acestea, șase sunt în rostire, însă șapte în afara rostirii. Însă mai întâi trebuie să vorbim despre cele ce sunt în rostire.

DESPRE RAȚIONAMENTELE FALACIOASE ÎN ROSTIRE

24. Prin urmare, dintre acestea șase care au loc în rostire, prima este echivocația, a doua amfibolia, a treia compoziția, a patra diviziunea, a cincea accentul, a șasea figura de rostire. Însă, Aristotel intenționează să probeze prin inducție și silogism faptul că există șase în rostire. Prin inducție astfel: acest raționament falacios, <adică> echivocația, are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri, la fel amfibolia are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri, și tot așa cu privire la celelalte; deci orice raționament falacios în rostire are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri. Prin silogism astfel: orice înșelare care este produsă întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru

are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri, însă orice raționament falacios în rostire are loc întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru; deci orice raționament falacios în rostire are loc în unul dintre aceste șase moduri. Silogismul se află în primul <mod> al primei <figuri>. Probarea majorei: orice multiplicitate a rostirii are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri, însă orice înșelare care este produsă întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru are loc din pricina multiplicității rostirii; deci orice decepție care se produce întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru are loc în unul din aceste șase moduri. Și acesta a fost majora. Probarea minorei: orice greșeală a rostirii are loc întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru, însă orice raționament falacios în rostire are loc din pricina greșelii în rostire; deci orice raționament falacios în rostire are loc întrucât prin aceleași nume sau rostiri nu semnificăm același lucru. Și aceasta a fost minora. Și aceste două silogisme se află în primul <mod> al primei <figuri>.

25. Însă trebuie știut că, precum dorește Alexandru în comentariul asupra cărții *Respingerilor*, multiplul are loc în trei feluri. Căci unul este actual, altul potențial, altul imaginar. Însă multiplul este actual atunci când expresia sau rostirea identică în mod absolut semnifică mai multe lucruri, precum va reieși în cazul echivocației și amfiboliei, în cazul cărora există multiplul actual. Privitor la multiplul potențial și imaginar <acest lucru> va fi evident în locurile proprii. De aceea, fiindcă rațiunea multiplului în cel actual se păstrează într-un mod mai adevărat decât în cel potențial, și într-un mod mai adevărat în cel potențial decât în cel imaginar, mai întâi trebuie să vorbim despre raționamentele falacioase care produc multiplul actual, apoi despre cele în care el este potențial și în ultimul rând despre cel imaginar.

Despre echivocație
Despre raționamentul falacios al definiției

26. Însă, odată ce acestea au fost considerate, trebuie să vorbim despre echivocație sau despre raționamentul falacios al echivocației. Dar înțelege că *'raționamentul falacios'* se spune în două feluri, deoarece raționamentul falacios se numește într-un mod înșelarea cauzată în noi, însă în alt mod, raționamentul falacios se numește cauza sau principiul acelei înșelări. Și în acest al doilea mod intenționăm <să vorbim> aici despre raționamentul falacios.

27. De aceea, trebuie să știm că în orice raționament falacios, luat în acest al doilea mod, principiul sau cauza este de două feluri, adică principiul motor sau cauza care mișcă sau cauza aparenței și prin acestea toate se numește același principiu; însă un alt principiu sau o altă cauză este principiu al lipsei sau cauză a non-existenței, ceea ce este același lucru, sau cauza falsității. Însă principiul motor sau cauza aparenței în orice raționament falacios este ceea ce mișcă spre a crede ceea ce nu există. Însă principiul lipsei sau cauza falsității este ceea ce face să fie fals ceea ce este crezut. Și deoarece aceste două principii sau aceste două cauze se află în orice raționament falacios, trebuie să se afle în echivocație. Însă principiul motor sau cauza aparenței în echivocație este unitatea aceleiași rostiri în mod absolut; însă spun *'în mod absolut'* datorită accentului, căci în accent expresia nu este aceeași în mod absolut, precum va reieși ulterior. Însă principiul lipsei sau cauza non-existenței sau a falsității în echivocație este diversitatea rațiunilor sau a lucrurilor semnificate.

Despre definiția echivocației

28. De aceea, echivocația se definește astfel: echivocația are loc atunci când rațiunile diverse ale lucrurilor sunt unite în același nume în mod absolut. Și în această definiție, *'lucruri'* se ia în mod comun pentru lucrurile însele, pentru modul dublu al lucrurilor și pentru raportările lor. Pentru lucrurile însele, precum în cazul numelui *'câine'*, care semnifică <câinele> ce poate să latre, <câinele> marin și <câinele> stea celestă. Pentru cele două moduri ale lucrurilor, deoarece există un anumit mod de a cosemnifica, potrivit căruia expresia cosemnifică accidentele sale, și există un alt mod care există pentru a semnifica, precum în cazul numelui *'sănătos'*, care semnifică întotdeauna aceeași sănătate, deoarece <semnifică> sănătatea viețuitorului, însă potrivit unor moduri diferite. Deoarece, când se spune *'urina este sănătoasă'*, sensul este: *urina este cea care semnifică sănătatea*, însă doar a sănătății viețuitorului; și când se spune *'mâncarea este sănătoasă'*, sensul este: *mâncarea este producătoare a sănătății*, însă doar a sănătății viețuitorului; și *'dieta este sănătoasă'*, deoarece conservă sănătatea viețuitorului; și *'poțiunea este sănătoasă'*, deoarece pregătește sănătatea viețuitorului. Și astfel sănătatea este întotdeauna aceeași, însă modurile sunt diverse, deoarece, când *'sănătos'* se rostește despre viețuitor, semnifică astfel sănătatea, precum despre subiect sau în subiect; când se rostește despre urină, precum despre semnul aceleiași sănătăți; despre mâncare, precum despre producător, despre dietă, precum despre conservator,

despre poțiune, precum despre preparator. Însă toate aceste moduri sunt diverse. <*'Lucruri'* se ia> pentru raportările lucrurilor, precum în cazul prepozițiilor care numesc diversele raportări ale cauzelor, precum va reieși în cazul paralogismelor.

Însă, în ce privește celălalt mod despre care am vorbit, cele două principii pomenite înainte sau cele două cauze nu sunt suficiente pentru echivocație, ci se cere ca mai apoi să existe în noi o neputință de a distinge diversele rațiuni ale numelui. De aceea, echivocația sau raționamentul falacios al echivocației, luat în acest mod, poate să fie definit astfel: raționamentul falacios al echivocației este înșelarea cauzată în noi datorită neputinței de a distinge diversele rațiuni în același nume în mod absolut.

Despre diviziunea echivocației

29. Speciile echivocației se pot lua în două moduri, precum pare că dorește Aristotel: în primul rând, potrivit ei înseși, însă în al doilea rând, potrivit cu ceea ce are în comun cu amfibolia. Însă, fie în acest mod, fie în acela, Aristotel nu indică decât trei specii sau moduri ale echivocației.

Despre prima specie

30. Prima specie are loc atunci când aceeași expresie semnifică în mod egal <lucruri> diverse, precum numele *'câine'* semnifică în mod egal, <câinele> marin, <câinele> stea celestă și <câinele> care poate să latre. Și se formează astfel paralogismul: *'orice câine poate să latre, însă un anumit viețuitor marin este câine; deci un anumit viețuitor marin poate să latre'*. Nu reiese, deoarece fiecare dintre premise este multiplă și doar într-un singur mod este adevărată, însă este falsă în două, deoarece în ambele există un sens triplu potrivit triplei semnificații a numelui *'câine'*. Sau astfel: *'oricine sunt gramatici învață, cei care știu sunt gramatici; deci cei care știu învață'*. Însă în acest paralogism majora și concluzia sunt duble, deoarece *'a învăța'* este echivoc pentru *faptul de a-l înțelege pe cel care îl învață pe altul* și pentru *faptul de a reține acel lucru pe care îl spune magistrul*. Precum sunt unii care înțeleg bine cele pe care magistrul lor le spune, însă nu rețin bine; însă alții sunt cei care rețin bine cele pe care le spune însă nu înțeleg bine; și atât aceștia cât și ceilalți se spune că învață. Și astfel *'a învăța'* devine echivocație pentru aceste două lucruri.

Despre a doua specie

31. A doua specie sau al doilea mod al echivocației are loc atunci când aceeași expresie semnifică potrivit <sensului> anterior și posterior lucruri diferite, precum acest nume *'folositorul'* semnifică în <sens> anterior *ceva bun*, și prin sensul posterior semnifică *ceva necesar care apare în cele rele*; nu spun că semnifică *ceva necesar* în mod absolut, ci *ceva necesar care apare în cele rele*; – precum atunci când apare un rău mare care nu poate fi evitat decât printr-un rău mai mic, atunci acel rău mai mic se numește *'necesar'* în raport cu răul mai mare; de aceea nu este ceva necesar în mod absolut, ci este necesar în raport cu răul mai mare; precum amputarea unei anumite părți a corpului este rea; însă este necesară pentru ca întreg corpul să nu fie corupt. Și poate să se formeze paralogismul astfel: *'orice folositor este bun, răul este folositor; deci răul este bun'.* Fiecare dintre premise este dublă, precum reiese din cele precizate, deoarece, atunci când *'folositorul'* semnifică *ceva bun* și *ceva necesar în rău*, potrivit căruia semnifică *ceva bun*, majora este adevărată, însă este falsă potrivit faptului că *'folositorul'* semnifică *ceva necesar în rău*. Și despre minoră trebuie să spunem invers. La fel este: *'orice sănătos este viețuitor, urina este sănătoasă; deci urina este viețuitor'*. Fiecare dintre premise este multiplă, precum s-a spus de mai multe ori.

32. Echivocația prin transsumpție se reduce la această specie secundă, precum: *'orice râde are gură, însă pajiștea râde; deci pajiștea are gură'* sau: *'orice aleargă are picioare, Sena aleargă; deci Sena are picioare'*; deoarece, verbele *'aleargă'* și *'râde'* semnifică printr-un <sens> anterior *faptul de a râde* sau *faptul de a alerga* și prin unul posterior *faptul de a înflori* sau *faptul de a se scurge*, deoarece acestea semnifică datorită propriei impoziții, însă celelalte datorită adaptării. De aceea, în fiecare paralogism, fiecare dintre premise a fost dublă.

33. De asemenea, orice multiplicitate de prepoziții se reduce la această specie secundă a echivocației, deoarece orice prepoziție preia printr-un <sens> anterior o raportare și printr-un <sens> posterior altele, precum prepoziția *'potrivit'* prin <sensul> anterior numește o raportare a cauzei formale și prin <sensul> posterior o raportare a cauzei eficiente. Și se poate forma un paralogism astfel: *'este propriu pentru o calitate să fie numită potrivit ei înseși 'asemănătoare' sau 'neasemănătoare', însă potrivit asemănării sau neasemănării un anumit lucru este numit 'asemănător' sau 'neasemănător', deci asemănarea și neasemănarea sunt calități'.* Ceea ce este fals; de fapt, sunt relații. Majora este dublă datorită duplicității pomenite înainte. Și, de aceea, dacă

prepoziția *'potrivit'* numește cauza eficientă, este adevărată, deoarece două calități de aceeași specie sunt cauza eficientă a asemănării, deoarece fac subiectele lor asemănătoare reciproc. Însă, dacă numește cauza formală, este falsă, deoarece calitatea nu este cauza formală a asemănării înseși, ci asemănarea este forma ei, precum albiciunea <este forma> albului, căldura a caldului, umiditatea a umedului. Însă despre minoră trebuie spus invers. La fel prepoziția *'în'* prin <sensul> anterior numește o raportare locală și prin <sensul> posterior toate celelalte, care reies potrivit modurilor *de a fi în*, care au fost distinse înainte. Și de aceea spune Aristotel acolo unde distinge acele moduri: "însă se spune în mod simplu și propriu că unul este în altul precum într-un loc".

34. Însă trebuie reținut că prepoziția *'în'* nu semnifică în mod egal celelalte raportări în afară de aceasta, adică de cea locală, ci printr-un <sens> anterior și unul posterior, precum reiese aici: *'în orice se află boală acela este viețuitor, însă în nepotrivirea umorilor se află boală; deci nepotrivirea umorilor este viețuitor'*. Majora este dublă, deoarece, dacă prepoziția *'în'* numește acolo o raportare a cauzei materiale cu sensul de *în ceva*, sau o raportare a subiectului, este adevărată. Însă, dacă numește o raportare a cauzei eficiente, este falsă. Despre minoră trebuie spus invers, deoarece viețuitorul este subiectul bolii și nepotrivirea umorilor este cauza eficientă a bolii. Și astfel <*'în'*> se ia aici potrivit diverselor raportări, iar prin <sensul> anterior semnifică acea raportare care este a bolii înseși în raport cu subiectul, și prin cel posterior, aceea care este a bolii înseși în raport cu cauza sa eficientă; deoarece, precum *'sănătos'* sau *'bolnav'* prin <sensul> anterior se rostește despre animal și prin cel posterior despre producătorul sau conservatorul <lui>, la fel prepoziția *'în'* prin <sensul> anterior semnifică raportarea lor înșiși la subiecte și prin cel posterior raportarea acelorași la producătoarele sau conservatoarele lor.

35. Dacă obiectezi că prepoziția *'în'* numește prin <sensul> anterior o raportare a sănătății sau a bolii la cauza eficientă și prin <sensul> posterior la subiectul ei, deoarece cauza este anterioară prin natură efectului ei (al cărui opus fusese rostit), trebuie spus că *'anterior'* se spune în două moduri. Căci într-un mod <se spune> în faptul de a cauza, și astfel cauza este prin natură anterioară efectului. Însă în alt mod se spune în completarea și desăvârșirea speciei sale, și în acest mod spunem că ceva complet și desăvârșit este prin natură anterior celui diminuat. Și prin acest mod vorbim despre anterior în această specie secundă a echivocației . De aceea, atunci când sănătatea încă nu este completă în specia sa (deoarece este în cauza sa, însă atunci când este în viețuitor, precum în subiect, atunci este în specia sa completă), prin acest mod este prin <sensul> anterior în viețuitor și prin cel posterior în efectul său, sau în cauza sa, deoarece aici are mai mult

parte de desăvârșire și specie, însă acolo mai puțin. Și la fel prepoziția *'în'*, prin <sensul> anterior semnifică această raportare și prin cel posterior pe cealaltă, precum s-a spus.

Despre a treia specie

36. A treia specie a echivocației are loc datorită cosemnificării diferite a expresiei, precum <reiese> aici: *'oricine se însănătoșea este sănătos, cel bolnav se însănătoșea; deci cel bolnav este sănătos'*. Minora și concluzia sunt duble, deoarece participiul *'bolnav'* cosemnifică timpul prezent și trecutul imperfect; de aceea cosemnifică pe *cel bolnav atunci* și *pe cel bolnav acum*; și de aceea, dacă se ia pentru *cel bolnav atunci*, minora este falsă, deoarece ar fi simultan sănătos și bolnav, ceea ce este fals. Însă dacă se ia pentru *cel bolnav acum*, este adevărată, deoarece poate să fie acum bolnav și putuse să fie sănătos atunci. Despre concluzie trebuie spus invers. La fel <reiese> aici: *'oricine se ridica stă, cel ce șade se ridica; deci cel ce șade stă'*. Minora și concluzia sunt duble, precum în paralogismul pomenit înainte. Și de aceea spune Aristotel în *Respingeri*: *"căci faptul că cel bolnav face ceva sau că este afectat de ceva nu semnifică un singur lucru"*, adică, dacă *'cel bolnav'* sau oricare alt participiu care se numește *'al timpului prezent'* se adaugă unui verb care semnifică o acțiune sau o afectare, nu semnifică un singur lucru, precum *'cel bolnav aleargă'* sau *'vede'* sau *'este împovărat'* au sensul: *cel îmbolnăvit acum aleargă* sau *vede* sau *este împovărat*, sau *este cel îmbolnăvit înainte*.

Despre cele trei specii

37. Însă Aristotel fixează aceste trei specii sau moduri ale echivocației în *Respingeri*; în primul rând, când pune un paralogism potrivit echivocației verbului *'a învăța'*; însă în al doilea rând, când pune un alt paralogism potrivit echivocației numelui *'folositor'*; iar în al treilea rând, <când pune> două potrivit multiplicității participiilor *'cel bolnav'* și *'cel ce șade'*. Însă există un alt mod de a distinge cosemnificațiile modurilor comune echivocației și amfiboliei, precum va reieși pe urmă.

38. Însă unii fixează o altă rațiune a diversității și ordinii acestor moduri ale echivocației, spunând că în primul mod expresia este echivocă în raport cu extrema majoră, precum reiese în paralogismul format potrivit echivocației verbului *'a învăța'*; însă în al doilea mod, expresia

echivocă este pusă în raport cu mediul; iar în al treilea, în raport cu extrema minoră, precum reiese în paralogismele lui Aristotel. Și aceste moduri sunt ordonate astfel, deoarece extrema majoră este anterioară mediului în măsura în care este majoră și mediul este anterior extremei minore.

Însă nu cred că Aristotel a avut în vedere acest lucru, deoarece diviziunea echivocației potrivit extremei majore, mediului și extremei minore în paralogism nu ar fi o diviziune a echivocației potrivit ei înseși, ci doar în raport sau în comparație cu altceva. Apoi, rațiunea mediului, a extremei majore și a celei minore revine expresiei, deoarece aceeași expresie, <care> uneori este în raport cu mediul, uneori cu extrema majoră, uneori cu extrema minoră, fie semnifică un singur lucru, fie mai multe; deci diviziunea echivocației potrivit rațiunii extremei majore, minore și mediului este o diviziune a subiectului în accidente; deci nu ar fi o diviziune a echivocației în părțile sale subiective. Apoi, ar fi o diviziune a echivocației potrivit accidentului și nu prin sine. Acestea toate sunt neconvenabile.

39. Și de aceea rațiunea diversității și a ordinii, precum le-am tratat, constă în faptul că echivocația are loc în trei moduri, deoarece faptul că o expresie semnifică mai multe lucruri se datorează fie semnificației, fie cosemnificației, pentru că expresia nu este semnul mai multora decât al semnificației sau cosemnificației; dacă se datorează semnificației, atunci cele ce sunt semnificate sunt semnificate prin expresie fie despre ceva egal, fie printr-un <sens> anterior și unul posterior; dacă despre ceva egal, atunci este primul mod; dacă printr-un <sens> anterior și unul posterior, atunci este al doilea mod; dacă se datorează cosemnificației, atunci este al treilea. Și astfel sunt trei moduri. Și sunt ordonate astfel, deoarece rațiunea echivocației sau definiția se conservă mai mult acolo unde sunt semnificate în mod egal mai multe lucruri decât acolo unde <este semnificat> un lucru printr-un <sens> anterior și altul prin unul posterior; și în oricare dintre aceste moduri <rațiunea> se conservă mai mult decât în cel de-al treilea, de vreme ce oricare dintre aceste două moduri are loc de la o parte a semnificației, în care se urmărește diversitatea lucrurilor semnificate; al treilea <mod are loc> de la o parte a consemnificației, în care nu se urmărește diversitatea lucrurilor semnificate, ci a modurilor de a semnifica.

DESPRE AMFIBOLIE

Despre definiția amfiboliei

40. *'Amfibolia'* se spune în două feluri. Căci uneori numește un principiu de a înșela care există în rostirea în mod absolut identică, anume acest principiu este compus din principiul motor

și principiul lipsei. Însă alteori numește o înșelare care este cauzată în noi prin acel principiu. Și aici este luat în primul <mod>.

41. Cauza aparenței amfiboliei sau principiul motor este unitatea aceleași rostiri în mod absolut. Însă cauza non-existenței sau principiul lipsei al amfiboliei este diversitatea aceleiași rostiri în mod absolut.

42. Însă amfibolia este un principiu de a înșela datorită aceleiași rostiri în mod absolut care semnifică mai multe lucruri. Însă în această definiție se menționează fiecare din cele două principii pomenite. Însă spun *'aceeași rostire în mod simplu'*, ca să se îndepărteze compoziția și diviziunea, deoarece în acestea rostirea nu este aceeași în mod absolut, ci potrivit unui lucru.

43. Însă trebuie știut că, precum *'amfibolie'* se spune în două feluri, în același mod și *'raționament falacios al amfiboliei'* se spune în două feluri, deoarece *'raționament falacios al amfiboliei'* uneori numește însuși principiul de a fi înșelat, potrivit căruia amfibolia a fost definită, însă alteori numește înșelarea din noi care este cauzată de acel principiu. Și această distincție generală revine fiecărui raționament falacios.

44. Însă *'amfibolie'* se spune de la *'amfi'*, care înseamnă *dubium*, și *'bole'*, care înseamnă sentință sau *'logos'*, care înseamnă *sermo*, ca și *dubia sententia* sau *dubius sermo*.

Despre prima specie

45. Există trei specii ale amfiboliei. Prima provine din faptul că rostirea semnifică în mod principal mai multe lucruri, precum *'cartea lui Aristotel'*, căci acesta este dublă. Căci într-un mod *'cartea lui Aristotel'* este același lucru cu *cartea produsă* sau *făcută de Aristotel*. Însă în alt mod este același lucru cu *cartea deținută de Aristotel*. Și se formează paralogismul astfel: *'orice este a lui Aristotel este deținut de Aristotel, această carte este a lui Aristotel; deci această carte este deținută de Aristotel'*. Fiecare dintre cele două premise este dublă prin dublul sens pomenit înainte.

Despre a doua specie

46. A doua specie a amfiboliei este cea care provine din transsumpția rostirii. Însă transsumpția rostirii are loc atunci când rostirea care semnifică în mod propriu un lucru este transsumpțiată pentru a semnifica un altul printr-o anumită asemănare, precum *'țărmul se ară'* este

transsumpțiat la *pierde timpul.* Și se formează un paralogism astfel: *'orice se ară se brăzdează, ţărmul se ară; deci ţărmul se brăzdează'.* Minora este dublă, deoarece *'a ara ţărmul'* semnifică în mod propriu *a brăzda pământul*, însă în mod transsumptiv, *a pierde timpul*. Și asemănarea constă în faptul că cel care ară țărmul pierde timpul și muncește în zadar.

Despre a treia specie

47. A treia specia a amfiboliei provine din faptul că o anumită rostire semnifică mai multe lucruri și fiecare parte a sa luată prin sine semnifică doar unul singur, precum *'ştie lumea'*. Căci această rostire este dublă, căci semnifică faptul că cineva știe lumea și că lumea deține știință despre altceva. Și acest lucru are loc deoarece cuvântul *'lume'* poate fi pus ca obiect pentru verbul *'ştie'* sau ca subiect. La fel paralogismul: *'ceea ce cineva vede vede acesta'*, deoarece cuvântul *'acesta'* poate fi pus ca subiect pentru verbul *'vede'* pus pe al doilea loc sau poate fi pus ca obiect. La fel aici: *'ceea ce cineva ştie ştie acesta'*; cuvântul *'acesta'* poate fi pus ca subiect sau obiect pentru verbul *'ştie'* pus pe al doilea loc. Și paralogismul: *'îmi doresc acceptarea luptătorilor'*; aceasta este dublă, deoarece acuzativul *'me'* poate fi pus ca subiect pentru verbul *'accipere'* sau ca obiect; și la fel acuzativul *'pugnantes'* poate fi pus ca subiect sau ca obiect pentru același <verb>. Și se formează un paralogism astfel: *'pe oricine doresc eu să accept, doresc ca ei înşişi să mă accepte pe mine, vreau să îi accept pe luptători; deci vreau ca luptătorii să mă accepte pe mine'*. Fiecare dintre cele două premise este dublă prin sensul dublu pomenit înainte. Și la fel <se formează un paralogism> astfel: *'ceea ce cineva vede vede acesta, însă columna vede; deci columna vede'.* Majora este dublă, precum s-a spus. La fel <paralogismul>: *'oricine sunt* episcopi *sunt oameni, aceşti măgari sunt* episcopi*; deci aceşti măgari sunt oameni'.* Fiecare dintre cele două premise este dublă, deoarece cuvântul *'episcopi'* poate fi la cazul nominativ sau genitiv.

48. Însă, faptul că înșelarea datorată diversității cazului produce o amfibolie și nu o echivocație reiese, deoarece cazul a fost dat cuvântului astfel încât un cuvânt să fie ordonat împreună cu un alt cuvânt; deci înșelarea datorată diversității cazului este o înșelare a ordonării cuvântului în raport cu un cuvânt; deci a rostirii, deci nu a echivocației. Faptul că din nou înșelarea datorată diversității cazului produce o amfibolie și nu o echivocație reiese prin Aristotel, care formează potrivit diversității cazului paralogisme ale amfiboliei și nu ale echivocației.

Despre modurile comune echivocației și amfiboliei

49. Însă, deoarece Aristotel în *Respingeri* după echivocație și amfibolie stabilește modurile comune ale fiecăreia, noi, urmărindu-l pe Aristotel, după aceste două locuri sofistice vom stabili modurile comune ale fiecăreia. Prin urmare, există trei moduri comune ale echivocației și amfiboliei.

Primul mod comun al fiecăreia are loc atunci când un cuvânt sau o rostire semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri. Și trebuie știut că, în măsura în care numele se spune că semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri, acest prim mod ține de echivocație, precum *'pește'* și *'câine'*: căci fiecare dintre aceste nume semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri. Însă în măsura în care se spune că rostirea semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri, acest prim mod ține de amfibolie, precum în rostirea *'cartea lui Aristotel'*.

Însă al doilea mod comun fiecăreia are loc datorită faptului că am fost obișnuiți să spunem astfel, adică atunci când ne folosim de cuvânt sau rostire în mod transsumptiv. Însă transsumpția în cazul numelui ține de echivocație, precum verbul *'râde'* este transsumpțiat în *'a înflori'*, precum a reieșit mai înainte; însă transsumpția în rostire ține de amfibolie, precum a reieșit mai înainte despre rostirea *'se ară țărmul'*.

Însă al treilea mod comun fiecăreia are loc atunci când numele compus semnifică mai multe lucruri, însă dacă este separat <semnifică> în mod absolut, adică un singur lucru. Însă exemplul echivocației se află în numele: *'nemuritor'* și *'incoruptibil'*; căci *'nemuritor'* într-un mod este același lucru cu *cel care nu poate să moară*, la fel *'incoruptibil', cel care nu poate fi corupt*; într-alt mod *'nemuritor'* este același lucru cu *cel care poate să nu moară* și incoruptibil cu *cel care poate să nu fie corupt*. Așa reiese în cazul lui Adam, care înainte să păcătuiască era nemuritor, adică cel care poate să nu moară; căci dacă nu păcătuia, nu ar fi murit niciodată; și astfel era cel care poate să nu moară, deoarece putea să se întâmple ca el să nu păcătuiască și astfel ca el să nu moară. Însă nu era nemuritor potrivit celeilalte semnificații, care este *cel care nu poate să moară*, deoarece atunci i s-ar fi îndepărtat de la el posibilitatea de a muri și de a păcătui, ceea ce nu este adevărat. Și acesta este același lucru cu numele *'nemuritor';* printr-un mod privează potența de a muri și prin celălalt mod actul de a muri, punând potența în raport cu același act. Și așa se spune mai bine decât mai înainte, deoarece planul este mai mare; totuși, oricare dintre cele două <moduri> este adevărat și revine adecvat la același lucru. Și deoarece acest lucru are loc datorită compunerii sale, se spune:

compusul semnifică mai multe lucruri, însă separatul doar unul singur, adică, dacă se desprinde în părțile sale mari de sensul anterior, atunci nici una dintre părți nu semnifică mai multe lucruri, ci doar unul singur.

50. Dacă se obiectează că părțile separate ale numelui nu semnifică nimic, precum este în începutul <cărții> *Despre interpretare*, trebuie spus că părțile numelui compus sunt comparate cu semnificatul pe care îl aveau înainte de compunere și sunt comparate cu semnificatul numelui compus, care anume semnificat este constituit din înțelesurile parțiale ale părților însele. Și în măsura în care <sunt comparate> cu primul semnificat, părțile numelui compus semnifică; în măsura în care <sunt comparate> cu al doilea semnificat, care adică a fost constituit din primele două, nu semnifică nimic separat.

51. De asemenea, trebuie reținut că înțelesul numelui compus este simplu prin comparație cu însuși numele compus prin care este semnificat, și astfel este indivizibil. Însă același înțeles prin comparație cu înțelesurile parțiale ale părților însele este divizibil, deoarece este constituit din ele. Însă înțelesul numelui simplu nu este divizibil în nici un fel. Și de aceea este necesar ca părțile numelui compus, potrivit căruia sunt în întregul său, să aibă în mai mare măsură natura de a semnifica decât părțile numelui simplu. Și acesta înseamnă ceea ce spune Aristotel la începutul <cărții> *Despre interpretare*, că în cazul numelor simple partea nu este semnificativă în nici un fel, însă în cazul celor compuse dorește de bună seamă ca ele să semnifice, însă <acest lucru> nu îi revine nici uneia dacă este separată, adică nu îi revine nici unui înțeles discret și acest lucru potrivit faptului că <partea> este în întregul său.

52. Însă, un exemplu pentru amfibolie se află în rostirea *'știe lumea'*, deoarece, fiind dat faptul că nici unul dintre aceste cuvintele, adică *'a ști'* și *'lumea',* nu semnifică mai multe lucruri, totuși rostirea constituită din ele semnifică mai multe lucruri, precum a reieșit din al treilea mod al amfiboliei. Și astfel, compusul semnifică mai multe lucruri, însă separatul doar unul singur în măsura în care <sunt raportate> la amfibolie.

Îndoieli

53. Pentru o evidență mai mare a celor trei moduri pomenite înainte, se pot formula îndoieli. În primul rând, că diviziunea acestor trei moduri nu a fost dată corect de Aristotel, deoarece orice diviziune corectă se realizează prin opuși; însă diviziunea acestor trei moduri nu are loc prin opuși;

deci diviziunea acestor trei moduri nu este o diviziune corectă. Și este un silogism în al patrulea <mod> al celei de a doua <figuri>. Majora reiese datorită faptului că *'opus'* este luat în ea în mod comun în raport cu opușii potrivit oricărui gen al opoziției și în raport cu cele disparate. Minora reiese, deoarece primul mod, întrucât produce o echivocație, are loc datorită faptului că numele semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri; însă numele care este luat în al treilea mod, întrucât produce o echivocație, precum *'nemuritor'*, semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri; deci al treilea mod, întrucât produce o echivocație, este inclus sub primul; însă nici unul dintre cele disparate sau cu adevărat opuse nu este inclus sub celălalt; deci diviziunea acestor trei moduri nu are loc prin opuși. Și aceasta este minora.

Și trebuie spus că această diviziune este corectă și se realizează prin opuși. Și silogismul pomenit înainte este bun, dar minora este falsă. Referitor la ceea ce se obiectează prin probarea ei, trebuie spus că faptul de a semnifica în principal mai multe lucruri se regăsește în nume din două cauze. Dintre acestea, una este instituirea numelui potrivit convenției, cealaltă este compunerea numelui însuși. Și prima dintre aceste cauze ține de primul mod, însă a doua ține de al treilea. De aceea, deși *'nemuritor'* semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri, acest lucru nu se datorează instituirii potrivit convenției pentru acest lucru și pentru acela, ci se datorează naturii compunerii sale, adică întrucât această prepoziție *'ne'* poate să priveze doar însuși actul de a muri sau potența anterioară actului, și astfel, în consecință, actul însuși. De aceea, faptul că semnifică mai multe lucruri, nu are loc potrivit convenției celui care instituie <numele>.

Dacă se obiectează că orice nume semnifică potrivit convenției, deci și acesta, trebuie spus că numele *'nemuritor'*, și aproape toate numele compuse, într-un mod semnifică potrivit convenției, în alt mod ca din necesitate; deoarece, raportate la cauza îndepărtată, toate numele semnifică potrivit convenției; raportate la cauza proximă, există acolo o necesitate de a semnifica. De exemplu, faptul că aceste două cuvinte, adică *'cal'* și *'sălbatic'*, se compun reciproc a avut ca principiu voința; însă, de vreme ce numele este deja un anumit compus din ele, precum *'cal-sălbatic'*, acum este necesar să aibă un astfel de semnificat. De aceea, în cazul numelui *'cal-sălbatic'* compunerea este cauza proximă a semnificației sale, pe când voința este cauza îndepărtată pentru compunere. De aceea, raportat la cauza îndepărtată semnifică datorită voinței, raportat la cauza proximă, care are loc prin compunerea sa, semnifică din necesitate. Însă în cazul numelor simple, voința este cauza proximă, precum în cazul numelui *'cal'*.

Și este cu totul la fel în cazul numelor echivoce, deoarece în cazul celor simple voința celui care instituie este cauza proximă eficientă a faptului că semnifică mai multe lucruri în principal, precum în cazul numelui *'câine'*. Însă în cazul numelor echivoce care sunt compuse, compunerea însăși este cauza proximă a faptului că semnifică mai multe lucruri și voința pentru o compunere de acest fel este cauza îndepărtată. De aceea, deoarece sunt distinse aceste moduri în funcție de cauzele proxime și nu de cele îndepărtate, reiese că aceste trei moduri sunt opuse și nici unul nu este conținut sub altul. De asemenea, reiese din acest lucru cum în cel de-al treilea mod numele semnifică în principal mai multe lucruri potrivit convenției și cum <semnifică mai multe lucruri> din necesitate.

54. Apoi, de vreme ce Aristotel stabilește un exemplu în primul mod cu privire la echivocație și nu cu privire la amfibolie, însă în al treilea mod invers, dar în al doilea cu privire la niciuna, nu clarifică bine aceste moduri. Referitor la acest fapt trebuie spus că, în principal faptul de a semnifica mai multe lucruri revine în sens anterior <mai degrabă> numelui decât rostirii, și de aceea se regăsește într-un sens anterior <mai degrabă> în echivocație decât în amfibolie. Și de aceea, oferă un exemplu privitor la echivocație în primul mod, și nu privitor la amfibolie, încât prin acesta semnifică faptul că acel mod îi revine printr-un sens anterior <mai degrabă> echivocației decât amfiboliei. Însă invers este privitor la al treilea mod, deoarece faptul că un compus semnifică mai multe lucruri și separatul unul singur îi revine într-un sens anterior rostirii și într-un sens posterior numelui, deoarece părțile rostirii, de vreme ce sunt în întregul lor, nu doar constituie semnificatul rostirii, ba chiar fiecare prin sine își păstrează semnificatul său propriu, discret și separat de semnificatul celuilalt. Însă în cazul numelui compus nu se întâmplă astfel ca fiecare dintre părți potrivit lor înseși – așa cum se află în însuși numele compus – să rețină semnificatul discret și separat de semnificatul celuilalt, ci în modul în care s-a spus mai înainte în diviziunea modurilor. Și de aceea oferă un exemplu în al treilea mod cu privire la amfibolie, și nu cu privire la echivocație, încât prin acesta semnifică că cel de al treilea mod revine într-un sens anterior <mai degrabă> amfiboliei decât echivocației. Însă în al doilea mod nu oferă un exemplu cu privire la echivocație, nici cu privire la amfibolie, deoarece, deși transsumpția are loc în toate cazurile, totuși nu are loc aceeași în același fel în toate cazurile. Și nu oferă un exemplu cu privire la nici una dintre acelea, deoarece în știință nu trebuie să fie determinate decât acelea ce sunt la fel în toate cazurile. Sau trebuie spus, și este mai bine, că semnificația cuvântului se numește *'proprie'* în măsura în care primește o folosire comună. De aceea, ceea ce acum este semnificat printr-un

anumit cuvânt în mod transsumptiv, odată ce folosirea <lui> se va fi înrădăcinat, va fi semnificat în mod propriu; și atunci va fi un cuvânt echivoc privitor la primul mod. Și deoarece se întâmplă astfel ca o semnificație, care nu este doar proprie, ci transsumptivă, să devină apoi proprie printr-o folosire frecventă, <Aristotel> nu a trebuit să ofere anumite exemple în al doilea mod, deoarece nu trebuie să determini într-o artă decât ceea ce rămâne întotdeauna la fel.

55. Apoi, până aici pare că diviziunea acestor moduri nu se produce în mod corect, deoarece echivocația provenită din cosemnificare nu este inclusă sub nici unul dintre aceste trei moduri. Ceea ce reiese prin inducție în oricare dintre acestea, deoarece un cuvânt nu semnifică accidentele sale nici în principal, nici transsumptiv. Și astfel echivocația provenită din cosemnificare nu este nici în primul, nici în al doilea mod, ba chiar nici în al treilea, deoarece al treilea, în ce privește echivocația, are loc doar în numele compuse. Însă echivocația provenită din cosemnificare nu are loc doar în cele compuse, ci și în cele simple.

Și trebuie spus că semnificația principală a cuvântului însuși se opune celor două, deoarece se opune cosemnificării și se opune semnificării transsumptive. De aceea, atunci când se opune acesteia, o îndepărtează pe aceasta; atunci când se opune aceleia, o îndepărtează pe aceea. De aceea, faptul de a semnifica în principal mai multe lucruri se ia aici potrivit faptului că se opune semnificației transsumptive; și în acest mod nu se îndepărtează cosemnificația. De aceea, aici, *'semnificație principală'* se numește în mod propriu orice este semnificat prin cuvânt potrivit folosirii comune, astfel încât cauza proximă să fie voința. De aceea, prin faptul că spun *'potrivit folosirii comune'* se îndepărtează al doilea mod; însă prin faptul că voința este cauza proximă a acelei semnificații, se îndepărtează al treilea mod. De aceea, echivocația ce provine din cosemnificare este inclusă sub primul mod, deoarece, potrivit folosirii comune, accidentele sunt reprezentate prin cuvânt și de către voință, deoarece cel care instituise un cuvânt pentru a semnifica un lucru de acest fel, în același timp îl instituise pentru a semnifica într-un astfel de gen și într-un astfel de număr, precum numele *'piatră'* în același timp era instituit pentru a semnifica un lucru de acest fel și sub accidente de acest fel.

56. Apoi, se cercetează cum înșelarea ce provine din anumite accidente produce o echivocație, precum în cazul cuvântului *'bolnav'* și înșelarea ce provine din unele accidente diferite produce o amfibolie, precum înșelarea ce provine din diversitatea cazului.

Soluția: unele accidente revin unui cuvânt, dar nu în mod absolut, ci așa cum poate fi acordat cu un alt cuvânt, precum cazul, deoarece cazul îi revine numelui în măsura în care faptul

că acționează sau că este afectat provine de la nume, precum cazul rect, sau în măsura în care faptul că acționează sau că este afectat trec la nume, precum cazurile oblice, și astfel, la fel, cazul îi revine numelui în raport cu verbul. De aceea accidentul este cu privire la un anumit lucru – căci există o dispunere a substanței cu privire la act – și prin astfel de accidente cuvintele se acordă între ele. De aceea, se spune în mod greșit atunci când se spune *'omului aleargă'*, deoarece acolo nu există cazul cerut; și înșelarea provenită din accidente de acest fel este o înșelare în ordinea cuvintelor, și astfel este o înșelare în rostire; și astfel va exista acolo o amfibolie și nu o echivocație. Însă altele sunt accidentele absolute, care îi revin cuvântului potrivit lui însuși, precum timpul. Și prin accidentele de acest fel cuvintele nu se acordă între ele, deoarece la fel de bine se spume *'omul aleargă', 'omul a alergat', 'omul va alerga', 'văd un om', 'am văzut un om'* și *'voi vedea un om'*. De aceea, deși timpul variază, rămâne întotdeauna aceeași construcție a numelui cu verbul și de partea anterioară și de partea posterioară, și de aceea nu se construiește printr-un timp intermediar cu cel pus ca subiect și nici cu cel alăturat lui. De aceea, înșelarea care provine din astfel de accidente nu îi revine rostirii, ci cuvântului; și astfel există acolo o echivocație și nu o amfibolie. Prin urmare, trebuie spus pe scurt că înșelarea ce provine din accidentelor care sunt absolute produce o echivocație, însă înșelarea provenită din accidente care sunt cu privire la ceva, produce o amfibolie.

DESPRE COMPUNERE ȘI DIVIZIUNE

Despre multiplul potențial

57. Compunerea, diviziunea și accentul produc un multiplu potențial, potrivit Comentatorului, precum s-a spus mai înainte. Însă multiplul potențial are loc atunci când același cuvânt sau rostire semnifică lucruri diferite potrivit diverselor perfecțiuni, de exemplu, verbul *'pendere'*, atunci când este la conjugarea a doua, are o perfecțiune, și atunci când este la a treia, alta, deoarece astfel sunt două verbe care sunt diferite prin specie. Motiv pentru care este necesar ca acestea să aibă perfecțiuni diferite; totuși este același verb potrivit materiei, de vreme ce este din aceleași litere și silabe. Și astfel există acolo o identitate materială și o diversitate a perfecțiunii și potrivit diversității perfecțiunii există o diversitate a semnificaților. La fel în rostire, atunci când rostirea este compusă, are o perfecțiune, iar atunci când este divizată are alta. Precum rostirea: *'doi și trei sunt cinci'*, când este compusă, atunci este categorică și este despre un subiect copulat; însă când este divizată astfel: *'doi sunt cinci și trei sunt cinci'*, atunci este copulativă. Însă este clar că

perfecțiunile propoziției categorice și copulative sunt diferite. Și la fel, în orice rostire putem întotdeauna să reperăm potrivit compunerii și diviziunii o anumită diversitate de partea perfecțiunii, și prin aceasta a celor ce sunt semnificate. Și deoarece în cazul acestora este posibil ca rostirea sau cuvântul să se schimbe de la o perfecțiune la alta și prin această posibilitate se reperează acolo o diversitate a semnificaților, multiplul este numit *'potențial'*. Însă în cazul echivocației și al amfiboliei, deoarece cuvântul sau rostirea care există mereu sub aceeași perfecțiune semnifică lucruri diferite, multiplul este numit acolo *'actual'*, deoarece multiplul este potrivit aceluiași act sau potrivit aceleași perfecțiuni; căci perfecțiunea se numește *'act'*.

Obiecții

58. Însă se obiectează împotriva celor pomenite înainte că, atunci când rostirea *'o pâine mănâncă un câine'* este una potrivit faptului că acuzativul *'o pâine'* este pus ca subiect pentru verbul *'mănâncă',* și alta potrivit faptului că același acuzativ este pus ca obiect pentru același verb; însă nu este una și alta potrivit materiei, deoarece este din aceleași litere, silabe și cuvinte; deci este identică potrivit materiei. Deci, când este în mod absolut una și alta, atunci trebuie ca rostirea să fie una și alta potrivit speciei. Și potrivit acestui fapt semnifică lucruri diferite. Deci rostirea *'o pâine mănâncă un câine',* care apare ca identică potrivit materiei și diversă potrivit diverselor perfecțiuni, semnifică lucruri diferite. Deci, acolo există un multiplu potențial, deoarece definiția multiplului potențial stabilită mai înainte îi revine lui. Și astfel, de vreme ce acolo nu există decât o amfibolie, atunci amfibolia va produce un multiplu potențial – ceea ce este împotriva celor pomenite înainte. Și trebuie spus că în rostirea *'o pâine mănâncă un câine'* nu există un multiplu potențial, ci doar unul actual, deoarece este întotdeauna aceeași rostire potrivit speciei, precum tocmai va reieși. Însă, referitor la faptul că se obiectează că <rostirea> este una și alta potrivit speciei, deși este aceeași potrivit materiei, deoarece este din aceleași litere, silabe și cuvinte, trebuie spus că multiplul este o identitate și o diversitate în rostire, deoarece identitatea în rostire este de două moduri, adică identitate a perfecțiunii și identitate materială. Și fiecare dintre aceste identități există în rostirea *'omul aleargă'*, de vreme ce acolo există una și aceeași perfecțiune – și astfel <există> o identitate a perfecțiunii – și de vreme ce este din aceleași litere, silabe și cuvinte care se raportează întotdeauna la aceeași ordine materială; și astfel acolo există o identitate materială.

59. Apoi, *'diversitate a rostirii'* se spune în mai multe moduri. Căci într-un mod, potrivit speciei, precum rostirea *'doi și trei sunt cinci'* este diferită în specie de aceasta *'doi sunt cinci și trei sunt cinci'*; într-un alt mod, este o diversitate materială. Și aceasta în două moduri, deoarece, fie datorită faptului că <rostirea> este <formată> din alte litere, silabe și cuvinte, precum *'Socrate aleargă și Platon dispută'*, fie datorită faptului că este <formată> din aceleași litere, silabe și cuvinte, însă ordonate tot altfel și altfel. Și acesta, din nou, în două moduri, deoarece, într-un fel este o rostire <formată> din aceleași cuvinte care sunt ordonate altfel și altfel în raport cu aceeași perfecțiune; însă în alt fel este o diversitate a rostirii <formată> potrivit materiei din cuvintele care sunt ordonate într-un mod și într-altul în raport cu perfecțiuni diferite. Și în acest ultim fel rostirea este tot alta și alta potrivit compunerii sau diviziunii. Însă în penultimul mod rostirea este una și alta potrivit amfiboliei, de exemplu rostirea: *'o pâine mănâncă un câine'*, deși oricare dintre acele acuzative este pus ca subiect sau ca obiect, este întotdeauna aceeași potrivit perfecțiunii sale, deoarece rostirea este încheiată de terminația care apare acolo, deși terminația este infinită. Căci, așa cum rostirea indicativă este încheiată de propria sa terminație, și cea imperativă de propria sa terminație, la fel și această rostire infinitivă este încheiată prin modul său de o terminație infinită, deși nu există o rostire perfectă în mod absolut. De aceea, rostirea pomenită înainte este aceeași potrivit speciei și este tot alta și alta potrivit materiei, așa cum unul dintre acele acuzative este pus ca subiect sau ca obiect; și la fel cu privire la celălalt.

Și acest lucru poate fi arătat printr-o asemănare naturală, deoarece, așa cum acest om, care acum este copil și apoi tânăr sau bătrân, este întotdeauna același om, dar corpolența sa nu este întotdeauna aceeași, ba chiar tot alta și alta, nici suplețea, deoarece uneori este gras, alteori suplu, totuși este întotdeauna același om; și tot așa părțile materiale se schimbă în el, însă specia umană este întotdeauna aceeași în el, și astfel există în el o diversitate materială și o identitate în specie; la fel în rostirea *'o pâine mănâncă un câine'* există o diversitate materială în modul pomenit înainte, însă o identitate în specie.

60. Apoi, dacă se întreabă: "oare rostirile potrivit amfiboliei participă în mod egal la identitatea rostirii?"; trebuie spus că într-un mod da, în altul nu, deoarece identitatea rostirii este dublă, precum tocmai reiese din cele pomenite înainte: una este materială și alta potrivit speciei. Căci, atunci când vorbim despre identitatea potrivit materiei, o anumită rostire amfibologică este întotdeauna aceeași, precum *'cartea lui Aristotel'*, însă o alta este tot alta și alta, precum orice rostire amfibologică, întrucât un anumit caz poate fi pus ca subiect sau ca obiect pentru același

verb. Însă, atunci când vorbim despre identitate potrivit speciei, orice rostire amfibologică este în mod egal aceeași, de vreme ce nu are nici o diversitate potrivit speciei în părțile sale, deoarece fiecare rostire are potrivit ei înseși propria perfecțiune, prin care întotdeauna devine perfectă. Și de aceea, fiecare rostire amfibologică este în mod absolut aceeași în sine prin identitatea potrivit speciei.

Despre compunere

61. După ce au fost stabilite acestea, urmează să discutăm deja în mod special despre compunere. Însă, mai întâi, trebuie să vedem când rostirea se spune că este compusă și când divizată. Prin urmare, trebuie să știm că rostirea nu poate să fie compusă sau divizată decât dacă se poate descoperi în ea o dispunere diversă potrivit căreia părțile pot fi ordonate în diverse moduri. Și de aceea, când cuvintele sunt ordonate în rostire potrivit unei dispuneri mai adecvate, atunci rostirea se numește *'compusă'*. Însă dacă sunt divizate de la acea dispunere și sunt puse într-o dispunere mai puțin adecvată, atunci rostirea este divizată; de exemplu rostirea: *'orice trăiește mereu există'* poate fi compusă sau divizată. Căci, atunci când întregul *'orice trăiește'* este subiect în ea și verbul *'există'* este predicat, atunci verbul *'există'* este principal în ea și verbul *'trăiește'*, deoarece este împletit cu subiectul, nu este principal în ea.

Probă: verbul este ceea ce cosemnifică timpul și este întotdeauna semnul celor ce sunt predicate despre un altul. Deci acel verb care este predicat în act, participă în act la rațiunea verbului în mod absolut; și ceea ce nu este predicat în act, nu participă la rațiunea verbului în mod absolut. Deci, deoarece verbul *'există'* este predicat în act, va participa la rațiunea verbului în act în mod absolut; și deoarece verbul *'trăiește'* nu este predicat în act, ci este împletit cu subiectul (ceea ce este împotriva naturii verbului în măsura în care este verb), atunci nu va participa în act la rațiunea verbului în mod absolut, deși oricare dintre cele două este verb în mod absolut potrivit raportării, deoarece oricare dintre cele două are capacitatea de a se predica în sine. Și astfel, oricare dintre cele două este verb în mod absolut prin raportare, însă nu oricare dintre cele două este verb în act în mod absolut. Și astfel, unul este principal și celălalt nu, precum s-a spus. Deci, când adverbul privitor la natura sa determină verbul, atunci va determina în mod mai corect verbul principal în mai mare măsură decât cel principal în mai mică măsură, și astfel este pus într-o poziție mai potrivită. Și datorită acestui fapt, când cuvântul *'mereu'* determină verbul *'există'*, atunci

rostirea este compusă astfel: *'orice trăiește există mereu'*; și dacă se divide de la acesta, va fi divizată astfel: *'orice trăiește mereu există'*. Și la fel trebuie înțeles despre toate celelalte potrivit naturii cuvintelor care au fost puse acolo.

62. La fel despre rostirea: *'eu te-am pus slujitor pe tine, care ești liber'*, deoarece, când semnele, în măsura în care sunt semne, trebuie să aibă o concordanță și o diferență datorită rațiunii celor ce sunt semnificate, de vreme ce cuvintele sunt semne ale lucrurilor, dacă lucrurile pot fi ordonate în mod diferit, la fel și semnele sau cuvintele, atunci, când ordonarea lucrurilor va fi mai convenabilă, și cea a semnelor va fi mai convenabilă; și când ordonarea lucrurilor este mai puțin convenabilă, și cea a cuvintelor este mai puțin convenabilă. Și, de vreme ce pentru natura umană statutul mai convenabil este cel de a ieși din servitute la libertate decât de a cădea din libertate în servitute, de aceea se construiește mai convenabil participiul *'entem' ('care ești')* împreună cu numele *'servum' ('slujitor')* decât cu numele *'liberum' ('liber')*. Și astfel <rostirea> este compusă, și sensul este *'pe tine care ești slujitor te-am pus liber'* adică: *din slujitor te fac liber*. Însă invers este divizată, și sensul este: *'pe tine care ești liber te-am pus slujitor'* adică *din liber te fac slujitor.*

63. Și reține că Aristotel plasează această rostire printre paralogismele diviziunii. Mai reține că oriunde este o compunere, o diviziune sau un accent, nu este necesar ca rostirea să fie întotdeauna într-un mod adevărată și în altul falsă, deoarece se poate întâmpla ca în fiecare sens dintre cele două să fie falsă sau în oricare sens să fie adevărată, precum *'ating <ceea ce este> lovit cu mâna'*. Fie astfel încât cineva a fost lovit cu mâna, și eu îl voi atinge pe el cu mâna, atunci prima este dublă, întrucât ablativul *'cu mâna'* poate să determine verbul *'ating'* sau participiul *'lovit'*; și este adevărată în ambele sensuri. Însă aceasta este falsă în ambele sensuri: *'ating cu bățul <ceea ce este> lovit'*, dacă rămâne în aceeași poziție. La fel este în cazul echivocației. Căci rostirea: *'orice câine este o substanță'* are trei sensuri și în oricare este adevărată; însă <rostirea> *'orice câine este alb'* în oricare <sens> este falsă. Și este la fel cu privire la amfibolie.

Din acestea reiese că vorbesc în mod incomplet cei care spun că rostirea este potrivit compunerii, atunci când este falsă în sensul compunerii, și potrivit diviziunii când este falsă în sensul diviziunii, deoarece acest lucru nu este adevărat în toate cazurile, precum s-a spus. Însă este adevărat faptul că, dacă paralogismul fusese făcut potrivit compunerii, soluția îi va reveni celui ce divide, și dacă a fost făcut potrivit diviziunii, soluția îi va reveni celui ce compune. Și acest lucru este stabilit de Aristotel, acela însă nu.

Despre cauzele acestui raționament falacios

64. Însă cauza aparenței sau principiul motor al compunerii este unitatea rostirii potrivit speciei sale, cauzată de compunere. Și spun că este cauzată de compunere deoarece, datorită faptului că rostirea este compusă într-un fel sau divizată într-un fel, are o specie sau alta, și la fel un adevăr sau altul. Însă principiul lipsei compunerii este posibilitatea semnificaților diferiți prin aceeași rostire. Și spun acest lucru deoarece, deși rostirea este compusă și astfel stă sub o singură specie în compunerea însăși, totuși este posibil <să se raporteze> la o altă specie sau la o altă perfecțiune decât cea pe care poate să o aibă prin diviziune; și datorită acestui fapt există în ea o posibilitate a semnificaților diferiți. Și acest lucru a reieșit în întregime în rostirea: *'orice trăiește mereu există'*. De aceea, posibilitatea rostirii în raport cu speciile diferite care provine din partea emisiei vocale este ordonată în raport cu posibilitatea semnificaților diferiți, care provine din partea lucrului.

65. Însă unii spun că însăși compunerea este cauza aparenței compunerii, <iar> diviziunea rostirii înseși este cauza non-existenței. Însă alții spun că adevărul rostirii compuse este cauza aparenței compunerii, însă falsitatea aceleiași rostiri divizate este cauza non-existenței, deoarece aceștia spun că adevărul rostirii compuse mobilizează pentru a crede adevărul în aceeași rostire atunci când este divizată, deoarece principiul motor produce întotdeauna faptul de a crede opusul principiului lipsei.

66. Însă, faptul că aceștia disting greșit în acest fel principiile acestui loc sofistic reiese, mai întâi, prin faptul că toate raționamentele falacioase în rostire diferă de raționamentele falacioase din afara rostirii, întrucât raționamentele falacioase în rostire au principiul motor din partea emisiei vocale sau din partea semnului, și au principiul lipsei din partea lucrului, însă raționamentele falacioase din afara rostirii au oricare dintre aceste două principii din partea lucrului. Deci, prima sentință a acestora nu poate să rămână, deoarece pune fiecare dintre aceste două principii de partea emisiei vocale sau a semnului. Căci, compunerea sau diviziunea rostirii înseși este considerată de partea emisiei vocale sau a semnului.

Apoi, nimic nu mișcă decât către asemănător în mod absolut sau în parte. Și, de aceea, nu este posibil ca unul dintre contrarii să miște către celălalt. Deci, nici compunerea către diviziune, sau invers. Însă prin prima dintre aceste rațiuni reiese falsitatea celei de a doua poziții, care pune

fiecare dintre cele două principii ale compunerii de partea lucrului, de vreme ce adevărul nu se află în rostire decât de partea lucrului.

Apoi, principiul motor în echivocație se ia de la unitatea cuvântului și principiul lipsei de la partea lucrurilor semnificate. Și în același mod în amfibolie și la fel în accent, precum va reieși ulterior și în figura de expresie. Deci, trebuie ca în compunere să fie la fel, sau nu vor exista șase <raționamente falacioase> în expresie, al cărui opus <ne>-a învățat Aristotel prin inducție și silogism. Deci, trebuie să punem principiul motor al compunerii de partea expresiei vocale și principiul lipsei de partea lucrului.

67. Și de aceea am spus că principiul motor al compunerii este unitatea rostirii potrivit speciei sale, care este cauzată din compunere, însă principiul lipsei este posibilitatea semnificaților diferiți prin aceeași rostire. Căci unitatea rostirii compuse mișcă înspre faptul de a crede un singur lucru semnificat fără posibilitate față de un alt lucru semnificat. Și astfel principiul motor mișcă către opus prin principiul lipsei, precum în celelalte locuri sofistice.

Despre modurile sale

68. Însă compunerii pot să i se atribuie două moduri, pe care Aristotel pare să le sugereze în capitolul despre compunere.

Despre primul mod

Primul mod apare datorită faptului că o anumită expresie poate fi pusă ca subiect unui anumit verb, în locul ei înseși sau în locul unei părți a sa, precum <expresia>: *'cel care șade să umble este posibil'*. Și se formează un paralogism astfel: *'se întâmplă să umble pentru oricine este posibil să umble, însă pentru cel care șade este posibil să umble; deci, se întâmplă ca cel care șade să umble'*. Minora este dublă, deoarece, dacă expresia *'cel care șade umblă'* este pusă ca subiect prin sine predicatului *'este posibil'*, astfel există un sens. Și rostirea este falsă în acel sens, deoarece, atunci actele opuse reciproc sunt legate împreună, adică *'a umbla'* și *'a șade'*; ceea ce este fals, precum este falsă <expresia>: *'cel care șade umblă'*. Dar, dacă acea expresie este pusă ca subiect pentru predicatul menționat înainte, în locul unei părți a sa, anume în locul subiectului expresiei înseși, atunci sensul este: *'cel care șade are în sine posibilitatea de a umbla'*; și în acest

sens minora este adevărată. Și la fel trebuie deosebită <expresia>: *'cel care nu scrie este posibil să scrie'*. Și paralogismul trebuie format la fel. Și aceste rostiri și cele asemănătoare sunt compuse potrivit faptului că întreaga expresie este pusă ca subiect potrivit sieși <ca întreg>, însă sunt divizate atunci când expresia este pusă ca subiect potrivit unei părți a sa, deoarece predicatul este atribuit într-un mod mai potrivit întregii expresii decât unei părți, deși expresia este pusă întotdeauna ca subiect.

69. De aceea, ceea ce unii obiectează, care spun că dacă <expresia> este adevărată potrivit modului pomenit înainte, că posibilitatea de a umbla se atribuie uneori întregii expresii, alteori părții sale, adică aceleia pe care o numesc *'cel care șade'*, deci, atunci acuzativul *'cel care șade'* este pus ca subiect al acelei <expresii> pe care o numesc *'cel care șade este posibil să meargă'*; însă acest lucru este neconvenabil, deoarece rostirea ar fi nepotrivită; căci acuzativul nu poate fi pus ca subiect pentru un verb de persoana a treia. Deci, distincția pomenită este nulă.

Însă, soluția este clară din cele pomenite, deoarece întreaga expresie este pusă ca subiect întotdeauna pentru acel verb de persoana a treia, însă uneori potrivit ei înseși <ca întreg>, și atunci se redă posibilitatea întregii expresii, alteori potrivit unei părți a sa, adică potrivit subiectului expresiei, și atunci i se redă subiectului posibilitatea expresiei înseși, adică potrivit acestuia pe care îl numesc *'cel care șade'*.

70. Alții disting aceste rostiri spunând că prin participiul *'cel care șade'* sau *'cel care scrie'* se provoacă o concomitență, precum dorește Priscian, deoarece participiul a fost descoperit ca să producă o concomitență a sa cu un verb, precum *'citesc șezând'*. Și această acompaniere este explicată prin expresia *'cât timp'* sau *'când': 'cât timp șed, citesc'* sau *'când șed, citesc'*. Deci ei spun că rostirile pomenite sunt duble, deoarece concomitența provocată prin participiul *'cel care șade'* poate fi semnificată privitor la verbul *'a umbla'*, și atunci îi revine acest sens: *'cel care șade este posibil să umble'*, adică *'cât timp șed, este posibil ca eu să umblu'*; ceea ce este fals; sau concomitența poate să fie indicată privitor la predicat; și atunci îi revine acest sens: *'cel care șade este posibil să umble'*, adică *'cât timp șade, are posibilitatea ca după aceea să umble'*, și acest lucru este adevărat.

Însă această distincție se reîntoarce la același lucru ca cea anterioară, deoarece, când concomitența este indicată cu privire la verbul *'a umbla'*, atunci posibilitatea se aplică asupra întregii expresii, și astfel este falsă; însă, când concomitența se indică cu privire la predicat, atunci posibilitatea se aplică asupra subiectului expresiei, și astfel este adevărată.

71. De asemenea, rostirile de acest fel obișnuiesc să fie numite *'despre lucru'* sau *'despre expresie'*. Și se numesc *'despre expresie'*, atunci când expresia stă în raport de supoziție pentru sine <ca întreg>. Însă atunci când expresia stă în raport de supoziție pentru o parte a sa, se numesc *'despre lucru'*. Și ei numesc *'lucru'* subiectul expresiei înseși; însă subiectul expresiei nu este o expresie. De aceea, deși expresia este un lucru, totuși nu este lucru potrivit celui pe care care ei înșiși îl iau ca *'lucru'* aici.

Despre al doilea mod

72. Însă al doilea mod al compunerii provine din faptul că un anumit cuvânt pus în rostire poate fi o determinare de lucruri diferite, precum aici: *'este posibil acum să înveți literele pe care le știi'*, deoarece adverbul *'acum'* poate să determine verbul *'a învăța'*, și astfel <rostirea> este falsă, deoarece nu este posibil să înveți acum literele pe care le știi, deoarece, dacă înveți acel lucru, ignori același lucru; căci, precum vrea Aristotel: *"oricine învață, ignoră"*; sau poate să determine predicatul *'este posibil'*, și astfel <rostirea> este adevărată, deoarece acum este posibil să înveți din nou literele pe care le știi. Căci <cineva> poate să le uite pe acestea și astfel acum, în prezent, are potența să le învețe pe ele. La fel este aici: *'ceea ce unul singur poate să poarte poate să poarte mai multe'*. Și astfel se formează un paralogism: *'ceea ce unul singur poate să poarte, poate să poarte mai multe, însă ceea ce nu poate să poarte mai multe, poate unul singur să poarte; deci ceea ce nu poate să poarte mai multe, poate să poarte mai multe*. Majora este dublă, deoarece, dacă cuvântul *'singur'* determină verbul *'poate'*, este falsă; și sensul este *'ceea ce poate să poarte doar unul singur etc.'*, adică: *'ceea ce unul singur poate să poarte și nu poate să poarte mai multe, poate mai multe să poarte'*, deoarece, dacă poate doar unul, atunci nu poate mai multe. Însă dacă cuvântul *'singur'* determină verbul *'să poarte'*, <majora> este adevărată, și sensul este: *'ceea ce poate să poarte pe unul singur, poate să poarte mai multe'* adică: *'ceea ce are o potență ca să-l poarte pe unul singur, poate să le poarte pe mai multe'*, deoarece orice poate să poarte mai multe, are de asemenea o potență ca să poarte unul singur, precum nava poate să poarte zece oameni, și poate să poarte unul singur; și astfel aceasta are o potență ca să poarte un singur lucru și poate să poarte mai multe. De aceea, ceea ce poate să poarte un singur lucru, poate să poarte mai multe.

73. În ce mod există un multiplu potențial în rostire, fie că a fost compusă, fie divizată, și când trebuie ca rostirea să fie numită *'compusă'* și când *'divizată'*, a reieșit în cele menționate. Însă acum rămâne să numim principiile sau cauzele și modurile diviziunii.

Despre diviziune

74. Prin urmare, principiul motor sau cauza aparenței diviziunii este unitatea rostirii potrivit speciei sale, care este cauzată datorită diviziunii, deoarece, atunci când este divizată are o specie, și atunci când este compusă are altă specie. Însă principiul lipsei sau cauza non-existenței diviziunii este posibilitatea semnificaților diverși în substanța unei rostiri divizate. Și spun acest lucru deoarece, deși rostirea are un singur semnificat datorită acelui mod prin care a fost divizată, totuși substanța sa este posibilă pentru compunere și astfel pentru un alt semnificat.

Despre primul mod

75. Însă există două moduri ale diviziunii. Primul mod provine din faptul că un anumit cuvânt poate să producă o conjuncție între termeni sau propoziții. Și acest lucru în două moduri, adică prin copulă sau prin disjuncție. Căci faptul de a produce o conjuncție este comun pentru copulă și disjuncție, precum conjuncția este comună pentru conjuncția copulativă, disjunctivă și pentru alte conjuncții; căci este genul tuturor acelora. Motiv pentru care, faptul de a produce o conjuncție între termeni sau propoziții este comun pentru oricare dintre cele două, adică copulă și disjuncție cu privire la aceleași lucruri. Și primul mod provine datorită acestui fapt, precum *'cinci sunt doi și trei'*. Și se formează un paralogism astfel: *'oricare sunt două și trei sunt trei, însă cinci sunt două și trei; deci cinci sunt trei'*. Minora este dublă. Căci poate fi divizată și sensul este: *cinci sunt două și cinci sunt trei* și astfel este copulativă. Sau poate să fie compusă, și sensul este: *cinci sunt două și trei* astfel încât este despre un predicat copulat, și atunci este o copulă a termenilor. La fel, majora este dublă. Și la fel acest caz: *'cinci sunt pare și impare'*. Prin disjuncție, astfel: *'orice viețuitor este rațional sau irațional, însă nu orice viețuitor este rațional; deci orice viețuitor este irațional'*. Majora este dublă, deoarece poate fi divizată, și sensul este: *orice viețuitor este rațional sau orice viețuitor este irațional*, și astfel este disjunctivă și este o disjuncție de propoziții. Sau poate fi compusă și sensul este: *orice viețuitor este rațional sau irațional* și astfel este despre

un predicat disjunct, și astfel este o disjuncție de termeni. Și astfel aceste rostiri se numesc *'compuse'*, deoarece conjuncția este într-un <sens> anterior o disjuncție de părți ale rostirii și în <sens> posterior o disjuncție de rostiri. La fel în aceste cazuri: *'orice viețuitor este sănătos sau bolnav', 'orice linie este dreaptă sau curbă'*, *'orice număr este par sau impar'*, *'orice substanță este corporală sau incorporală'*.

Despre al doilea mod

76. Al doilea mod al diviziunii provine din faptul că ceva cazual sau o anumită determinare poate fi ordonată cu lucruri diferite, precum acesta: *'tu vezi cu ochii ceva lovit'*. Și se produce un paralogism astfel: *'cu orice vezi tu acest lucru lovit cu acela este el lovit, însă tu vezi acest lucru lovit cu ochiul sau cu ochii; deci cu ochiul sau cu ochii este el lovit'*. Minora este dublă, deoarece acel ceva cazual sau ablativul *'cu ochii'* poate fi ordonat cu verbul *'vezi'*, și atunci semnifică instrumentul vederii, și sensul este: *tu cu ochiul îl vezi pe acela care este lovit*; și atunci este compusă, de vreme ce acel ablativ este o determinare a actului și actul se regăsește într-un mod mai adevărat în verb decât în participiu, de aceea, printr-un <sens> anterior trebuie să determine verbul și prin unul posterior participiul. Sau poate fi ordonat cu participiul *'lovit'*; și atunci semnifică instrumentul lovirii, și astfel este divizată, iar sensul este: *tu îl vezi pe acela care este lovit cu ochii*. La fel în aceste cazuri: *'eu te-am pus slujitor fiind liber'* și *'cincizeci de bărbați o sută a lăsat divinul Ahile'*. Și *'tu știi doar că trei oameni aleargă'*, dacă stabilim că șase oameni aleargă, dar tu nu știi decât de trei; *'însă orice se știe este adevărat; deci faptul că doar trei oameni aleargă este adevărat.'* Prima este de două feluri, deoarece adverbul *'doar'* poate să determine verbul *'știi'*, și astfel este compusă și adevărată; sau verbul *'a alerga'*, și astfel este divizată și falsă. Și *'tu ai fost născut azi'*. Probarea: *'Tu ești azi; deci fie ai fost născut fie ai fost nenăscut*, *însă nu ai fost nenăscut; deci ai fost născut; deci tu ai fost născut azi.'*. Prima este de două feluri, datorită faptului că adverbul *'azi'* poate să determine verbul *'ești'*, și astfel este compusă și adevărată, sau participiul *'născut'*, și astfel este divizată și falsă.

DESPRE ACCENT
Despre definiția accentului

77. Accentul este o lege sau o regulă în vederea ridicării sau coborârii silabei din fiecare parte a rostirii. Apoi, acesta se divide în trei părți: ascuțit, grav și circumflex. Căci accentul ascuțit este cel care ascute sau ridică silaba; însă cel grav este cel care coboară și domolește silaba, cel circumflex este acela care ascute silaba și o coboară.

78. Accentul, de vreme ce este un principiu de a înșela, este o multiplicitate a aceluiași cuvânt potrivit substanței, cauzată potrivit diversității accentului.

Despre cauzele și modurile accentului

Însă cauza aparenței accentului este unitatea cuvântului potrivit unui singur accent. Causa falsității accentului este diversitatea semnificaților prin posibilitatea cuvântului <de a trece> de la un accent la altul. Însă există două moduri ale accentului.

Despre primul mod

79. Primul <mod> provine din faptului că un anumit cuvânt, același potrivit substanței, poate fi stăpânit de un accent diferit, precum aici: *'orice populus este copac, însă neamul este un populus, deci neamul este un copac'*. Majora este de două feluri, deoarece cuvântul *'populus'* semnifică un lucru atunci când prima <silabă> se prelungește, și alta atunci când se suprimă. La fel aici: *'orice ara este în templu, staulul porcilor este un ara; deci, staulul porcilor este în templu'*. La fel aici: *'orice este hamatur este prins în cârlig, însă vinul este amatur; deci, vinul este prins în cârlig'*; una semnifică *'amatur'* fără aspirație, și alta cu aspirație, și se pronunță într-un mod și în altul. La fel aici: *'bărbații drepți trebuie să pendere, însă bărbații drepți nu trebuie să pendere; deci bărbații drepți trebuie să sufere și să nu sufere același lucru'*.

Despre al doilea mod

80. Al doilea mod provine din faptului că ceva poate să fie cuvânt sau rostire, precum aici: *'tu eşti cel qui es, însă quies este odihnă; deci tu eşti odihnă'*. Prima este de două feluri, deoarece acest lucru pe care îl numesc *'quies'* poate să fie cuvânt sau rostire, și potrivit acestui fapt semnifică lucruri diferite. La fel aici: *'Dumnezeu nu a făcut nimic invite, însă a făcut vinul in vite; deci a*

făcut vinul invite'. Prima este de două feluri, deoarece acest lucru pe care îl numesc *'invite'* poate să fie cuvânt, și atunci ea este adevărată; sau rostire, și atunci este falsă; și la fel concluzia. La fel aici: *'metuo Lidia dormi pierzând lungile nopți'*; acest lucru pe care îl numesc *'metuo'* poate să fie cuvânt sau rostire.

Îndoieli

81. Însă din cele pomenite ies la iveală îndoieli. Și în primul rând, cum este luat aici *'accent'*, adică oare este luat potrivit definiției accentului stabilită la începutul acestui tratat despre accent, sau *'accent'* este luat în mod comun pentru orice mod de a pronunța în rostire, care sunt: prelungit, scurtat, aspirat, neaspirat, ascuțit, grav și <altele> de acest fel. Însă faptul că nu este luat aici în mod propriu, ci comun, iese la iveală prin faptul că unele paralogisme sunt luate de la partea accentului prelungit sau scurtat, precum în cazul verbului *'pendere'*, atunci când <silaba> medie este prelungită sau scurtată; altele sunt luate de la partea <accentului> aspirat, ceea ce reiese în mod suficient. Deci *'accent'* nu este luat aici în mod propriu, ci comun.

Însă faptul că nu este luat în mod comun ci propriu iese la iveală prin autoritatea lui Aristotel în a doua carte a *Respingerilor*, care stabilește o soluție generală pentru toate rostirile potrivit accentului atunci când spune: "însă este clar în ce mod trebuie soluționat, căci un nume nu semnifică același lucru când este rostit în mod grav și ascuțit". Deci se ia în mod propriu, deci nu în mod comun, deoarece gravul și ascuțitul sunt diferențe ale accentului luate în mod propriu. Apoi, dacă *'accent'* s-ar lua în mod comun, precum se ia aici, ar fi comun în raport cu timpul și spiritul; deci ar fi predicat despre ele însele, precum este predicat despre cel ascuțit și grav.

Și trebuie spus că *'accent'* se ia aici în mod comun pentru orice mod de a rosti, însă nu se ia în mod comun potrivit predicației, ci în mod comun potrivit consecinței, deoarece *'comun'* se spune în aceste două moduri, anume pentru faptul de a predica, și doar pentru a trage o consecință, astfel încât nu pentru faptul de a predica, precum, pentru albiciune și negriciune și pentru toate culorile intermediare suprafața este o consecință, deoarece suprafeței îi este propriu în primul rând să fie colorată; și acest lucru trebuie înțeles cu privire la corpurile ce sunt compuse din elemente, deoarece alte corpuri, precum elementele, cerul și stelele, nu sunt colorate; despre acest mod nu trebuie să ne preocupăm, deoarece ține de cele naturale; însă se ia doar faptul că suprafața reiese pentru fiecare dintre culorile pomenite înainte și despre nici una dintre ele nu este predicată. Și

astfel este într-un mod comun în faptul de a trage o consecință și nu în faptul de a predica; însă în alt mod în faptul de a predica, precum cele superioare despre cele inferioare. Deci, potrivit acestui fapt spun că *'accent'* se ia aici în mod comun, când *'comun'* este luat potrivit consecinței, deoarece potrivit variației sau diversității timpului reiese diversitatea sau variația accentului, precum reiese în cazul verbului *'pendere'*, potrivit căruia <silaba> medie se prelungește sau se scurtează. Și astfel reiese soluția.

Referitor la ceea ce se obiectează cu privire la autoritatea lui Aristotel, că numele nu ar semnifica același lucru rostit în mod grav sau ascuțit; totuși acest lucru se întâmplă uneori doar din cauza diversității accentelor, însă alteori din cauza diversității și variației timpurilor potrivit prelungirii și scurtării, din care reiese diversitatea accentelor. Referitor la ceea ce se obiecta, că accentul s-ar predica despre timp și spirit, dacă ar fi comun, reiese soluția din cele pomenite înainte, deoarece *'comun'* devine echivoc. Căci nu *'accent'* este aici comun potrivit predicației, ci așa cum s-a spus. Și astfel nu este predicat despre timp și nici despre spirit. Și se numește aici *'spirit'* potrivit faptului că silaba sau cuvântul se spune că este aspirată, deoarece spiritul îi revine printr-un sens anterior silabei și prin silabă cuvântului, precum reiese de la Priscian în tratatul *Despre ortografie*, unde se desemnează patru accidente ale silabei: timpul, tonul, spiritul și numărul de litere; și tonul este același lucru cu accentul. De aceea toate acestea printr-un sens anterior se află în silabă și printr-un sens posterior în cuvânt. Și spun *'anterior'* în sensul în care incompletul și indistinctul este anterior complet și distinct. Căci aceste lucruri indeterminate și indistincte sunt în silabă potrivit lor însele, însă în cuvânt sau în însăși silaba potrivit căreia este în cuvânt, sunt determinate și distincte.

82. Apoi, se întreabă, atunci când *'accent'* este luat în mod comun, precum s-a spus, de ce acest raționament falacios se numește mai degrabă *'potrivit accentului'* decât *'potrivit timpului'* sau *'spiritului'*. Și trebuie spus, precum deja reiese din cele pomenite înainte, că, deoarece potrivit diversității acelora reiese diversitatea accentului și nu invers, de aceea se numește *'potrivit accentului'*, și nu *'potrivit timpului'* sau *'spiritului'*, atunci când denumirea *'potrivit accentului'* este mai comună, întrucât și diversitatea ei este mai comună.

DESPRE FIGURA DE ROSTIRE

Despre modul de a semnifica în rostire

83. Modul de a semnifica într-o rostire este de două feluri, deoarece unul este substanțial și altul accidental. De exemplu, *'calitatea unui nume'* se ia în două moduri, deoarece într-un mod potrivit faptului că <această calitate> are capacitatea naturală să fie participată de mai multe sau potrivit faptului că are capacitatea naturală să nu fie participată de mai multe, ci de unul singur, și astfel <calitatea> este completiva sau perfectiva numelui, și astfel este esențială; și astfel se spune că orice nume semnifică substanța împreună cu calitatea în mod esențial. Însă în alt mod se ia acea calitate identică, ca și cum poate să fie participată de mai multe potrivit actului, sau când poate să fie participată doar de un singur singular potrivit actului, și astfel îi revine în mod accidental numelui. Și este tot una a spune că *'calitatea unui nume'* se ia într-un mod potrivit *habitus-ului* de a fi participată de mai multe sau de unul singur, și astfel este esențială, și în alt mod potrivit actului a fi participată de mai multe sau de unul singur, și astfel este accidentală.

Și reține că fiecare dintre cele două calități se divide printr-un propriu și un apelativ. Însă propriul și apelativul așa cum denumesc capacitatea de a fi participată de unul singur sau de mai multe, tot așa sunt părți ale calității esențiale. Însă potrivit faptului că numesc actul de fi participată de unul singur sau de mai multe, astfel sunt părți ale calității accidentale. Și potrivit faptului că sunt părți ale calității esențiale, astfel sunt puse în definiția numelui de către Priscian și Donatus. Însă potrivit faptului că sunt părți accidentale, astfel sunt atribuite printre accidentele numelui. De exemplu, *'om'*, potrivit faptului că numește calitatea ce are capacitatea naturală de a fi participată de mai multe, semnifică astfel o calitate esențială; însă potrivit faptului că omul este deja în act în acesta și în acela, semnifică astfel o calitate accidentală; căci numelui îi revine accidentul de a fi în act în mai multe, însă nu îi revine lui accidentul de a fi în *habitus* în mai multe sau în capacitate, ba chiar îi revine lui în mod esențial.

84. Dacă cineva întreabă dacă acea calitatea a omului este *natura umană*, trebuie spus că nu, deoarece *'natura umană'* este un anumit nume potrivit lui însuși care are substanța sa și calitatea sa; căci astfel s-ar întâmpla să se meargă la infinit, ceea ce este imposibil. Însă prin numele *'om'* este semnificată substanța sa și calitatea sa și la fel calitatea lui Socrate; potrivit faptului că are capacitatea naturală de fi participată de unul singur, astfel <calitatea> este pentru el esențială; potrivit faptului că acea capacitate este în actul său, astfel îi revine lui ca accident.

85. Din cele pomenite înainte reiese că modul de a semnifica, care este într-o rostire, într-un mod este esențial, într-alt mod este accidental, adică potrivit faptului că este luat în capacitatea <sa> sau în act, așa cum s-a spus.

86. Apoi, în nume există de asemenea un alt mod accidental de a semnifica din partea accidentului potrivit faptului că numele semnifică în <genul> masculin sau feminin, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Deci, în nume există un mod dublu de a semnifica, unul substanțial, altul accidental. Însă, la fel și în verb, deoarece *'a acționa'* și *'a fi afectat'* se iau în două moduri, adică potrivit *habitus-ului*, și atunci sunt esențiale pentru verb, sau potrivit actului, și atunci sunt accidentale pentru el. De exemplu: *'a vedea', 'a alerga', 'a șade'* și *'a umbla'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele, sunt luate în două moduri, adică potrivit *habitus*-ului sau potrivit actului. Sunt luate potrivit *habitus*-ului, când se spune despre cel care doarme că vede, și despre calul în staul că aleargă bine sau umblă sau merge mult și despre cineva care stă spunem că stă întotdeauna sau doarme întotdeauna. Însă se ia potrivit actului, atunci când tocmai deschide ochii și vede un lucru din afară sau când tocmai parcurge spațiul cu o viteză prea mare. La fel spunem potrivit habitus-ului că arde despre foc și despre fierul incandescent, când nimic nu este vătămat sau ars de către ele și spunem că ard, adică că au habitus-ul de a arde. Și în mod universal, ori de câte ori predicăm despre un anumit subiect, care nu acționează, un verb care semnifică modul acțiunii, întotdeauna predicăm un *habitus* și faptul de a acționa se ia aici în *habitus*, precum spunem despre cuțitaș că taie, chiar dacă nimeni nu taie cu el. Însă când predicăm despre subiectul însuși un anumit verb, întrucât acțiunea însăși tocmai se unește în mod actual cu el, atunci predicăm faptul de a acționa în act. Și la fel în cazul verbelor care semnifică faptul de fi afectat. Și de aceea spunem că *'a acționa'* și *'a fi afectat'* se iau în două moduri, adică în *habitus* și în act. Și dacă sunt luate potrivit *habitus*-ului, sunt esențiale pentru verb, însă dacă sunt luate potrivit actului, sunt accidentale pentru el. Și astfel, modul de a semnifica în nume și în verb este de două feluri, adică esențial și accidental. Și la fel în oricare altă parte a rostirii. Și de aceea acest mod dublu de a semnifica este în mod absolut în rostire.

Despre figură

87. Figura este cea care este conținută de o limită sau de limite; de limită, precum cercul de circumferință, însă de limite, precum figurile poligonale sunt conținute de laturile sale; căci cercul nu este circumferință, ci suprafața care este conținută de circumferință; nici trei linii drepte concurente din ambele părți în trei puncte nu sunt triunghi, ci suprafața care este conținută de

aceste trei linii. Însă figura se regăsește într-un <sens> anterior în obiectele naturale și apoi în cele matematice, și într-un <sens> posterior în rostire, deoarece <în rostire există> prin analogie.

Despre figura de rostire

88. Însă, deoarece orice figură este accidentul celui căruia îi este figură, dacă figura trebuie să îi revină prin analogie rostirii, ea trebuie luată de la cele care sunt accidentale pentru rostire. De aceea spunem că figura de rostire este modul de a semnifica în rostire în mod accidental, căci datorită acestui fapt am distins mai întâi două moduri de a semnifica. Însă, faptul că figura este accident în rostire, precum figura în celelalte cazuri, nu este o asemănare proprie datorită căreia această figură se ia prin analogie de la aceea, ci aceasta este o asemănare comună a acesteia cu aceea, potrivit faptului că fiecare este accident, și nu potrivit faptului că fiecare este figură, deoarece, în măsura în care este accident, se potrivește cu oricare alt accident. Însă asemănarea proprie potrivit căreia există o figură în rostire, se datorează faptului că, precum în obiectele naturale și matematice ea îl limitează și îl conține pe cel a cărui <figură> este, tot așa în rostire modul accidental de a semnifica limitează și conține rostirea; nu vorbesc despre terminația vocală, precum *'musa'* se termină în *'a'*, ci de terminație inteligibilă. Căci această figură nu este terminația vocală a rostirii însăși, ci ea este înțeleasă în terminația vocală a rostirii potrivit faptului că semnifică prin modul lui *ceva* sau prin modul *de ce fel*, sau în <genul> masculin, sau feminin, și tot așa despre altele. Însă reiese că faptul de a conține îi revine figurii de rostire pomenită înainte, deoarece ceea ce este ultim cu privire la lucru se spune că limitează și conține lucrul, precum reiese în figura care este luată în mod propriu, care limitează și conține corpul a cărui <figură> este, și este limita ultimă a corpului însuși. De aceea, de vreme ce modul accidental de a semnifica îi revine prin natură rostirii ca ultim, deși nu prin timp, de aceea este ultim din partea celor care sunt înțelese în rostire; și astfel este precum cel care limitează și conține o rostire. Și datorită acestui fapt se numește *'figură de rostire'*, iar în acest sens este o asemănare sau o analogie a acestei figuri cu aceea.

89. Și reține că prin această figură nu se întâmplă să se înșele, decât dacă figura unei rostiri sau modul ei de a semnifica este asemănător figurii altei rostiri sau modului ei de a semnifica. Însă asemănarea acestei figuri se află în rostiri în două moduri. Căci într-un mod, potrivit faptului că fiecare dintre cele două rostiri care se aseamănă în figură au același mod de a semnifica; și, potrivit

acestei asemănări a figurii, faptul de a fi înșelat nu are loc, deoarece acolo nu subzistă nici un defect, precum atunci când fiecare dintre cele două este de gen feminin sau de gen masculin sau fiecare dintre cel două semnifică *ce* sau fiecare semnifică *de ce fel*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Însă în alt mod se ia *'asemănare a figurii'* unei rostiri cu o altă figură a unei rostiri diferite, când o rostire are doar un mod de a semnifica și datorită unei anumite potriviri pe care o are cu o altă rostire pare că are modul de a semnifica al acelei rostiri diferite, atunci când se ia sub acea rostire diferită la termenul mediu, precum va reieși în cazul paralogismelor. Și, deoarece în acest mod rostirea care se ia sub termenul mediu are propriul mod de a semnifica, altul față de rostirea pusă la termenul mediu, nu îi este ei asemănătoare în mod absolut, ci neasemănătoare. Însă pare asemănătoare ei deoarece se ia sub ea, și Aristotel indică această neasemănare în capitolul din *Respingeri* <care începe cu cuvintele>: "însă raționamentele falacioase au loc în acestea...", spunând: "este dificil a distinge între cele care sunt rostite în mod asemănător și în mod diferit", adică în mod neasemănător; și astfel în una și aceeași rostire sunt implicate moduri diferite de a semnifica, însă unul în mod real și altul în mod aparent. Și, datorită acestui fapt, acolo există un multiplu imaginar și prin acea aparență acolo subzistă un defect. Și asemănarea este diminuată și imaginară. Și în acest mod se ia asemănarea figurii în acest raționament falacios, și nu în primul mod.

90. Din cele menționate tocmai reiese ce este multiplul imaginar și că nu este multiplu în mod absolut, deoarece multiplicitatea în mod absolut este o reprezentare potrivit convenției a mai multor lucruri în același semn. Și multiplul actual este multiplu în mod absolut, deoarece această descriere este complet păstrată în el, precum reiese în echivocație și amfibolie. Însă multiplul potențial nu este multiplu în mod absolut, deoarece semnul nu este identic datorită dispozițiilor diferite în care se ia, precum a reieșit mai înainte. Însă multiplul este imaginar, când aceeași rostire are un mod de a semnifica în realitate și un alt mod opus <de a semnifica> în mod aparent. De aceea, în măsura în care există acolo un singur semn în mod simplu și include în sine mai multe, se potrivește în mai mare măsură cu multiplul actual decât cu cel potențial. Însă întrucât acea multitudine nu revine lucrurilor, ci modurilor de a semnifica, se potrivește în mai mică măsură cu multiplicitatea actuală decât cu cea potențială.

Despre cauzele și modurile figurii de rostire

91. După ce s-a stabilit care mod de a semnifica în rostire se numește *'figură a rostirii'*, și în ce fel *'figură'* se ia transsumptiv în rostire, și ce este asemănarea transsumpției, și ce asemănare a figurii unei rostiri cu figura alteia produce un raționament falacios, și de ce această multiplicitate se numește *'imaginară'*, trebuie în consecință să discutăm despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios. Principiul motor al figurii rostirii este asemănarea unei rostiri cu alta în modul accidental de a semnifica. Însă principiul lipsei este incompletitudinea sau diminuarea acelei asemănări.

92. Însă modurile figurii de rostire sunt trei, deoarece în rostire există un anumit mod accidental de a semnifica, care este principiul potrivirii și nepotrivirii, precum masculinul, femininul și neutrul. Și există un alt mod accidental de a semnifica, care i se datorează lucrului semnificat, adică acel lucrul ce este principiu al adevărului și al falsității. Și diferă de primul, deoarece primul i se datorează lucrului care există în rostire de la principiile potrivirii și nepotrivirii; însă cel de-al doilea i se datorează lucrului de la principiile adevărului și falsității; spun lucrului universal, precum *ce, de ce fel, cât* și tot așa cu privire la celelalte. Însă al treilea mod de a semnifica în rostire îi revine rostirii care semnifică un lucru singular precum *acest ceva anume*. Și potrivit acestor trei moduri de a semnifica sau de a înțelege în rostire, există trei moduri ale figurii de rostire.

Despre primul mod

93. Primul <mod> are loc atunci când masculinul este interpretat ca feminin sau invers, sau când între acestea este un altul dintre ele, precum: *'orice substanță colorată de albiciune este albă, însă bărbatul este o substanță colorată de albiciune; deci bărbatul este albă'*. Și la fel aici: *'orice apă este udă, fluviul este o apă; deci, fluviul este udă'*. În aceste două cazuri masculinul este interpretat ca feminin, deoarece *'fluviu'* este de gen masculin și datorită potrivirii care pare să o aibă cu *'apă'*, întrucât există acolo un mod de a-l lua pe unul sub celălalt, pare că ar participa cu *'apa'* la același mod de a semnifica și astfel că ar fi de același gen. Și înțelege că nu pun această aparență întrucât este unul sub celălalt potrivit adevărului, ci deoarece există acolo un mod de a-l lua pe unul sub celălalt, de exemplu acesta este o figură de rostire: *'orice piatră este albă, bărbatul*

este o piatră; deci, bărbatul este albă'; și totuși, extremul minor nu este sub termenul mediu cu adevărat, ci acolo există un mod de a-l lua sub termenul mediu; și deoarece astfel se ia unul ca sub celălalt, pare că are același mod de a semnifica precum termenul mediu exceptându-l pe cel propriu. Și astfel conține în sine moduri diferite de a semnifica. Și astfel reiese potrivirea cu privire la care figura pare că este asemănătoare. Și la fel trebuie înțeles cu privire la oricare alt mod.

94. Și reține că, datorită faptului că asemănarea figurii de rostire se produce prin modul de a lua <o rostire> sub termenul mediu, toate paralogismele figurii de rostire sunt împotriva inferenței, însă în mod diferit, deoarece cele care sunt potrivit primului mod, distrug natura inferenței și potrivit adevărului și potrivit aparenței, deoarece stabilesc o incorectitudine, pentru că e un solecism, și astfel în acel lucru care pare să concluzioneze, nu există nici adevăr, nici falsitate, nici multiplicitate. Și de aceea acolo nu există o anumit raportare, nici adevărată și nici falsă, a premiselor către acel lucru care pare să fie concluzionat; căci, dacă nu există acel lucru care este anterior, nu există nici ceea ce este în mod consecvent. De aceea, nu există în mod propriu nici silogisme nici paralogisme în primul mod al figurii de rostire, ci există rostiri incorecte.

95. Acest lucru nu este nici împotriva acelui lucru pe care l-am spus înainte, că acolo există un principiu motor și un principiu al lipsei și astfel o aparență, deoarece acea aparență era în premisele însele; însă spunem că este în cel ce pare a fi o concluzie. Însă în alte moduri rămâne adevărul și falsitatea, și astfel rămân acolo dispozițiile, și dacă nu cele adevărat, totuși cele aparente, deoarece posteriorul pune anteriorul; căci adevărul și falsitatea sunt posterioare dispoziției, motiv pentru care, când adevărul sau falsitatea este pusă, sunt puse dispozițiile adevărate sau aparente. Însă în rostirea: *'orice om este alb, femeia este om; deci, femeia este alb'*; femininul este interpretat ca masculin, invers față de cele pomenite înainte, datorită modului de a lua sub termenul mediu, precum s-a spus. Însă în acesta: *'orice substanță însuflețită sensibilă este colorată, viețuitorul este o substanță însuflețită sensibilă; deci viețuitorul este colorată'*; nici unul nu este interpretat ca unul dintre acelea. Însă dacă se formează un paralogism astfel: *'«musa» și «poeta» se termină la fel, însă «musa» este de gen feminin; deci și «poeta»'*; acolo există un consecvent, și nu o figură a rostirii, deoarece rostirile nu se iau prin modul semnului sau al instrumentului, ci prin modul obiectului, deoarece, atunci se spune că rostirile se iau prin modul semnului sau al instrumentului, când prin ele însele vorbim despre obiecte, căci astfel sunt semne ale obiectelor și instrument de vorbire. Însă când nu vorbim prin ele însele despre obiecte, ci vorbim de ele însele potrivit lor, atunci se iau ca obiecte, și de aceea există o înșelare în obiect,

motiv pentru care nu există o înșelare în rostire. Însă dacă se formează un paralogism astfel: *' de orice fel este muza este și poetul, însă muza este de genul feminin; deci și poetul'*; aici rostirile sunt luate încât vorbim despre obiecte prin rostirile însele, și astfel stau în rațiunea semnului și a instrumentului; însă acolo nu există o figură a rostirii, deoarece, când *'de orice fel'* este un distributiv al calității, și calitatea nu poate să se extindă mai departe decât la calitatea care este un obiect semnificat, precum albiciunea, știința, și cele asemănătoare, și la calitatea care este modul de a semnifica, precum masculinul, femininul și cele asemănătoare, căci obiectul semnificat prin numele *'albiciune'* este o calitate care este un obiect, și la fel prin numele *'culoare'*; însă genul feminin în numele *'albiciune'* este o calitate care este un mod de a semnifica sau de a înțelege, și la fel genul masculin în numele *'culoare'*; de aceea trebuie ca *'de orice fel'* să distribuie fie pentru ambele, fie pentru nici una, fie doar pentru una, fie doar pentru cealaltă, deoarece nu poate să fie în mai multe moduri. Dacă spune că pentru nici una, acest lucru este prostesc, deoarece este un distributiv al calității și nu există un alt mod al calității în afară de acestea două. Dacă spune că pentru ambele, atunci îl ia într-adevăr sub termenul mediu și silogismul este cel mai bun, când o ia pe cealaltă <calitate>; însă majora este falsă, deoarece în acest mod sensul ar fi: *orice calitate pe care o are acest lucru, <o are> și acela, și sub oricare mod de a semnifica este înțeles acest lucru, <este înțeles> și acela*; și fiecare parte a acelei propoziții copulative este falsă, și astfel majora este falsă. Însă dacă spune că distribuie doar pentru calitatea care este un mod de a semnifica, atunci din nou îl ia bine sub termenul mediu și silogismul este bun, deoarece preia un anumit mod particular de a semnifica. Însă majora este din nou falsă; căci sensul este: *sub oricare mod de a semnifica este înțeles 'musa', <sub același este înțeles> și 'poeta'*; și astfel, de vreme ce silogismul este bun, nu există o figură a rostirii acolo. Dacă spune că distribuie doar pentru o calitate care este un lucru semnificat, atunci vor fi patru termeni, fiindcă preia o altă calitate, precum acesta: *'orice om alb aleargă, etiopianul este negru; deci etiopianul aleargă'*; și astfel nu ia nimic sub termenul mediu, nici în mod adevărat, nici aparent; motiv pentru care acolo nu există o figură a rostirii.

Despre al doilea mod

96. Însă al doilea mod al figurii rostirii are loc atunci când schimbăm un mod al rostirii care semnifică un universal la un alt mod al rostirii care semnifică un universal. Și acest lucru în trei feluri.

În primul fel, potrivit faptului că modul care se regăsește în general în oricare predicament, precum în *faptul că este ceva*, este schimbat la un mod propriu altui predicament, precum *în faptul că este de un anumit fel* sau *în faptul că este câtva* sau *în faptul că este în raport cu altul*. Căci acel mod care se rostește *întrucât este ceva* se regăsește în oricare predicament, deoarece orice gen și orice specie sunt predicate *întrucât sunt ceva* despre inferiorii lor; însă *'faptul că este de un anumit fel'* numește modul propriu al calității și *'faptul că este câtva'* al cantității și *'faptul că este în raport cu un altul'* al relației. Și se formează un paralogism astfel: *'orice ai văzut ieri vezi astăzi, ceva alb ai văzut ieri; deci ceva alb vezi astăzi'*; căci *'ceva alb'* rostește despre sine *faptul că este de un anumit fel*, ba chiar când se ia ca și cum stă prin sine; însă deoarece se ia sub mediul care rostește *că este ceva*, datorită acestui mod de a-l lua sub el pare să semnifice *că este ceva.* Și astfel *'ceva alb'* implică în sine diverse moduri de a semnifica, unul cu adevărat, altul în mod aparent; și datorită acestui fapt, *faptul că este ceva* se schimbă în *faptul că este de un anumit fel*.

Însă în al doilea fel, se schimbă un mod al rostirii care semnifică un universal la un mod al altei rostiri care semnifică un universal, atunci când modul propriu al unui predicament se schimbă în modul propriu altuia, precum *faptul că este câtva* la *faptul că este de un anumit fel*, precum: *'cât de mult ai cumpărat ai mâncat, însă ai cumpărat mâncare crudă; deci mâncare crudă ai mâncat';* căci *'crud'* rostește *faptul că este de un anumit fel*, și deoarece se ia sub *faptul că este câtva*, pare să aibă un mod al cantității, și astfel are în sine un mod cu adevărat, altul în mod aparent; și datorită acestei asemănări aparente și neadevărate *faptul că este câtva că* se schimbă în *faptul că este de un anumit fel*.

Însă în al treilea fel, acesta se produce atunci când modul propriu unui predicament se schimbă în alt mod al aceluiași predicament, precum *faptul că este câtva* în *faptul că sunt câțiva*, precum: *'oricât de multe degete ai avut, ai, însă zece ai avut; deci zece ai'*; căci *'câte nouă'* și *'câte zece'* numesc o cantitate discretă prin acel mod care este *faptul că este ceva*, deoarece sunt specii ale numărului, și specia numește *faptul că este ceva*; însă *'nouă'* și la fel *'zece'*, care se iau în mod denominativ de la ele, numesc o cantitate discretă și prin modul cantității discrete. Însă *'oricât de multe'* numește prin modul cantității continue, și astfel, de vreme ce se ia unul sub altul *faptul că este câtva* se schimbă în *faptul că sunt câțiva*. Și astfel, acest al doilea mod se subdivide în trei și obișnuiește să se numească *comutarea predicamentului*, însă nu întrucât lucrul unui predicament se schimbă în lucrul altui predicament, ci modul în <alt> mod, precum s-a spus. De aceea, aceasta: *'orice ai văzut ieri vezi azi, ai văzut ieri albiciunea; deci, vezi azi albiciunea'* nu este o figură a

rostirii, deoarece precum *'orice'* numește *faptul că este ceva* în mod comun în orice predicament și nu substanța, la fel *'albiciunea'* numește *faptul că este ceva*; însă, dacă s-ar lua *'alb'*, ar fi o figură a rostirii datorită modurilor diferite, precum s-a spus.

Despre al treilea mod

97. Al treilea mod al figurii rostirii are loc atunci când *faptul că este ceva de un anumit fel* este interpretat ca *faptul că este acest ceva*, adică atunci când un mod comun este schimbat într-un mod singular, sau invers, dacă extindem numele *'comun'* la comunul în mod absolut, precum *om* sau *viețuitor*, și la comunul prin adăugarea altuia, precum *'Coriscus cult'*; căci în acest caz cel comun este adăugat termenului singular, adică *'cult'*. Și potrivit lui Aristotel se produce un paralogism de acest fel: *'Coriscus este al treilea de la om, însă el însuși este om; deci, este al treilea de la el însuși';* căci *'om'*, precum spune Aristotel, și orice termen comun nu semnifică *acest ceva* ci *că este ceva de un anumit fel* sau *faptul că este în raport cu un altul*, și așa cu privire la celelalte moduri ale celor comune. Însă *'Coriscus'* semnifică *acest ceva*, adică un lucru discret și semnificat în mod singular, care nu poate să fie în mai multe; însă termenul comun poate. De aceea *'Coriscus'* are în mod absolut un mod al individuației sau al singularității, și deoarece se ia sub *'om'*, pare că are în sine un mod care este *faptul de a fi ceva de un anumit fel*, precum *'om'*. Și astfel pare că implică în sine mai multe moduri, însă *'om'*, invers, este în mod absolut *ceva de un fel anume*, deoarece este în mod absolut comun. Căci acel *de un fel anume* nu este decât capacitatea de a exista în mai multe lucruri, însă deoarece *'om'* este în acest singular și în acela, care sunt *acest ceva anume*, în mod similar pare că *'om'* este *acest ceva anume*, și astfel *'om'* implică în sine mai multe moduri, unul cu adevărat, adică cel care este ceva *de un fel anume*, și altul în mod aparent, precum cel care este *acest ceva anume*. Și la fel orice altceva ce este comun, care este gen sau specie, are aceste două moduri. De aceea când spun: *'Coriscus este al treilea de la om'*, această <propoziție> nu este adevărată, decât datorită faptului că omul este *ceva de un anumit fel*. Căci dacă omul ar fi *acest ceva anume,* precum Socrate și alți individuali, atunci nu s-ar predica despre nici un individual, precum nici *'Coriscus'* nu se predică despre Socrate sau Platon. Motiv pentru care, acesta: *'Coriscus este al treilea de la om'* este adevărată, decât datorită faptului că omul este *ceva de un anumit fel*. Însă, atunci când spun: *'Coriscus însuși este om'*, sub acela care este *ceva de un anumit fel* îl iau pe *acest ceva anume,* și astfel schimb *ceva de un anumit fel* la *acest ceva*

anume concluzionând: *'deci, Coriscus este al treilea de la el însuși'*. Căci toate paralogismele figurii de rostire sunt împotriva inferenței, precum s-a spus. Însă dacă omul ar fi *acest ceva anume*, atunci ar reieși bine: *'Coriscus este al treilea de la om, însă Coriscus însuși este om; deci, este al treilea de la el însuși';* însă minora ar fi falsă, precum acesta: *'Coriscus este al treilea de la Platon*, (stabilind că sunt trei) *însă Coriscus este Platon; deci, Coriscus este al treilea de la sine';* reiese bine, însă minora este falsă. Aristotel sugerează alt paralogism de acest fel: *'Coriscus este altul decât Coriscus cult, însă Coriscus cult este Coriscus; deci, Coriscus este altul decât Coriscus'*. Căci acesta, adică *'Coriscus'*, semnifică *acest ceva anume*; însă acela, adică *'Coriscus cult'*, semnifică *ceva de un anumit fel*. De aceea, de vreme ce s-ar semnifica un altul decât Coriscus în raport cu Coriscus cult, potrivit faptului că acolo s-ar semnifica o calitatea, adică *cult*, și nu în raport cu Coriscus, care este *acest ceva anume*, de aceea, de vreme ce altul decât Coriscus este concluzionat, *ceva de un anume fel* se schimbă la *acest ceva anume*; și de aceea inferența nu e validă.

98. Și reține că în primul paralogism, ceea ce este gen sau specie este numit *ceva de un anumit fel*. Căci specia și genului, potrivit faptului că este ceva comun, are natura *de a fi de un anumit fel*, însă potrivit a ceea ce este predicat *întrucât este ceva*, semnifică *ceva*. Și astfel este *ceva de un anumit fel,* deoarece este comun și este predicat *întrucât este ceva.* Însă în al doilea paralogism cel care este *'Coriscus cult'* îl numește Aristotel *ceva de un anumit fel,* și astfel *'cult'*, care este o calitate, numește *faptul de a fi de un anumit fel*. Însă, Aristotel numește subiectul acestei calități, adică Coriscus, *ceva*, și astfel Coriscus cult este *ceva de un anumit fel*. Deci, astfel reține cum extinde Aristotel *faptul de a fi ceva de un anumit fel* la acestea două, deoarece în predicamentul substanței numește *ceva de un anumit fel* doar genurile și speciile. De aceea, acolo ia *ceva de un anumit fel* în mod propriu, însă aici îl ia prin extensiunea numelui. La fel, *ceva de un anumit fel* este interpretat aici ca *acest ceva anume*: *'un viețuitor este Socrate, un viețuitor este Platon* (și tot așa cu privire la fiecare); *deci un viețuitor este orice om'*. Fiindcă *'viețuitor'* este *ceva de un anumit fel* și potrivit faptului că semnifică același lucru ca *'Socrate'*, pare să aibă modul aceluia care este *acest ceva anume*. Și astfel, atunci când concluzionează astfel: *'deci un viețuitor este orice om'*, schimbă modul care era cu adevărat în viețuitor, adică *ceva de un anumit fel*, la modul care era acolo în mod aparent, adică *acest ceva anume*. Și de aceea nu reiese. Însă, dacă acel mod care pare ar fi acolo potrivit adevărului, atunci reiese corect, deoarece atunci viețuitorul ar fi în mod absolut *acest ceva anume*, precum aici: *'Socrate este Socrate, Socrate este Platon,*

Socrate este Cicero (și tot așa cu privire la fiecare); *deci, Socrate este orice om'* reiese corect, căci falsitatea propozițiilor nu împiedică argumentul.

99. Și obișnuiesc să numească acest paralogism și pe cele asemănătoare *'de la mai multe supoziții determinate la o singură supoziție determinată'*, deoarece *'viețuitor'* în premise și în concluzie are o supoziție determinată. Însă acest lucru nu înseamnă nimic, deoarece a înainta de la o supoziție determinată către alta determinată nu produce nici un raționament falacios, decât dacă este acompaniat de o anumită lipsă, precum aici: *'un viețuitor alb se mișcă, un viețuitor alb aleargă; deci un viețuitor alb se și mișcă, și aleargă';* în premise *'viețuitor'* are o supoziție determinată și în concluzie are o supoziție determinată. La fel, oriunde ei înșiși spun că înaintarea are loc de la o supoziție simplă la una personală, fie acesta nu va produce un raționament falacios al figurii de rostire, fie trebuie ca acolo *ceva de un anumit fel* să fie interpretat ca *acest ceva anume*, precum: *'omul este o specie, acest om este un om; deci acest om este o specie'*; fiindcă *'om'* semnifică *ceva de un anumit fel* și *'acest om'* semnifică *acest ceva anume*, precum reiese clar din cele pomenite înainte. Și aici: *'orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om este acest viețuitor'*; și la fel aici: *'orice corp însuflețit cu excepția viețuitorului este lipsit de simțire; deci cu excepția acestui viețuitor...'*; căci în ambele *'viețuitor'* semnifică *ceva de un anumit fel*, însă *'acest viețuitor'* semnifică *acest ceva anume*; și astfel *ceva de un anumit fel* este interpretat ca *acest ceva anume*.

100. Și reține că genurile diferite, ca și cum sunt în mod absolut în aceeași rostire, sunt principiile faptului de a raționa falacios potrivit echivocației, precum: *'preotul celebrează, femeia este preot; deci, femeia celebrează'*; însă genurile diferite, nu doar după cum sunt în aceleași rostiri, ci potrivit faptului că sunt în rostiri diferite, astfel încât una dintre ele are un gen propriu pentru sine însăși și are un alt gen în mod aparent, sunt principii ale faptului de a raționa falacios potrivit figurii de rostire în ceea ce privește primul mod, precum a reieșit mai înainte. Și despre acest raționament falacios s-a vorbit în mod amplu datorită numeroaselor lui dificultăți.

DESPRE RAȚIONAMENTELE FALACIOASE DIN AFARA ROSTIRII

101. Se numește *'raționament falacios din afara rostirii'* cel a cărui cauză a aparenței și cauză a non-existenței se află în lucru. Și prin acest fapt diferă de raționamentele falacioase în rostire. Căci raționamentul falacios în rostire este cel a cărui cauză a aparenței se află în rostire și cauză a falsității se află în lucru. Însă raționamentele falacioase din afara rostirii sunt șapte. Dintre

care prima este *accidentul*, a doua *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*, a treia este *ignorarea respingerii,* a patra *solicitarea celui aflat la început*, a cincea este *consecventul*, însă a șasea este *non-cauza în calitate de cauză*, a șaptea este *mai multe întrebări <luate> ca una*.

DESPRE ACCIDENT

102. Prin urmare, trebuie să vorbim mai întâi despre accident. Însă este stabilită de către Aristotel următoarea rațiune a accidentului: "accidentul are loc atunci când în același fel ceva fusese atribuit ca inerent lucrului care este subiect și celui care este accident", precum: *'omul este o specie, Socrate este om; deci Socrate este o specie'*; căci aici *om* este lucrul cu rol de subiect și Socrate este accidentul lui; și specia este atribuită ca inerentă fiecăruia ba chiar în același fel, deoarece fiecare este atribuit ca inerent, precum un accident subiectului său.

103. Și reține că oriunde există un sofism al accidentului, se cere un accident de două feluri, unul care este accidentul lucrului subiect și altul care este atribuit ca inerent lucrului subiect și celui accident. Și fiecare dintre cele două este atribuit în rațiunea comună a paralogismelor accidentului pomenită înainte. Dacă, prin urmare, cineva întreabă în ce fel se ia aici *'accident'*, trebuie spus că întrebarea aceasta este multiplă datorită acelui accident de două feluri, care întotdeauna este cerut pentru paralogismul potrivit accidentului. Și de aceea trebuie spus că, dacă întreabă despre acel accident ce este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cele două, atunci acel accident nu este unul din cele cinci predicabile, precum este luat de Porfir, și nici unul din cele patru predicate din *Topica*, potrivit modului în care este luat de Aristotel, și nici nu este un accident care se deosebește față de substanță prin opoziție, când spunem: *'orice este, sau este substanță, sau accident, sau Creator al substanței și al accidentului'*. Însă acel accident este același lucru ca *'non-necesar în formarea consecinței'*, deoarece *'non-necesar'* se spune în două moduri. Într-un mod, în faptul de a predicat sau în faptul de a pune ca subiect, precum *'Socrate este om'* sau *'viețuitorul este o substanță'*, potrivit faptului că cel superior în primul mod este accidentul celui inferior și în alt mod, invers, cel inferior celui superior; și *'non-necesar'* nu se ia aici în acest mod. Însă în celălalt mod non-necesar se află în formarea consecinței, precum am spus; și astfel se ia aici *'accidentul care este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cele două'*. De aceea, accidentul în acest mod se opune acelui lucru care înseamnă *'că este accident din necesitate'*. Însă nu spun *'că este accident din necesitate'* după cum necesitatea de a infera este cauzată de calitatea, cantitatea

și ordinea propozițiilor, – căci ceea ce se opune acestei necesități se numește *legătură inutilă* în *Analitica primă* –, însă spun *'că este accident din necesitate'* după cum necesitatea de a infera este cauzată de dispozițiile locale, precum în raționamentele dialectice, sau de cauză sau de efect, precum în raționamentele demonstrative; și acestei necesități de a infera se opune accidentul care este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cele două, deoarece astfel *'că este accident din necesitate'* se spune în două feluri. De aceea *'accident'* în acest mod este același lucru ca *'non-necesar în formarea consecinței'* contrar față de această necesitate de a infera, pe care am numit-o.

Însă dacă întreabă despre acel accident care este accidentul lucrului care este subiect, spun că este străin sau diferit cu privire la un anumit terț. De aceea: *'om',* potrivit faptului că stă sub predicatul *'specie'*, toate cele inferioare lui îi sunt accidente și la fel toate cele superioare; de aceea, accidentul provine din ambele părți, dacă unul dintre acelea îi este accident, precum: *'omul este specie, omul este substanță; deci substanța este specie'* sau: *'omul este specie, Socrate este om; deci Socrate este specie'*; și astfel, atât cel superior cât și cel inferior este accidentul omului privitor la un anumit terț.

104. De asemenea, reține că unii au spus că accidentul care este cerut de acest raționament falacios, era un termen mediu, în parte același și în parte diferit de extremi. Însă aceștia greșeau în două moduri. Într-un mod deoarece în orice silogism termenul mediu trebuie să fie în parte același și în parte diferit de ambii extremi. De asemenea, greșeau deoarece presupuneau că pentru acest raționament falacios se cere un singur mod al accidentului, ceea ce este fals, deoarece, precum am spus, pentru acesta se cere întotdeauna un accident de două feluri.

105. De asemenea, reține că se cere o dublă identitate a termenului mediu în orice silogism bun. Căci o identitate este cea care suportă diversitatea, și aceasta este identitatea mediului însuși raportată la extremi, precum am spus. Alta este identitatea mediului însuși în sine după cum în premise există un termen mediu repetat, sau după cum stă în rațiunea mediului repetat, deoarece, după cum termenul mediu este repetat în premise, el trebuie să fie în mod absolut același. Și acest raționament falacios greșește împotriva acestei identități în termenul mediu.

Despre cauzele și modurile accidentului

106. Odată ce am văzut rațiunea comună a paralogismelor accidentului, precum și că se cere întotdeauna un accident de două feluri pentru paralogismele accidentului, și în ce fel se iau

acolo cele două moduri ale accidentului și în ce fel nu, și că se cere o identitate de două feluri în orice silogism, acum trebuie să discutăm despre cauzele și modurile accidentului. Prin urmare, principiul motor al accidentului este identitatea termenului mediu potrivit părții, așa cum este repetat în premise. Și spun *'așa cum este repetat în premise'*, încât să nu se înțeleagă cu privire la acea identitate potrivit părții care este a mediului însuși în raport cu extremii, ci în sine, precum el a fost repetat. Însă principiul lipsei este diversitatea termenului mediului repetat potrivit rațiunii, de exemplu: *'omul este specie, Socrate este om; deci Socrate este specie'*; Acesta este accident, deoarece termenul mediu, adică *'om'*, este același în premise potrivit substanței, după cum este repetat, însă nu este același potrivit rațiunii, deoarece *'om'* este pus ca subiect în majoră pentru însuși ceva comun potrivit lui însuși, și nu ca și cum este în Socrate sau potrivit asemănării pe care o are cu inferiorii; însă în propoziția minoră este predicat despre Socrate potrivit acestei asemănări și nu potrivit aceleia; și astfel este identic în substanță, însă diferit în rațiune, precum el a fost repetat. Însă când spun: *'orice om aleargă, Socrate este om; deci Socrate aleargă';* acesta este un silogism bun, deoarece *'a alerga'* este predicat despre om potrivit asemănării pe care o are *'om'* cu inferiorii; și astfel termenul mediu nu este luat în rațiuni diferite, precum atunci când era pus ca subiect al speciei.

107. Dacă cineva obiectează că, de vreme ce termenul mediu se ia potrivit diferitelor raportări accidentale, deci termenul mediu este un accident în acest raționament falacios, trebuie spus că nu reiese, deoarece termenul mediu, deși este luat în diferitele raportări accidentale, acest fapt nu are loc deoarece el însuși este accidentul altora, ci deoarece altele sunt accidentele lui, precum pentru *om* este accident că este specie și în alt mod îi este accident că este Socrate, precum s-a pomenit înainte.

108. Însă modurile acestui raționament falacios se disting de la partea accidentului care este accident pentru lucrul care este subiect, deoarece accidentul care e accident pentru lucrul care e subiect, uneori este antecedent, alteori consecvent, alteori convertibil. Deoarece, într-un mod cel inferior este accident pentru cel superior, precum spune Aristotel atunci când oferă o soluție generală a paralogismelor accidentului, deoarece Socrate este accident pentru *om*; și în *Topica*, II, că pentru triunghi echilateralul este accident, deoarece este o specie de triunghi, precum cel isoscel; căci cel echilateral este un triunghi care are trei laturi egale, însă cel isoscel este triunghiul care are doar două laturi egale, însă cel scalen toate inegale. Însă în alt mod cel superior este accident pentru cel inferior. De aceea, Aristotel în capitolul despre aducerea <oponentului> la ignoranța respingerii

spune că faptul de a fi figură este accident pentru triunghi, și în începutul *Metafizicii Vechi* spune că omul este accident pentru Socrate. Însă în al treilea mod *'accident'* se ia potrivit faptului că convertibilul este accident pentru convertibilul său, precum va reieși mai apoi. Și astfel spun că uneori cel superior este accident pentru cel inferior, alteori cel inferior pentru cel superior, alteori convertibilul pentru convertibil. Înțelege la fel în privința antecedentului, consecventului și convertibilului, fie că fuseseră predicabile, fie nu, deoarece acest raționament falacios apare atât în cazul predicabilelor cât și în cazul non-predicabilelor.

Despre primul mod

109. Primul mod al accidentului se produce atunci când antecedentul este accidentul celui căruia îi este antecedent, precum: *'omul este specie, Socrate este om; deci Socrate este specie'*; sau: *'viețuitorul este asin, omul este viețuitor; deci, omul este asin'*; sau: *'viețuitorul aleargă, omul este viețuitor; deci omul aleargă'*; sau: *'orice triunghi are trei unghiuri egale cu două unghiuri drepte, isoscelul este triunghi; deci isoscelul are trei unghiuri egale cu două unghiuri drepte'*; sau: *'orice metal este natural, însă orice statuie turnată este metal; deci orice statuie turnată este naturală'*; sau: *'orice piatră sau lemn este natural, însă casa este din pietre și lemne; deci casa este naturală'*. Căci în primul paralogism, *Socrate*, care este antecedent față de *om*, este accidentul lui, și *specie* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi. În al doilea, *om* este accident pentru *animal*, și *asin* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi. Și la fel ar fi dacă *viețuitor* s-ar fi predicat despre fiecare, astfel încât paralogismul ar fi în a doua figură, precum: *'asinul este viețuitor, omul este viețuitor; deci omul este asin'*. La fel în celălalt, *om* este accident pentru *viețuitor*, și *a alerga* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi. Însă în al patrulea, *isoscel* este accident pentru *triunghi* și *are trei unghiuri* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia.

110. Și reține că în acest paralogism, fie că dialecticianul, fie că cel care demonstrează arată că are trei unghiuri etc. despre isoscel precum despre un subiect adecvat sau convertibil, există întotdeauna un sofism al accidentului. Însă dacă fiecare dintre aceia arată că are trei laturi despre isoscel, precum despre subiectul particular prin termenul mediu potrivit, încât unul printr-un termen mediu dialectic, celălalt printr-un termen mediu demonstrativ, silogismul va fi întotdeauna bun pentru fiecare, deoarece, pentru primul va fi un silogism dialectic bun, însă pentru cel care demonstrează va fi o demonstrație particulară bună.

111. Și reține că, dacă *'triunghi'* se ia întrucât este predicabil despre isoscel, este astfel un termen mediu dialectic; însă dacă *'triunghi'* se ia întrucât are în sine cauza proximă a acelei afectări care este *faptul de a avea trei*, și dacă este un termen mediu încât să se probeze aceeași afectare despre isoscel ca despre un subiect particular, este astfel un termenul mediu demonstrativ; și potrivit acestui fapt este o demonstrație particulară. De aceea, același lucru luat potrivit rațiunilor diferite poate să fie un termen mediu dialectic și un termen mediu demonstrativ. De aceea, nu spun nimic cei care zic că există un sofism al accidentului în paralogismul pomenit înainte pentru cel care demonstrează, și un silogism bun pentru dialectician, deoarece, deși *'triunghi'* se ia după cum are în sine cauza proximă și nemediată a acelei afectări, totuși, cât timp aceeași afectare se probează despre isoscel ca despre subiectul propriu, întotdeauna există un sofism al accidentului. Și se vede că termenul mediu luat astfel nu este dialectic. De aceea, trebuie înțeles precum am spus.

112. La fel, *statuia turnată* este accident pentru *metal* și *casa* pentru *lemne și pietre*, după cum termenul mediu stă sub predicatul *'a fi natural'* sau *'a fi de la natură'*. De aceea, în oricare dintre acestea antecedentul este accident pentru consecvent, însă în ultimele două *'antecedent'* și *'consecvent'* nu sunt luate în mod propriu potrivit predicației, căci *metalul* nu este predicat în mod propriu despre *statuia turnată*, și nici *pietrele* și *lemnele* despre *casă*. Dacă cineva obiectează că acesta este un accident: *'orice viețuitor aleargă, orice om este viețuitor; deci orice om aleargă',* când *om* este accident pentru *viețuitor* și *a alerga* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cele două, trebuie spus, precum mai înainte, că acolo nu există un accident, deoarece *viețuitor* este pus ca subiect pentru *alergare* în mod discret și determinat în majoră pentru orice inferior, și la fel *viețuitorul* însuși se va predica în minoră despre *om* prin raportare la toate cele care sunt conținute sub *om*. Și astfel termenul mediu este același potrivit substanței și este luat potrivit aceleiași raportări, și astfel termenul mediu este luat în mod uniform, și nu neuniform.

Despre al doilea mod

113. Însă al doilea mod al accidentului se produce atunci când consecventul este accident pentru antecedent, precum: *'omul este specie, omul este substanță; deci substanța este specie'* și *'orice triunghi are trei unghiuri egale cu două unghiuri drept, însă orice triunghi este o figură; deci figura are trei unghiuri etc.'*; sau: *'medicul îl vindecă pe Socrate, însă Socrate este om; deci, medicul îl vindecă pe om'; 'Socrate este călugăr, Socrate este alb; deci Socrate este un călugăr*

alb'; *'îl cunosc pe Coriscus, însă Coriscus este cel care vine; deci îl cunosc pe cel care vine'; 'orice casă este produse artizanal, orice casă este din pietre și lemne; deci pietrele și lemnele sunt produse artificial'*. Căci în primul, *substanța* este accident pentru *om* și *specie* este atribuit ca inerentă fiecăruia dintre cei doi, precum în propriul său subiect adecvat; și de aceea, există un sofism al accidentului. Însă în al doilea, *figura* este accident pentru triunghi. Însă *a avea trei etc.* este atribuit ca inerentă fiecăruia, ca în propriul său subiect adecvat; și tot așa la fel. Însă în celălalt, *om* este accident pentru *Socrate*; căci orice mișcare și toate acțiunile sunt despre singulare. De aceea, medicul nu îl însănătoșește pe om decât potrivit accidentului, ci pe *Socrate* sau *Platon*. Însă în celălalt, *a fi călugăr* este accident pentru *Socrate*, și *alb* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia; însă *a fi călugăr* este un accident comun, și astfel are rațiunea consecventului, și astfel consecventul este accident pentru antecedent. La fel, *cel care vine* este accident pentru *Coriscus* și, *a fi cunoscut* de mine este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia. Însă în ultimul, *pietrele și lemnele* sunt accidente pentru *casă* potrivit faptului că <termenul> *'casa'* stă sub predicatul *'a fi produs artizanal'* sau *'a proveni de la o artă'*. Căci pietrele și lemnele nu sunt produse artizanale și nici de o artă, ci sunt, dimpotrivă, de la natură, însă cvadratura și dodratura acestora provine de la o artă; de aceea sunt accidente pentru *casă* cu privire la acel predicat. Și astfel în toate cele pomenite înainte cu privire la acest al doilea mod, consecventul este accident pentru antecedent.

Despre al treilea mod

114. Însă al treilea mod al accidentului se produce atunci când convertibilul este accident pentru convertibilul său, precum: *'omul este specie, rizibilul este om; deci rizibilul este specie'*; căci *om* este pus ca subiect pentru *specie* potrivit esenței sale și nu prin rațiunea prin care este rizibil; și astfel *rizibil* este accident pentru *om* cu privire la predicatul ce este *'specie'*. Apoi: *'rizibilul este propriu, omul este rizibil; deci omul este propriu';* căci *om* este accident pentru *rizibil*, deoarece *rizibil* este astfel subiectul acestei intenții *propriu,* încât nu este prin rațiunea *omului*; și astfel *om* este accident pentru *rizibil*; și astfel convertibilul este accident pentru convertibil. La fel aici: *'tatăl este în supra-poziție; deci și fiul'*, deoarece, așa cum *tatăl* stă sub acel predicat, *fiul* este accident pentru el, și astfel *tatăl* este lucrul ce este subiect, și *fiul* este accidentul lucrului ce este subiect și *a fi în supra-poziție* este accidentul care este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi. Și de aceea este non-necesar ca *fiul* să fie consecvent pentru tată, și astfel este non-

necesar în formarea consecinței. Și la fel aici: *'acela care este tată este anterior prin natură fiului; deci tatăl este anterior prin natură fiului'*. Căci în acest <exemplu>, subiectul paternității este lucrul ce este subiect, adică *acela care este tată*, și *tată* este accidentul lucrului ce este subiect și *a fi prin natură anterior fiului* este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia.

115. Și reține că această convertibilitate diferă de cea pomenită înainte, deoarece *'tată'* este convertit cu *'acela care este tată'* sau cu subiectul paternității, precum relația cu subiectul propriu în care are să fie sau să se producă, raportându-l pe el însuși la un altul; însă *'rizibil'* nu <se convertește> cu *'om'* astfel, ci precum afectarea proprie cu subiectul propriu; Însă *'tată'* și *'fiu'* în nici unul dintre modurile pomenite înainte, ci precum unul dintre corelativi cu celălalt; căci cauzele convertibilității sunt multe și diferite. Din cele pomenite înainte tocmai reiese că un convertibil este accident pentru convertibilul său cu privire la un anumit terț.

116. Și reține că oriunde există o figură a rostirii, acolo există întotdeauna un accident, și nu invers, ci prin principii diferite și prin rațiuni diferite care se însoțesc reciproc, deoarece, precum *a vedea* are două raportări diferite sau două raporturi diferite care se însoțesc reciproc (căci *a vedea* se raportează la ochi, și îi revine lui însuși, ca unui organ; și se raportează la culoare, și îi revine ei înseși, ca unui obiect; și aceste două raporturi se însoțesc reciproc întotdeauna în același act de a vedea, deși sunt diferite), la fel este acolo unde există o figură a rostirii, deoarece modul de a semnifica se raportează la rostire, și îi revine ei înseși, ca unui instrument sau semn, și se raportează la lucrul semnificat, și îi revine lui însuși, ca unui obiect sau semnificat, ba chiar ca unui subiect.

Și înțeleg acest lucru cu privire la modul de a semnifica pentru toate modurile figurii de rostire sau pentru toate speciile sale, adică potrivit faptului că acest mod de a semnifica are aceste două raportări diferite. De aceea, spun că, dacă acel mod de a semnifica ar fi principiul motor, după cum este în semnul său, care este o rostire, astfel este o înșelare în rostire și astfel este o figură a rostirii. Însă dacă *'modul de a semnifica'* se ia potrivit unei alte raportări, adică potrivit faptului că se raportează la lucru, și îi revine lui însuși, ca unui subiect, și în acest mod se produce principiul motor, și astfel este o înșelare în afara rostirii și astfel este accident. De aceea, oriunde există o figură a rostirii, acolo există întotdeauna un accident, și nu invers, deoarece rațiunea lucrului nu depinde de rațiunea rostirii, ci rațiunea rostirii depinde de rațiunea lucrului, deoarece rostirea este un semn al lucrului și în final este ordonată în raport cu lucrul; însă de la scop provine perfecțiunea și împlinirea în acelea care sunt în vederea scopului, și nu invers; motiv pentru care, fără rațiunea lucrului nu poate să existe o rațiune a rostirii.

117. De asemenea, reține că oriunde există un sofism al accidentului, spun că termenul mediu (sau acela despre care este predicat cu adevărat ceea ce este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi) *este lucrul ce este subiect*; și extrema minoră (sau acela care provine de la partea extremei minore), *este accident pentru lucrul ce este subiect*, fie că poate fi pus ca subiect, fie că poate fi predicat despre termenul mediu, fă că nu; și extrema majoră (sau acela care provine de la partea extremei majore) spun că este *accident care este atribuit ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cei doi*. Și acesta este celălalt accident, care este non-necesar în formarea consecinței.

118. Nici nu este contrar ceea ce spune Aristotel în *Respingeri*, II, că uneori acela care este inerent accidentului se spune despre lucrul ce este subiect. Și astfel pare că nu doar prin lucrul ce este subiect indicăm ceva în mod sofistic despre accident, ba chiar indicăm prin accidentul însuși ceva în mod sofistic despre lucrul ce este subiect. Căci spun că dintre paralogismele accidentului, unele concluzionează doar o singură parte a contradicției, precum reiese din cele pomenite înainte, însă altele concluzionează ambele părți ale contradicției; și acest lucru în mod implicit sau explicit, precum: *'îl cunosc pe Coriscus, nu îl știu pe cel care vine; deci pe același îl cunosc și nu îl știu'*. Această concluzie are o contradicție implicită, și o parte se ia de la partea lucrului ce este subiect, însă alta de la partea accidentului. Însă când spun: *'îl cunosc pe Coriscus și nu îl cunosc pe cel care vine; deci pe același îl cunosc și nu îl cunosc'*, acolo există o contradicție în mod explicit. Și în acelea care au ambele părți ale contradicției, pare că este ceea ce spune Aristotel. De aceea, el însuși spune în același loc că în unele <paralogisme> pare într-un fel și spun în acel fel, însă în altele nu spun în acest fel. Însă în acelea care concluzionează o singură parte a contradicției, întotdeauna se arată prin lucrul ce este subiect că ceva îi revine accidentului, fie că termenii se iau potrivit predicației, fie că nu.

119. S-ar putea rezolva și altfel – și cred că mai bine, deși celălalt mod este corect – spunând de exemplu că nici în acestea nu există o obiecție, de vreme ce în oricare paralogism de acest fel există o putere a celor două paralogisme. De aceea, de asemenea, trebuie înțeleasă o a treia propoziție în premise astfel*: 'îl cunosc pe Coriscus, nu îl știu pe cel care vine și Coriscus este cel care vine; deci pe același îl cunosc și nu îl știu'*; și se ia astfel: *'îl cunosc pe Coriscus, Coriscus este acela care vine; deci îl cunosc pe acela care vine'*; apoi: *'nu îl știu pe cel care vine și cel care vine este acela care vine; deci nu îl știu pe acela care vine; deci îl cunosc și nu îl știu pe același'*. Căci în primul paralogism prin *'Coriscus'*, care este lucrul ce e subiect, se indică că *acela care vine* este în cunoașterea mea, cunoaștere care se aplică la extremul minor și este accident pentru

Coriscus potrivit faptului că *'Coriscus'* este pus ca subiect *'pentru acela care vine'*. Însă în al doilea paralogism, prin *'pe cel care vine'*, care este lucrul ce e subiect, se indică că *acela care vine* nu este știut de mine și astfel *cel care vine* este lucrul ce e subiect și este termenul mediu, și *'acela care vine'* este extremul major și *'nu îl știu'* este extremul minor și este accident pentru *cel care vine* potrivit faptului că *'cel care vine'* stă sub acel predicat. Și astfel reiese în mod universal ce trebuie să se atribuie ca *lucru ce este subiect* și ce ca *accident al lucrului ce este subiect*, și ce ca *accident care se atribuie ca inerent fiecăruia dintre cele două*.

Despre raționamentul falacios potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut
Despre definiția acestor termeni

120. Urmează <să tratăm> despre raționamentul falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*. Prin urmare, în primul rând, reține că *'potrivit cu ceva'* se spune în două moduri, deoarece, în primul mod, *'potrivit cu ceva'* diminuează întregul său, precum *'albul referitor la picior'* reduce *'albul'* în mod absolut, și *'omul mort' 'omul'*. Și prin acest *potrivit cu ceva* are loc raționamentul falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*.

Însă în alt mod, *'potrivit cu ceva'* nu diminuează întreg său, ci îl pune în mod absolut pe el însuși și îl inferează, precum: *'cap creț; deci creț'* sau *'nas cârn; deci cârn'*. Și acest lucru are loc în orice formă și în orice accident care denumesc întregul prin parte, precum încrețirea, care prin cap îl denumește pe om; și cârnia și acvilinitatea sunt doar în nas, și prin aceasta se spune că omul este cârn sau acvilin; și lipsa vederii este în ochi, și prin aceasta se spune că omul este lipsit de vedere; și știința și virtutea este în suflet ca în subiect, și prin aceasta se spune că omul știe sau că omul are virtuți; și tot așa cu privire la altele asemănătoare, oricare denumesc întregul prin parte.

Însă toate celelalte forme și accidente, oricare sunt forme și accidente ale întregului însuși, astfel încât nu <sunt> doar ale părții, acestea toate, spun eu, nu post să denumească întregul decât dacă ar fi în mod absolut în întreg. Și în astfel de cazuri apare raționamentul falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*, deoarece determinarea care se produce în acestea potrivit părții sau potrivit altei raportări, diminuează <întregul> însuși în mod absolut. Și astfel se ia aici *'potrivit cu ceva'*, însă nu celălalt care nu diminuează.

Însă din cele precizate reiese că *'potrivit cu ceva',* așa cum se ia aici, numește o determinație care diminuează rațiunea aceluia căruia i se adaugă; însă *'în mod absolut'* este numit lucrul care nu este diminuat, fie că este accident, fie că este subiect, precum *'alb', 'negru', 'viețuitor', 'om'.*

Despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios

121. Însă cauza motoare a acestui raționament falacios este identitatea parțială a ceea ce diminuează *potrivit cu ceva* cu ceea ce este rostit *în mod absolut*. Însă cauza non-existenței este diferența acelorași lucruri. Însă acest raționament falacios se produce în tot atâtea moduri în câte se întâmplă să se adauge la o anumită determinare care diminuează <întregul> însuși.

Despre primul mod

122. Primul este potrivit părții care diminuează în mod, precum: *'există un om mort; deci există un om';* nu reiese, deoarece *'mort'* diminuează rațiunea *'omului'* însuși. Și *'o himeră este subiect de opinie; deci himera este'*; căci *'subiect de opinie'* diminuează pe *'a fi'*. Și: *'există un viețuitor pictat sau un ochi pictat; deci există un viețuitor sau un ochi'*; căci *'pictat'* reduce rațiunea acestora. Însă Aristotel formează aceste paralogisme astfel: *'ceea ce nu există, este subiect de opinie,* precum himera; *deci ceea ce nu există, este'*. Și la fel tu poți forma toate celelalte, ca: *'ceea ce nu este om este un om mort; deci ceea ce nu este om este om'* și *'ceea ce nu este viețuitor este un viețuitor pictat; deci ceea ce nu este viețuitor este viețuitor'.*

Despre al doilea mod

123. Al doilea, potrivit părții integrale, precum: *'Etiopianul este alb la dinți; deci Etiopianul este alb'.*

Despre al treilea mod

124. Al treilea, în cele care sunt *în raport cu ceva*, precum: *'bogățiile nu sunt bune pentru cel nesocotit sau pentru cel care nu le folosește corect; deci bogățiile nu sunt bune'*; căci, deși nu sunt bune în raport cu un anumit lucru, totuși în sine sunt bune. Și: *'un ou este în mod potențial*

animal, deci oul este animal'; căci, orice potență este în raport cu un anumit lucru, deoarece este în raport cu actul prin care se desăvârșește.

Despre al patrulea mod

125. Al patrulea, potrivit locului, precum: *'este bine să îți sacrifici tatăl în Trivallis; deci este bine să îți sacrifici tatăl'* și *'este bine să te folosești de dietă în locurile producătoare de boli; deci este bine să te folosești de dietă'*; căci, deși este folositor acolo, totuși nu este folositor în mod absolut.

Despre al cincilea mod

126. Însă al cincilea, potrivit *faptului de a fi cândva*, precum: *'acesta ține post în Patruzecime; deci ține post'* și: *'este folositor pentru cineva să fie tratat atunci când este bolnav; deci este folositor să fie tratat'*;

127. Și trebuie știut că oriunde există raționamentul falacios *<potrivit cu> ceva și în mod absolut*, se înțelege și că există o contradicție dublă, una în concluzie, care este o contradicție adevărată, și alta în premise, care este o contradicție diminuată. Căci respondentul spune că Etiopianul nu este alb, și oponentul spune că este alb la dinți, și astfel nu îl contrazice pe el decât *potrivit cu ceva*. Și din această contradicție *potrivit cu ceva* inferează o contradicție adevărată astfel: *'deci Etiopianul este alb și nu este alb'*; și de aceea greșește *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*, deoarece o contradicție adevărată nu reiese dintr-o contradicție *potrivit cu ceva*, și tot așa în toate celelalte cazuri.

128. Și de aceea Aristotel oferă o soluție universală pentru toate paralogismele acestui raționament falacios, adică consideră concluzia în raport cu contradicția, adică consideră contradicția concluzie, care este corectă, în raport cu contradicția în premise, care contradicție este *potrivit cu ceva*; și de aceea una nu reiese din cealaltă.

129. Și reține că este același raționament falacios de la *potrivit cu ceva* la *în mod absolut* și de la *în mod absolut* luat negativ la *potrivit cu ceva* negat în măsura în care este de partea termenilor, precum: *'nu este om; deci nu este om mort'* și *'nu este alb; deci nu este alb la dinți'*,

deoarece principiul motor rămâne același și principiul lipsei rămâne același, căci însuși *ceva* și nici însuși *în mod absolut* nu mișcă, ci corespondența în parte a unuia în raport cu celălalt.

130. De asemenea, reține că, pe acelea în care pare că sunt contrariile în mod egal potrivit părților diferite, nu trebuie să le numești de la unul dintre contrarii, precum dacă jumătate de scut este alb și jumătate este negru, nu trebuie să zici *'scutul este alb sau negru'*, ci *'în parte așa, în parte așa'*. De aceea, acest argumentul nu este valid: *'nu există nicio culoare în afară de alb sau negru sau o culoare intermediară; deci nimic nu este colorat, decât albul sau negrul sau ceva colorat cu o culoare intermediară'* deoarece, dintre acelea care sunt colorate, unele sunt colorate printr-o singură culoare, însă altele prin mai multe. Și acel argument ține doar pentru acelea care sunt colorate cu o singură culoare. Și argumentul este nul, deoarece nu ține în mod universal. De aceea, deși acel scut nu este colorat cu o culoare intermediară, totuși nu reiese că este alb sau negru. Însă așa, argumentul ar fi bun: *'nu există nicio culoare decât albul sau negrul sau o culoare intermediară; deci nimic nu este colorat decât albul sau negrul sau ceva colorat cu o culoare intermediară, sau parțial alb, parțial negru, parțial de o culoare intermediară, sau colorat de culori intermediare'*. Și este la fel în toate formele contrare care au un intermediar și care sunt inerente potrivit unor părți diferite, precum albul și negrul; la fel caldul și recele, durul și moalele, și oricare altele care potrivit părților diferite sunt în același întreg.

Despre ignorarea respingerii
Despre respingere

131. Respingerea este un silogism al contradicției unuia și aceluiași, nu doar a numelui, ci a lucrului și a numelui, nu a unui sinonim, ci a aceluiași lucru, din cele ce au fost date cu necesitate, fără a include ceea ce era la început, potrivit aceluiași, în raport cu același, în același fel, și în același timp. Căci în această definiție a respingerii există două lucruri, adică *'silogismul'* și *'contradicția'*. Căci respingerea nu este nimic altceva decât un silogism a cărui concluzie contrazice concluzia altui silogism. Și atunci respingerea constă în două silogisme care se contrazic reciproc, sau <un silogism> a cărui concluzie contrazice o altă propoziție asumată înainte. Și astfel, respingerea este un silogism al unei singure <concluzii> cu contradicție. Și astfel respingerea este întotdeauna un silogism cu contradicție.

132a. De aceea, în definiția pomenită a respingerii, unele sunt puse pentru rațiunea silogismului, însă altele pentru rațiunea contradicției, dar altele pentru rațiunea ambelor. De bună seamă, pentru rațiunea silogismului sunt acestea: *'din cele ce au fost date cu necesitate'*, *'fără a include ceea ce era la început'*; prin care se îndepărtează solicitarea aceluia care este la început, precum va reieși ulterior. Însă pentru rațiunea contradicției sunt puse acestea, adică *'a unuia'* și *'a aceluiași'*, adică a unui singur subiect și a aceluiași predicat; căci dacă nu ar fi același subiect și același predicat, nu ar fi o contradicție, precum *'Etiopianul este negru', 'Etiopianul nu este negru la dinți'* nu este același predicat; însă aici: *'nici un om mort nu aleargă'*, *'un anumit om aleargă'*, nu este același subiect. Și la fel acestea: *'potrivit aceluiași'*, *'în raport cu același'*, *'în același fel'* și *'în același timp'* sunt puse acolo pentru rațiunea contradicției. Și împotriva acestor elemente particulare greșește acest raționament falacios care este numit *'ignorarea respingerii'*, potrivit căreia este una dintre cele treisprezece <raționamente falacioase> care se raportează la celelalte prin opoziție, deoarece într-un mod ignorarea respingerii greșește împotriva tuturor elementelor particulare în definiția stabilită a respingerii, și în acest mod toate raționamentele falacioase se reduc la ea însăși, precum va reieși ulterior. Însă pentru rațiunea ambelor sunt puse acestea: *'nu doar a numelui ci a lucrului și a numelui'*, *'nu a unui sinonim, ci a aceluiași'*, deoarece atât în silogism cât și în contradicție se cere ca numele să fie unul singur și ca lucrul să fie unul singur. De aceea, aici nu există o contradicție: *'Marcus aleargă'*, *'Tullius nu aleargă'*, deoarece nu se pune același nume, ci un sinonim; nici aici: *'orice câine este capabil să latre '*, *'un anumit câine nu este capabil să latre'*, deoarece nu este un singur lucru. Însă în acesta: *'orice sabie taie, un anumit instrument este o spadă; deci un anumit instrument taie'*; nu este un silogism, deoarece, raportat la termenul mediu, nu se regăsește același nume, ci un sinonim.

Despre ignorare

132b. *'Ignorarea'* se spune în mai mule feluri. Căci, una este ignorarea negației; și în acest mod, copilul ce se află în leagăn ignoră toate științele. Și aceasta se numește *'ignorarea negației'*, deoarece nu stabilește nimic; căci, cel care o are pe aceasta, nu știe nimic. Alta este cea care se numește *'ignorarea dispoziției'*; și ea are loc atunci când cineva știe deja ceva despre un lucru, totuși nu cunoaște lucrul așa cum este. Și acesta, din nou, se spune în două feluri, deoarece una se numește *'simplă'*, și este cea privitoare la principiile sau propozițiile ce sunt premise. Însă alta se

numește *'compusă'* sau *'multiplă'*, și aceasta este privitoare la concluzii. Și astfel distinge Aristotel ignorarea în *Analitica secundă*, I, atunci când se ocupă de silogismul falsigraf.

133. Însă înțelege mai departe că oricare dintre acelea, adică ignorarea simplă și aceea care este compusă sau multiplă, este și ea de două feluri, deoarece ignorarea simplă a dispoziției poate să fie într-un mod cu privire la principiile însele sau propozițiile care sunt premise, înțelegându-le pe ele într-un mod contrar, încât să le ia pe ele ca false; însă în alt mod, această ignorare simplă poate să fie cu privire la propozițiile care sunt premise, cunoscând în mod corect ceva despre ele, totuși necunoscând întreaga substanță și putere a lor însele. Și de aceea, la fel, ignorarea compusă sau multiplă este de două feluri cu privire la concluzii, încât dacă sunt înțelese într-un mod contrar, adică în falsitate, sau dacă sunt cunoscute în mod imperfect.

Despre ignorarea respingerii

134. Odată ce s-a văzut ce este respingerea și în câte moduri se spune *'ignorarea'*, trebuie știut că *'ignorarea respingerii'* nu se ia aici <ca ignorare> a negație, ci a dispoziției; și din nou, nu ca ignorare a dispoziției, care este multiplă sau compusă, ci se ia aceea care este simplă, deoarece *'ignorarea respingerii'* se ia aici prin rațiunea perfecțiunii respingerii și completudinii sale. De bună seamă, această perfecțiune se produce prin determinațiile proprii ale contradicției, adică prin acestea: *'în raport cu același', 'potrivit aceluiași'*, *'în același fel'* și *'în același timp'*. Mai mult, prin faptul că este un principiu de argumentare, reiese că ignorarea dispoziției se ia aici ca fiind simplă, și astfel se raportează ca un principiu la concluzie. Și astfel prin această ignorare simplă este cauzată apoi cea compusă sau multiplă, atunci când respondentul este înșelat prin ea deoarece argumentează sofistic.

Despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios

Cauza aparenței acestui raționament falacios este potrivirea a două lucruri luate *potrivit cu ceva* cu două lucruri luate *în mod absolut*; însă cauza falsității este diferența acelorași. Însă există patru moduri ale acestui raționament falacios.

Despre primul mod

135. Primul <mod> este împotriva particulei *'în raport cu același'*, precum *'doi este dublul lui unu, însă nu este dublul lui trei; deci același este dublu și non-dublu'*; nu reiese, deoarece *'dublu'* nu se ia în raport cu același lucru în ambele premise.

Despre al doilea mod

136. Al doilea greșește împotriva particulei *'potrivit aceluiași'*, precum: *'acesta este dublul aceluia potrivit lungimii, nu este dublul aceluiași potrivit lățimii; deci este dublu și non-dublu'*. Nu reiese, deoarece *'dublu'* nu se ia potrivit aceluiași lucru, deși dublu se spune cu privire la același lucru.

Despre al treilea mod

137. Al treilea mod este împotriva particulei *'în același fel'*, precum: *'omul este specie, nici un om nu este specie; deci același este specie și non-specie'*; căci nu există o contradicție în premise, deoarece termenul *'om'* nu se în același fel; căci în una se ia în locul inferiorilor, însă în cealaltă nu, ci se ia în locul ei înșeși.

Despre al patrulea mod

138. Al patrulea este împotriva particulei *'în același timp'*, precum: *'mâna mea este închisă într-un timp, și nu este închisă în altul; deci este închisă și nu este închisă'*.

139. Și reține că, deși în acest raționament falacios există o contradicție adevărată în concluzie și există altă contradicție în premise, care este aparentă, precum se spunea în cazul raționamentul falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut,* totuși acest raționament falacios diferă de acela, deoarece acesta are o contradicție aparentă în premise, care are o lipsă în ambele părți ale contradicției, precum reiese în paralogismele acestui raționament falacios; însă raționamentul falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut* are o contradicție aparentă care greșește doar în cealaltă parte a contradicției. Și prin acest fapt, soluția acestuia diferă de soluția aceluia, deoarece Aristotel <ne> învață că ambele se rezolvă odată ce se consideră concluzia în raport cu contradicția, adică

odată ce se ia în considerare contradicția adevărată a concluziei în raport cu contradicția aparentă în premise, însă aici în raport cu cea aparentă datorită diminuării ambelor părți, însă acolo în raport cu cea aparentă datorită diminuării uneia singure.

140. Dacă cineva obiectează că <*potrivit cu*> *ceva* și *în mod absolut* trebuie să fie parte a acestui raționament falacios, deoarece acolo se produce o înaintare de la un lucru luat *potrivit cu ceva* la unul luat *în mod absolut*, iar aici se produce o înaintare de la două lucruri luate *potrivit cu ceva* la două luate *în mod absolut*, și astfel nu trebuie să existe două raționamente falacioase, deoarece partea nu produce o pluralitate împreună cu întregul său, trebuie spus că nici una nu este parte a celeilalte, ba chiar, sunt raționamente falacioase care se separă reciproc prin opoziție, deoarece însuși *ceva* și însuși *în mod absolut* nu produc un raționament falacios *potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut*, ci raportarea unuia către celălalt, precum specia și genul nu sunt loc, ci raportare a unuia către celălalt. De aceea, deși *'om'* nu produce o pluralitate numerică cu *'viețuitor'*, deoarece este o parte a lui, totuși raportările produc o pluralitate numerică între ele. Căci una dintre aceste raportări este un loc ce provine de la gen, alta este un loc ce provine de la specie. La fel, raportarea unuia care este luată *potrivit cu ceva* către unul luat *în mod absolut* este diferită față de raportarea a două care sunt luate *potrivit cu ceva* către două care sunt luate *în mod absolut*, deși unul luat *potrivit cu ceva* este parte a celor două și unul luat *în mod absolut* este parte a celor două.

Și astfel vor exista două raționamente falacioase diferite ca specie. La fel, deși mijlocul liniei nu produce o pluralitate numerică cu întreaga linie, deoarece este o parte a ei, totuși raportările produc o pluralitate numerică. Căci raportarea întregii linii la mijloc este dublul, însă raportarea mijlocului la întreaga linie este ceva conținut de două ori într-un întreg, adică jumătatea.

Despre solicitarea celui aflat la început
Despre definiția sa

141. De bună seamă, despre solicitarea celui aflat la început se determină potrivit adevărului în *Analitica primă*, II, însă potrivit opiniei în *Topica*, VIII, și în acest al doilea mod intenționăm aici <să tratăm> despre solicitare celui aflat la început. Prin urmare, trebuie știut că solicitarea celui aflat la început, așa cum este luat aici, are loc atunci când concluzia care trebuie probată este solicitată în premise. Deci, de vreme ce același lucru nu poate să se probeze prin sine însuși sub același nume, deoarece întotdeauna cel care probează este diferit de ceea ce trebuie

probat, ci același și sub același nume nici nu este diferit, nici nu pare diferit, deci același și sub același nume nu poate să se probeze pe sine însuși. Motiv pentru care, ceea ce inferă și ceea ce este inferat nu poate fi același lucru potrivit artei, precum: *'omul aleargă, deci omul aleargă'*. Deci, în cele de acest fel nu poate exista o solicitare a celui aflat la început. Însă o astfel de argumentare este ridicolă și nu cade în <domeniul acestei> arte, și acolo este o solicitare a începutului. Căci una este a solicita începutul și alta este solicitarea celui aflat la început, deoarece faptul de a solicita începutul are loc atunci când același este solicitat sub același nume, precum: *'omul aleargă, deci omul aleargă'* și acesta nu produce nici un raționament falacios, deoarece nu este conținut sub o anumită specie a argumentării nici potrivit adevărului și nici potrivit aparenței.

Despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios

142. Cauza aparenței solicitării celui aflat la început este diferența aparentă a concluziei față de premise; însă cauza falsității este identitatea acelorași. Cel aflat la început este solicitat în cinci moduri, precum este în *Topica*, VIII, la final.

Despre primul mod

143. În primul <mod>, atunci când definitul este solicitat în definiție, sau invers, precum dacă se întreabă dacă omul aleargă și se ia aceasta: *'viețuitorul rațional muritor aleargă; deci omul aleargă'*; aici nu există nicio probare, deoarece când se întreabă cu privire la unul dintre acestea, este necesar să se întrebe și cu privire la celălalt; și astfel, dacă se ia unul, atunci îl solicită pe celălalt în acela.

Despre al doilea mod

144. Al doilea mod are loc atunci când un particular este solicitat într-un universal, precum dacă trebuie probat că toate contrariile țin de aceeași învățătură și admite următoarea: *'toți opușii țin de aceeași învățătură; deci toate contrariile țin de aceeași învățătură'*; Acest mod solicită concluzia în premise.

Despre al treilea mod

145. Al treilea mod are loc invers, atunci când se solicită un universal în particulare, precum dacă trebuie probat că toți opușii țin de aceeași învățătură și se iau acestea: *'toate contrariile țin de aceeași învățătură, toți opușii privativi țin de aceeași învățătură* (și tot așa cu privire la ceilalți)*; deci toți opușii țin de aceeași învățătură'*.

Despre al patrulea mod

146. Al patrulea mod are loc atunci când <termenul> conjunct este solicitat în cele ce sunt divizate, precum dacă trebuie probat că sănătatea și boala țin de medicină și se ia astfel: *'medicina este știința sănătății, medicina este știința bolii; deci medicina este știința sănătății și a bolii'*.

Despre al cincilea mod

147. Al cincilea mod are loc atunci când unul dintre corelativi este solicitat în celălalt, precum dacă trebuie probat că Socrate este tatăl lui Platon, și se ia aceasta: *'Platon este fiul lui Socrate; deci Socrate este tatăl lui Platon'*; aici se solicită ceea ce ar trebui probat.

148. Și trebuie știut că acest raționament falacios nu împiedică silogismul care inferează, ci pe cel care probează. Căci dintre silogisme unul este cel care doar inferează, altul este cel care inferează și probează.

149. Apoi, trebuie știut că este de două feluri calea de a cunoaște, una de la cele anterioare potrivit intelectului la cele posterioare potrivit intelectului, și această cale se numește *'intelectivă'*; cealaltă cale de a cunoaște este de la cele anterioare potrivit simțului la cele posterioare potrivit simțului, și această cale se numește *'senzitivă'*. Însă se numesc *'anterioare potrivit intelectului'*, cele care sunt anterioare ca natură; însă se numesc *'anterioare potrivit simțului'* cele ce sunt în mai mare măsură sensibile. Prin urmare, spun că în oricare dintre paralogismele pomenite, într-un mod este un loc dialectic și într-alt mod este un loc sofistic, deoarece, dacă ceea este a fost destinat să se probeze printr-o cale, se probează într-un <sens> anterior în aceeași cale, argumentul este bun și acolo este un loc dialectic. Dacă însă ceea ce a fost destinat să se probeze prin una dintre acele căi, se probează într-un <sens> anterior în alta, și acel lucru va fi <probat> într-un <sens> posterior

în aceeași <cale>, atunci este un loc sofistic și se solicită cel aflat la început. Și acest lucru este ușor de observat pentru cel ce ia în considerare oricare dintre paralogismele pomenite.

Despre raționamentul falacios potrivit consecventului
Despre consecință

150. Dintre consecințe, una este simplă, alta compusă. Simplă este precum: *'dacă este om, este viețuitor'* sau *'dacă este adulter, este ferchezuit, ba chiar pribeag în noapte'*; și la fel cu privire la alte circumstanțe. Însă cea compusă este cea care are loc potrivit opușilor. Și aceasta are loc în contrarii sau în contradictorii, precum este în *Topica*, II.

151. Și această consecință care este compusă sau potrivit opușilor, are două specii, deoarece una este în sine însăși și cealaltă este în mod invers.

152. Însă consecința în sine însăși are loc atunci când din opusul antecedentului reiese opusul consecventului. Precum *'dacă există dreptate, există virtute; deci, dacă există nedreptate, există viciu'*; căci aici, din opusul antecedentului, adică *'nedreptate'*, reiese opusul consecventului, adică *'viciu'*. Căci consecința în sine însăși este aproape în toate contrariile.

153. Consecința în mod invers are loc atunci când din opusul consecventului reiese opusul antecedentului, precum *'dacă este om, este viețuitor; deci, dacă este non-viețuitor, este non-om'*; căci aici, din opusul consecventului, adică *'non-viețuitor'*, reiese opusul antecedentului, adică *'non-om'*. Însă în cazul contradictoriilor consecința nu poate fi decât în mod invers.

154. Apoi, speciile consecinței simple sunt două. Căci una este prin rațiunea raportărilor locale, precum *'dacă este om, este viețuitor'*; căci aici este o raportare ce <provine> de la specie. Însă alta este prin rațiunea circumstanțelor, care se cercetează în retorice.

155. Și așa cum *'consecință'* se ia în mod comun pentru toate aceste consecințe, tot așa *'consecvent'* se ia în mod comun așa cum se spune că un singur loc sofistic este potrivit consecventului. Și acest loc se numește *'potrivit consecventului'* și nu *'potrivit antecedentului'*, deoarece consecventul devine aici principiu de a infera potrivit faptului că consecventul este pus în antecedent, însă locul este numit sofistic de la ceea ce inferează și nu de la ceea ce este inferat, precum și cel dialectic.

Despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios

156. Însă principiul motor <al raționamentului falacios> al consecventului este buna potrivire a consecinței cu conversa sa. Însă principiul lipsei este falsitatea conversei. Și Aristotel atinge pe scurt această cauză de două feluri, atunci când spune "întrucât ei cred că consecința este convertită" care nu este convertită. Căci prin faptul că spune: *'consecință'*, atinge consecința corectă, care este principiul motor de a crede conversa sa; însă prin faptul că spune *'este convertită'*, atinge conversa sa. Și aceea este o consecință falsă, care este principiul lipsei. Însă Aristotel indică trei moduri ale consecventului.

Despre primul mod

157. Primul <mod> are loc atunci când consecința produsă este convertită potrivit raportărilor locale, precum: *'dacă este om, este viețuitor; deci, dacă este viețuitor, este om'*; și provine de la punerea consecventului; de aceea acolo există un raționament falacios al consecventului. La fel aici: *'dacă nu este viețuitor, nu este om; deci, dacă nu este om, nu este viețuitor'* provine la fel de la punerea consecventului. La fel aici: *'dacă este miere, este roșiatică; deci, dacă este roșiatică, este miere, însă bila este roșiatică; deci bila este miere'*. La fel aici: *'dacă plouă, pământul este umed, deci, dacă pământul este umed, plouă'.* Căci în toate cele menționate ei gândesc că o consecință este convertită, deși nu este convertită. Și de aceea ei greșesc potrivit consecventului.

Despre al doilea mod

158. Însă al doilea mod are loc atunci când ei gândesc că o consecință este convertită datorită anumitor circumstanțe atașate unei persoane, așa cum se întâmplă în <discursurile> retorice, precum: *'dacă este adulter, este ferchezuit, ba chiar pribeag în noapte* (și tot așa cu privire la alte circumstanțe)*; deci, dacă este ferchezuit, ba chiar pribeag în noapte, este adulter'*; acesta este un raționament falacios al consecventului, deoarece dacă este adulter, are una dintre circumstanțele adulterului, însă nu și invers, adică *'dacă este om, este colorat'* și nu invers. La fel aici: *'dacă ceva a fost furat, acela nu a fost câștigat și nici nu a fost primit ca împrumut; deci, dacă*

nu a fost câştigat şi nici primit ca împrumut, acela a fost furat'. Nu reiese, căci ei gândesc că o consecință este convertită, deși ea nu este convertită.

Despre al treilea mod

159. Însă al treilea mod <al raționamentului falacios> al consecventului are loc atunci când ei consideră că o consecință produsă se convertește potrivit opozițiilor, precum: *'dacă a fost făcut, are un început; deci, dacă nu a fost făcut, nu are un început; însă lumea nu a fost făcută, adică generată; deci lumea nu are un început;, deci lumea este infinită în durată şi astfel lumea este din eternitate';* căci Mellisos greșea potrivit consecventului în prima inferență; căci această consecință este corectă: *'dacă a fost făcut, are început'*; deoarece orice este generat, are un început, de vreme ce din nimic nu devine ceva; deci dacă devine ceva, devine din ceva; deci, dacă a fost făcut, are un început. Însă nu reiese: *'dacă nu a fost făcut, nu are un început'*. Căci argumentează de la distrugerea antecedentului și pune consecința în sine însăși în opușii contradictoriei, deoarece în cazul lor trebuie pusă întotdeauna consecința inversă, precum: *'dacă a fost făcut, are un început; deci, dacă nu are un început, nu a fost făcut'* atunci reiese bine. La fel aici există <un raționament falacios> al consecventului *'dacă este om, este viețuitor; deci, dacă nu este om, nu este viețuitor'* <care provine> de la distrugerea antecedentului. De aceea, acolo este o consecință în <opusul> însuși, deși trebuie să fie în mod invers; căci în cazul celor contradictorii nu este permis a argumenta în <opusul> însuși.

160. Din cele precizate reiese că oriunde există <un raționament falacios> al consecventului, întotdeauna există acolo o consecință de două feluri. De asemenea, acest lucru reiese prin faptul că oriunde Aristotel vorbește despre *consecvent,* întotdeauna formează rostiri ale raționamentului falacios al consecventului potrivit consecinței de două feluri, precum *'dacă acest lucru este, acel lucru este'*; și de vreme ce acel lucru este, ei consideră că acesta este.

161. Apoi, cu privire la substanța fiecărui paralogism există un principiu motor și un principiu al lipsei, atât în raționamentele falacioase din rostire cât și în cele din afara rostirii. Deci, dacă în cazul raționamentului falacios al consecventului principiul motor este consecința corectă iar principiul lipsei este consecința falsă, este necesar ca oriunde există un paralogism al consecventului, să existe o consecință de două feluri.

162. Apoi, referitor la același lucru, este imposibil ca o anumită consecință să se convertească, dacă nu există acolo două consecințe, deoarece, dacă consecința este convertită, există acolo o consecință care se convertește și aceea în care este convertită. Deci, este necesar să existe o consecință de două feluri, oriunde există <un raționament falacios al> consecventului, dacă cauza pe care o atribuie Aristotel este corectă.

163. Apoi, acel lucru este probat în mod evident prin soluția pe care o stabilește Aristotel în *Respingeri*, 2, pentru paralogismele *consecventului*. Căci spune acolo că există o consecință de două feluri; una atunci când din particular reiese universalul, precum *'dacă este om, este viețuitor'*, și pe aceasta noi o numeam mai înainte *'simplă'*; însă spune că cealaltă este potrivit opușilor, pe care noi o numeam *'compusă'*. Și aceasta este diviziunea consecinței, pe care am stabilit-o la început. Însă atât în cazul acesteia cât și în cazul celeilalte, se rezolvă atunci când se arată că o consecință se convertește în alta. Deci, dacă soluția lui este universală, este necesar ca oriunde există un <raționament falacios al> consecventului, consecința să fie de două feluri, adică cea care se convertește și cea în care se convertește. Și admitem toate acestea. De aceea, în argumentele de acest fel: *'viețuitorul aleargă; deci omul aleargă'*, sau *'omul aleargă; deci Socrate aleargă'* și în toate cele asemănătoare nu există un sofism al consecventului, ci al accidentului, precum a reieșit mai înainte în rostirile accidentului.

Despre raționamentul falacios potrivit non-cauzei în calitate de cauză
Despre silogismul de două feluri

164. Silogismul este de două feluri, adică ostensiv și <prin reducere> la imposibil. Ostensiv este cel care are o singură concluzie. Însă silogismul prin reducere la imposibil are loc atunci când este dus în mod silogistic către ceva imposibilă și datorită acestui fapt se distruge una dintre premise, care este cauza acelui fapt imposibil. De aceea, acest silogism are întotdeauna două concluzii, precum dacă se întreabă: *'Oare nu este omul asin?'*, odată ce se admite contra: *'nici un asin nu este viețuitor rațional muritor, omul este asin; deci omul nu este viețuitor rațional muritor, însă acest fapt este imposibil; deci omul nu este asin';* și acel silogism este în al patrulea mod al primei figuri.

Despre raționamentul falacios potrivit non-cauzei în calitate de cauză

165. Însă trebuie știut că *non cauza în calitate de cauză* are loc întotdeauna în silogismele <prin reducere> la imposibil. Însă raționamentul falacios potrivit non-cauzei în calitate de cauză se produce atunci când non-cauza este pusă în calitate de cauză datorită căreia pare să reiasă imposibilul, și acel lucru care pare că este cauză, este distrus ulterior, precum dacă se întreabă: *'Oare nu este Brunellus om?',* odată ce se admite contra: *'nici un asin nu este viețuitor rațional muritor, omul este asin și Brunellus este om; deci omul nu este viețuitor rațional muritor, însă acest lucru este imposibil; deci Brunellus nu este om'*. Căci în această argumentare există un raționament falacios al *non-cauzei în calitate de cauză*, deoarece se distruge acel lucru care pare să fie cauza acelui fapt imposibil și nu este, adică *'Brunellus este om'*; căci fără ea însăși din altele reiese imposibilul. Și silogismul va fi în al patrulea mod al primei figuri, precum s-a spus mai înainte.

Despre cauzele acestui raționament falacios

166. Cauza aparenței este potrivirea acelui lucru care pare că este cauză și nu este cu acel lucru care este cauză, datorită unei anumite potriviri într-un anumit termen care semnifică același lucru. Și acest lucru reiese, deoarece propozițiilor folosite ca premise, întrucât împărtășesc un anumit termen, sunt cauză a concluziei. De aceea, propoziția care nu face nimic în vederea concluziei care trebuie inferată, și astfel este non-cauză, dacă împărtășește un anumit termen cu una dintre premise, pare că este cauza concluziei; și astfel non-cauza se ia în calitate de cauză. Motiv pentru care, potrivirea non-cauzei cu acel lucru care este cauză cu privire la un anumit termen este principiul motor în acest raționament falacios.

167. Însă cauza falsității sau principiul lipsei este diferența propoziției care este non-cauză, față de cauza concluziei însăși. Însă Aristotel stabilește exemplul acestui raționament falacios: *'oare nu sunt sufletul și viața identice?;* odată ce se admite contra: *'moartea și viața sunt contrarii, generarea și coruperea sunt contrarii, însă moartea este corupere; deci viața este generare, motiv pentru care a trăi înseamnă a fi generat; însă acest lucru este imposibil, deoarece cel care trăiește nu este generat, ci a fost generat; deci sufletul și viața nu sunt identice';* însă în această ultimă concluzie există o greșeală potrivit *non-cauzei în calitate de cauză*; căci fără aceasta reiese un lucru

imposibil din altele. De aceea, nu ar trebui ca aceasta să se distrugă, adică *'sufletul şi viaţa sunt identice'* ci aceasta: *'moartea şi viaţa sunt contrarii'*. Căci în toate acestea ceea ce nu este cauză pare că este cauză, deoarece împărtăşeşte un termen cu alte propoziţii din care reiese imposibilul.

168. Din cele pomenite reiese că acest raţionament falacios nu apare în silogismul ostensiv, precum aici: *'orice om aleargă, Socrate este om şi soarele este în zodia racului; deci Socrate aleargă'*; nu este <un raţionament falacios al> *non cauzei în calitate de cauză*, deoarece propoziţia *'soarele este în zodia racului'* nu este cauză şi nici nu pare că este cauză.

169. Şi reţine că aceasta este de două feluri *'moartea şi viaţa sunt contrarii'*. Totuşi, în ambele sensuri este falsă. Căci, în primul mod, moartea este mişcarea prin care sufletul este despărţit de corp, şi în acest mod moartea şi viaţa nu sunt contrare, deoarece sunt simultan în acelaşi lucru; căci, cât timp durează această mişcare sau această despărţire, omul încă trăieşte, şi trăieşte până când această despărţire s-a terminat. De aceea, este necesar ca moartea şi viaţa să fie în acest mod simultan în acelaşi. Motiv pentru care, în acest mod, este imposibil ca ele să fie contrarii. Însă *'moarte'* se ia în alt mod <dar> nu în locul acestei mişcări de separare, ci în locul finalului separării sau desprinderii, în care sufletul nu este separat de corp, ci tocmai a fost separat. Însă nici în acest mod moartea nu este contrarul vieţii, ci opusă în mod privativ prin ordinea ireversibilă cu privire la acelaşi lucru, precum vederea şi lipsa vederii cu privire la ochi. Şi astfel în ambele moduri propoziţia pomenită este falsă.

170. Apoi, aceasta este de două feluri: *'moartea este corupere'*, deoarece, dacă *'moartea'* se ia în primul mod, <propoziţia> este adevărată; căci, atunci când sufletul se desparte de corp, omul se corupe. Însă dacă *'moarte'* se ia în al doilea mod, <propoziţia> este falsă, deoarece astfel moartea nu este corupere, ci este finalul coruperii. Şi astfel reiese care propoziţii trebuie suprimate în premise şi în ce mod trebuie diferenţiate.

Despre raţionamentul falacios potrivit întrebărilor multiple ca una
Despre enunţare, propoziţie, întrebare şi concluzie

171. Enunţarea, propoziţia, întrebarea şi concluzia sunt identice în substanţă, însă diferă în raţiunile proprii. De exemplu, rostirea: *'orice om aleargă'*, potrivit faptului că semnifică că un lucru este sau nu este, se numeşte enunţare; însă aceeaşi rostire, după cum este pusă în premise pentru a proba ceva, este o propoziţie; însă aceeaşi rostire potrivit faptului că i se adaugă ei modul de a

întreba este o întrebare, precum *'oare nu orice om aleargă?'*; însă potrivit faptului că aceeași rostire este probată printr-un altul, este concluzie.

172. Și potrivit acestor intenții proprii, ele pot să se definească astfel: enunțarea este o rostire indicativă potrivit faptului că semnifică faptul că un lucru este sau nu este; propoziția este o rostire indicativă care probează o alta; întrebarea este o rostire indicativă luată sub modul de a întreba; concluzia este o rostire indicativă confirmată prin elementul mediu sau prin elementele medii. Însă, deoarece enunțarea se divide prin una și prin mai multe, la fel și propoziția și întrebarea, trebuie știut că una este unitatea de la care enunțarea sau propoziția se numește *'una'*, și alta este unitatea de la care întrebarea se numește *'una'*.

173. Pentru a pune în evidență acest lucru, reține că modurile unității în mod absolut de la care propoziția și enunțarea se numește *'una'* sunt multe. Deoarece există un anumit *unu* în mod absolut care provine din mai multe lucruri, semnificate prin mai multe nume, ca în definiție, precum în acesta: *'viețuitor rațional muritor'*; căci aici sunt mai multe din care provine unul singur. Și există alt *unu* în mod absolut care este unu și sub un singur nume. Și acesta se subdivide prin cinci părți, deoarece un fapt care ține de acest unu este acela că el este unu prin analogie, și este cel rostit potrivit anteriorului și posteriorului, precum *'ființa'* <este rostită> despre toate ființele și *'sănătos'* despre toate cele sănătoase și *'bun'* despre toate cele bune, precum reiese în *Topica*, 1. Al doilea mod este *unu* în gen, precum *sufletul* sau *culoarea*. Al treilea mod este *unu* în specie, precum *omul*, *albeața*. Al patrulea mod este *unu* în număr, precum Socrate sau Platon. Al cincilea și ultimul mod este unul în accident. Și numesc unu în accident un accident, precum unu în gen un singur gen și unu în specie o singură specie.

174. Prin urmare, spun că *'unitatea'* luată în mod comun pentru toate aceste moduri ale unității produce o singură enunțare și o singură propoziție, deoarece pune ca subiect una dintre aceste unități și alta dintre ele este predicată, precum în aceste exemple: *'piatra este viețuitor rațional muritor'*; *'omul este un viețuitor rațional muritor'*; *'piatra este ființă'; 'piatra este viețuitor'; 'omul este viețuitor; 'asinul este om'; 'Socrate este om'; 'Socrate este Socrate'; 'Socrate este Platon'; 'omul poate să râdă'; 'omul este alb'*. Însă dacă nu ar fi acolo vreuna dintre unitățile pomenite, nu va fi o singură enunțare, ci mai multe, și atunci mai multe s-ar predica despre unul singur, sau unul singur despre mai multe, sau mai multe despre mai multe, din care nu provine unul singur. Însă unitatea de la care interogația se numește *'una'*, nu este cea care a fost menționată, ci este unitatea modului de a interoga adăugată peste aceea unitate care face propoziția una singură,

precum *'oare nu este omul viețuitor?'*. Aici una dintre unitățile pomenite stă ca subiect, adică unitatea specială, și alta este predicată, adică unitatea generală, și deasupra acestor unități se adaugă unitatea modului de a interoga. Însă această unitate care îi revine modului de a interoga, nu este unitatea în mod absolut, ci potrivit cu ceva. Însă acea unitate din pricina căreia propoziția este una singură și enunțarea este una singură, este unitate în mod absolut. Și așa reiese când interogația este una. De asemenea, reiese că pentru o singură interogație se cere o unitate de două feluri, adică unitatea lucrului care mai întâi este divizată – și acesta este ca și o unitate materială într-o interogație – și unitatea modului de a interoga, și aceasta este cea care completează interogația.

175. Însă întrebarea este *"multiple"* atunci când în întrebare rămâne unitatea modului de a întreba și lipsește unitatea care face propoziția una, care era unitatea în mod absolut. Și deoarece rămâne acolo unitatea modului de a întreba, ea se numește *'întrebare'*; și deoarece lipsește cealaltă unitate care era unitatea în mod absolut, se numește *'multiple'*. Și de aceea acestea două se leagă bine una de alta, adică *'întrebare'* și *'multiple'*, deși apare un dezacord între substantiv și adjectiv.

Despre cauzele și modurile acestui raționament falacios

176. După ce am văzut în ce mod se aseamănă și se deosebesc enunțarea, propoziția, întrebarea și concluzia, și în câte moduri se spune unu în mod absolut, și când enunțarea este una sau multiple, și propoziția și întrebarea, și din ce cauză se spune corect *'întrebare-multiple'*, trebuie să vorbim în consecință despre cauzele și modurile raționamentului falacios *potrivit întrebării-multiple ca una*. Însă cauza aparenței sau principiul motor al acestui raționament falacios este unitatea modului de a interoga; însă causa falsității este lipsa sau privația unității unei propoziții. Căci unitatea *potrivit cu ceva* pretinde unitatea în mod absolut, și astfel ascunde defectul și face să pară că nu este. Însă modurile acestui raționament falacios sunt două.

Despre primul mod

177. De bună seamă, primul <mod> are loc atunci când într-un număr singular mai multe stau ca subiect sau sunt predicate, precum *'oare nu acesta și acesta este om?'*, indicând către Socrate și Brunellus; și astfel, *'deci Brunellus este om'*; însă dacă nu, *'deci Socrate nu este om'*.

Căci nu răspunde corect cel care dă un singur răspuns la o întrebare-multiple, ci trebuia să răspundă: *'este adevărat pentru unul, este fals pentru celălalt'*.

Despre al doilea mod

178. Al doilea mod apare atunci când mai multe sunt puse ca subiect sau sunt predicate într-un număr plural, precum *'oare nu sunt acestea bune?'* indicând către unul bun și către altul rău; dacă <se răspunde> *'bune'*, *'deci răul este bun'*; dacă *'rele'*, *'deci bunul nu este bun'*. Căci trebuia să răspundă: *'unul este bun și celălalt nu este bun'*. Însă dacă cineva admite într-un mod asemănător că definițiile sunt date la plural precum la singular, precum *'orbul a fost născut capabil să vadă și nu este văzător'* și *'cele oarbe au fost născute capabile să vadă și nu sunt văzătoare'*, nu va scăpa de respingere; căci indicând către un orb și către altul care este văzător inferează astfel: *'acestea au fost născute capabile să vadă și nu sunt văzătoare; deci sunt oarbe'*; și astfel ambele vor fi oarbe. Dacă spui că sunt văzătoare, *'deci ambele sunt văzătoare; deci orbul vede'*. Căci nu spune că unul este văzător și altul nu este văzător, ci va da un singur răspuns, întrucât admisese înainte că la fel se dădea definiția la plural și la singur. Și de aceea se dă un singur răspuns.

Despre reducerea tuturor raționamentelor falacioase
Despre cele două moduri ale ignorării respingerii

179. De bună seamă, distincția ignorării respingerii obișnuiește să se producă în două moduri, potrivit faptului că una dintre cele treisprezece raționamente falacioase este specifică, și potrivit faptului că una este generală la care se reduc toate cele treisprezece raționamente falacioase. Căci, într-un mod se distinge astfel că ignorarea respingerii se numește *'specifică'* potrivit faptului că ignorarea respingerii este cauzată de ignorarea acestor diferențe, adică *în raport cu același, potrivit aceluiași*, *în același fel și în același timp*; și astfel ignorarea respingerii este împotriva formei care completează respingerea, deoarece aceste diferențe sunt cele ce completează contradicția și astfel respingerea, de vreme ce contradicția este cea care completează respingerea. Însă potrivit faptului că ignorarea respingerii este cauzată în mod comun de ignorarea tuturor diferențelor stabilite în definiția respingerii, astfel este generală, și astfel la ea însăși sunt reduse toate raționamentele falacioase.

Însă în alt mod se distinge astfel că ignorarea respingerii este întotdeauna împotriva tuturor diferențelor respingerii, însă în mod diferit, deoarece într-un mod este potrivit ei înseși iar în al mod este din cauza consecventului. Și în primul mod există un singur principiu de a raționa falacios care este divizat față de celelalte prin opoziție, însă în al doilea mod este general pentru toate. Și se spune că cineva ignoră respingerea din cauza consecventului, atunci când, întrucât este un singur nume, crede că este un singur lucru, deși nu este un singur lucru; și deoarece crede că este un singur lucru, crede datorită consecventului că este un singur termen, și datorită consecventului că este un singur termen mediu, și prin consecvent un singur silogism, și apoi prin acesta o singură respingere. Și astfel ignorarea respingerii se datorează consecventului.

Însă în alt mod respingerea este ignorată potrivit ei înseși și părții sale datorită consecventului, atunci când mai întâi se crede că este o respingere în timp ce nu este; și deoarece crede că acolo este o respingere, crede că acolo sunt toate diferențele respingerii. Și astfel respingerea este ignorată mai întâi și părțile sau toate diferențele sale datorită consecventului. Și astfel este specifică, precum se întâmplă într-un mod să vină de la cele care definesc, precum de la gen și diferențe, spre definit, și în alt mod invers, de la definit spre cele care definesc. Însă, deși a doua distincție este mai subtilă decât prima, totuși prima este mai ușor de probat și cred în mai mare măsură că ea însăși este adevărată.

Despre reducerea generală

180. Însă, atât reducerea paralogismelor cât și a respingerilor aparente la ignorarea respingerii este de două feluri, deoarece una este generală și alta specifică. Căci reducerea este generală în măsura în care toate sunt nemodificate. Însă nemodificarea este de două feluri, deoarece opusul său, adică modificarea, este de două feluri, așa cum de două feluri este necesitatea silogismelor, deoarece una este necesitatea silogismului cauzată de cantitatea, calitatea și ordinea propozițiilor și termenilor silogismului; și la fel modificarea, potrivit faptului că modurile silogismelor sunt determinate în *Analitica primă*; și nemodificarea, care este opusă acestei modificări, trebuie să fie determinată în cartea *Analiticii prime*, și se numește *'legătură inutilă'*. Însă alta este necesitatea silogismului care este cauzată în silogismul specific. Și din nou, această necesitate este de două feluri, deoarece una este cauzată de raportările locale, precum în silogismul dialectic, și alta este cauzată de raportarea cauzei la efect, precum în silogismul demonstrativ. Și

la fel modificarea, care se datorează silogismului specific este de două feluri. Însă această modificare nu este decât necesitatea de a infera prin raportările locale, în cazul silogismului dialectic, sau prin raportarea cauzei la efect, în cazul silogismului demonstrativ. Și nemodificarea care se opune modificării cauzată prin raportările locale, este stabilită în cartea *Respingerilor,* deoarece cealaltă nemodificare, ce este privitoare la raportarea cauzei la efect sau invers, este determinată în cartea *Analiticii Secunde*, întrucât revine silogismului falsigraf. De aceea, atunci când Aristotel spune că toate sunt nemodificate, trebuie înțeles cu privire la nemodificarea care se referă la modificarea cauzată prin raportările locale și nu cu privire la altele.

Despre reducerea specifică

181. Însă reducerea specifică înseamnă a indica cum prin fiecare loc sofistic diferențele comune ale silogismului și contradicției sau diferențele proprii ambelor sunt ignorate. Și prin acest lucru respingerea este ignorată ulterior deoarece, așa cum diferența care îi revine genului constituie specia, tot așa contradicția care îi revine silogismului constituie respingerea; și din acest motiv contradicția este cea care completează silogismul. De aceea, orice diferență a respingerii fie este comună silogismului și contradicției, fie proprie acestuia, fie proprie aceleia. Și de aceea prin ignorarea acelora se obține ignorarea respingerii.

182. Deci, Aristotel reduce mai întâi silogismele aparente și respingerile care sunt în rostire la ignorarea respingerii, atunci când spune: "echivocația, rostirea și figurarea asemănătoare se reduc întrucât sunt de două feluri"; căci în două feluri pune lipsa în termen, în silogism și în contradicție, motiv pentru care și în respingere. Însă cum este de două feluri în figura rostirii s-a spus. Despre echivocație și amfibolie reiese pentru oricine. Însă compunerea, diviziunea și accentul sunt reduse întrucât nu este aceeași rostire sau nume, ci diferă; căci trebuia să fie aceeași rostire în măsura în care <este și același> lucru, dacă trebuia să fie respingere sau silogism.

183. Însă în consecință, reduce silogismele și respingerile aparente care sunt în afara rostirii la ignorarea respingerii, atunci când spune "însă cele care sunt potrivit accidentului sunt evidente odată ce silogismul a fost definit"; căci ei pun lipsa acestei expresii, adică *'a se întâmpla din necesitate'*, care este pusă în definiția silogismului; și astfel reiese lipsa accidentului. Căci potrivit acestui raționament falacios se argumentează de către cei lipsiți de cunoaștere contra celor pricepuți în arte și cu totul cunoscători; căci potrivit accidentului produc silogisme aparente

împotriva celor înțelepți. Însă cele care sunt *potrivit cu ceva și în mod simplu* sunt reduse, deoarece afirmația și negația nu este despre același lucru, precum *'Etiopianul este alb la dinți'*, *'Etiopianul nu este alb'*.

184. Apoi, <Aristotel> le reduce pe cele care sunt potrivit ignorării respingerii, după cum <reducerea> este specifică, atunci când spune: *"însă cele mai evidente dintre toate sunt cele care au fost numite mai întâi potrivit ignorării respingerii, motiv pentru care chiar au fost numite astfel"*.

185. În mod consecvent, le reduce pe altele atunci când spune *"însă acele paralogisme care au loc întrucât se ia cel aflat la început și se pune non-cauza în calitate de cauză, sunt evidente prin definiție; căci trebuie ca o concluzie să aibă loc din necesitate, întrucât acestea sunt ceea ce nu era în non-cauze, și, pe de altă parte, dacă cel aflat la început nu se numără, <acestea sunt> ceea ce nu au cele care sunt potrivit solicitării celui aflat la început"*.

186. Însă după aceea, el le reduce pe acelea care sunt potrivit consecventului, atunci când spune "*însă cele potrivit consecventului sunt reduse la fel cu cele care sunt potrivit accidentului, deoarece consecventul este parte a accidentului*". Și astfel reducerea accidentului este redusă la cea a consecventului. Însă faptul că consecventul este parte a accidentului reiese din cele pe care le-am spus despre accident, deoarece, așa cum s-a spus acolo, într-un mod antecedentul este accident pentru consecvent, și într-alt mod consecventul pentru antecedent, și în al treilea mod unul dintre convertibili pentru celălalt celălalt; motiv pentru care, accidentul este comun celui care este antecedent, celui care este consecvent și celui care este convertit. Deci, consecventul sau lucrul care este consecvent trebuie să fie parte a accidentului, de vreme ce antecedentul este comun acestora trei.

187. Însă reține că un singur loc nu este parte a altuia. Căci nu se poate spune că locul sofistic potrivit consecventului este parte subiectivă sau integrală a locului sofistic potrivit accidentului. De aceea, înțelege că consecventul este parte a accidentului <ce provine> de la partea termenilor în care are să fie, însă nu <ce provine> de la partea raportărilor sofistice însele sau a locurilor sofistice; precum locul <ce provine> de la specie nu este parte a locului <ce provine> de la gen, ci acelea pentru care sunt ele raportări se raportează astfel încât unul este parte a altuia. Și așa consecventul este ca o parte subiectivă a accidentului <ce provine> de la partea acelora în care au loc, și nu de la partea raportărilor sofistice însele. Și Aristotel probează acest lucru potrivit faptului că consecventul este parte a accidentului, atunci când spune: *"căci consecventul este*

accident". Căci la fel este adevărat că antecedentul este accident și la fel faptul că convertibilul este accident, precum s-a spus în tratatul despre accident.

188. Însă <raționamentul falacios al> consecventului are o altă reducere proprie potrivit lui însuși în afară de aceasta, căci pune o lipsă împotriva acestei diferențe a silogismului, adică *'cele puse'*. Ceea ce reiese, deoarece mai marele nu pune mai micul, precum *'viețuitor'* nu pune *'om'*. Și astfel consecventul nu pune antecedentul, deoarece este mai mare, ci invers. De aceea, de vreme ce diferența *'cele puse'* numește ordinea premiselor în raport cu concluzia potrivit raportărilor locale, (deoarece locurile sofistice sunt determinate în *Respingeri* împotriva silogismului prin raportările locale)¸ însă acolo unde este consecventul, nu este o ordine a premiselor în raport cu concluzia potrivit anumitor raportări locale; motiv pentru care, acolo unde există <raționamentul falacios al> consecventului, nu există diferența *'cele puse'*. Și astfel consecventul este redus potrivit lui însuși prin diferența *'cele puse'*, atunci când pune o lipsă cu privire la ea.

Și reține, precum adesea s-a amintit, că punerea în silogism este de două feluri. Căci una este punerea prin cantitate, calitate și ordinea propozițiilor și a termenilor; și astfel se ia diferența *'cele puse'* în *Analitica primă*. Însă alta este punerea în silogism, care are loc prin raportările locale; și o punere este de acest fel în silogismul dialectic. Și împotriva acestei puneri este locul sofistic *potrivit consecventului*.

189. Însă cele care, întrucât produc mai multe întrebări ca una, sunt reduse întrucât pun o lipsă contra unității propoziției. Căci propoziția înseamnă un singur lucru despre un singur lucru, deoarece aceeași este definiția unui singur lucru și a lucrului în mod absolut, precum a omului și doar a unui singur om; și tot așa cu privire la altele. Deci, dacă doar o singură propoziție este aceea care semnifică un singur lucru despre unul singur, va fi și în mod absolut o propoziție care semnifică un singur lucru despre un singur lucru. Și locul provine de la părțile care sunt enumerate în mod suficient.

190. Însă după ce reducția generală și apoi cea specifică potrivit diferențelor respingerii și contradicției au fost încheiate, Aristotel determină în consecință care locuri sofistice sunt reduse de la partea contradicției și care de la partea silogismului, atunci când spune: *"deci, cele care sunt potrivit rostirii sunt reduse deoarece contradicția este aparentă, ceea ce era propriu respingerii; însă altele sunt reduse potrivit definiției silogismului"*. Iar despre raționamentele falacioase și despre reducerea lor, fie suficiente cele spuse.

TRATATUL VIII
DESPRE RELATIVI

Despre relativul de două feluri

1. Relativul este de două feluri. Căci, într-un mod, cel al cărui fapt de a fi înseamnă a se afla într-un oarecare raport cu un altul este relativ; și astfel relativul este unul dintre cele zece predicamente. Însă într-alt mod, relativul este cel ce reamintește lucrul pus anterior, deoarece, precum dorește Priscian în volumul mai mic, relația este reamintirea lucrului pus anterior, precum aici: *'Socrate aleargă, <el> care dispută'*; relativul *'care'* îl amintește pe Socrate, care este lucrul pus anterior. Însă dacă lăsăm deoparte relativii potrivit primului mod, atunci ne îndreptăm atenția aici către relativii potrivit celui de-al doilea mod.

Despre relativii substanței

2. Însă dintre relativi, unii sunt relativi ai substanței, precum *'care'*, *'acela', 'altul';* alții, relativi ai accidentului, precum *'de un asemenea fel', 'de ce fel'*, *'atât de', 'cât de'*. Însă relativul substanței este cel care face referire la un lucru identic în număr cu antecedentul său, precum *'el care'*, *'acela'*. Apoi, dintre relativii substanței, unii sunt relativi ai identității, precum *'el care'*, *'acela'*; însă alții, relativi ai diversității, precum *'unul'*, *'altul'* și cele asemănătoare.

Despre relativii identității

3. Însă relativ al identității este acela care face referire și stă în locul aceluiași lucru, precum *'Socrate aleagă, <el> care dispută'*; relativul *'care'* face referire la Socrate și stă în locul lui Socrate. Însă dintre relativii identității, unii sunt nume, precum *'care'*, *'ceea ce'*; alții sunt pronume, precum *'acela'*, *'acelaşi'*. Apoi, dintre relativii identității, unii sunt reciproci, precum *'al său, sieşi, pe sine, de la sine'*, însă alții, relativi non-reciproci, precum *'care'*, *'acela'*, *'acelaşi'*. Însă nu se numește *'reciproc'* întrucât este cel afectat, ci deoarece pune modul celui afectat deasupra substanței care acționează. Deoarece, una este cel afectat și alta este modul celui afectat, precum reiese prin faptul că nominativul poate să fie cel afectat, precum *'Socrate este lovit'*, însă nu poate

să aibă modul celui afectat. De aceea, modul celui afectat este întotdeauna în cazuri oblice. Și astfel reiese că una este cel afectat și alta este modul celui afectat.

Întrebări

4. Însă dacă se întreabă ce adaugă în plus un relativ reciproc la un agent, trebuie spus că adaugă identitatea substanței și o pune pe ea sub modul celui afectat, precum *'Socrate se vede pe sine'*. Căci substanța care era mai înainte sub modul celui care acționează, este pusă sub modul celui afectat, precum în pronumele *'pe sine'*. De aceea, reciprocul poate fi definit astfel: reciproc este ceea ce semnifică substanța care acționează sub modul celui afectat.

5. Apoi, dacă se întreabă de ce pronumele *'al său, sieși, pe sine, de la sine'* nu are nominativ, trebuie spus că soluția tocmai reiese din cele menționate, deoarece agentul nu poate fi semnificat ca fiind afectat sau sub modul celui afectat, decât în cazuri oblice. Însă nominativul numește modul agentului. Și de aceea, natura nominativului se opune naturii pronumelui *'al său, sieși, pe sine, de la sine'*. Și de aceea, nominativul nu poate să aibă un agent.

6. Deci, din cele pomenite reiese că toate relativele de identitate fac referire la aceeași substanță cu antecedentul său și fac referire și stau în locul aceluiași lucru în număr. Și de aici reiese că certitudinea devine mai mare prin relativul identității decât prin antecedentul său pus în locul relativului, precum *'omul aleargă, omul dispută'*, deoarece există o îndoială dacă se vorbește despre același om sau nu. Însă atunci când se spune *'omul aleargă și acela dispută'*, este cert că se vorbește despre același lucru. Căci acesta reiese prin ceea ce spune Priscian în <volumul> mai mic, atunci când spune: *'Aiax vine la Troia, Aiax luptase cu vitejie'*; există o îndoială dacă se înțelege cu privire la același. Însă dacă se spune: *'Aiax vine la Troia și același luptase cu vitejie'*, se înțelege cu privire la același. Și astfel reiese că se produce o certitudine mai mare prin relativul identității decât prin antecedentul său pus în locul relativului.

Îndoieli

7. Însă există obiceiul de a formula îndoieli cu privire la relativii identității, dacă înșelarea care se produce dintr-o relaționare diferită are loc potrivit echivocației sau potrivit altui raționament falacios, precum atunci când se spune *'omul vede un asin, <el> care este rațional'*,

acest relativ *'care'* poate să se refere la termenul *'om'*, sau la termenul *'asin'*. Și astfel acolo există înțelesuri diferite. Și acolo echivocația obișnuiește să se atribuie în mod comun.

Însă contra, numele *'care'*, potrivit faptului că este un relativ, semnifică un singur lucru care se raportează în mod egal la orice lucru care se raportează prin modul substanței, precum *'omul care aleargă', 'culoarea care este în corp', 'locul care conține lucrul localizat'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Deci, înșelarea ce provine din relaționarea diferită nu este o echivocație. Apoi, numele *'el care'*, potrivit faptului că este un relativ, semnifică în mod nedeterminat substanța. Însă acea substanță are capacitatea naturală de a se determina atât printr-un antecedent, cât și prin altul. Așadar, dacă acea substanță care este luată în mod nedeterminat este una singură în sine, deși poate să se refere la oricare antecedent, atunci semnificația relativului *'care'* va fi una singură. Deci nu este o echivocație. Apoi, rațiunea fiecărui antecedent, potrivit faptului că este în cel relaționat, este una singură, adică acest lucru pus înainte. Deci toți antecedenții ai relativului, potrivit acestui nume relativ, participă la un singur nume și la o singură rațiune. Deci, relativul este univoc în măsura în reamintește lucrul pus anterior. Deci relativii particulari precum *'care'*, *'acela'*, *'altul'*, în măsura în care sunt relativi ai antecedenților săi, nu sunt echivoci.

Dacă cineva obiectează că relativul *'care'* are o anumită rațiune potrivit faptului că este luat în antecedentul *'om'*, și alta potrivit faptului că este luat în antecedentul *'asin'*, ca în rostirea menționată, deci numele este comun și are rațiuni diferite, deci este echivoc, trebuie spus că argumentul nu este valid. La fel ar putea fi probat că orice univoc ar fi echivoc, precum *viețuitorul* potrivit faptului că este om sau este în om are o anumită rațiune, și potrivit faptului că este în cal sau este cal, alta. Însă numele *'viețuitor'* este comun și totuși nu este echivoc, ci univoc.

8. De aceea, trebuie dat pe scurt ca soluție faptul că, așa cum univocele se spun că au aceeași rațiune, <dar> nu potrivit lor însele, ci în cel care produce univocația, precum *om, bou, cal* și cele asemănătoare în *viețuitor*, la fel toate relativele trebuie să aibă aceeași rațiune, <dar> nu potrivit lor însele, ci în referentul lor sau în cel cu care relaționează, ba chiar au același nume. Și de aceea, cele univoce sunt univocate în el. Însă acela obiectează cu privire la rațiunile lucrurilor relaționate potrivit lor însele. De aceea, conchidem obiecțiile menționate de aceasta. Și de aceea, conchid că înșelarea produsă datorită relaționării diferite nu este potrivit echivocației. Apoi, această înșelare este în ordonarea cuvintelor între ele însele. Deci în rostire, deoarece ordonarea cuvintelor nu este nimic altceva decât o rostire. Deci, nu este o echivocație, deoarece echivocația este doar într-un singur cuvânt.

9. Apoi, probez că acolo nu există o amfibolie, deoarece oriunde există o amfibolie, acolo există o îmbinare a unuia cu altul, precum în rostirea: *'cartea lui Aristotel'* cât privește primul mod; cât privește al doilea, în rostirea: *'țărmul se ară'*; cât privește al treilea, în rostirea: *'știe lumea'*. Și astfel reiese în mod inductiv prin toate modurile amfiboliei că oriunde există o amfibolie, există o îmbinare a unuia doar cu un altul, însă oriunde există o relaționare diferită, nu există o îmbinare a unuia doar cu un altul, ci din contră a unuia cu alții. Deci, înșelarea ce provine dintr-o relaționare diferită nu produce o amfibolie. Ceea ce concedem. Apoi, oriunde există o înșelare, întrucât un anumit cuvânt se poate referi la lucruri diferite, există o compunere sau o diviziune. Însă înșelarea produsă de relaționarea diferită apare datorită faptului că un anumit cuvânt se poate referi la lucruri diferite. Deci, înșelarea produsă de relaționarea diferită este o compunere sau o diviziune, ceea ce iarăși concedem.

Despre relativii deosebirii

10. Urmează <să tratăm> despre relativii deosebirii. Relativul deosebirii este ceea ce stă în locul altuia decât a aceluia la care se referă, precum *'Socrate aleagă și altul dispută'*; relativul *'altul'* se referă la Socrate și stă în locul altuia decât Socrate, deoarece sensul este *Socrate aleargă și altul decât Socrate dispută;* și astfel îl reamintește pe Socrate.

Despre o anumită regulă cu privire la relativul deosebirii

11. Însă despre relativul deosebirii se dă regula următoare: *dacă relativul deosebirii este adăugat superiorului și inferiorului, ceea ce se adaugă superiorului devine inferior și ceea ce se adaugă inferiorului devine superior*. De exemplu, atunci când se spune: *'altul decât viețuitorul; deci altul decât omul'*. Acesta este locul <ce provine> de la specie, deoarece, în rostirea *'altul decât viețuitorul',* relativul deosebirii, adică *'altul'*, este adăugat *'viețuitorului'*, care este superior față de *om*, și în rostirea *'altul decât omul'* se adaugă inferiorului, adică *'omului'*; și de aceea *'altul decât viețuitorul'* este inferior față de *'altul decât omul'*. Și de aceea acolo este locul <ce provine> de la specie sau de la partea subordonată.

Despre o anumită regulă a celor vechi cu privire la relativul identității

12. Însă apoi, despre relativul identității obișnuiește să se dea de către cei din vechime o astfel de regulă: *nici o propoziție care începe de la un relativ nu are contradictorie.* Și ei stabilesc următorul raționament: când se spune *'orice om aleargă și acela dispută'*; relativul *'acela'* are o raportare la antecedentul *'om'* datorită dependenței relaționării sale. Însă, când negația se adaugă la propoziția care începe de la un relativ, spunând: *'acela nu dispută'*, atunci acea negație neagă verbul care urmează și nu neagă raportarea relaționării pe care o are față de antecedent. Deci negarea nu neagă orice afirmase afirmația. Deci nu contrazice. Deci, deoarece acest lucru are loc în orice propoziție care începe de la un relativ, nici o propoziție care începe de la un relativ nu are contradictorie.

Obiecții

13. Însă împotriva acestei <poziții> se obiectează. Orice se întâmplă să nege, se întâmplă să afirme despre orice subiect. Însă se întâmplă să nege verbul despre orice subiect, și astfel să afirme. Deci despre subiect, care este un cuvânt relativ. Deci orice propoziție care începe de la un relativ are contradictorie. Apoi, orice propoziție sau enunț care este una singură, are contradictorie. Însă orice propoziție care începe de la un relativ, cât timp nu există în ea un anumit cuvânt echivoc nici nu stau ca subiect sau sunt predicate mai multe, este una singură. Deci, orice propoziție care începe de la un relativ are contradictorie. Apoi, Aristotel spune în *Despre interpretare*, 1 că fiecărei afirmații îi este opusă o negație și invers. Deci afirmației care începe de la un relativ. Ceea ce concedem spunând că regula pomenită este falsă.

14. Însă la argumentul acelora să răspundem că relativul se raportează la antecedentul său și se raportează la verbul pentru care stă ca subiect. De aceea, de vreme ce afirmația și negația este o rostire afirmativă sau negativă a cuiva despre ceva, adică a predicatului despre subiect, spun că așa cum reiese prin definiția pomenită a afirmației și a negației, afirmația și negația consideră doar raportarea subiectului cu predicatul. Deci în propoziția care începe de la un relativ doar contradictoria se ia prin raportarea subiectului la predicatul. Deci, doar prin raportarea relativului la verbul pentru care stă ca subiect, și nu prin raportarea relativului la antecedent. Și astfel nu trebuie să se nege relația pe care o are relativul cu antecedentul, deoarece acea relație nu este acolo

datorită naturii afirmației și nici datorită dependenței subiectului ca subiect, ci datorită dependenței celui care este subiect. Deoarece, una este subiectul și cel care este subiect, precum una este predicatul și cel care este predicat. Și astfel, orice este afirmat în propoziția care începe de la un relativ, este negat în contradictoria sa. Și contradictoria acesteia *'acela dispută'* este aceasta: *'nu acela dispută'*, prin negația care este pusă în fața relativului.

Despre o anumită regulă cu privire la relativul identității

15. Însă despre relativul identității se dă regula următoare: *orice relativ al identității non-reciproc trebuie să aibă aceeași supoziție pe care o are antecedentul său*; precum atunci când se spune: *'orice om aleargă și acela este Socrate'*, relativul *'acela'* stă în locul oricărui om; și sensul este *'acela este Socrate'* adică *orice om este Socrate*. Însă spun *'non-reciproc'*, deoarece, atunci când se spune: *'orice om se vede pe sine'*, sensul nu este *'orice om vede orice om'*. De aceea, în locul relativului reciproc *'pe sine'* nu este permis a pune antecedentul său, însă este permis să îl pună în locul altuia.

Despre relativii accidentului

16. După ce am stabilit cu privire la relativii substanței, trebuie să vorbim despre relativii accidentului. Însă relativul accidentului este ceea ce se referă la același lucru printr-un mod al denominării, precum *'de un asemenea fel'*, *'de ce fel'* și cele asemănătoare. De aceea, aceasta este diferența relativului substanței față de relativul accidentului, deoarece relativul substanței se referă la un lucrul univoc, sau prin modul celui ce este *ceva*, precum *'albiciunea care este în perete'*, *'culoarea care este în corp'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Însă relativ al accidentului este cel care se referă la un lucru prin modul denominării, precum *'Socrate este alb și de un asemenea fel este Platon'*.

Însă altfel se dă diferența acelorași, că relativul substanței se referă la același lucru în număr, însă relativul accidentului se referă la aceeași în specie, precum *'Socrate este alb și de un asemenea fel este Platon'*, deoarece același accident în număr nu poate să fie în subiecte diferite, ci același accident în specie.

Despre diviziunea relativului accidentului

17. Însă relativul accidentului se divide, deoarece una este relativul identității, precum *'de un asemenea fel'*, alta relativul deosebirii, precum *'de un alt fel'*. Relativul identității în accidente este ceea ce se referă la același accident în specie și stă în locul aceluiași lucru în specie, precum *'Socrate este alb și de un asemenea fel este Platon'*. Însă relativul deosebirii în accidente este ceea ce se referă la aceeași calitate sub specie și stă în locul unei calități diferite în specie, precum *'Socrate este alb și de un alt fel este Platon'*. Însă relativul identității substanței diferă de relativul identității accidentului, deoarece relativul identității substanței se referă la aceeași substanță în număr, dar relativul identității accidentului nu se referă la același accident în număr, ci același accident în specie.

Despre relativii identității accidentului

18. Apoi, dintre relativii identității în accidente, unul este relativul calității, precum *'de un asemenea fel', 'de ce fel'*, altul al cantității, precum *'atât de', 'cât de'*. Apoi, de felul cantității, una este cantitatea continuă, precum *'atât de'*, însă alta a numărului, precum *'tot atât', 'tot atât de mult'*. Apoi, dintre relativele numărului, unele sunt nume, precum *'tot atât', 'tot atât de mult'*, altele adverbe, precum *'tot de atâtea ori'*.

Despre cuvintele 'de un asemenea fel', 'atât de', 'tot atât', 'tot atât de mult', 'de atâtea ori'

19. Însă trebuie știut că *'de un asemenea fel', 'atât de', 'tot atât', 'tot atât de mult'* și *'tot de atâtea ori'* pot fi relative, demonstrative și reditive. Deoarece, dacă sunt rostite referitor la cele prezente, sunt demonstrative; precum spunem indicând către mare *'de un asemenea fel este Nilul'*, și indicându-l pe Hercule *'atât de <măreț> este Platon'*, și tot așa despre altele. Însă dacă nu se rostesc referitor la cele prezente sau prin indicarea lucrurilor prezente, atunci sunt relative sau reditive. Însă atunci sunt în mod propriu reditive când sunt redate interogației precedente, precum *'de ce fel este Socrate?'; 'este de un asemenea fel ca Platon.'*. Însă sunt relative, atunci când sunt rostite fără interogație, precum *'de ce fel este Platon, de un asemenea fel fusese Socrate'*, și atunci când sunt rostite referitor la adjectivele accidentelor speciale, precum *'Etiopianul este negru și de*

un asemenea fel este corbul' sau *'Socrate fusese alb și de un asemenea fel este Platon'*. Și fie suficiente cele spuse despre relativi.

TRATATUL IX
DESPRE AMPLIAȚII

Despre supoziția personală

1. Supoziția personală este luarea termenului comun în locul inferiorilor săi. Dintre care, una este determinată, alta confuză, precum a reieșit înainte. Apoi, există o altă diviziune a supoziției personale, căci de felul ei, una este cea restrânsă, alta cea ampliată. Și de aceea restrângerea și ampliația trebuie să aibă de-a face cu supoziția personală.

Despre restrângere și ampliație

2. Restrângerea este contractarea termenului comun de la o supoziție mai mare la una mai mică, precum atunci când se spune *'omul alb aleargă'*, adjectivul *'alb'* restrânge *'omul'* la faptul de a sta în locul celor albi. Ampliația este extinderea termenului comun de la o supoziție mai mică la una mai mare, precum atunci când se spune *'omul poate fi Antichrist';* termenul *'omul'* nu stă doar în locul acelora care există, ci în locul celor ce vor exista. De aceea, este ampliat la cei viitori. Însă spun *'termenului comun'*, deoarece termenul discret, precum *'Socrate'*, nici nu se restrânge și nici nu se ampliază.

Despre diviziunea ampliației

3. Însă dintre ampliații, una se produce prin verb, precum prin verbul *'poate'*, precum *'omul poate fi Antichrist'*; alta prin nume, precum *'faptul că omul este Antichrist este posibil'*; alta prin participiu, precum *'omul este cel care poate fi Antichrist'*; alta prin adverb, precum *'omul este în mod necesar viețuitor'*; căci *'omul'* este ampliat nu doar pentru timpul prezent, ci și cu privire la cel viitor. Și de aceea reiese o altă diviziunea a ampliației, adică că, de felul ampliației, una este cu privire la supoziți, precum *'omul poate fi Antichrist'*; alta cu privire la timp, precum *'omul este în mod necesar viețuitor'*, precum s-a spus.

Sofism

4. Cu privire la cele menționate se cercetează despre sofismul: *'imposibilul poate fi adevărat'*. Proba: acel lucru care este sau va fi imposibil, poate fi adevărat, precum *faptul că nu fusese Antichrist* va fi imposibil după timpul lui și într-un mod poate fi adevărat, deoarece este adevărat; deci imposibilul poate fi adevărat. Contra: orice poate fi adevărat este posibil, însă imposibilul poate fi adevărat; deci imposibilul este posibil, în al treilea <mod> al primei <figuri>. Însă concluzia este falsă. Deci și una dintre premise. Nu majora. Deci minora. Însă aceasta este prima. Deci prima este falsă.

Soluția: prima este în mod absolut falsă, adică acesta *'imposibilul poate fi adevărat'*. Și proba greșește potrivit sofismului accidentului, deoarece, atunci când spun *'celui care îi este sau îi va fi imposibil'*, spun două lucruri, adică subiectul acelei imposibilități și imposibilitatea însăși sau însuși imposibilul. Însă celui care îi va fi imposibil imposibilitatea sau imposibilul îi este accident. De aceea, cel care este sau va fi imposibil, este lucrul pus ca subiect, și imposibilul este accidentul lui, și faptul de a fi adevărat se atribuie ca inerent ambilor. Precum aici: *'faptul că nu fusese Antichrist va fi imposibil, însă faptul că nu fusese Antichrist poate fi adevărat; deci imposibilul poate fi adevărat'*; nu este valid, deoarece *faptul că nu fusese Antichrist* este lucrul pus ca subiect și *imposibilul* este accidentul lui și *faptul că poate fi adevărat* se atribuie ca inerent ambilor.

Despre cele două reguli

5. Însă despre ampliația care se produce din cauza supozițiilor, se dă regula următoare: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect pentru verbul ce are putere de a amplia de la sine sau de la un altul este ampliat la cele care pot fi sub forma termenului care stă ca subiect*. Precum *'omul poate fi alb'*, căci aici termenul *'om'* stă nu doar în locul celor prezenți, ci de asemenea este ampliat la toți cei care vor fi. Însă spun *'de la sine'*, deoarece verbul *'poate'* are de la sine natura de a amplia. Însă spun *'de la un altul'*, deoarece participiul *'care poate'* și numele *'posibil'* dau puterea de a amplia verbului căruia îi sunt adăugate, precum *'omul este cel care poate fi alb'*, sau *'viețuitorul este posibil să fie alb'*.

6. Însă despre ampliația care se produce din cauza timpului, se dă regula următoare: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau ca obiect pentru verbul ce are puterea de a amplia datorită*

timpului stă în locul acelora care sunt și vor fi întotdeauna. Precum *'omul este în mod necesar viețuitor'*; atât *'omul'* cât și *'viețuitor'* se țin în locul acelora care sunt și care vor fi întotdeauna. Și fie suficiente cele spuse despre ampliații.

TRATATUL X
DESPRE APELAȚII

Despre definiția apelației

1. Apelația este luarea termenului comun în locul lucrului care există. Însă spun *'în locul lucrului care există'*, deoarece termenul care semnifică neființa nu apelează nimic, precum *'Cezar',* ba chiar *'Antichrist'* și *'himera'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Însă apelația diferă de supoziție și de semnificație, deoarece apelația este doar despre un lucru care există, însă semnificația și supoziția atât despre un lucru care există cât și despre unul care nu există. Precum *'Antichrist'* îl semnifică pe Antichrist și stă în locul Antichristului, însă nu apelează nimic; însă *'om'* semnifică un om și potrivit propriei sale naturi stă atât în locul celor existenți cât și în locul celor non-existenți și apelează doar oamenii care există.

Despre diviziunea apelației

2. Însă dintre apelații, una este a termenului comun, precum cea a [termenului] *'om'*, alta a termenului singular, precum a lui *'Socrate'*. Termenul singular semnifică, stă în locul și apelează același lucru, deoarece semnifică un lucru care există, precum *'Petrus'* sau *'Iohannes'*.

Despre apelația termenului comun

3. Apoi, de felul apelației termenului comun, una este a termenului comun în locul lucrului însuși în comun, precum atunci când un termen comun are o supoziție simplă; precum atunci când se spune *'omul este specie'* sau *'viețuitorul este gen'*. Și atunci termenul comun semnifică, stă în locul, și apelează același lucru, precum *'om'* semnifică *omul* în comun și stă în locul *omului* în comun și apelează *omul* în comun.

4. Însă alta este <apelația> termenului comun în locul inferiorilor săi, precum atunci când termenul comun are o supoziție personală; precum când se spune *'omul aleargă'*, atunci *'omul'* nu semnifică, stă în locul și apelează același lucru, ci semnifică *omul* în comun și stă în locul unor oameni particulari și apelează oameni particulari care există. Și să fie suficiente cele spuse despre apelații.

TRATATUL XI
DESPRE RESTRÂNGERI

Despre definiția restrângerii

1. După ce am vorbit despre ampliații și apelații, trebuie să vorbim despre restrângeri. Restrângerea este contractarea termenului comun de la o supoziție mai mare la una mai mică, precum s-a spus mai înainte.

Despre diviziunea restrângerii

2. Însă dintre restrângeri, una se produce prin nume. Precum atunci când se spune *'om alb'*, termenul *'om'* nu stă în locul celor negri și nici în locul celor colorați cu o culoare intermediară, ci este restrâns la cei albi. Alta se produce prin verb, precum atunci când se spune *'omul aleargă'*; termenul *'omul'* stă în locul celor prezenți. Alta se produce prin participiu, precum atunci când se spune *'omul care aleargă dispută'*; termenul *'omul'* stă în locul celor care aleargă. Alta prin implicație, precum atunci când se spune *'omul care este alb aleargă'*; <expresia> *'care este alb'* restrânge *'omul'* la cei albi.

Despre restrângerea produsă prin nume

3. Apoi, de felul restrângerii produse prin nume, una se produce printr-un inferior adăugat unui superior, precum atunci când se spune *'viețuitor-om'*; termenul *'viețuitor'* stă doar în locul viețuitoarelor care sunt oameni. Alta se produce printr-o diferență care este adăugată genului, care este esențială, deoarece este constructivă pentru specie, precum atunci când se spune *'viețuitor rațional'*; căci termenul *'viețuitor'* stă în locul celor raționale. Alta se produce printr-un adjectiv al accidentului, precum atunci când se spune *'om alb'*; termenul *'om'* stă doar în locul celor albi.

Despre o anumită regula cu privire la restrângerea produsă prin nume

4. Despre restrângerea produsă printr-un nume se dă următoarea regulă luată în mod comun: *orice nume care nu micșorează și care nici nu are natura de a-l amplia pe cel adăugat de*

aceeași parte a termenului în mai mare măsură comun îl restrânge pe el însuși la a sta în locul acelora, pe care semnificația sa o cere. Precum reiese în exemplele menționate mai sus, deoarece *'om'* prin semnificația sa restrânge *'viețuitor'* la viețuitoarele care sunt oameni, atunci când se spune *'viețuitor-om'*; și *'alb'* restrânge omul prin semnificația sa la oamenii albi, atunci când se spune *'om alb'*. Însă spun *'care nu micșorează'* pentru a îndepărta numele care micșorează rațiunea celui adăugat, precum *'mort'* și *'corupt'*, și cele asemănătoare, care nu restrâng, ci mai degrabă îl distrug pe cel adăugat. Însă spun *'care nu are natura de a amplia'* pentru a îndepărta cuvintele ampliative, precum *'posibil', 'care poate'*, și cele asemănătoare, care nu îl restrânge, ci mai degrabă îl ampliază.

5. Și trebuie știu că cel în mai mică măsură comun îl restrânge întotdeauna pe cel în mai mare măsură comun, precum atunci când se spune *'om alb'*; deoarece *om* se regăsește în oamenii albi, în cei negrii și în cei colorați într-o culoare intermediară, însă *alb* nu, întrucât termenul *'om'* este în mai mare măsură comun, *'alb'* este în mai mică măsură comun. Și astfel *'alb'* îl restrânge pe *'om'*. Însă potrivit faptului că *alb* se regăsește în oameni, fiare și pietre, însă *om* nu, astfel *alb* este în mai mare măsură comun și *om* în mai mică măsură comun. Și astfel *'om'* îl restrânge pe *'alb'* la albiciunea care există în oameni, atunci când se spune *'om alb'*. Și astfel *'om'* stă doar în locul oamenilor albi și *'alb'* este restrâns la albiciunea care este în oameni. Și astfel fiecare îl restrânge pe celălalt, însă potrivit unor lucruri diferite.

Despre o anumită regulă cu privire la termenul restrâns

6. Apoi, cu privire la termenul restrâns se dă regula următoare: *dacă semnul universal se adaugă termenului restrâns, nu îl distribuie pe el însuși decât în locul acelora la care este restrâns*, precum atunci când se spune *'orice om alb aleargă'*; deoarece *'om'* este restrâns la cei albi, nu poate fi distribuit decât în locul celor albi.

Despre o anumită regulă diferită cu privire la restrângere

7. Apoi, cu privire la restrângere se dă o altă regulă de acest fel: *nimic care este pus de partea predicatului nu poate să restrângă termenul comun pus de partea subiectului în ce privește semnificația principală*, deoarece, atunci când se spune *'omul este alb'*, termenul *'alb'* pus în predicat nu poate să restrângă *'omul'* pus în subiect la cei albi. Deoarece, dacă s-ar restrânge la cei

albi, deci, prin regula precedentă, dacă semnul universal i se adaugă lui, el însuși s-ar distribui doar la cei albi. Și astfel în acesta: *'orice om este alb'*; termenul *'om'* se ține doar în locul celor albi; și astfel sensul este: *orice om alb este alb*. De aceea, acestea două sunt echipolente: *'orice om este alb'* și *'orice om alb este alb'*. Deci, dacă una este adevărată, cealaltă este adevărată, și dacă una este falsă, cealaltă este falsă. Însă acesta este adevărată: *'orice om alb este alb'*. Deci aceasta va fi adevărată: *'orice om este alb'*. Însă acesta este falsă. Deci și prima. Deci, atunci când se spune *'omul este alb'*, termenul *'om'* nu este restrâns la cei albi. Și astfel această regulă reiese. Însă spun *'în ce privește semnificația principală'*, deoarece predicatul restrânge subiectul în ce privește cosemnificația, precum atunci când se spune *'cetățeanul este alb'*; termenul *'cetățean'* este restrâns la masculi și nu la cei albi, și astfel *'alb'* îl restrânge pe el însuși în ce privește cosemnificația, care este gen, și nu în ce privește semnificația sa.

Despre cele două reguli cu privire la restrângerea produsă prin implicație

8. Apoi, cu privire la restrângerea produsă prin implicație se dă o regulă de acest fel: *orice implicație nemediată adăugată termenului comun îl restrânge pe el însuși și pe adjectivul său,* precum atunci când se spune: *'omul care este alb aleargă'*; termenul *'om'* este restrâns la cei albi prin implicația *'care este alb'*.

9. Apoi, cu privire la aceeași restrângere se dă o regula de acest fel: *ori de câte ori un semn universal și o implicație sunt puse în aceeași locuțiune, expresia este are două* <*sensuri*>; întrucât semnul poate preceda implicația și astfel distribuie termenul comun pentru oricare supozit al său, precum *'orice om aleargă, care este alb'*; ba chiar implicația poate să vină mai întâi și să restrângă termenul comun, și atunci semnul care vine după nu distribuie termenul, decât în locul acelora la care este restrâns, precum *'orice om care este alb aleargă'*; și astfel <propoziția> este echipolentă cu acesta *'orice om alb aleargă'*.

Despre anumite reguli cu privire la restrângerea produsă prin verb

10. Urmează <să tratăm> despre restrângerea produsă prin verb, cu privire la care se dau mai multe reguli. Prima este următoarea: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau ca obiect pentru un verb al timpului prezent, care este luat în mod absolut, dacă nu are putere de a amplia nici de*

la el însuși și nici de la un altul, este restrâns la faptul de a sta în locul acelora care sunt sub forma termenului suponent. Însă spun *'a termenului comun'*, deoarece termenul discret nu este restrâns și nici nu este ampliat. Însă spun *'al timpului prezent'* pentru a îndepărta verbele altor timpuri, deoarece termenul comun are o altă supoziție cu ele. Însă spun *'care este luat în mod absolut'* pentru a îndepărta verbele diminutive, precum *'este opinabil sau este inopinabil'*. Însă spun *'dacă nu are putere de a amplia'* pentru a îndepărta verbele ampliative, precum *'poate'*. Însă spun *'nici de la sine nici de la un altul'*, deoarece când se spune *'este cel care poate'* sau *'este posibil'*, deși verbul *'este'* nu ampliază prin sine, totuși are putere de a amplia prin cele adăugate. Însă spun *'sub forma termenului suponent'*, deoarece *'om'* stă în locul acelora care sunt sub natura umană și *'viețuitor'* în locul acelora care sunt sub natura de viețuitor, atunci când se spune *'omul este viețuitor'*.

11. Apoi, se dă o altă regulă, <care este> următoarea: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau care stă ca obiect pentru un verb despre trecut, care este luat în mod absolut, dacă nu are puterea de a amplia nici de la sine, nici de la altul, este restrâns la faptul de a sta în locul celor care sunt sau au fost sub forma termenului suponent*. Precum atunci când se spune *'omul a fost viețuitor'*, termenul *'omul'* stă în locul celor care sunt sau au fost oameni, dacă aceia care sunt oameni au fost în trecut, și *'viețuitor'* în locul celor care sunt sau au fost viețuitoare.

12. Apoi, o altă regulă: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau ca obiect pentru un verb despre viitor etc. stă în locul celor care sunt sau vor fi sub forma termenului suponent, dacă cele care sunt vor fi în viitor*, precum *'omul va fi viețuitor'*.

13. Din cele menționate reiese că verbul restrânge în ce privește cosemnificația, adică timpul, și nu în ce privește semnificația sa.

Sofism

14. Potrivit celor menționate se întrebă despre acest sofism: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*. Probarea: *'omul a fost în arca lui Noe, și calul și boul, și tot așa cu privire la fiecare; deci orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*. Contra: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe, însă Cezar a fost viețuitor; deci Cezar a fost în arca lui Noe'*; ceea ce este fals; deci una dintre premise <este falsă>; însă nu minora; deci majora. Însă probez faptul că prima este falsă, deoarece o anumită regulă spune că termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau stă ca obiect pentru un verb la trecut etc.

este restrâns la faptul de a sta în locul acelora care sunt sau au fost sub forma termenului suponent. Însă o altă regulă este aceea că, dacă i se adăugă termenului restrâns un semn universal, îl distribuie pe el însuși în locul tuturor celor la care este restrâns. Deci, atunci când se spune *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*, termenul *'viețuitor'* stă în locul oricărui viețuitor care a fost în trecut, însă multe viețuitoare au fost în trecut care nu au fost în arca lui Noe; deci prima este falsă.

Apoi, referitor la același <sofism>: în propoziția: *'orice viețuitor care a fost atunci, a fost în arca lui Noe'*, termenul *'viețuitor'* este restrâns în mai mare măsură decât în aceasta: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*, deoarece în aceasta: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*, termenul *'viețuitor'* este restrâns la cele care au fost în trecut în mod absolut; însă în cealaltă este restrâns doar la cele care au fost în acel trecut prin implicația care este pusă acolo. Deci, deoarece doar acelea care au fost în acel trecut au fost în arca lui Noe, și nu mai multe, trebuie ca aceasta să fie falsă: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*, deoarece în aceasta sunt mai mulți care stau în relație de supoziție.

Soluție: unii spun că aceasta are două sensuri: *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*, întrucât poate avea loc o distribuire a genurilor pentru fiecare <individ> în parte sau a fiecărui <individ> în parte pentru genuri. Și în primul mod <propoziția> este falsă, deoarece, când are loc distribuirea genurilor pentru fiecare <individ> în parte, atunci este o distribuire pentru toți indivizii care sunt sub gen și sub specie. Și atunci trebuie ca toți indivizii care au fost conținuți sub *viețuitor* să fi fost în arca lui Noe, ceea ce este fals. Însă când distribuirea genurilor a fost pentru fiecare <individ> în parte, atunci distribuirea este doar pentru genuri sau pentru specii. Însă nu a fost o anumită specie de viețuitor care să nu fi fost în arca lui Noe. Și în acest mod prima este adevărată.

Însă nu subscriu acestei soluții, deoarece speciile viețuitorului nu au fost în sine în arca lui Noe, ci doar indivizii. De aceea, pe vremea aceea nu a fost adevărată decât <distribuirea> genurilor pentru fiecare în parte, adică pentru indivizi, și nu <distribuirea> fiecăruia în parte pentru genuri. De aceea, spun că prima este falsă în mod absolut, și conced toate rațiunile referitor la acest fapt. Însă probarea greșește potrivit faptului de a trage o consecință din ceva insuficient, deoarece nu primește toate părțile distribuirii care este în subiectul propoziției *'orice viețuitor a fost în arca lui Noe'*.

Întrebare

15. Însă se obișnuiește a întreba dacă termenii sunt restrânși la fel în propoziția negativă precum în cea afirmativă. Și pare că nu. Căci unii spun că *'a fi'* este restrâns la cele existente și *'a nu fi'* la cele non-existente. Deci restrângerea nu se produce pentru aceleași lucrul în <propoziția> afirmativă și în cea negativă. Apoi, pare că orice negativă în care *a fi* este negat în mod absolut este falsă, dacă termenii s-ar restrânge la fel în cea afirmativă și în cea negativă. Deoarece în <propoziția> *'trandafirul este'*, termenul *'trandafir'* este restrâns la cei existenți. Deci, dacă în <propoziția>: *'trandafirul nu este'* este restrâns la fel la cei care există, atunci sensul este: *'trandafirul care este, nu este'*. Însă aceasta este falsă; deci și aceasta: *'trandafirul nu este'*. Și astfel, orice negativă în care *a fi* este negat în mod absolut, este falsă, ceea ce este fals. Și astfel pare că termenii nu s-ar restrânge la fel în cea afirmativă și cea negativă.

Probez că <sunt restrânși> la fel, deoarece, dacă în acesta: *'omul este'*, termenul *'omul'* este restrâns la cei existenți și în aceasta: *'nici un om nu este'*, el este restrâns la cei non-existenți; deci oricare dinte cele două este adevărată, deoarece despre cele existente este predicat de bună seamă *a fi* și de la cele non-existente el este de bună seamă îndepărtat; deci, două contradictorii sunt simultan adevărate, ceea ce este imposibil; deci, acela din care reiese este imposibil, anume că termenii nu sunt restrânși la fel într-o afirmativă și o negativă.

Apoi, regula este aceea că: *orice verb luat în mod absolut, care nu are puterea de a amplia nici de la sine însuși, nici de la un altul, restrânge termenul care stă ca subiect pentru el în ceea ce privește cosemnificația, adică timpul, și nu în ceea ce privește semnificația*; deci timpul este cauza restrângerii aceluia, însă același timp rămâne în afirmativa și negativa opusă lui, precum *'trandafirul este'*, *'trandafirul nu este'*; deci, aceeași este cauza restrângerii în ambele; deci restrângerea se produce pentru aceleași în ambele. Și concedem aceste argumente.

16. Însă referitor la acel lucru care este obiectat mai întâi, trebuie spus că *'a fi'* nu restrânge la cele existente, precum nici verbul *'aleargă'* la cei care aleargă, deoarece nici un verb nu restrânge termenul care stă ca subiect pentru el în ce privește semnificația sa, ci în ce privește cosemnificația, adică timpul. De aceea, nu restrânge la supoziții existenți ci la supoziții prezenți. Însă, în cazul anumitor termeni, supoziții prezenți pot fi atât existenți cât și non-existenți. Precum atunci când se spune *'enunțiabilul este'*, termenul *'enunțiabil'* stă atât în locul enunțiabilelor existente, cât și în locul celor non-existente. Însă toate enunțiabilele care sunt false în prezent, sunt prezente dar non-existente, deoarece nu există nimic fals. Și astfel *'a fi'* nu restrânge la cele existente, ci la cele

prezente. De aceea, la fel *'a nu fi'* nu restrânge la cele non-existente, ci la cele prezente, atunci când același timp este în ambele locuri, întrucât este cauza restricției.

17. Referitor la cealaltă, trebuie spus că forma termenului comun este de două feluri, deoarece una este cea care se păstrează doar în lucrurile existente, precum *'natura umană'*, care este forma omului, și *'natura de viețuitor'* care este forma viețuitorului. Alta este forma termenului comun care se păstrează atât în lucrurile existente cât și în cele non-existente, precum *'natura de enunțiabil'*, care este forma enunțiabilului, deoarece unele enunțiabile sunt existente, precum faptul *'că Dumnezeu este'* și toate cele adevărate, și altele sunt cele non-existente, precum faptul *'că omul este asin'* și toate cele false; și în astfel de cazuri, când termenul comun este restrâns la cele prezente, este restrâns atât la cele existente cât și la cele non-existente. De aceea, pentru această propoziție: *'trandafirul nu este',* sensul nu este: *trandafirul care este nu este*, ci sensul este acesta: *trandafirul luat în mod prezent nu este*.

Despre restrângerea care se produce în urma folosirii

18. Însă se obișnuiește a se stabili că o anumită restricție se produce în urma folosirii. Precum atunci când se spune *'nu este nimic în cutie'*, deși este plină cu aer, deoarece termenul *'nimic'* stă în urma folosirii în locul lucrurilor solide și robuste. Și *'regele vine'* în locul regelui patriei, și *'învățătorul citește'* în locul învățătorului propriu.

Despre restrângerea care are loc prin tranzitivitatea verbului

19. De asemenea, se obișnuiește a stabili că o altă restrângere are loc prin tranzitivitatea verbului. Precum atunci când se spune *'Socrate hrănește un om'*, termenul *'om'* stă în locul altuia diferit de Socrate în virtutea tranzitivității verbului, deoarece cel ce dă și cel ce primește diferă prin sine; de aceea, cel care hrănește și cel care este hrănit trebuie să difere. Și de aceea, dacă uneori sunt identici, acest lucru se întâmplă prin accident, deoarece <se întâmplă> datorită faptului că același lucru este subiectul ambilor, precum conducător și episcopul sunt identici potrivit accidentului. De aceea, spun că nu reiese: *'Socrate se hrănește, și el însuși este om*; *deci hrănește un om'*, deoarece acolo este un sofism al accidentului, deoarece pronumele *'se'* nu poate sta în locul unuia diferit de Socrate, însă *'om'* poate. Și fie suficiente cele spuse despre restrângeri.

TRATATUL XII
DESPRE DISTRIBUIRI

Despre definiția distribuirii

1. Distribuirea este multiplicarea termenului comun produsă printr-un semn universal. Precum atunci când se spune *'orice om'*, termenul *'om'* este distribuit sau este difuzat pentru oricare inferior al său prin semnul *'orice'*; și astfel există acolo o multiplicare a termenului comun. Însă spun *'a termenului comun'*, deoarece termenul singular nu poate fi distribuit. De aceea, acestea sunt nepotrivite: *'orice Socrate'*, *'orice Platon'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Și acolo există un solecism prin părțile rostirii.

Despre semnele universale

2. Însă dintre semnele universale, unele sunt distributive ale substanței, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'*, și cele asemănătoare; pe când altele sunt distributive ale accidentelor, precum *'oricum'*, *'oricât'*. Însă semnul distributiv al substanței este ceea ce distribuie lucrurile care se raportează prin modul celui care este *ceva*, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'*; precum atunci când se spune *'orice albiciune'*, *'orice negriciune'*. De aceea, *'substanța'* se ia în mod comun pentru lucrurile fiecărui gen, atunci când se spune *'semnul distributiv al substanței'*. Însă semnul distributiv al accidentului este ceea ce distribuie lucrurile care se prezintă prin modul accidentului, precum prin modul *de ce fel* sau *cât,* precum *'oricum'*, *'oricât'*.

Despre semnele distributive ale substanței

3. Apoi, dintre semnele distributive ale substanței, unele sunt distributive ale părților integrale, precum *'întreg'*; altele sunt distributive ale părților subordonate, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'*, *'oricare'*. Apoi, dintre semnele distributive ale părților subordonate, unele sunt distributive ale ambelor, precum *'oricare'*, *'nici una'*, și altele asemănătoare; altele sunt distributive ale mai multora, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'*, și altele asemănătoare.

Despre semnul 'orice'

4. Însă dintre acestea, mai întâi trebuie să vorbim despre semnele distributive ale substanței. Și dintre acestea, în primul rând despre semnul *'orice'*. Deci trebuie știut că, într-un număr plural, el se ia în două moduri: uneori colectiv, precum aici: *'toți apostolii sunt doisprezece'*, și atunci nu reiese: *'deci aceștia sunt doisprezece'* atunci când unii din ei sunt indicați; alteori se ia divizat sau distribuit, precum *'toți oamenii doresc datorită naturii să cunoască'*.

Ce semnifică

5. Și atunci se caută ce semnifică semnul *'orice'*. Și se pare că nimic, deoarece orice lucru fie este universal, fie particular. Însă semnul *'orice'* nu semnifică un lucru universal și nici unul particularul; deci semnul *'orice'* nu semnifică nici un lucru. Apoi, referitor la același lucru, *'orice'* nu este predicabil despre unul singur și nici despre mai mulți; deci nu este universal și nici particular. Și astfel nu semnifică nimic.

Însă, contra: datorită faptului că lucrul este sau nu este, rostirea se numește *'adevărată'* sau *'falsă'*; deci, dacă *'orice'* nu semnifică nimic, adevărul și falsitatea nu vor fi cauzate în rostire datorită adăugării sau îndepărtării lui însuși. Însă aceasta este adevărată: *'viețuitorul este om'*; deci și aceasta: *'orice viețuitor este om'*, ceea ce este fals; deci și prima, adică faptul că *'orice'* nu semnifică nimic.

Soluție: referitor la prima, trebuie spus că *'orice'* nu semnifică universalul, ci întrucât <semnifică> în mod universal, deoarece semnifică faptul că termenul comun este luat în locul fiecăruia, precum *'orice om'*; și astfel *'orice'* semnifică un anumit lucru. Însă lucrul este de două feluri, deoarece unul este lucrul care poate fi subiect sau care poate fi predicat, precum *om* sau *viețuitor*, sau *aleargă* sau *dispută*; și cu privire la acest lucru obiectează în primul rând și este adevărat că *'orice'* nu semnifică nimic, deoarece orice lucru de acest fel fie este un universal, fie un singular, și *'orice'* nu semnifică nici un universal și nici un singular. Însă altul este lucrul care este o dispoziție a lucrului care poate fi subiect sau care poate fi predicat; și semnul *'orice'* semnifică un asemenea lucru. Și adevărul și falsitatea în rostire este cauzat atât de acest lucru, cât și de celălalt.

6. Însă se obiectează că *'orice'* nu semnifică o dispoziție a subiectului, deoarece în orice silogism elementul mediu trebuie repetat împreună cu dispozițiile sale în propoziția minoră; deci trebuie să raționăm silogistic astfel: *'orice om este viețuitor, Socrate este orice om; deci Socrate este viețuitor'*, deoarece *'orice'* este o dispoziție a subiectului în propoziția majoră; deci trebuie repetată în minoră, ceea ce este fals; deci *'orice'* nu este o dispoziție a subiectului.

Soluție: așa cum *'predicat'* numește două lucruri, adică pe cel care este predicat și predicatul ca predicat, la fel *'subiect'* numește două lucruri, adică pe cel care este subiect și subiectul ca subiect. Și potrivit acestui fapt dispoziția subiectului este de două feluri; deoarece una îi revine celui care este subiect, precum *'alb', 'negru'* și tot așa cu privire la alte dispoziții absolute; și acestea trebuie repetate în propoziția minoră împreună cu elementul mediu. Însă alta este dispoziția subiectului în măsura în care este subiect, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'* și toate semnele, atât cele universale, cât și cele particulare. Și asemenea dispoziții nu trebuie repetate în propoziția minoră împreună cu elementul mediu, deoarece sunt cu privire la ceva; căci dispun subiectul în relație cu predicatul. Precum atunci când se spune *'orice om alb aleargă'*, dispoziția *'alb'* trebuie repetată, deoarece este absolută și astfel îi revine aceluia care este subiect. Însă dispoziția *'orice'* nu trebuie repetată, deoarece îi revine subiectului raportată la predicat, și astfel îi revine subiectului ca subiect. De aceea, trebuie să spunem astfel: *'orice om alb aleargă, Socrate este un om alb; deci Socrate aleargă'* și nu *'Socrate este orice om alb'*.

Dacă cere trei apelați

7. După ce am stabilit ce semnifică semnul *'orice'* și în ce fel semnifică o dispoziție, se pune în consecință întrebarea dacă cer trei apelați. Și se pare că da, deoarece orice perfecțiune se află în trei, precum în debutul <cărții> *Despre cer și lume*, deci și ceea ce este perfect se află în trei; însă întregul și perfectul sunt același lucru, precum se spune în același loc; deci întregul în trei; deci *'orice'* dorește să aibă trei apelați.

Apoi, referitor la același lucru, Aristotel spune în același loc că despre doi bărbați nu spunem *'toți bărbații'* ci *'doi bărbați'*; însă despre cel puțin trei spunem *'toți bărbații'*; deci *'toți'* dorește să aibă trei apelați.

Însă contra: în orice demonstrație toate propozițiile sunt universale, însă demonstrațiile au loc cu privire la soare și lună; deci trebuie să spună: *'orice soare'* și *'orice lună'*; însă *'soare'* nu are decât un supozit unic, la fel și *'lună'*; deci nu dorește să aibă trei apelați.

Apoi, referitor la același lucru, *'orice este privat de lumină este întunecat datorită pământului care se pune înaintea lui'*. Această propoziție a fost admisă de către toți, deoarece este stabilită de autoritate. Și este universală, însă *'privat de lumină datorită pământului care se pune înaintea ei'* nu are decât un unic supozit, adică această lună singulară; deci *'orice'* nu cere întotdeauna trei apelați.

Apoi, referitor la același lucru, *'"orice" semnifică întrucât <semnifică> în mod universal'*. Însă acest lucru pe care îl numesc *'întrucât <semnifică> în mod universal'* este un mod propriu al universalului însuși. Însă propriul se diversifică potrivit diversificării subiectului său, precum, dacă *om* este în mod absolut, și *rizibil* este în mod absolut; și dacă *om* a fost diminuat, și *rizibil* a fost diminuat; și dacă *om* este mort, și *rizibil* este mort. Însă uneori universalul este păstrat în mai multe, precum *om, cal, leu*; alteori în unul singur, precum *soare* și *lună*; deci *'orice'* uneori este păstrat în mai multe, alteori în unul singur; deci *'orice'* uneori dorește să aibă trei apelați, alteori unul singur.

Apoi, referitor la același lucru: forma este de două feluri, deoarece una este forma materiei, precum sufletul meu este forma corpului meu și al tău a corpului tău, și această formă este parte și nu se predică despre cel căruia îi este formă. Însă, alta este forma predicabilă, și astfel toate cele superioare, precum genurile, speciile și diferențele, sunt numite forme ale celor inferioare, precum *om*, *cal*, *viețuitor* și cele asemănătoare. Însă individualele acestei forme predicabile sunt materia ei. Deci, deoarece forma nu depășește materia sa în nici unul dintre modurile precizate și nici nu este depășită de ea, deci nici un universal nu depășește individualii săi și nici nu este depășit de ei. Așadar, deoarece *'orice'* desemnează o adecvare a universalului cu individualii săi, precum *'orice om'*, atunci trebuie, de vreme ce *'soare'* și *'lună'* nu au decât un unic individual, ca pe bună dreptate să se spună *'orice soare'*, și la fel *'orice lună'* și *'orice phoenix'*.

Ceea ce concedem, când spunem că propozițiile menționate sunt adevărate, că *'orice'* nu cere întotdeauna trei apelați, ci, când el i se adaugă unui termen universal care are mai mulți supoziți, atunci *'orice'* dorește să aibă mai mulți supoziți; însă, când el i se adaugă unui termen universal care are doar un singur individ, nu se cere decât un <supozit> unic.

Însă, referitor la acel lucru pe care îl obiectează mai întâi spunând că perfecțiunea fiecăruia este în trei, trebuie spus că este adevărat. Și aceste trei sunt: substanța lucrului, puterea lui și

operația lui. Și pe aceste trei le atinge Aristotel prin cuvintele: "natura ce are capacitatea naturală face astfel". Căci prin ceea ce numește *'natura'*, atinge substanța lucrului; prin ceea ce numește *'capacitatea naturală'*, atinge puterea lui; prin ceea ce numește *'face astfel'*, atinge operația corespunzătoare lui. De aceea, omul se numește *'perfect'* atunci când are substanța omului, puterea lui și operația corespunzătoare lui. Și la fel semnul *'orice'* are substanța semnului universal, puterea lui, deoarece este distributiv, și operația lui însuși, când distribuie. Și în acestea trei constă perfecțiunea sa.

Referitor la a doua <obiecție>, trebuie spus că *'om'* și *'oameni'* diferă, deoarece *'om'* numește specia însăși potrivit ei însăși, care este predicabilă despre mai multe, însă *'oameni'*, la plural, numește specia <dar> nu potrivit ei însăși, ci multiplicată în act prin materiile indivizilor diferite în număr. De aceea, *'orice'* în sensul plural al multiplicării realizată prin materiile diferite dorește să aibă cel puțin de trei apelați. Însă *'orice'* în sens singular, deoarece consideră specia potrivit ei însăși și nu materia indivizilor, cere doar o esență capabilă de la natură să fie predicată despre mai multe, fie că este participată de mai multe în act, fie de unul singur. Și de aceea, uneori cere trei apelați, alteori unul singur, potrivit naturii universalului căruia îi este adăugat.

Despre o anumită regulă cu privire la cele menționate

8. Însă unii spun că *'orice'* dorește întotdeauna să aibă cel puțin trei apelați și stabilesc regula următoare: *ori de câte ori semnul universal afirmativ este adăugat termenului comun care nu are suficienți apelați, recurge la neființă*. Precum atunci când se spune *'orice phoenix'*, deoarece termenul *'phoenix'* nu are decât un unic supozit care există, semnul *'orice'* recurge în acel caz la phoenicșii care nu există. Și de aceea, atunci când se spune *'orice phoenix'*, sensul este: *un anumit phoenix și alți doi phoenicși care nu există*. Și ei spun că aceste două propoziții *'orice phoenix există', 'un anumit phoenix nu există'* sunt simultan false și nu sunt contradictorii, deoarece în propoziția negativă *'phoenixul care există'* stă ca subiect, și în cea afirmativă *'doi phoenicși care nu există'* stă ca subiect; și astfel subiectul nu este identic în ambele.

Despre distrugerea ei

9. Însă aceasta poate fi distrusă în mai multe moduri. În primul, deoarece această inconsistență reiese din falsitatea pe care ei o stabilesc, anume că *'orice'* ar dori să aibă cel puțin

trei apelați, ceea ce s-a arătat mai sus că este fals. Mai mult, Aristotel dorește ca acea propoziție în care universalul este pus ca subiect luat în mod universal pentru un anumit predicat să contrazică acea propoziție în care același universal este pus ca subiect luat în mod non-universal pentru același predicat. Însă acestea sunt următoarele: *'orice phoenix există'*, *'un anumit phoenix nu există'*. Deci sunt contradictorii. Ceea ce ei înșiși neagă. Și astfel regula lor este falsă.

Referitor la același lucru, regula este următoare: *termenul comun care stă ca subiect sau ca obiect cu un verb la timpul prezent luat în mod absolut, care nu are puterea de a amplia nici de la sine nici de la un altul, este restrâns la faptul de a sta în locul acelora care sunt sub forma termenului suponent.* Deci, atunci când se spune *'phoenixul este'*, termenul *'phoenixul'* este restrâns la faptul de a sta numai în locul unui singur phoenix, deoarece nu există acolo decât un unic supozit. Deci, prin cealaltă regulă ce a fost dată mai înainte, dacă semnul universal i se adaugă lui, nu îl va distribui pe el însuși, decât în locul unui supozit unic. Deci, nu va avea loc un recurs la phoenicșii care nu există. Și astfel regula acelora este falsă și se bazează pe falsitate. Ceea ce concedem.

Sofism

10. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'orice om este și orice diferă de el este non-om'*. Proba: acesta este o anumită <propoziție> copulativă ale cărei părți sunt amândouă adevărate; deci ea însăși ca întreg este adevărată. Contra: orice om este și orice diferă de el este non-om; deci Socrate este și orice diferă de el este non-om. Ceea ce este fals, deoarece acesta este o anumită <propoziție> copulativă care are o parte falsă; deci ea însăși este falsă.

Soluția: *'diferă de orice om'* este mai puțin decât *'diferă de Socrate'*, deoarece *'diferă de orice om'* stă doar în locul lucrurilor diferite de om, însă *'diferă de Socrate'* stă în locul acelorași, ba chiar în locul oricăror alți oameni diferiți de Socrate. De aceea reiese corect: *'diferă de orice om; deci diferă de Socrate'*; și este locul <ce provine> de la specie sau de la partea subiectivă. De aceea, dacă semnul universal se pune ca predicat, are loc o trecere de la inferior la superior cu distribuire. Și astfel sofismul consecințe cade în probă potrivit unei treceri, deoarece în probă trecerea este de două feluri, deoarece reiese corect: *'orice om; deci Socrate'*; și este locul <ce provine> de la întreg în cantitate. Însă nu reiese: *'orice diferă de orice om; deci orice diferă de Socrate'*; însă acolo este un raționament falacios al consecventului, precum s-a spus; precum aici: *'orice om; deci orice viețuitor'*.

Un alt sofism

11. Apoi, se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'orice om și un alt om sunt'*. Proba: Socrate și un alt om sunt, Platon și un alt om sunt, și tot așa cu privire la alții; deci orice om și alt om sunt. Contra: relativul *'un alt'* este un relativ al diversității; deci stă în loc unui lucru diferit de orice om; însă omul nu este altul față de orice om; deci prima este falsă.

Soluția: prima este falsă și proba greșește potrivit figurii rostirii de la mai multe lucruri determinate la unul singur, deoarece termenul *'un alt'* are o supoziție determinată în premise și în concluzie. Apoi, proba greșește potrivit sofismului accidentului, deoarece, deși din *'Socrate'*, *'Platon'* și *'Cicero'* se inferează *'orice om'* potrivit lui însuși, totuși sub această copulă care este *'și un alt om'* nu se poate infera *'orice om'*, atunci când se spune *'orice om și un alt om sunt'*. Așa cum eu îl cunosc pe Coriscus potrivit lui însuși, totuși nu îl cunosc sub acest accident care este *a veni*.

Despre o anumită regulă

12. De aceea se dă o regulă de acest fel: *ori de câte ori ceva reiese dintr-un altul, fie în mod convers, fie non-convers, dacă ceva îi revine unuia astfel încât nu îi revine altuia, şi prin acela căruia îi revine se inferă cu privire la acela căruia nu îi revine, este întotdeauna un raţionament falacios al accidentului.* De exemplu, reiese corect: *'omul este; deci substanța este'*. Și speciile îi revin omului astfel încât nu îi revin substanței. De aceea, dacă prin *'om'* se inferează despre substanță, va fi un raționament falacios al accidentului, precum: *'om este specie; deci substanța este specie'* și *'rizibilul este propriu; deci omul este propriu'* și *'casa valorează 100 de mărci; deci și pereții'*. Însă dintre acestea unele se concluzionează în mod convers, precum *'om'* și *'rizibil'*, altele însă nu.

Un alt sofism

13. Apoi, se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'orice om este orice om'*. Proba: Socrate este Socrate, Platon este Platon, Cicero este Cicero, și tot așa cu privire la fiecare; deci orice om este orice om. Sau astfel: Boethius spune că nici o propoziție nu este mai adevărată decât aceea în care același lucru se predică despre sine, însă în aceasta același lucru se predică despre sine; deci

nici o propoziție nu este mai adevărată decât aceasta. Însă contra: contradictoria sa este adevărată, adică aceasta: *'un anumit om nu este orice om'*; deci ea însăși este falsă. Apoi cu privire la același lucru: orice om este orice om; însă Socrate este om; deci Socrate este orice om; însă concluzia este falsă; deci și prima, din care ea reiese.

Soluția: prima este în mod absolut falsă. Și proba greșește potrivit consecinței trase de la ceva insuficient, deoarece pe lângă acelea pe care le ia, trebuie să le ia pe acelea de la partea subiectului: *'Socrate este orice om'*, *'Platon este orice om'* și tot așa cu privire la alții; ba chiar pe acelea de la partea predicatului: *'orice om este Socrate'*, *'orice om este Platon'* și tot așa cu privire la fiecare. Pe acestea toate le trece cu vederea și astfel greșește <potrivit consecinței trase> de la ceva insuficient. Însă referitor la celălalt lucru, trebuie spus că același lucru nu se predică despre sine, ci *'orice om'* este predicat despre om care este luat în locul fiecărei părți a sa.

Despre semnul 'nici unul'
Ce semnifică

14. Despre acest semn *'nici unul'* reiese că semnifică în mod negativ de vreme ce o face în mod universal. De aceea semnifică același lucru ca semnul *'orice'* cu o negație postpusă. Și de aceea *'orice nu'* și *'nici unul'* sunt echipolente.

Despre o anumită regulă

15. Despre semnul *'nici unul'* se dă regula următoare: *ori de câte ori semnul 'nici unul' se adaugă în mod nemediat termenului comun, el însuși confundă în mod distributiv și imobil; și la fel termenul căruia i se adaugă în mod mediat.* Precum *'nici un om nu este asin'*. De aceea poate produce o coborâre sub subiect astfel *'deci Socrate nu este asin, și nici Platon'* și tot așa cu privire la alții; și sub predicat astfel: *'nici un om nu este asin, deci nici un om nu este Brunellus și nici Fanellus'*, și tot așa cu privire la alții.

Sofism

16. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'niciun om nu este orice om'*. Proba: *'Socrate nu este orice om, Platon nu este orice om, și tot așa cu privire la alții;*

deci niciun om nu este orice om'. Sau astfel: contradictoria sa este falsă, adică: *'un anumit om este orice om'*; deci ea însăși este adevărată. Contra: acolo un opus este predicat despre un opus, deoarece *'orice'* și *'nici un'* sunt opuși; deci expresia este falsă.

Soluția: prima este adevărată în mod absolut. Însă pentru o dezaprobare trebuie răspuns prin suprimare, deoarece acolo opusul nu este predicat despre opus, ci *'a fi orice om'* este îndepărtat de la *'orice om'* în locul fiecărui supozit al său, și acest lucru este adevărat.

Despre semnul 'nimic'
Ce semnifică

17. Despre semnul *'nimic'* reiese că semnifică același lucru ca semnul *'nici unul'* și în plus semnifică termenul care primește distribuirea sa, deoarece *'nimic'* nu semnifică nici un lucru; căci *'nici unul'* este un semn universal cu o negație, însă *'lucru'* este termenul care primește distribuirea sa.

Sofism

18. Potrivit acestui fapt se cercetează cu privire la sofismul: *'cel care nu vede nimic este cel care vede ceva'*. Proba: cel care nu vede acest lucru este cel care vede ceva, deoarece *'cel care nu îl vede pe Socrate este cel care îl vede pe Platon; cel care nu vede acel lucru este cel care vede ceva, (și tot așa cu privire la fiecare); deci cel care nu vede nimic este cel care vede ceva'*. Contra: acolo un opus este predicat despre un opus, deoarece *'a vedea ceva'* este predicat despre ceea ce înseamnă *'a nu vedea nimic'*. Deci expresia este imposibilă.

Unii disting acesta: *'cel care nu vede nimic este cel care vede ceva'* întrucât cuvântul *'nimic'* poate fi în cazul acuzativ, și sensul este: *cel care nu vedete nici un lucru este cel care vede ceva*, sau poate fi în cazul nominativ și sensul este: *nici un lucru care vede este cel care vede ceva*. Și potrivit acestui lucru stabilesc acolo o amfibolie ce provine din diferența de caz. Însă acest lucru nu soluționează <problema>, deoarece în ambele sensuri este falsă.

Alții disting acesta: *'cel care nu vede nimic este cel care vede ceva'* întrucât negația care există în termenul *'nimic'* poate să nege participiul care este pus mai întâi, și atunci sensul este: *cel care nu vede orice lucru este cel care vede ceva*, și astfel este divizată; sau poate să nege verbul

'este', și sensul este: *cel care vede orice lucru nu este cel care vede ceva*, și astfel este compusă, deoarece negația este adusă la o poziție mai potrivită. Însă din nou, acest sofism nu se soluționează, deoarece în fiecare sens este falsă, deoarece opusele sunt puse cu privire la același lucru.

De aceea trebuie spus că prima este în mod absolut falsă. Și proba greșește potrivit figurii de rostire de la mai multe lucruri determinate la unul singur determinat al termenului *'cel care vede'*, deoarece în premise are o supoziție determinată și la fel în concluzie, deoarece atât premisele cât și concluzia sunt nedefinite. De asemenea, greșește potrivit sofismului accidentului, deoarece *a vedea* revine tuturor premiselor potrivit lui însuși, și nu potrivit faptului că se unesc în întregul *'cel care nu vede nimic'*. De aceea, întregul este accident pentru părți și *a vedea ceva* este atribuit ca inerent ambelor.

19. Însă trebuie știut că toate premisele sunt de două feluri, deoarece negația poate determina verbul sau participiul, precum s-a spus mai înainte. De aceea, cei vechi au stabilit că premisele sunt de două feluri, însă concluzia nu, datorită unei anumite reguli de acest fel pe care o dădeau: *ori de câte ori negația și distribuirea sunt incluse într-un singur termen, la oricare este purtat unul, și celălalt*. De aceea, când distribuirea pusă în cazul oblic nu poate să atingă verbul în rostirea precedentă, nici negația.

Câteva sofisme diferite

20. Apoi, judecata despre aceste sofisme este cu totul aceeași: *'cel care nu are nici un cap este cel care are un anumit cap', 'cel care nu diferă de nici un om este cel care diferă de un anumit om', 'cel care nu are nici un ochi este cel care are un anumit ochi', 'tu ești oricine sau cel care diferă de oricine', 'tu ești orice om sau cel care diferă de orice om'*.

Despre semnele distributive ale dualelor

21. Urmează <să tratăm> despre semnele distributive ale dualelor. Și sunt următoarele: *'oricare din două'*, *'nici una din două'* și cele asemănătoare. Și acestea diferă de cele menționate, deoarece cele menționate, precum *'orice'*, *'nici unul'* și cele asemănătoare, distribuie în locul tuturor indivizilor termenului comun, însă *'oricare din două '*, *'nici una din două '* distribuie doar în locul celor doi arătați prin indicare, precum *'oricare dintre acestea două'*, *'niciunul dintre acestea două'*.

Sofism

22. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'de către oricare dintre aceştia doi a fost enunțat adevărul'*, după ce s-a stabilit că Socrate spune că *Dumnezeu există* și Platon că *omul este viețuitor* și ambii împreună spun că *omul este asin*, și aceștia doi sunt indicați prin pronumele *'dintre aceştia'*. Proba primei: adevărul a fost enunțat de către Socrate; adevărul a fost enunțat de Platon; deci adevărul a fost anunțat de către oricare dintre aceștia doi. Contra: adevărul a fost anunțat de către oricare dintre aceștia doi; însă nu a fost enunțat nimic de către oricare dintre aceștia doi, decât că omul este asin; deci faptul că omul este asin este adevărat.

Soluția: prima este adevărată. Și dezaprobarea greșește potrivit raționamentului falacios al accidentului, deoarece așa cum această propoziție este stabilită ca adevărată de către Aristotel, adică *'învățarea oricăror contrarii este aceeaşi'*, și totuși nici o învățare particulară a oricăror contrariilor nu este aceeași, ci o învățare în general, de aceea, aici are loc un raționament falacios al accidentului: *'învățarea oricăror contrarii este aceeaşi, însă nu există nici o învățare, decât aceasta sau aceea,* și tot așa cu privire la altele; *deci învățarea aceasta sau aceea a oricăror contrarii*, ceea ce este fals. Și la fel este aici: *'omul este specie, însă nu există nici un om decât Socrate sau Platon sau Cicero,* și tot așa cu privire la fiecare; *deci Socrate este specie sau Platon sau Cicero'*. Căci aici există un accident, precum a reieșit mai înainte în cazul raționamentului falacios al accidentului. Însă este la fel în cazul propus, deoarece cuvântul *'enunțat'* și cuvântul *'adevărat'* este înțeles în locul celui comun însuși. Și astfel adevărul a fost enunțat de către oricare dintre aceștia doi. De aceea, *'enunțat'* nu este ținut în locul enunțării particulare de către oricare dintre cei doi. De aceea *particularul enunțat de către oricare dintre cei doi* este accident pentru *ceea ce este enunțat de către oricare dintre cei doi*, precum inferiorul pentru superior, și *faptul de a fi adevărat* este atribuit ca inerent oricăruia dintre cei doi. Și numesc *'superior'* în mod comun orice este mai mare, fie că este esențial, fie accidental.

Totuși, unii spun că prima este în mod absolut falsă. Și spun că *'ceea ce este enunțat de către oricare dintre cei doi'* este ținut în locul enunțatului particular de către oricare dintre cei doi, și *'adevărat'* la fel în locul adevărului particular. Și proba greșește potrivit figurii de rostire de la mai multe lucruri determinate la unul singur al acestui termen *'ceea ce este enunțat'*, și la fel pentru termenul *'adevărat'*. Însă soluția anterioară este mai bună și mai subtilă.

Un alt sofism

23. Apoi, se cercetează cu privire la acest sofism: *'tu poți să vezi neavând nici un ochi dintre cei doi'*. Proba: tu poți să vezi neavând ochiul drept, tu poți să vezi neavând ochiul stâng; deci tu poți să vezi neavând nici un ochi dintre cei doi. Contra: tu poți să vezi neavând nici un ochi dintre cei doi; deci tu poți să vezi *cât timp* nu ai nici un ochi dintre cei doi sau *dacă* nu ai nici un ochi dintre cei doi sau *deoarece* nu ai nici un ochi dintre cei doi, ceea ce este fals. Căci gerunziul care are desinența în *'ând'* trebuie explicitat prin *'cât timp'*, *'dacă'* sau prin *'deoarece'*, însă în orice mod <propoziția> este falsă; deci și prima este falsă în mod absolut.

Soluția: prima este falsă în mod absolut. Și proba greșește potrivit <raționamentului falacios al> accidentului, deoarece putința de a vedea revine părților potrivit lor însele așa cum sunt divizate, și nu revine lor așa cum sunt unite în întregul lor, sau nu revine întregului însuși; căci întregul este identic cu toate părțile unite împreună. De aceea, printr-o anumită regulă pomenită, de vreme ce de la părți reiese întregul și putința de a vedea revine părților și nu întregului, dacă prin părți se inferează despre întreg, este un raționament falacios al accidentului.

Dacă negația are putere de a distribui

24. După ce am stabilit cu privire la fiecare dintre semnele distributive ale părților subiective, se cercetează apoi dacă negația are putere de a distribui sau de a difuza. Și se pare că da, deoarece Aristotel spune în *Despre interpretare,* 1 că aceste două <propoziții> se contrazic: *'omul este drept', 'non-omul este drept'*; deci cealaltă este universală, deoarece termenul comun este pus ca subiect. Însă nu numai aceasta: *'non-omul este drept'*; deci termenul *'omul'* este distribuit. Însă acolo nu există altceva din cauza căruia este distribuit decât negația; deci este distribuit de către negație.

Însă contra: dacă negația are puterea de a distribui, atunci, așa cum aceasta este incorectă: *'orice Socrate'*, la fel și aceasta *'non-Socrate'*, ceea ce este fals, deoarece, deși semnul distributiv nu poate fi adăugat termenului singular, totuși negația poate pe drept să fie adăugată lui însuși. Apoi, oriunde există o distribuire, acolo există un termen comun care este luat întrucât <este luat> în mod universal; deci trebuie ca acolo să fie un cuvânt care semnifică întrucât <semnifică> în

mod universal. Însă semnul universal semnifică întrucât <o face> în mod universal, însă negația nu; deci negația nu are puterea de a distribui.

Ceea ce concedem atunci când spunem că negația nu difuzează, ci doar îl neagă pe cel la care ajunge. De aceea, atunci când este adăugată termenului comun, îl neagă pe el însuși, însă, dacă un superior este negat, reiese îndepărtarea fiecărui inferior, întrucât distrugând superiorul este distrus fiecare inferior, precum, dacă distruge genul fiecare specie a sa este distrusă. Și astfel negația nu difuzează, ci neagă lucrul la care ajunge, fie că este universal, fie singular.

Însă soluția la ceea ce obiectează reiese, deoarece, faptul că această <propoziție> este universală: *'non-omul este drept'* nu se datorează naturii distribuirii care există în negație, ci se datorează faptului că omul este negat în comun, prin a cărei îndepărtare fiecare inferior este îndepărtat.

Despre distribuirea capacității

25. Apoi, se obișnuiește să se stabilească o distribuire a capacității precum: *'orice om se teme pe mare'*, adică are capacitatea naturală de a se teme pe mare.

Despre distribuirea potrivită

26. Apoi, se obișnuiește să se stabilească o distribuire potrivită, precum *'cerul le acoperă pe toate'*, adică pe toate celelalte în afară de sine însuși; și *'Dumnezeu le-a creat pe toate'*, adică pe toate celelalte în afară de sine însuși. Însă aceste două genuri de distribuiri nu sunt atât de proprii precum cele menționate înainte.

Despre semnul 'întreg'

27. Cu privire la semnul *'întreg'* reiese că este un distributiv al părților integrale, precum reiese aici: *'Socrate întreg este alb'* și sensul este: *Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este alb*. De aceea din: *'Socrate întreg este alb'* reiese nemediat: *'Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este alb'*; și din: *'Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este alb'* reiese: *'oricare parte a lui Socrate este albă'*. Proba: căci în propoziția *'Socrate întreg este alb'* Socrate este pus ca subiect pentru albiciune

potrivit lui însuși, și părțile nu potrivit lor însele, ci așa cum sunt în întregul lor, însă așa cum sunt în întregul lor, sunt sub forma întregului; deci nu sunt puse ca subiect pentru albiciune decât prin întreg; deci printr-un sens anterior reiese: *'Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este alb'*, și printr-un sens posterior reiese: *'oricare parte a lui Socrate este albă'*.

Apoi, în <propoziția> *'Socrate întreg este alb'* întregul este pus ca subiect pentru albiciune în cazul rect, însă părțile în cazul oblic, deoarece întrucât este întreg, părțile se înțeleg în cazul oblic, și întrucât este parte, întregul se ia în cazul oblic, ceea ce reiese prin definiția celui ce este întreg. Precum casa este din perete, acoperiș și fundație; și Socrate este din părți de felul acela; deci, acel lucru care este întreg permite înțelegerea părților oblice. Deci din: *'Socrate întreg este alb'* reiese în mod nemediat: *'Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este alb'* și prin cea din urmă: *'orice parte a lui Socrate este albă'*.

Apoi, privitor la același lucru, cel ce este parte, nu are ființă decât de la întregul său, deoarece nu are perfecțiune decât de la el; deci nu este pus ca subiect pentru ceva decât prin întreg. Deci, din: *'Socrate întreg etc.'* reiese nemediat: *'Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa etc.'* și prin cea din urmă: *'orice parte a lui Socrate etc.'*.

Sofism

28. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la sofismul: *'Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate'*. Proba: *'orice parte a lui Socrate este mai mică decât Socrate; deci Socrate potrivit oricărei părți a sa este mai mic decât Socrate; deci Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate'*. Contra: *'Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate, însă Socrate întreg este Socrate; deci Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate'*, ceea ce este fals.

Soluție: prima este adevărată, adică: *'Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate'*. Și dezaprobarea greșește potrivit <raționamentului falacios> al accidentului, deoarece în: *'Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate'*, predicatul este atribuit părților, cărora le revine cu adevărat, însă nu îi revine întregului. Și de aceea această <propoziție> este în mod absolut falsă: *'Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate'*. Și de aceea, dacă prin părți se inferează despre întreg, va fi un raționament falacios al accidentului. De aceea, Socrate întreg este lucrul pus ca subiect și *Socrate* este accidentului și *faptul de a fi mai mic decât Socrate* este atribuit ca inerent ambilor. De asemenea, dezaprobarea greșește potrivit raționamentului falacios *în raport cu ceva și în mod*

absolut, deoarece <propoziția> *'Socrate întreg este mai mic decât Socrate'* nu stabilește că Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate în mod absolut ci potrivit părților sale; și astfel stabilește că Socrate potrivit cu ceva este mai mic decât Socrate. Și astfel, deoarece inferă în mod absolut astfel: *'deci Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate',* greșește potrivit raționamentului falacios *în raport cu ceva și în mod absolut*. Precum aici: *'Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate potrivit piciorului; deci Socrate este mai mic decât Socrate'*.

29. Apoi, de vreme ce în cazul unora reiese: *'Socrate întreg; deci Socrate'*, precum *'Socrate întreg este alb; deci Socrate este alb'*, și în cazul altora nu, se cercetează în cazul cărora are loc acest lucru. Și trebuie spus că unele sunt accidente care revin în mod nediferențiat întregului și părții, precum *alb, negru, cald, rece, a fi mărit, a fi micșorat* și cele asemănătoare; și în cazul celor de acest fel reiese corect: *'Socrate întreg; deci Socrate'*, precum *'Socrate întreg este alb; deci Socrate este alb'*, și tot așa cu privire la altele. Însă altele sunt cele care revin părților și nu întregului, sau invers, întregului și nu părților, precum *totalitatea, majoritatea, minoritatea* și *micimea*; și în cazurile de acest fel nu reiese: *'Socrate întreg; deci Socrate'*, sau invers.

Despre semnele distributive ale accidentelor

30. Urmează <să tratăm> despre semnele distributive ale accidentelor. Dintre acestea, mai întâi trebuie să vorbim despre semnele distributive ale calității.

Despre semnele distributive ale calității

31. Însă se numește semn distributiv al calității ceea ce distribuie lucrul care se prezintă prin modul calității, precum *'de orice fel'* al cărui particular este *'de un anumit fel'*. Însă se obiectează că, de vreme ce accidentul s-ar multiplica odată cu multiplicarea subiectului, deci, atunci când semnele distributive ale substanței distribuie sau multiplică subiectul, trebuie ca ele să distribuie sau să multiplice accidentul însuși. Deci semnele distributive ale accidentelor sunt superflue. Și trebuie spus că multiplicarea accidentului este de două feluri, deoarece uneori se multiplică potrivit numărului; și această multiplicare se produce prin semnele distributive ale substanței, precum *'orice om este alb'*. Însă alta este multiplicarea accidentului potrivit speciei; și

aceasta se produce prin semnele distributive ale accidentului, precum *'de orice fel aleargă'*, adică *lucrul care are o calitate oarecare aleargă.*

Sofism

32. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la sofismul: *'orice de orice fel cu privire la ceva de acest fel știe că el însuși este de acel fel de care el însuși este'*; dacă am stabilit că Socrate știe gramatică, dialectică și retorică, și la fel Platon și Cicero, și ei știu că le dețin pe ele; și există alți trei oameni, dintre care unul știe una dintre acelea, și altul alta, și al treilea a treia, și aceștia nu știu că le dețin pe ele, și nu știu nimic despre ceilalți; însă ceilalți știu despre ei înșiși și despre aceia; și nu sunt mai mulți oameni și nici alte calități.

Probarea primei: *'acesta de orice fel cu privire la ceva de acest fel știe că el însuși este de acel fel de care el însuși este; acel de orice fel etc. (și tot așa cu privire la al treilea și nu sunt mai multe); deci de orice calitate cu privire la orice de acest fel etc.'*. Contra: *'orice de orice fel etc.; deci orice gramatical cu privire la orice de acest fel etc.'*.

Soluție: prima este adevărată. Și dezaprobarea greșește potrivit <raționamentului falacios al> consecventului de la inferior la superior cu distribuire, deoarece *'de orice fel'* stă doar în locul celor trei, însă *'gramatical'* stă în locul acelorași, ba chiar în locul aceluia care deține doar gramatica; și astfel *'gramatical'* este în mai multe lucruri decât *'de orice calitate'*. De aceea, dacă distribuirea este pusă astfel: *'orice de orice fel; deci orice gramatical'*, se produce un raționament falacios al consecventului, precum *'orice om; deci orice viețuitor'*. Și la fel în ablativ, precum *'cu privire la orice de orice fel; deci cu privire la orice gramatical'*, atunci când ea spune cu privire la orice de acest fel.

Despre semnele distributive ale cantității

33. Urmează <să tratăm> despre semnele distributive ale cantității, care distribuie lucrul ce se prezintă prin modul cantității.

Sofism

34. Și potrivit acestui lucru se cercetează cu privire la sofismul: *'ori de câte ori ai fost la Paris, ai fost om'*. Proba: *'cu o ocazie ai fost la Paris și cu acea ocazie ai fost om; cu o altă ocazie ai fost la Paris etc. (și tot așa cu privire la alții)'*; deci prima este adevărată. Contra: *'ori de câte ori ai fost la Paris, ai fost om, însă de două ori ai fost la Paris; deci de două ori ai fost om'*, ceea ce este fals, deoarece cuvântul *'de două ori'* stabilește o discontinuitate a actului căruia i se adaugă; însă actul de a fi om nu a fost întrerupt în tine.

Soluție: prima este falsă în mod absolut; dar proba trebuie soluționată prin suprimare, deoarece a doua parte a copulativei este falsă, adică aceasta: *'cu acea ocazie ai fost om'*, deoarece până atunci cu nici o ocazie nu ai fost om, întrucât viața ta încă nu a fost delimitată, încât ai începe din nou să trăiești și apoi s-ar fi terminat. Și acesta se cere faptului că de două ori ai fi fost om, precum de două ori începe goana și de două ori se termină întrucât cineva aleargă de două ori.

Despre cuvântul 'de două ori'

35. Și reține că *'de două ori'* nu importă o discontinuitate, ci limita acelui act căruia i se adaugă; însă după limită urmează o discontinuitate. Însă dacă se formează un paralogism astfel: *'oricând ai fost la Paris, ai fost om, însă ai fost la Paris de două ori; deci de două ori ai fost om'*, atunci prima este adevărată, însă dezaprobarea greșește potrivit figurii de expresie datorită mutării predicamentului, deoarece *'oricând'* este în predicamentul *când*, și *'de două ori'* numește un mod al cantității discrete.

Despre numele 'infinit'

36. Urmează <să tratăm> despre numele *'infinit'*, care se spune în cinci moduri. Căci într-un mod se numește *'infinit'* ceea ce nu poate fi parcurs, precum emisia vocală se numește infinită cu privire la văz, deoarece este invizibilă, deoarece nu are capacitatea naturală de a fi văzută. Însă în alt mod se numește *'infinit'* ceea ce are o parcurgere imperfectă întrucât încă nu a fost parcurs, <dar> totuși are capacitatea naturală de a fi parcurs, precum atunci când cineva parcurge un spațiu și încă nu a ajuns la capătul lui. În al treilea mod se numește *'infinit'* potrivit adăugării, precum

numărul augmentabil este infinit prin adăugarea unei unități sau unui alt număr. Însă în al patrulea mod, potrivit diviziunii, precum continuul; căci orice continuu este divizibil la infinit. De aceea este definit de către Aristotel în *Fizica,* 6 astfel: "continuul este divizibil în <părți> mereu divizibile". Însă în al cincilea mod se numește *'infinit'* în ambele moduri, adică prin adăugare și diviziune, precum timpul. Căci, deoarece este continuu, este divizibil la infinit și astfel este infinit prin diviziune; și deoarece după un timp vine alt timp, astfel prin adăugarea unui timp la altul este infinit prin adăugare. Și întrucât aceste ultime trei semnificații sunt definite astfel: infinitul este cel a cărui cantitate, pentru cele care admit o cantitate, poate întotdeauna lua ceva în plus; precum dacă după o parte a liniei se ia alta, și după aceea o a treia, și niciodată nu se poate atinge capătul ei, atunci linia s-ar numi *'infinită'*.

37. Însă se obișnuiește să se stabilească că *'infinit'* uneori se ia ca termen comun, și atunci propoziția *'cele infinite sunt finite'* este echipolentă acesteia *'unele lucruri infinite sunt finite'*; însă alteori se ia ca semn distributiv, și atunci aceasta *'cele infinite sunt finite'* este echipolentă acesteia din pricina distribuirii, adică *'mai multe decât oricare sunt finite'*. Și se probează astfel*: 'mai multe decât unul sunt finite, mai multe decât două sunt finite, mai multe decât trei sunt finite,* și tot așa cu privire la altele*; deci mai multe decât oricare sunt finite'*. Și atunci se spune că produce o distribuire inter-scalară, sau întreruptă sau discontinuă, deoarece cuvântul *'mai multe'* stă în prima propoziție în locul lui doi și ce urmează, în a doua în locul lui trei și ce urmează, și astfel întotdeauna crește gradual sau scalar. Și de aceea rostirea *'mai multe decât oricare'* produce o distribuire inter-scalară, deoarece în locul unora stă ceea ce numesc *'oricare'* și în locul altora stă ceea ce numesc *'mai multe'*, potrivit numărului odată ce va crește, precum s-a spus.

Sofism

38. Potrivit celor menționate se cercetează cu privire la sofismul: *'cele infinite sunt finite'*. Proba: *'două sunt finite, trei sunt finite,* și tot așa la infinit*; deci cele infinite sunt finite'*. Contra: acolo opusul este predicat despre opus; deci expresia este imposibilă. De asemenea poate fi probată astfel: *'mai multe decât orice sunt finite; deci cele infinite sunt finite'*.

Soluție: unii diferențiază faptul că *'infinit'* se rostește echivoc pentru *'infinit potrivit nouă'* și pentru *'infinit în mod absolut'*. De aceea, dacă *'infinit'* se ia potrivit nouă, prima este adevărată și opusul nu este predicat despre opus, deoarece cele infinite potrivit nouă, precum stelele și firele

de nisip, sunt finite în mod absolut. Însă, dacă *'infinit'* se ia în mod absolut, prima este falsă și opusul este predicat despre opus. Alții diferențiază întrucât *'infinit'* poate fi un termen comun; și astfel prima este falsă; sau poate fi un cuvânt sincategorematic care importă în sine o distribuire, precum s-a spus; și astfel ei stabilesc că ea însăși este adevărată.

Însă nici una dintre aceste soluții nu este validă, deoarece, dacă se îndepărtează ambele distincții și *'infinit'* se ia în mod absolut și potrivit faptului că este un termen comun, probarea și dezaprobarea sofismului încă rămân. De aceea, trebuie spus că prima este în mod absolut falsă, și probarea greșește prin raționamentului falacios potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut, deoarece infinitul prin adăugare este infinit de un anumit fel și nu în mod absolut. De aceea, atunci când ia părțile numărului potrivit adăugării, precum două, trei, patru, nu ia *'infinit'* în mod absolut, ci într-un anumit fel, sau potrivit cu ceva; și de aceea nu poate ca din ele să infereze infinitul în mod absolut. Și astfel, de vreme ce din *infinitul potrivit cu ceva* concluzionează *infinitul în mod absolut*, greșește prin raționamentul falacios potrivit cu ceva și în mod absolut. Și fie suficiente cele spuse despre distribuiri.

Appendix II - List of representations and tables

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3. Table of the suppositions of the extremes in the simple categorical propositions according to Peter of Spain - p. 252;

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Les Summulae logicales *de Pierre d'Espagne et la théorie de la supposition*

Résumé

Quand nous sommes confrontés à la tâche d'étudier, d'expliquer et de rendre dans une langue moderne une doctrine philosophique ancienne ou médiévale, qui a bénéficié d'une tradition d'interprétation longue et variée, nous sommes obligés d'aborder une série de questions et de problèmes qui concernent le cœur même de l'histoire de la philosophie. Les questions concernant les méthodes que nous pouvons utiliser et les outils conceptuels que nous pouvons employer sont toutes légitimes, voire nécessaires. Si nous nous demandons comment parcourir la longue distance qui nous sépare de l'objet de notre enquête, la réponse ne doit pas être immédiate. La réaction la plus appropriée serait de réfléchir à la variété des méthodes et des outils conceptuels utilisés par des chercheurs pour explorer un objet théorique particulier. La théorie médiévale de la supposition ne fait pas exception à cet état de fait, mais peut au contraire être considérée comme un exemple illustre des différentes manières dont une théorie peut être comprise et rendue tout au long de l'histoire. Notre travail intitulé « Les *Summulae logicales* de Pierre d'Espagne et la théorie de la supposition » invite à une réflexion sur la théorie pétrinienne de la supposition qui tente d'aborder ses problèmes et ses limites philosophiques, logiques et herméneutiques. Dans un effort pour offrir une compréhension globale de la construction théorique de Pierre, notre étude propose une enquête sur la phénoménalité historique du concept de *suppositio*, c'est-à-dire la manière dont il a été compris, conçu et articulé à différentes étapes de son évolution historique. De cette façon, notre travail confrontera la théorie de la supposition développée dans *Summulae logicales* avec : sa source lointaine et proche, avec la tradition des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles de la logique terministe et avec ses interprétations post-frégéennes. Ce faisant, notre effort ne vise pas seulement à offrir un exposé historique et descriptif de la théorie de la supposition, mais essaie de rendre manifestes à la fois les articulations doctrinales et la mécanique formelle qui sont à la base de la théorie de la supposition. Cela nous permettra d'ouvrir une discussion directe entre la construction théorique médiévale de la supposition et ses interprétations modernes ou contemporaines dans le but principal d'expliquer la nature de la théorie de Pierre d'Espagne. Notre but ultime est de combler

le fossé entre deux méthodologies et traditions différentes de traitement des constructions logiques médiévales présentes dans la recherche actuelle.

Notre sujet d'enquête principal et général sera quelques théories particulières de la supposition qui ont été développées tout au long des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles. Notre sujet de recherche spécifique sera la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne développée tout au long de son ouvrage logique *Tractatus*, qui fut appelé par la suite *Summulae logicales*[1].

Mais pourquoi une telle enquête devrait-elle être faite en premier lieu, étant donné que depuis le regain d'intérêt des XIX^{e} et XX^{e} siècles pour la logique médiévale, les travaux des logiciens médiévaux ont été édités de manière critique, traduits, commentés, étudiés et reconstruits de nombreuses manières? Nous essaierons d'offrir une justification de notre effort en répondant à quelques questions et en donnant un bref sondage sur l'état actuel de la recherche.

Pourquoi Pierre d'Espagne ? Si, pour certains auteurs médiévaux, nous avons des informations explicites sur leur vie, leur activité académique et leurs œuvres écrites, et pour d'autres, nous n'avons même pas de nom à attribuer, dans le cas de Pierre d'Espagne, la situation est peu différente, fait qui fait de lui une personnalité intrigante. Presque toutes les descriptions biographiques de Pierre d'Espagne disponibles dans la littérature spécialisée, à l'exception peut-être de celle qui lui attribue simplement le travail de logique intitulé *Tractatus*, sont problématiques, puisqu'elles sont faites en souscrivant à l'une des trois thèses majeures concernant l'identité de notre auteur. Donc, en raison du manque de témoignages explicites, il fut considéré tour à tour comme : un traducteur latin d'un traité de logique byzantin, le célèbre pape Jean XXI ou un membre de l'ordre dominicain. Par conséquent, nous sommes placés devant une situation dans laquelle nous devons choisir parmi un ensemble de propriétés possibles attribuées à l'auteur de *Summulae logicales*, chacune d'entre elles étant appuyée par des arguments différents avec des degrés de plausibilité différents mais qui ne sont jamais énoncés avec certitude. Ces controverses sur la paternité et l'identité de Pierre d'Espagne, même si notre but ne sera pas de les résoudre, peuvent représenter en elles-mêmes une motivation pour étudier les *Tractatus*.

[1] Dans notre travail, nous utiliserons les deux noms de l'œuvre de Pierre d'Espagne de manière interchangeable ou avec une abréviation appropriée *SL.* = DE RIJK (ed.), *Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis): Tractatus Called afterwards Summule logicales*, First critical edition from the manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk., (1972).

Pourquoi *Summulae logicales* ? Peut-être indépendamment de la personnalité de l'auteur, les *Tractatus* ou *Summulae logicales* sont un texte important qui a connu un intérêt remarquable au Moyen Âge. Étant un manuel médiéval ou, comme le suggèrent les titres, un groupe de petits résumés[2] de logique qui, d'une part, comprend des doctrines et des problèmes de *logica antiqua* et *logica nova*, et, d'autre part, de *logica modernorum*, les *Tractatus* ont réussi à continuer une tradition de commentaires et en faire naître une autre. Puisque la première partie du livre porte sur des sujets relevant de la logique aristotélico-boécienne, l'ouvrage s'inscrit dans la tradition des commentaires et des paraphrases de ce corpus classique de textes logiques. Puisque les *Tractatus* eux-mêmes commenceront à être commentés dès le XIII[e] siècle, il engendrera une nouvelle tradition de commentaires qui commencera avec des auteurs comme Simon of Faversham, Robertus Anglicus, Guillelmus Arnaldi et d'autres commentateurs anonymes[3]. En commençant par le sud de la France et le nord de l'Espagne, en continuant par le nord de l'Italie et de Paris, pour finalement, au XIV[e] siècle, arriver aux universités allemandes, les *Tractatus* ont connu une large diffusion au Moyen Âge[4]. Bien que, comme l'a déclaré Lambertus Marie de Rijk[5], il n'ait pas laissé une empreinte ferme sur les universités anglaises, et que l'on puisse parler de deux traditions différentes de logique terministe, l'une à Paris et l'autre à Oxford[6], à partir du XIV[e] siècle les *Tractatus* sont devenus l'un des les textes les plus célèbres de la logique. L'ouvrage est conservé dans plus de 300 manuscrits distribués dans les bibliothèques européennes et dans près de 200 éditions imprimées datant de 1474-1639[7]. L'absence de traduction en langue roumaine de ce manuel de logique médiévale, mais aussi l'absence de discussions approfondies le concernant et concernant ses doctrines, sont des raisons supplémentaires d'aborder le sujet que nous proposons.

Au-delà de son importance due à sa circulation et sa diffusion, l'œuvre logique de Pierre d'Espagne mérite d'être étudiée pour ses doctrines de logique terministe. Considérant que les *Tractatus* seront commentés et utilisés dans le milieu universitaire au cours des siècles suivant sa composition, la clarification de leurs thèses est nécessaire. Mais l'étude de ce traité ne doit pas être

[2] Voir la définition de *summa* dans TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages* (2003), p. 337-338.
[3] Cf. DE RIJK, *SL.*, p. XCV.
[4] Cf. *SL.*, p. XCVIII
[5] Cf. *SL.*, p. XCIX.
[6] Voir DE LIBERA, « The Oxford and Paris traditions in logic » dans KRETZMANN, KENNY, PINBORG, STUMP (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (2008).
[7] Voir *SL.*, p. C.

considérée comme n'ayant d'intérêt que pour le chercheur de la philosophie du Moyen Âge du fait qu'il propose un exposé systématique de la logique aristotélicio-boécienne et terministe. Au contraire, en raison de ses problèmes généraux qu'il soulève, le traité relève de l'intérêt du chercheur contemporain en ontologie, logique et philosophie du langage. Les similitudes entre les théories présentées dans les *Tractatus*, c'est-à-dire la théorie des termes et surtout la théorie de la supposition, et les théories post-frégéennes du langage, font avec succès l'objet de nombreuses recherches entreprises avec les outils de la philosophie analytique contemporaine.

Pourquoi la théorie des suppositions ? Contrairement à *logica antiquorum*, la théorie de la supposition est caractérisée par la littérature contemporaine comme étant une création originale de la pensée latine médiévale. Ayant une triple racine, à savoir, la logique, la grammaire et la théologie, la théorie de la supposition commence à émerger au XII^{e} siècle[8] et atteint une maturité terminologique et conceptuelle entre le XIII^{e} et le XIV^{e} siècle, période au début de laquelle les *Tractatus* furent composés. En général, la théorie de la supposition offre des explications sur la manière dont un mot habituellement situé dans le contexte d'une proposition peut être mis pour (*supponit*) ou à la place de quelque chose. Bien que la manière dont ce processus se déroule réellement, la terminologie en usage et la taxonomie particulière des modes de supposition diffèrent d'un auteur et d'une époque à l'autre, il existe un point commun : la théorie de la supposition peut présenter une explication de la façon dont le langage fonctionne par rapport au monde. En tant que telles, la théorie de la supposition et la théorie générale des propriétés des termes commencent à être utilisées au-delà du domaine de la logique et deviennent un instrument général d'analyse propositionnelle, étant ainsi instrumentalisées dans des pratiques herméneutiques comme les commentaires théologiques sur les Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Cependant, dans la logique terministe de Pierre d'Espagne développée à travers les traités VI, VII-XII des *Tractatus*, c'est-à-dire la logique qui se préoccupe des propriétés des termes catégoriques, la supposition est la propriété la plus importante ; ce fait s'applique à d'autres œuvres des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles de la même tradition de la logique summuliste. C'est par rapport à la théorie de la supposition que sont définies toutes les autres propriétés des termes comme *ampliatio*, *restrictio*, *appellatio* et *distributio*. Ainsi, pour comprendre la logique de Pierre d'Espagne et surtout sa logique terministe, l'étude de la théorie de la supposition est une nécessité.

[8] Voir EBBESEN, « Early Supposition Theory II » dans *Vivarium* vol. 51 (2013).

La théorie de la supposition des *Tractatus* est également importante puisqu'elle entre en dialogue direct avec les théories contemporaines du langage, de l'ontologie et de la logique. Comme la *suppositio* est définie comme « prendre à la place de quelque chose le terme même qui signifie déjà une chose »[9] ou comme « prendre un terme substantif à la place de quelque chose »[10], elle prend en compte les relations entre les entités linguistiques et extralinguistiques et peut donc être appréciée par et comparée aux théories contemporaines de la référence et de la signification. Dans la mesure où l'on s'interroge sur le statut de ces entités linguistiques et extralinguistiques, la théorie de la supposition relève de l'incidence de l'ontologie linguistique et générale. En ce qui concerne le dernier aspect, la théorie de la supposition est un indicateur du degré d'engagement ontologique de Pierre d'Espagne qui peut être analysé dans des modèles de pensée sur la réalité qui sont traditionnellement appelés *nominalisme, conceptualisme* et *réalisme*.

En ce qui concerne les études récentes sur la théorie de la supposition, nous pouvons affirmer que le domaine des études sémantiques et logiques médiévales est un domaine d'enquête relativement nouveau qui a pu se développer dans la seconde partie du XX^{e} siècle avec l'émergence de nouvelles éditions de textes critiques. Dans *Formalizing medieval logical theories*[11], Catarina Dutilh Novaes fait une distinction entre deux types d'approches concernant l'étude des théories logiques médiévales. La première est l'approche l'historique qui traite de : l'établissement des éditions critiques, la paternité et les sources du texte, la tradition à laquelle appartient un certain texte et les idées qui seront reprises par ceux qui suivront l'auteur en question. On peut dire que ce genre d'approche appartient généralement à l'historien de la philosophie médiévale, qui, selon le même auteur, s'intéresse plutôt à l'univers intellectuel de l'auteur puisqu'il évalue les textes étudiés de l'intérieur sans œil critique[12]. La deuxième approche est l'approche systématique[13], qui considère que certaines théories et idées développées par les auteurs médiévaux peuvent être appliquées avec succès à certains problèmes particuliers de la philosophie contemporaine du langage et de la logique, ou – nous pouvons ajouter – certaines théories ou idées médiévales pourraient être transposées avec succès grâce aux outils conceptuels de la philosophie contemporaine du langage et de la logique. Les deux cas de l'approche systématique traiteront

[9] *SL*, VI. 3, p. 80, l. 10-11: "suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo".
[10] *SL*, VI. 3, p. 80, l. 8-9: "suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo"
[11] DUTILH, *Formalizing medieval logical theories* (2007a), p. 9.
[12] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 10.
[13] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 9

d'une évaluation critique des théories et idées médiévales, mais qui doivent aborder le problème de l'anachronisme[14]. La distinction susmentionnée peut être appliquée avec succès à la fois à la manière dont l'exégèse contemporaine se rapporte en général au thème de la supposition ou à la logique du XIII^{e} siècle, et au thème spécifique de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne.

Par conséquent, concernant notre sujet d'étude spécifique, d'une part, nous pouvons identifier l'approche historique. En 1944, Joseph Patrick Mullally[15] propose une première édition et traduction modernes, bien qu'incomplètes, du texte des *Summulae logicales* à partir de quelques éditions imprimées, donc de quelques témoins textuels tardifs. Cette édition particulière est considérée par L. M. de Rijk comme une édition non critique, puisque le texte de Pierre est souvent interpolé avec des textes de différents commentateurs[16]. En 1947, Józef Maria Bocheński publie une édition complète des résumés de logique de Pierre basée sur le codex Bibliothèque du Vatican, Reg. Lat. 1205. Même cette édition est considérée par De Rijk comme impraticable dans la mesure où elle regorge d'erreurs[17]. En 1972, L. M. de Rijk propose enfin la première édition critique des *Tractatus* ou *Summulae logicales* de Pierre d'Espagne. Après la première édition critique, des traductions en langues modernes comme l'anglais, l'espagnol, l'italien et l'allemand ont commencé à apparaître naturellement[18].

Outre les aspects liés aux éditions critiques, aux traductions et aux descriptions explicatives, dans l'approche historique nous pouvons trouver une discussion sur : l'identité de Pierre d'Espagne, la paternité et la date de composition des *Tractatus*, ses sources et d'autres sujets connexes. Pour le premier, nous pouvons mentionner l'existence de trois thèses principales concernant la paternité des *Tractatus* et de l'identité de Pierre d'Espagne, comme cela a été discuté

[14] Voir *idem*.
[15] MULLALLY (ed., transl.), *The "Summulae Logicales" of Peter of Spain* (1945).
[16] Cf. *SL.*, p. C.
[17] Cf. *SL.*, p. C; BOCHENSKI (ed.), *Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, quas a manu scripto Reg. Lat. 1205* edidit Iuri M. Bochenski (1947)
[18] BEUCHOT (transl.), Pedro Hispano, (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), *Tractatus, llamados después Summule logicales, primera edición crítica basada en los manuscritos e introducción de L.M. de Rijk* (1986); DINNEN (transl.), *Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute. An English Translation of Peter of Spain's Tractatus Called Afterwards Summulae Logicales on the basis of the Critical Edition Established by L.M. De Rijk* (1990); PONZIO (transl.), *Pietro Ispano, Trattati di lógica. Summule logicales* (2004); DEGEN-PABST (übers.), *Summulae Logicales – Logische Abhandlungen*, Übersetzt und mit einer Einführung versehen, (2006); CNP = COPENHAVER, NORMORE, PARSONS (eds., transl.), *Peter of Spain: Summaries of logic* (2014).

par L. M. de Rijk, Angel D`Ors, Simon Tugwell, José Meirinhos, Joke Spruyt et d'autres[19]. La première s'appelle la thèse byzantine qui trouve son origine chez Elias Ehinger[20] qui affirme que les *Tractatus* sont une traduction du grec en latin d'un traité attribué à Michel Psellos. La deuxième thèse, la thèse papale, identifie Pierre d'Espagne, l'auteur des *Tractatus*, avec le pape Jean XXI. La troisième thèse, la thèse dominicaine, identifie Pierre d'Espagne auteur des *Tractatus* à un membre de l'ordre dominicain. Cette attribution particulière est faite avec différents degrés de précision conduisant à une triple division de la thèse dominicaine selon sa généralité. Ce débat autour de la paternité des *Tractatus*, est complété par une recherche orientée vers le Corpus pétrinien[21]. Sur la base des différents ensembles d'œuvres attribués à Pierre d'Espagne, José Meirinhos a établi différentes personnalités qui ont porté ce nom[22].

En ce qui concerne la discussion sur les sources possibles de la théorie des suppositions, De Rijk identifie deux traditions, l'une de commentaires aux *Réfutations sophistiques* d'Aristote, et l'autre de commentaires à la grammaire du VI^e^ siècle de Priscien[23]. Mais à ces deux sources pourrait s'en ajouter une troisième, comme le suggère Ebbesen, la tradition théologique qui a ses

[19] DE RIJK, *SL*; « On the genuine text of Peter of Spain's Summule Logicales » dans *Vivarium* vol. 6 (1968) p. 1-34; « On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales II Simon of Faversham (+ 1306) as a Commentator of the Tracts I-V of the Summule » dans *Vivarium* vol. 6 (1968), p. 69-101; « On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales. III. Two Redactions of a Commentary upon the Summule by Robertus Anglicus » dans *Vivarium* vol. 7 (1969); p. 8-61; « On the genuine text of Peter of Spain's Summule logicales IV », dans *Vivarium* vol. 7 (1969) p. 120-162; D'ORS, « Petrus Hispanus O.P., auctor summularum » dans *Vivarium* vol. 35 (1997), p. 21-71; « Petrus Hispanus O. P., Auctor Summularum (II): further documents and problems » dans *Vivarium* vol. 39 (2001), p. 209-254; « Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (III). "Petrus Alfonsi" or "Petrus Ferrandi"? » dans *Vivarium* vol. 41 (2003), p. 249-303; TUGWELL, « Petrus Hispanus: comments on some proposed identifications » dans *Vivarium* vol. 37 (1999), p. 103-113; « Auctor "Summularum", Petrus Hispanus OP Stellensis? » dans *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* vol. 76 (2006), p. 103-115; MEIRINHOS, « Pedro Hispano Portugalense? Elementos para una diferenciaÇao de autores » dans *Revista española de filosofía medieval* vol. 3 (1996) p. 51-76; « Giovanni XXI » dans *Enciclopedia dei papi* (2021); « Pedro Hispano e a lógica Pedro » dans Calafate (org.): *História do pensamento filosófico português* (2002), p. 331-375; *Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Hispani* (2011), « Petrus Hispanus' Attributed Works: Searching for New Interpretations » dans *Enrahonar*, Supplement Issue (2018), p. 355-363; SPRUYT, « Peter of Spain » dans *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/peter-spain/; Les études introductives de: CNP, PONZIO (2010); DINNEEN (1990) and DEGEN-PABST (2006); LONGEWAY, « Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus) (circa 1205-1277) » dans *Medieval Philosophers (DLB)* (1992), p. 315-325.

[20] Cf. *SL*, p. LXI.

[21] MEIRINHOS (2011).

[22] Voir par exemple MEIRINHOS (2018).

[23] Voir par exemple DUTILH, « Supposition Theory » dans *Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500* (2011b), p. 1231; RIJK, *Logica modernorum: A contribution to the history of early terminist logic. Bd. 1: On the 12th century theories of fallacy. Bd. 2: The origin and early development of the theory of supposition*, vol. I et II, (1962-1967)

sources dans Gilbert de Poitiers[24]. Comme le suggèrent Luisa Valente et Alain de Libera[25], un certain nombre d'auteurs et de textes de l'école porrétaine proposent un programme d'étude de la prédication divine avec un cadre conceptuel similaire à celui que l'on retrouve dans la tradition logique après la seconde moitié du XII^{e} siècle.

Jusqu'ici, nous avons fait une brève enquête sur ce que nous pourrions appeler « l'approche historico-descriptive ». Dans ce qui suit, nous tenterons d'esquisser la seconde approche qui pourrait être identifiée dans la littérature, à savoir l'approche systématique. Une caractéristique générale de cette ligne de pensée particulière est qu'elle identifie la propriété de supposition avec un certain élément ou une certaine théorie de la philosophie contemporaine du langage ou de la logique. Comme Catarina Dutilh Novaes le montre, Thomas Peter Gech dans *Reference and Generality: An examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories* a probablement été le premier à initier cette tradition, en identifiant la propriété médiévale de supposition à la propriété de référence[26]. Depuis, nombreux chercheurs ont souscrit, partiellement ou non et explicitement ou implicitement, à sa, disons, thèse de « référence ». Parmi ceux-ci, on peut citer Paul Vincent

[24] Voir DUTILH (2011b), p. 1231.

[25] Voir EBBESEN (2013); voir également VALENTE, *Logique et théologie: les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220* (2008); « Supposition Theory and Porretan Theology: Summa Zwettlensis and Dialogus Ratii et Everardi » dans *Vivarium* vol. 51 (2013), p. 119-144. JOLIVET, DE LIBERA (eds), *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum*. Actes du Septième Symposium Europeen d'Histoire de la Logique et de la Semantique Medievales ; Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale de Poitiers ; Poitiers 17 - 22 juin 1985 (1987)

[26] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 11; GEACH, *Reference and generality. An examination of some medieval and modern theories* (1962), p 84

Spade[27], Peter King[28], Claude Panaccio[29], Gyula Klima[30] et bien d'autres. Cette interprétation a été contestée à au moins deux niveaux. Au niveau du contenu théorique, Dutilh[31] plaide pour une compréhension de la supposition comme théorie du sens propositionnel, au sens particulier d'une théorie de l'herméneutique computationnelle, d'autant plus que la théorie de la supposition est mise en relation directe avec la tradition des commentaires sur les *Réfutations sophistiques* d'Aristote. Au deuxième niveau, la critique de l'interprétation de référence est faite à propos de l'étymologie, de la signification et de la fonction des termes utilisés par les Latins dans la fabrication de la théorie des suppositions. Comme le souligne Alain de Libera[32], le terme de supposition ne peut être assimilé aux termes de référence, de dénotation, de signification ou d'autres termes post-frégéens. Mais l'approche systématique ne se limite pas à l'identification de la théorie des suppositions avec la théorie de la référence, bien qu'elle soit l'une des options les plus répandues par les exégètes contemporains. En fait, nous pouvons affirmer que la théorie des suppositions a été considérée

[27] Voir par exemple : SPADE, *Thoughts, Words and Things: An introduction to Late medieaeval logic and semantic theory* (2002), p. 245: "To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call 'reference.'"; « Ockham's rule of supposition: two conflicts in his theory » dans *Vivarium* vol. 12 (1974), p. 63: "William of Sherwood enunciates the following principle 'Subjects are of such sorts as their predicates may have allowed'. That is, the kind of supposition or refence a term has in a given sentence depends at least in part on what kind of a term the predicate is."

[28] Voir par exemple : BURIDAN, *Jean Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition, The Treatise on Consequences. A Translation from the Latin with a Philosophical Introduction*, translation par Peter King (1985), p. 35: "The theory of supposition should not be assimilated to formal logic, but to the philosophy of logic; it is the mediaeval theory of reference", p. 36: "Supposition theory is a theory of reference. It is a unified theory, which has as its goal to specify what a term is used to talk about in a given sentence"

[29] Voir par exemple : PANACCIO, PERINI, « Guillaume d'Ockham et la suppositio materialis » dans *Vivarium* vol. 42 (2004), p. 202 : « La théorie de façon générale, essaie de thématiser dans un jeu complexe de distinct règles les variations de la fonction référentielle d'un terme pris en contexte, par rapport à ce que l'on appellerait aujourd'hui son extension, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble de toutes les choses présentes, passées, même seulement possibles auxquelles le terme s'applique. »

[30] Voir par exemple : KLIMA, « Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic » in HIEKE, MORSCHER (eds.), *New Essays in Free Logic* (2001), p. 197: "In this paper I am going to give a brief, primarily systematic (as opposed to primarily historical) account of how it was possible for medieval logicians to maintain Aristotle's theory of the four categoricals and to dispense with these existential assumptions in the framework of their theory of reference, the theory of supposition."

[31] Cf. DUTILH (2007a), p. 30.

[32] Cf. DE LIBERA, « Supposition » in CASSIN (ed.), *Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon* (2014), pp. 1097-1102. Presque le même point est avancé par Bocheński, voir BOCHENSKI, *A history of formal logic* (1961), sur la base des différences de langage employées par la théorie de la supposition et la théorie de la référence.

comme[33] : une théorie de la référence[34], une théorie liée à la notation conceptuelle[35], une théorie herméneutique ou une théorie du sens propositionnel[36], une théorie de l'inférence[37] et une théorie de la quantification[38]. Ainsi, la réponse offerte par les chercheurs à la question « qu'est-ce que la théorie de la supposition ? » varie considérablement et une réponse concernant une théorie particulière de la supposition doit prendre en compte de manière critique toutes les options disponibles aujourd'hui. Notre tentative d'analyser la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne par rapport à ces interprétations modernes particulières sera encore plus justifiée, puisqu'une grande partie d'entre elles prennent en compte des théories de la supposition plus matures comme celles de Guillaume d'Ockham et Jean Buridan, qui sont plus prédisposés d'un point de vue théorique à de tels traitements contemporains.

En ce qui concerne notre propre milieu universitaire, c'est-à-dire la recherche roumaine, nous pouvons affirmer qu'il n'y a qu'une petite contribution à ce domaine, et que même cette contribution n'appartient principalement qu'à l'approche historique. Bien que nous n'ayons pas encore de traduction des *Tractatus* en langue roumaine – un objectif que nous essaierons

[33] Voir ILE, « The Formality of Peter of Spain's Theory of Supposition » dans *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai-Philosophia* 63 (3), (2018), p. 12, pour une liste similaire d'interprétations.

[34] Pour l'interprétation de la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de référence, voir par exemple : GEACH (1962), SPADE (2002), (1974); PANACCIO, PERINI (2004), KLIMA (2001)

[35] Pour l'interprétation de la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de la notation conceptuelle, voir : PERREIAH, « Approaches to supposition theory » dans *The New Scholasticism*, XLV, 3 (1971), p. 381-408; « Supposition theory: A new approach » dans *The New Scholasticism*, LX, 2 (1986), p. 213-231

[36] Pour l'interprétation spécifique de la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de l'herméneutique computationnelle ou algorithmique ou théorie de la sens propositionnelle, voir : DUTILH (2007a); DUTILH, « Theory of Supposition vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham » dans *Vivarium*, Vol. 45, No. 2/3 (2007), pp. 343-359. DUTILH, « Ockham's Supposition Theory as Formal Semantics » in KANN, LOEWE, RODE, UCKELMAN (eds.) *Modern views of medieval logic* (2018), p. 85-110.

[37] Pour l'interprétation de la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de l'inférence, voir par exemple : KARGER, « Modes of personal supposition: the purpose and usefulness of the doctrine within Ockham's logic » dans *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 44, *William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue* Part I (1984), pp. 87-106; « Consequences et inconsequences de la supposition vide dans la logique d'Ockham » dans *Vivarium*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1978), pp. 46-55; MATTHEWS, « A note on Ockham's theory of the modes of common personal supposition » dans *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 44, *William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue*, Part I (1984), pp. 81-86.

[38] Pour l'interprétation de la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de la quantification, voir par exemple : BÖHNER, *Medieval logic. An Outline of its Development from 1250 to 1400* (1952); « Ockham's theory of supposition and the notion of truth » dans *Franciscan Studies* Ser. NS, vol. 6 (1946), pp. 261-292; PRIEST, READ, « The formalization of Ockham's theory of supposition » dans *Mind* vol. 86 (1977) pp. 109-113; PRIEST, READ, « Merely Confused Supposition: A Theoretical Advance or a Mere Confusion? » dans *Franciscan Studies*, Volume 40, 1980, pp. 265-297; PARSONS, « Supposition as Quantification versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect » dans *Topoi* 16 (1997), pp. 41–63.

d'atteindre dans l'annexe – nous pouvons trouver dans *History of logic*[39] d'Anton Dumitriu une simple description expositive de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne. Aussi, dans un autre manuel d'histoire, mais cette fois de philosophie du langage, Eugen Coșeriu[40] propose un exposé de quelques aspects généraux de la théorie de la supposition d'un point de vue linguistique. Une autre mention digne d'intérêt est l'article de Valeriu Streinu, *Teoria supoziției*[41], qui livre une histoire générale de la théorie de la supposition et un exposé du fonctionnement de cette propriété particulière des termes. Une intervention plus récente liée à notre sujet est celle d'Alexander Baumgarten. Dans *Le lexique philosophique roumain. L'exemple de la suppositio*[42], il interroge la manière dont les termes impliqués dans le vocabulaire de la *suppositio* peuvent être traduites, en les qualifiant dans les trois registres de leur origine : théologie, logique et grammaire. Optant pour le triplet obtenu à partir du calque linguistique : « supoziție », « suponent » et « supozit », le concept de *suppositio* reçoit une traduction différente de celle donnée par Dumitriu, c'est-à-dire de « supleanță », terme emprunté au terme français de Jacques Maritain « suppléance ».

Voyant la richesse de la recherche qui s'est développée dans deux branches différentes de la réflexion sur la théorie de la supposition, notre objectif principal sera d'explorer les deux en relation avec la logique de Pierre d'Espagne, afin de clarifier le statut de sa théorie. Dans ce but principal, nous proposons les objectifs de recherche suivants : (1.) offrir une description générale de la logique de Pierre d'Espagne en l'intégrant dans le contexte du XIII^{e} siècle ; (2.) analyser la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne selon son propre texte et expliciter ses principaux points d'articulation ; (3.) analyser la logique de Pierre d'Espagne dans son ensemble et sa relation particulière avec la théorie de la supposition ; (4.) établir des différences et des similitudes avec d'autres théories des suppositions des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles, afin de formuler une meilleure image du développement de cette théorie à l'époque médiévale ; (5.) pour répondre à la question « qu'est-ce que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne selon l'approche historique ? » (6.) exposer chaque type d'interprétation contemporaine sur la théorie de la supposition ; (7.) évaluer de manière critique tout type d'explication contemporain identifié afin d'en établir leur légitimité ; (8.) appliquer chaque type particulier d'interprétation contemporaine à la théorie des suppositions de

[39] DUMITRIU, *History of Logic* (1977) translated in English from Dumitriu, *Istoria logicii* (1969).
[40] COȘERIU, *Istoria Filozofiei Limbajului* (2011)
[41] STREINU, « Teoria supoziției » in *Probleme de logică* vol 5 (1973), pp. 111-131.
[42] Voir BAUMGARTEN, « Le lexique philosophique roumain. L'exemple de la suppositio » in CASSIN (ed.), *Philosopher en langues, Les intraduisibles en traduction* (2014), pp. 185-199.

Pierre d'Espagne ; (9.) répondre à la question « qu'est-ce que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne selon l'approche systématique ? » (10.) offrir une explication de la mécanique générale des interprétations contemporaines sur la théorie de la supposition.

Voyant que notre recherche est principalement orientée vers un texte spécifique – les *Tractatus* de Pierre d'Espagne – sur un problème spécifique – la relation de la théorie de la supposition à : ses sources, la logique de Pierre d'Espagne, d'autres théories de la supposition des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles et leurs interprétations contemporaines – nous pouvons affirmer que le caractère de notre recherche est appliqué. Dans la mesure où la théorie peut aborder certains problèmes fondamentaux, comme la manière dont le langage fonctionne en relation avec le monde et les conséquences ontologiques de ce modèle de fonctionnement, notre recherche peut être considérée comme fondamentale.

Comme toute recherche, notre effort repose sur des hypothèses théoriques qui seront confirmées ou infirmées tout au long de notre étude. Nos hypothèses sont les suivantes : (t1.) Pierre d'Espagne développe dans les *Tractatus* une considération unitaire et cohérente de la supposition qui permet de la qualifier comme une théorie, distinguable des autres doctrines de la supposition des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles ; (t2.) il existe une différence fondamentale entre la logique médiévale et la logique contemporaine; (t3.) bien qu'il existe des différences principales entre la logique médiévale et contemporaine ou les théories du langage, nous pouvons identifier des ressemblances de principe, (t4.) la théorie des suppositions n'est pas une théorie de : inférence, référence, quantification, notation conceptuelle ou herméneutique/sens propositionnel, mais une théorie spécifique qui a de nombreux stades de développement et qui diffère de ses interprétations modernes.

En prenant en compte à la fois les études contemporaines et l'idée d'I. M. Bochenski qu'entre la logique médiévale et la logique contemporaine, qui est passée par une étape de mathématisation, il y a une différence fondamentale, c'est-à-dire que la première exprime avec un langage naturel, commun et intuitif ce que la seconde exprime de manière formelle, à travers les signes spécialisés d'un langage artificiel[43], nous pouvons arriver à notre principale hypothèse de travail.

[43] Voir BOCHEŃSKI (1961), p. 173: "The most notable difference between the doctrine of supposition and the corresponding modern theories lies in the fact that while contemporary logic as far as possible has one sign for one function, e.g. a sign for a word, another for the word's name, one for the word in personal, another for it in simple

Notre principale hypothèse de travail est qu'une meilleure compréhension de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne peut être atteinte en montrant ses différences par rapport aux autres théories de la supposition des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles et leur interprétation contemporaine. Ces différences montreront qu'on ne peut pas mettre un signe d'équivalence entre (a.) les théories de la supposition articulées par différents logiciens médiévaux et entre (b.) les théories de la supposition spécifiques et les théories contemporaines du langage et de la logique selon lesquelles les premières sont interprétées. La théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne n'est pas une théorie de la signification, de l'inférence, de la référence, de la notation conceptuelle, de l'herméneutique computationnelle ou de la quantification, mais une considération sur une propriété particulière des termes. Cette propriété doit être comprise, d'une part, dans la dynamique propre de la langue latine médiévale et d'autre part, dans le cadre fixe de la logique médiévale.

Donc, notre thèse est que la réponse à la question « qu'est-ce que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne » ne sera acquise que si l'on prend en compte deux aspects différents :

1. La propriété médiévale de supposition et implicitement la version de Pierre d'Espagne est une théorie qui s'est développée à travers différentes étapes, dans la mesure où l'on peut parler d'une tendance à la formalisation, c'est-à-dire une tendance à l'objectivation et à la maturité terminologique ou à la rigueur du discours et outils logiques. En ce sens particulier, la thèse de Bocheński pour une logique médiévale exprimée dans un pur langage naturel et commun est partiellement infirmée.

2. La théorie médiévale de la supposition a un sens intuitif directement lié à la manière dont les supposition-termes fonctionnent en latin médiéval sur la base de leur sens originel. Par conséquent, dans ce sens particulier, la thèse de Bocheński est conservée.

Notre thèse, l'existence dans les *Tractatus* de Pierre d'Espagne d'une théorie de la supposition qui peut être exprimée et comprise dans ses propres termes, sans être assimilée à ses interprétations contemporaines ou à d'autres constructions médiévales de la théorie de la supposition, et qui souffre d'une tendance à la formalisation par la terminologie développement, mais qui présente en même temps un contenu intuitif, sera argumenté à partir d'une notion spécifique de formalité. À notre avis, le concept de formalité est la notion clé qui nous aidera à

supposition, the Scholastics took equiform signs and determine their functions by establishing their supposition. And this brings us back to the fundamental difference already remarked on between the two forms of formal logic; scholastic logic dealt with ordinary language, contemporary logic develops an artificial one."

observer la manière dont la théorie de la supposition a évolué depuis ses débuts jusqu'à nos jours. Bien que notre concept clé reste à nuancer dans notre étude, il sera chargé de montrer les différences structurelles entre la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne et d'autres théories des XIII^e^ et XIV^e^ siècles et leurs interprétations modernes. De cette façon, nous montrerons que le degré de formalisme impliqué dans la théorie de Pierre d'Espagne est bien inférieur à celui employé dans les autres articulations théoriques médiévales et contemporaines concernant la supposition.

A la base de notre recherche se trouve une méthodologie inspirée en grande partie par la distinction de Catarina Dutilh Novaes entre deux approches du traitement des théories logiques médiévales, à savoir l'approche historique et l'approche systématique[44]. Puisque la première pourrait être accusée de ne pas relier la théorie de la supposition à la logique contemporaine ou aux théories du langage et donc de ne pas la rendre plus actuelle ou pertinente pour nos propres problèmes, et la seconde pourrait être accusée d'anachronisme, dans la mesure où son action d'interpréter la théorie médiévale de la supposition produit un changement dans le degré de formalisme et donc une distorsion de la doctrine originale ; nous essaierons de dépasser ces deux problèmes en prenant un position intermédiaire. Sur la base de la synthèse entre les deux approches susmentionnées, en employant une analyse de contenu et une analyse terminologique, nous établirons le statut de la théorie des suppositions de Pierre d'Espagne par rapport à : ses sources, l'ensemble de la logique des *Tractatus* et les doctrines terministes des XIII^e^ et XIV^e^ siècles. Grâce à une analyse historique et comparative avec les précurseurs immédiats et la postériorité de Pierre, nous pourrons évaluer l'évolution de la théorie de la supposition et sa tendance à la formalité. A travers une analyse critique et comparative, nous pourrons montrer la différence de formalité entre la doctrine de la *suppositio* de Pierre d'Espagne et les interprétations contemporaines.

Bien que notre travail ait l'intention d'apporter une contribution significative à l'important débat concernant le statut de la théorie de la supposition au Moyen Âge, en utilisant une méthodologie claire qui espère combler le fossé entre deux traditions interprétatives différentes, il présente encore quelques lacunes, limites et risques. Premièrement, les limitations de temps et de ressources ne nous ont pas permis d'être impliqués dans des études sur des textes inédits liés à notre sujet. Pour expliquer correctement les origines de la théorie de la supposition, la tradition ancienne des commentaires de l'œuvre logique de Pierre et la tradition qui suivra dans les siècles

[44] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 9

à venir, un travail avec des textes inédits est nécessaire[45]. Donc, concernant certains sujets, nous avons la tendance à dépendre des études existantes. Deuxièmement, la grande quantité de littérature secondaire consacrée à la relation entre logique médiévale et logique moderne ou contemporaine et même celle consacrée aux différentes manières d'interpréter la théorie de la supposition rend presque impossible une étude exhaustive de ces problèmes. Donc, nous avons seulement essayé de couvrir ses principaux points d'articulation. Certaines parties consacrées aux interprétations contemporaines de la théorie de la supposition n'ont pas été considérées dans leurs implications finales et complètes et dans la formalité présupposée par les logiques contemporaines. Troisièmement, en complétant, en adaptant et en transformant la considération de Catarina Dutilh Novaes sur l'histoire du traitement de la supposition dans une méthodologie pleinement développée, à la lumière des lacunes et des limites susmentionnées, nous pouvons faire face à un risque majeur. Ce risque peut s'expliquer de la manière suivante : nous entendons trouver un juste milieu entre la tradition historique et la systématique, en proposant : une analyse historique et doctrinale, une analyse systématique et, enfin, une évaluation de la théorie de la supposition qui se place à l'intersection des deux types d'analyse précédents ; mais ce faisant, nous risquons de ne nous engager correctement ni dans une analyse historique proprement dite, ni dans une analyse systématique, comme celle que feraient un véritable historien de la philosophie médiévale et un logicien contemporain. En conclusion, en essayant de combler le fossé entre les deux traditions interprétatives, nous risquons de tomber entre elles.

Cependant, nous pensons toujours que notre étude va au-delà de l'état actuel de l'art en ce qui concerne l'étude de la théorie de la supposition. Jusqu'à présent, à l'exception du cas de Catarina Dutilh Novaes[46], aucune étude n'a sérieusement posé la question métalogique et méthodologique de la manière dont nous devrions aborder l'interprétation de la théorie de la supposition, sur la base de la relation entre la logique médiévale et la logique moderne ou contemporaine. Aucune étude récente n'a tenté d'offrir un compte exhaustif et complet des différentes manières dont la théorie de la supposition a été interprétée dans la recherche contemporaine[47]. L'objectif principal des

[45] Par exemple, il pourrait y avoir une nouvelle édition des premiers commentateurs de SL. De Rijk, dans un certain nombre d'articles, a édité certains de leurs textes avec un résultat discutable.

[46] La seule exception semble être Catarina Dutilh Novaes. Cependant, son analyse systématique ne prend en compte que les théories de la supposition du XIVe siècle et que l'interprétation contemporaine de la supposition comme théorie de référence.

[47] PERREIAH (1971) offers an evaluation of all the interpretative positions taken up to that time. However, since then, the scholarship has changed and new approaches of supposition have emerged.

recherches en ce qui concerne la théorie de la supposition était les versions plus matures, articulées au XIV[e] siècle et non la doctrine de Pierre d'Espagne dans les *Tractatus* ou *Summule logicales*. Bien que l'on puisse trouver au sein de la tradition systématique un vif débat autour de la bonne interprétation de la théorie de la supposition qui utilise souvent des arguments de la tradition historique, aucun véritable pont entre les deux pôles interprétatifs n'a été tenté, et surtout pas en ce qui concerne la théorie de Pierre d'Espagne. En conséquence, la bonne compréhension de la propriété terministe nommée « suppositio » reste un sujet très débattu qui nécessite une étude avec une méthodologie adéquate.

Afin d'aborder les problèmes insuffisamment traités par la recherche actuelle, dans le but de défendre notre thèse principale selon la méthodologie susmentionnée, nous proposons une argumentation dépliée en trois sections principales : *Section 1 : L'analyse historique et doctrinale*, *Section 2 : L'analyse systématique* et *Section 3 : Évaluation de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne*.

La première partie de notre travail est consacrée à l'analyse historique et doctrinale de la théorie de la supposition. La « ligne historique » d'investigation a été identifiée à l'origine par Catarina Dutilh Novaes comme un moyen, pour les chercheurs modernes, d'aborder les textes logiques médiévaux. Cette approche semble se caractériser, selon elle, d'une part, par un intérêt pour un type limité de sujets comme l'établissement d'éditions critiques de textes et la recherche de connexions doctrinales entre différents logiciens médiévaux et, d'autre part, par une méthode : analyser les textes de l'intérieur et avec un œil non critique[48]. Il est vrai que la compréhension de Dutilh de la « ligne historique » a ses limites puisqu'elle est faite en contraste avec la « ligne systématique » et dans le but de montrer ses lacunes par rapport à la compréhension de la supposition comme référence[49]. Cependant, nous considérons que la « ligne historique » comprise comme un type spécifique d'analyse des textes logiques a à son fondement une idée qui mérite d'être explorée. Outre ses conclusions discutables sur ce qu'est la théorie de la supposition, la ligne historique a ou devrait avoir une méthode unitaire et globale pour traiter les constructions théoriques. Que ce soit le cas ou non avec la recherche actuelle, n'a pas une grande importance. Ce

[48] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 8-9.
[49] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 9.

qui est important, c'est l'idée d'une méthode historique d'approche des textes logiques médiévaux et la possibilité de la mettre en œuvre dans notre travail actuel.

Le but d'une méthode historique d'analyse d'un texte devrait être de suivre un principe d'exactitude interprétative, de fidélité et d'objectivité. Cela signifiera que la construction théorique médiévale sera interprétée dans ses propres limites ou dans les limites imposées par son contexte proche. L'analyse historique et doctrinale souhaite ainsi établir de manière descriptive, mais non dénuée de sens critique, les origines d'une construction théorique, ses articulations ou sa structure, son contenu et son influence. Il est important qu'en appliquant une telle méthode, ni moins ni plus de théories contemporaines ne soient appliquées afin d'interpréter la construction théorique médiévale. Du point de vue de Dutilh, la « ligne historique » a précisément échoué dans cette tâche, puisqu'elle a interprété la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de la référence[50]. Cependant, l'analyse historique et doctrinale ne doit pas être considérée comme une méthode indépendante et suffisante pour étudier à elle seule la théorie logique médiévale. En fait, elle devrait être utilisée comme une étape préliminaire d'analyse à partir de laquelle d'autres approches systématiques et comparatives devraient être faites. C'est notamment la raison pour laquelle nous avons établi une analyse historique et doctrinale de Pierre d'Espagne et de sa théorie de la supposition pour la première partie de notre étude.

Dans la première partie de la première section, *1.1. L'auteur, son contexte et ses œuvres*, nous avons analysé une série de problèmes liés à la paternité des *Tractatus*, à leur date et à leur lieu de composition, au corpus d'œuvres attribuées à Pierre d'Espagne, aux principales caractéristiques de son manuel logique, et, in fine, à la réception et à la diffusion de son œuvre.

Dans le premier chapitre, *1.1.1. Le problème de la paternité*, nous avons exploré les trois principales thèses avancées par les études actuelles concernant l'identité de l'*auctor summularum*. Premièrement, nous avons discuté la thèse byzantine, qui identifie Pierre d'Espagne à un simple traducteur d'un ouvrage original grec de logique attribué initialement à Michel Psellos. Datant de la fin du XVI^{e} siècle, cette thèse a été prouvée par la majorité des chercheurs être fausse. L'œuvre grecque originale présupposée est en fait une traduction faite au XV^{e} siècle par Gennadius Scholarius à partir d'une version latine interpolée et partielle des *Tractatus*.

[50] Voir DUTILH (2007a), p. 9.

Deuxièmement, nous avons exposé la thèse papale. Elle identifie Pierre d'Espagne avec Petrus Juliani ou le pape Jean XXI. Cette thèse a bénéficié (et bénéficie encore pour certains) d'une large approbation et était considérée comme la tradition. Défendue par De Rijk lui-même, qui identifie ses origines à la fin du XIII^{e} siècle, cette thèse s'est avérée pour le moins problématique sinon fausse, après les interventions de D'Ors et Meirinhos. Selon leurs études, cette thèse a une origine beaucoup plus tardive, au XVI^{e} siècle, et n'a pas de fondement stable dans la tradition manuscrite ancienne. De plus, elle oblige à modifier la biographie connue du pape Jean XXI et produit une inflation des œuvres qui lui sont attribuées.

Troisièmement, nous avons proposé une brève enquête sur la thèse dominicaine. Celle-ci identifie Pierre d'Espagne, l'auteur des *Tractatus*, à un membre d'ordre dominicain. Nous avons présenté comment tout l'effort de D'Ors dans la défense de cette thèse est dirigé vers l'exploration d'au moins six différentes identifications possibles. Les deux candidats les plus importants à la paternité des *Tractatus* sont Petrus Alfonsi et Pedro Ferrando. Le premier est un dominicain qui a au moins travaillé au couvent d'Estella, fondé vers le milieu du XIII^{e} siècle ; la thèse a été relancée dans un premier temps par H.-D. Simonin et a été retracée à certains des catalogues du XIV^{e} siècle. Le second est un frère dominicain mort au milieu du XIII^{e} siècle à Zamora, considéré comme l'auteur d'une Légende de Saint Dominique. Cette thèse semble avoir ses origines dans les considérations de Luis de Valladoid au XV^{e} siècle. D'Ors et surtout Tugwell montrent que ces deux identifications posent des problèmes à la fois en elles-mêmes et en relation avec d'autres identifications possibles au sein de la thèse dominicaine. Ce fait ouvre, d'une part, la possibilité de repenser les traditions classiques d'Estella et de Zamora en relation avec d'autres personnes nommées « Pierre » qui appartiennent à l'ordre dominicain et, d'autre part, met en évidence le besoin de sources plus fiables pour l'identification de la paternité exacte.

La conclusion du chapitre consacré à l'identité de l'auteur des *Résumés* était que la recherche moderne a pu jusqu'à présent offrir des arguments convaincants pour le rejet de la thèse byzantine et papale. Bien que la thèse dominicaine ne puisse apporter une réponse précise avec des arguments irréfutables sur l'identité réelle de l'auteur des *Tractatus*, elle réussit à rejeter les thèses précédentes et à proposer quelques pistes d'études supplémentaires.

Dans le deuxième court chapitre de la première section, *1.1.2 Tractatus et les ouvrages attribués à Pierre d'Espagne*, nous avons tenté de montrer d'une part, la contribution de Meirinhos au problème du corpus pétrinien, et d'autre part, la débat sur la date et le lieu de la composition des

Tractatus. Pour la première, en distinguant différents types d'œuvres attribuées à Pierre d'Espagne, Meirinhos distingue différentes personnes. Alors qu'à l'*auctor summularum* O.P. on peut attribuer, outre les deux ouvrages de logique, quelques *Sermones* et commentaires sur les ouvrages de Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite, les ouvrages sur la médecine et la philosophie naturelle devraient être attribués à des personnes différentes. Ce fait contribue au rejet de la thèse papale et implicitement à la limitation du nombre d'œuvres attribuées à l'auteur des *Tractatus*. Pour le second, nous avons soutenu sur la base des études actuelles que la date et le lieu de composition dépendent dans une certaine mesure de l'identité possible de l'auteur. Cependant, si pour le lieu de composition le sud de la France ou le nord de l'Espagne peuvent être envisagés, pour la date, nous avons plaidé pour une période plus tardive que celle proposée par De Rijk. Puisque les interventions d'Ebbesen, Rosier-Catach, Meirinhos et D'Ors indiquent une date de composition postérieure pour les premiers commentaires des *Tractatus*, nous avons soutenu que la date de composition semble se situer entre 1240 et 1270, sinon à la fin du XIII^{e} siècle.

Le troisième chapitre de la première partie, *1.1.3. Tractatus, contenu et contexte*, décrit le travail de logique de Pierre à la fois selon ses propres traits et selon son assimilation à travers le temps. Dans un premier temps, nous avons analysé des éléments tels que le titre, le genre, la structure et le contenu. Ils ont montré que les *Tractatus* sont un manuel destiné à l'assimilation systématique des doctrines logiques. Étant composé de traités relatifs à la logique ancienne (I-V, VII) et de traités relatifs à la logique moderne (VI, VIII-XII), les *Tractatus* représentent une synthèse des enseignements logiques anciens et nouveaux. Outre l'engagement réaliste et quelques sections consacrées aux *quaestiones* ou aux sophismes, l'ouvrage rend les doctrines logiques de manière neutre sans beaucoup d'interventions « originales », donc de manière descriptive et paraphrastique. On peut affirmer que sa brièveté relative, sa systématisation et son caractère concis ont contribué à sa large diffusion. Ainsi, dans un second temps nous avons montré comment dans la période comprise entre sa composition et le XVII^{e} siècle, les *Tractatus* ont circulé dans les régions de France, d'Italie, d'Espagne et d'Allemagne, il est passé par les écoles cathédrales, les écoles monastiques et les universités, étant souvent prescrit comme matériel pédagogique obligatoire au niveau le plus fondamental. Se transmettant d'abord par manuscrits puis par incunables, l'influence des *Tractatus* dépassa les latins médiévaux, et atteignit les intellectuels byzantins et juifs ; dans la culture latine, il fut commenté par des savants d'orientations différentes (par exemple, thomistes, albertistes, scotistes) et affronta la dure critique de l'humanisme. Dans un

troisième temps, nous avons signalé qu'à partir de la seconde moitié du XX^e siècle, les *Tractatus* a connu une nouvelle vie grâce aux éditions de Mullally et Bocheński. En 1972 paraît l'édition critique de De Rijk, ce qui permit une série de traductions et d'études dans différentes langues modernes. Sans chercher à rendre compte de manière exhaustive du rôle joué par les *Tractatus* tout au long de son histoire, la description proposée dans le troisième chapitre entendait souligner sa grande importance au Moyen Âge.

Après avoir essayé d'explorer certains des principaux problèmes contextuels liés à la personne qui a composé les *Tractatus*, la structure, la diffusion et le contenu de l'œuvre, la partie suivante de notre travail est consacrée à l'analyse plus approfondie du contenu doctrinal compris dans les 12 traités de logique. Notre approche se limite, comme le nom de cette première section l'indique, à une analyse historique, doctrinale et, si nécessaire, philologique. Nous avons essayé de proposer une compréhension des considérations logiques de Pierre d'Espagne en recourant uniquement à son texte, à sa source possible et à d'autres ouvrages médiévaux qui peuvent apporter des éclaircissements supplémentaires. Donc, à ce stade de la recherche, nous avons essayé de ne pas utiliser les interprétations de la logique terministe et non-terministe qui sont nées au sein de différentes théories contemporaines du langage et de la logique et qui ont commencé à émerger depuis le début du XX^e siècle. Bien qu'une brève analyse de ce type ait été faite dans la traduction anglaise des *Tractatus* en 2014[51], nous pensons qu'elle n'a pas été réalisée dans toute l'ampleur méritée.

Dans la partie *1.2 Summulae logicales et la théorie de la supposition*, nous avons analysé chaque traité logique dans l'ordre standard proposé par l'édition de De Rijk. En plus de présenter les différentes considérations logiques de l'œuvre de Pierre, notre propos était de montrer comment exactement la supposition, propriété principale des termes, liée d'une part aux éléments logiques de *logica antiquorum*, et, d'autre part, aux autres propriétés des termes qui apparaissent dans la logique terministe. En conséquence, dans le premier chapitre, nous avons examiné les notions introductives de la logique. La seconde était consacrée aux cinq prédicables. Le troisième étudia la position de Pierre sur les catégories. Le quatrième chapitre a été consacré à l'étude du syllogisme. Le cinquième considérait les lieux dialectiques, tandis que le septième s'occupait du raisonnement fallacieux. Le sixième chapitre a été consacré à notre propriété principale des termes, la

[51] Voir *CNP*., p. 21-79 ; une analyse plus courte de la logique de Pierre d'Espagne se trouve dans MEIRINHOS (2002).

supposition. Le huitième a considéré les relatifs. Les quatre autres parties, la neuvième, la dixième, la onzième et la douzième, résumaient les considérations de Pierre sur les propriétés d'ampliation, d'appellation, de restriction et de distribution. Donc, cette partie a tenté d'offrir une brève description de la considération logique de Pierre d'Espagne à partir des *Tractatus*, avec un accent particulier sur la relation entre deux de ses composants principaux : ce qu'on appelle « logique ancienne », représentée par la doctrine aristotélico-boécienne, et la « logica modernorum », représentée par la doctrine des propriétés des termes. De notre analyse, quelques conclusions ont été tirées.

Premièrement, au niveau structurel, on peut parler d'une organisation systématique du manuel en deux parties thématiques qui convergent partiellement au milieu de l'ouvrage, dans les traités six et sept. La première partie thématique a une structure presque atomistique, puisqu'elle débute par le traité consacré à la notion introductive qui analyse tous les éléments de logique entre le plus simple, le *vox*, et le plus complexe à ce niveau, les relations entre proposition modale. De plus, les deuxième et troisième traités traitent des éléments qui rendent chaque prédication possible explicable d'un point de vue logique et ontologique, c'est-à-dire les cinq prédicables et les dix prédicaments. Les deux traités suivants, sur les syllogismes et les lieux, traitent des relations inférentielles entre propositions, donc d'entités logiques d'une complexité supérieure. Le passage de ce premier groupe thématique au second, se fait par les deux traités suivants qui représentent le point central de l'ouvrage : celui consacré aux suppositions et celui consacré aux sophismes. Le sixième traité nous introduit, d'une part, à la *logica modernorum* par sa propriété principale : la supposition ; d'autre part, il nous présente son utilisation possible, bien qu'elle ne soit pas totalement explorée, dans la théorie des sophismes, fait qui est évoqué à quelques reprises dans le septième traité. Cette position inhabituelle du traité sur la supposition, entre le traitement des lieux et des sophismes, a été interprétée comme une connexion entre les deux types de logique représentés par ces doctrines. Pour le deuxième groupe thématique, les cinq traités suivants sont tous des développements théoriques de la logique terministe qui expliquent soit des propriétés liées mais contrastées avec la supposition, le cas des relatifs et de l'appellation, soit expliquent comment la supposition fonctionne en fonction du contexte propositionnel, le cas de l'ampliation, restriction et distribution.

Deuxièmement, au niveau doctrinal, l'unité des *Tractatus*, le rôle de la nouvelle théorie terministe dans le corpus de l'ancienne logique et la centralité de la supposition ont été argumentés

de la manière suivante. Dans *SL* VI, la théorie de la supposition est définie comme la propriété d'un terme substantif, qui a déjà une signification, d'être pris ou être mis pour quelque chose. Le fait qu'un terme soit une partie catégorique d'une proposition, un type de mot dans lequel une proposition se résout ; le fait qu'il puisse s'agir d'un nom ou d'un verbe qui joue le rôle du sujet et respectivement du prédicat dans des groupements de mots qui peuvent être vrais ou faux ; le fait que dans leurs cas la signification fonctionne comme une relation de représentation conventionnelle d'une *res*, sont autant de questions doctrinales qui sont présentées dans le premier traité et sur lesquelles s'érige la construction de la théorie terministe. Dans le premier traité, la logique est conçue comme une science du langage (*scientia sermocinalis*), dans laquelle ses concepts fonctionnels sont partiellement empruntés à la science de la grammaire mais sont raffinés et enrégimentés conformément aux besoins logiques du dialecticien. La théorie de la supposition, à travers la division de ses modes, nous présente la manière dont un certain terme, en raison de sa nature propre et de son contexte propositionnel, peut représenter ou substituer une nature commune, une substance individuelle ou un ensemble des substances individuelles qui ont entre eux un rapport qui, dans une certaine mesure, peut être saisi logiquement. Ce que signifie exactement pour un terme être un sujet par opposition à être un prédicat, et ce que signifie pour une entité être une nature commune, accidentellement ou substantiellement, et une substance primaire à la fois ontologiquement et logiquement, tout cela est pris en compte par le deuxième et le troisième chapitre des *Tractatus*. Sans l'arbre porphyrien et l'explication de la façon dont le genre de substance, le plus général, est divisé en espèces consécutives jusqu'à arriver aux individus, et comment dans cette division les genres et espèces supérieurs sont prédiqués de manière univoque de leurs inférieurs, la compréhension de la supposition comme une relation de position sous la forme du terme supposant ne serait pas aussi claire. Bien que la relation de subordination au sein de la catégorie de substance, en particulier celle des espèces les plus spécifiques et des individus, soit parallèle et ressemble à celle d'un terme supposant personnellement et de ses inférieurs, la différence est montrée par inférence dans *De locis*, V. 11-15, au passage du lieu du tout. Dans le cas d'une supposition personnelle confuse, nous devons traiter d'un tout en quantité et non d'un tout universel, qui se manifeste inférentiellement différemment. De plus, comme les modes personnels de supposition sont presque tous vérifiés par une inférence immédiate, notamment par la notion de mobilité, la connexion du traité six et du traité cinq est manifeste. Bien que la théorie qui explore les figures syllogistiques valides n'ait rien à voir directement avec la théorie de la

supposition, elle a à voir avec elle indirectement, puisque la supposition semble avoir une application dans le raisonnement invalide. Ce raisonnement invalide est traité dans le traité sept à travers la théorie des sophismes. Nous y avons vu que la mécanique de la figure d'expression et du sophisme de l'accident peut éventuellement s'expliquer par la théorie de la supposition. Déjà dans le traité six, le passage des multiples suppositions déterminées à une supposition déterminée et d'une supposition simple à une supposition personnelle, à la fois par une inférence immédiate et par un syllogisme, est considéré comme fallacieux. Effectivement, des liens plus profonds entre la théorie de la supposition et le corpus logique aristotélico-boécien peuvent être identifiés. Certains d'entre eux ont été explorés dans les parties ultérieures de notre travail. Cependant, à ce moment, un argument a été avancé pour la centralité de la théorie des suppositions. Quant au reste des *Tractatus*, le rapport avec la théorie de la supposition semblait clair. Le huitième traité nous a montré comment la notion grammaticale de relatif présente un rapport intra-propositionnel à un terme qu'elle détermine en faisant un rappel. Ce faisant, la relation intra-propositionnelle de référence s'oppose à la relation extra-propositionnelle de supposition. Les traités sur l'ampliation, la restriction et la distribution sont tous consacrés à l'aspect accidentel de la supposition personnelle. Le nombre d'entités pour lesquelles un terme peut être mis dans un contexte propositionnel peut être étendu ou réduit en fonction des autres éléments de la proposition. Les noms, les verbes, les participes et dans certains cas les adverbes peuvent amplifier ou restreindre le terme avec un supposition commun selon des règles spécifiques. En ce qui concerne la distribution, elle est au cœur de la supposition personnelle confuse et explique l'effet que le signe universel a sur les termes propositionnels. Bien qu'ils soient un mot syncatégorématique, les signes universels, tant négatifs qu'affirmatifs, jouent un rôle central dans la théorie de la supposition et dans le sens de la proposition dans son ensemble. La doctrine de l'appellation d'autre part, est comprise presque de la même manière que la supposition, avec la seule différence que l'appellation est une relation entre un terme et un objet existant. De cette façon, la supposition d'un terme et son appellation peuvent différer.

En conclusion de l'analyse descriptive des douze traités, nous avons indiqué que le manuel de logique de Pierre d'Espagne représente une synthèse de deux types de logique, classique ou aristotélicienne et moderne ou terministe, et une timide intention de les intégrer. Il est vrai que cette intention n'est pas pleinement et explicitement assumée et n'est qu'une question de spéculation interprétative. De nombreux aspects doctrinaux liés aux origines, à l'utilisation, à la

cohérence et à l'engagement ontologique de la théorie de la supposition font défaut et sont abordés dans d'autres parties de notre travail. Cependant, jusqu'à présent, la théorie de la supposition semble être pour Pierre une extension de l'ancienne logique comprise de manière systématique dans une orientation doctrinale réaliste. Pour une meilleure compréhension de notre objet d'enquête, le reste de la première section aborde le problème de l'origine de la théorie des suppositions et discute quelques-unes de ses différentes articulations tout au long des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles.

Dans la troisième partie de la première section, *1.3. Logique médiévale et la théorie de la supposition*, nous avons commencé notre argumentation par le fait que, bien que la source exacte de la théorie de la supposition ne puisse pas être rapportée à un certain auteur ou à un groupe d'auteurs, une base thématique pourrait être trouvée dans la logique d'Aristote et le travail de grammaire de Priscien. Nous avons voulu montrer que des usages de notions similaires à celui de supposition se retrouvent dans les ouvrages théologiques, grammaticaux et logiques du XII^{e} siècle. Bien que l'on ne puisse parler d'une véritable théorie des suppositions qu'au XIII^{e} siècle, les premiers usages de la terminologie des suppositions ont joué un rôle fondamental dans la configuration du cadre conceptuel utilisé par les logiciens terministes. Nous avons considéré que tous ces usages précoces sont des couches de sédimentation rassemblées autour d'un usage beaucoup plus ancien de la *suppositio*, que l'on retrouve sous une forme non spécialisée dans le langage naturel, et sous une forme spécialisée, dans le domaine juridique. Après l'articulation sous la forme d'une théorie, aux XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles, notre principale période d'intérêt, nous avons montré que différentes versions de la supposition étaient formulées en mettant l'accent sur différents aspects théoriques de la logique médiévale. Ces instances théoriques ont été développées par différents auteurs de différentes orientations doctrinales et traditions, ce qui nous permet de parler d'une évolution de la théorie de la supposition. Donc, dans la troisième partie de la première section, premièrement, nous avons proposé une discussion des derniers débats entourant les sources de la théorie de la supposition. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé, d'une part, les théories de la supposition du XIII^{e} siècle que l'on peut trouver dans les travaux de Guillaume de Sherwood et Lambert de Lagny, et, d'autre part, les théories de la supposition du XIV^{e} siècle de Jean Buridan et Guillaume d'Ockham.

Dans le premier chapitre, *1.3.1. Sources et origines de la théorie de la supposition*, nous avons tenté d'explorer les principales thèses concernant les origines de cette théorie. Dans un

premier temps, nous avons montré comment De Rijk plaide pour une origine logique placée principalement dans la tradition des sophismes du XII^{e} siècle. Selon elle, « appellare » et ensuite « supponere » ont été utilisés pour expliquer la différence entre les types de sophismes. La cause des sophismes comme l'univocation, l'équivoque et la figure d'expression était expliquée en fonction d'une variation d'appellation ou de supposition au sein d'un argument. De plus, à la suite de De Rijk et Ebbesen, nous avons montré que des auteurs comme Abélard et Anselme ont utilisé la suppo-terminologie et considéré des problèmes logiques similaires à ceux présents dans la théorie de la supposition, mais sans qu'ils en soient la source traçable.

En fait, De Rijk, Ebbesen et peut-être bien d'autres semblent considérer que la théorie des suppositions du XIII^{e} siècle a de multiples sources. L'un d'eux est représenté par la seconde thèse explorée dans une seconde étape, qui place l'origine de la supposition dans la tradition grammaticale. Selon elle, le terme « supponere » se retrouve dans l'œuvre de Priscien et dans sa tradition du XIIe siècle. De Rijk a plaidé en faveur d'un sens de « supponere » trouvé chez Priscien dépourvu de toute implication ontologique et reflété dans les travaux d'Abélard et Pierre Hélie. En conséquence, le terme a pour sens principal de mettre quelque chose comme sujet de la proposition ou comme sujet grammatical. Nous avons montré que d'autres chercheurs comme Kneepkens et Ebbesen ont plaidé en faveur d'une explication dans laquelle le sens grammatical pur ne peut être retenu. En fin de compte, notre argumentation pointait vers une interprétation selon laquelle, dans l'interaction entre la grammaire et la logique, l'utilisation de « suppositio » formait en effet une étroite proximité avec « subiectum » et « substantia ». La catégorie grammaticale de sujet renvoie finalement à une entité (et ses qualités) qui est conçue logiquement et ontologiquement comme une substance. Ce fait montre que même dans le cas de Priscien et de la tradition qui a suivi, on ne peut pas parler d'un sens grammatical pur de « suppositio ». Dans une troisième étape, nous avons essayé de montrer l'origine théologique de la théorie des suppositions. Sur la base des études menées par Valente, Libera, Ebbesen et De Rijk, nous avons analysé l'utilisation de la supposition dans la tradition porrétaine. Cette tradition se caractérise par un effort d'explication de la prédication divine à travers les outils grammaticaux et logiques disponibles. Ce faisant, ils semblent comprendre la notion de « suppositum », comme le suggère Ebbesen, comme porteur des formes. Chaque prédication exprime une inhérence d'une forme signifiée par la *qualitas nominis* dans une subsistance signifiée par la *substantia nominis*. Ce schéma a été appliqué à la prédication trinitaire. Un système de règles, des modes de suppositions et des catégories logiques et

grammaticales ont été utilisés afin d'analyser herméneutiquement des combinaisons de sujets et de prédicats qui impliquaient des termes liés à Dieu et désignant son essence, ses personnes et ses attributs. Dans certains cas, comme celui d'Alain de Lille, la tradition fondée par Gilbertus Porretanus semble se démarquer explicitement de la tradition grammaticale de la supposition. Cependant, nous avons soutenu que la tradition théologique peut être considérée comme une méthode d'application de doctrines grammaticales et logiques déjà connues à un sujet particulier. De cette façon, elle ne peut pas être la seule à être créditée de l'apparition des théories de la supposition du XIII^{e} siècle. En fait, notre thèse est qu'aucune des traditions ci-dessus ne peut être considérée indépendamment comme une source pour la théorie de la supposition. Dans la dernière étape argumentative de ce chapitre, nous avons essayé de montrer que le terme « suppositio » ou « sub positio » a un sens intuitif originaire de la langue latine commune. Ce sens est au fondement même de chacune de ses acceptions spécifiques dans les traditions grammaticales, logiques et théologiques. Partant de l'observation naturelle d'Aristote, continuant à travers l'ancienne langue latine de quelqu'un comme Plaute et arrivant au droit romain, la supposition semble avoir désigné un type spécifique de relation. Le remplacement d'un objet par un autre, la mise en place de quelque chose à la place d'un autre ou une substitution entre deux objets physiques étaient tous couramment évoqués dans la terminologie de *suppositio*. En ce sens, le droit romain a été le premier à enrégimenter ce terme couramment utilisé de « supponere », le faisant désigner comme un crime punissable, c'est-à-dire la substitution d'enfants.

En conclusion de ce chapitre, nous avons indiqué que la théorie de la supposition a son origine lointaine dans une relation commune et intuitive entre des objets physiques, celle de substitution. Au cours des siècles, le terme a été filtré à travers différentes disciplines et a subi différentes réglementations. Le droit, la logique, la grammaire et la théologie ont partiellement reconfiguré son sens en l'appliquant à différents contenus doctrinaux. Dans ce processus, on peut dire que la relation représentée par le terme a subi un certain degré d'abstraction. La supposition n'était pas décrite directement et exclusivement comme une relation entre des objets physiques mais était conçue comme une relation entre un type de mot et quelque chose d'autre qui pouvait être spécifié selon chaque discipline individuelle (substance, sujet, personne divine, etc.). Au cours de ce processus, des règles, une classification des types de suppositions et des réflexions sur le contexte dans lequel s'effectue la substitution ont naturellement eu lieu. En fait, on pourrait dire que la supposition était une méthode de pensée abstraite sur le langage. Puisqu'on ne peut pas

amener d'objets dans le langage, les mots sont en fait ceux qui sont mis pour, supposent ou substituent des objets. Donc, au cœur même de la théorie terministe de la supposition se trouve la relation de substitution entre les objets physiques.

Dans la seconde partie du chapitre consacré à la relation entre la logique médiévale et la théorie de la supposition, *1.3.2. Théories de la supposition*, nous avons considéré différentes versions de la théorie de la supposition aux XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles. Nous avons signalé que selon Alain de Libera, on peut parler de deux traditions interconnectées : celle d'Oxford et celle de Paris. Étant donné que nous ne pouvons pas parler d'une théorie médiévale unique et générale de la supposition, mais de multiples théories avec une articulation conceptuelle différente, qui ont été développées dans différentes traditions, dans cette partie de notre travail nous avons essayé d'explorer quelques exemples pertinents différents de Pierre d'Espagne. Notre objectif était de voir comment différents auteurs summulistes des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles articulent dans leurs livres logiques la notion de supposition. Cet effort nous a permis de mettre en contexte les considérations présentées dans *Summulae* et de les évaluer dans une analyse comparative pour une meilleure compréhension de l'évolution générale de la théorie de la supposition. Bien que divers chercheurs aient effectué beaucoup d'études qui prennent en compte les différentes théories de supposition de cette période séparément ou dans une étude comparative avec des fins différentes, nous ne pouvions pas en trouver un qui réponde directement à notre but.

Dans un premier temps, nous avons montré deux versions de la théorie de supposition du XIII^{e} siècle : d'une part, la théorie des suppositions de Lambertus de Lagny dans la *Logica* ou *Summa Lamberti* représentative de la tradition parisienne ; d'autre part, la théorie de Guillaume de Sherwood dans les *Introductiones in Logicam*. Dans un second temps, l'analyse se dirige vers le XIV^{e} siècle, où les théories de la supposition de Buridan et d'Ockham, tirées des *Summulae de dialectica* et de la *Summa logicae* devaient être présentées, dans le cadre de la tradition nominaliste. Dans notre effort, nous avons essayé de nous concentrer uniquement sur la manière dont la supposition est définie et classée sous différents modes.

De cette enquête quelques conclusions ont été formulées. Premièrement, bien que la théorie des suppositions soit présentée de différentes manières dans la tradition summuliste, les logiciens médiévaux que nous considérons ont tous en commun le fait qu'ils ont formé un sens unitaire de « suppositio » propre à la logique terministe, malgré leur différence doctrinale. La supposition est une propriété des termes et elle repose sur la notion de signification. Sa fonction principale semble

être celle d'établir la ou les chose(s) pour laquelle un terme peut être mis en fonction du contexte propositionnel et de la nature du terme supposant. En fait, comprise comme telle, la supposition peut être vue comme une propriété qui classe et établit les significations possibles des termes en fonction du contexte propositionnel. Bien qu'un sens logique soit parfois opposé au sens grammatical, les logiciens terministes semblent intégrer tous les sens différents et antérieurs de « suppositio » dans leur propre récit. La substitution, le fait d'être mis en sujet (puisqu'au XIIIe siècle, au moins théoriquement, la prédication a une fonction de *copulatio*), le fait d'être une subsistance, porteur de formes (voir notamment Sherwood[52]) ou de substance et le fait d'être subordonné ou mis sous la forme d'un terme, sont toutes les acceptations des suppo-termes qui précèdent la théorie de la supposition et sont incorporés dans son articulation.

Deuxièmement, à côté de la division des *modi supponendi* caractéristique de chaque tradition, comme l'a montré De Libera, il existe des différences entre les quatre théories analysées qui nous ont permis de parler d'une évolution de la supposition. Dans les deux doctrines du XIII^{e} siècle, la supposition simple est d'abord conçue comme la propriété d'un terme qui est pris pour sa forme signifiée, ou pour ses objets contenus sous cette forme, mais sans avoir avec eux un rapport déterminé. La supposition mobile confuse est conçue comme une propriété marquée par un signe distributif ; elle a lieu lorsque le terme est mis pour chacun de ses individus ou porteurs de forme contenus sous le terme ou sous la forme du terme supposant. Un tel type de supposition s'explique par la possibilité d'une inférence descendante du terme supposant à chacune de ses suppositions. Les doctrines du XIV^{e} siècle étaient articulées de manière plus rigoureuse en mettant l'accent sur le lien entre la propriété d'un terme d'être mis pour quelque chose et le fait que la chose pour laquelle les termes ont été mis vérifie ou rend la proposition vraie. Beaucoup plus d'attention a été accordée au rôle du logicien dans l'établissement du type de supposition que peut avoir un terme et à la condition sous laquelle chaque mode de supposition est défini. Ils conçoivent ce que les logiciens du XIII^{e} siècle appelaient la « suppositio simplex », comme une propriété selon laquelle un terme est mis pour un concept ou une notion de l'âme, dépourvu de tout engagement ontologique dur. La supposition déterminée, la supposition simplement confuse et la supposition confuse ont été expliquées par des inférences ascendantes et descendantes qui ont été faites : disjonctivement, avec un extrême disjonctif ou conjonctivement. Complétés par des règles de distribution beaucoup

[52] Voir SHERWOOD, *Introductiones*, 5.1.6-5.1.7., p. 266; SHERWOOD, *Introduction* (transl. Kretzmann, 1975), p. 108-109.

plus rigoureuses, les trois types de suppositions susmentionnés sont systématiquement expliqués à travers des types d'inférences possibles de la proposition originale qui contient le terme supposant, à une proposition ou une concaténation des propositions où le terme supposant est remplacé par ses inférieurs, et de ceux-ci, retour à l'original. Ce traitement permettra une explication plus complète des propositions catégoriques simples sur la base de la propriété de la supposition. Enfin, cela nous a permis de considérer que la théorie de la supposition dans sa transition du XIII^{e} siècle aux conceptions nominalistes du XIV^{e} siècle, a subi un processus de maturation et d'évolution, visible au niveau de son cadre conceptuel.

En conclusion de la première section de notre étude, consacrée à l'analyse historique et doctrinale, nous pouvons affirmer que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne développée dans les *Tractatus* peut être mieux comprise comme une construction théorique engagée dans un développement historique. Premièrement, « supponere » a été utilisé pour exprimer l'action ou la relation de substitution entre les objets physiques. Puis, au cours des traditions logiques, grammaticales et théologiques, formées jusqu'à la fin du XII^{e} siècle, qui utilisaient l'appareil conceptuel des suppo-termes, cette relation a subi des modifications différentes et est devenue plus abstraite. C'est devenu une relation de substitution entre un objet de langage et un objet logique, grammatical ou physique. Après cela, la tradition summuliste du XIII^{e} siècle a étendu la logique entendue comme science du langage, en complétant la théorie de la signification, incapable de traiter des situations de langage plus complexes, par la propriété des termes nommés « suppositio ». À ce stade, des définitions, des classifications et des règles pour cette relation qui expliquaient comment les termes sont mis pour différentes choses, ont été énoncées. La tradition nominaliste du XIV^{e} siècle a apporté une autre couche dans le développement historique de la supposition, en offrant des règles plus étendues et systématiques pour chaque mode de supposition et en reliant de manière plus explicite la théorie de la supposition avec d'autres parties de la logique. Pourtant, à ce stade de notre analyse, la question directrice « Qu'est-ce que la théorie des suppositions ? » restait encore partiellement sans réponse. Si nous expliquions comment la théorie des suppositions peut être conçue dans ses propres termes, la manière dont elle a été ou devrait être interprétée reste encore inexplorée à ce stade. Ainsi, dans la section suivante, nous avons analysé les différentes manières dont la théorie des suppositions était considérée à l'intérieur de ce que Catarina Dutilh Novaes appelait « la ligne de pensée systématique ». Ce faisant, nous avons tenté d'analyser la théorie de la supposition en recourant au concept de « formalité ».

Après avoir vu le traitement explicite de la supposition dans les *Tractatus* de Pierre d'Espagne dans la première section, notre compréhension a progressé. Nous avons compris en ses propres termes comment il est défini, sur quel type d'entités linguistiques il s'applique, quelle est sa fonction principale et comment cette fonction peut varier dans certaines conditions propositionnelles. Mais aussi facilement nous comprenons les principales caractéristiques de la théorie de la *suppositio*, aussi perplexes nous restons sur certains aspects particuliers de celle-ci. On pourrait prendre comme exemple un exercice simple d'explication. Si nous essayons un instant de nous éloigner du langage médiéval employé dans la thématisation de la théorie, et essayons de le reformuler dans nos propres termes, nous semblons faire face à quelques difficultés. Par exemple, la fameuse proposition qui vise à décrire la propriété de la supposition « acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo » (SL 6.3) nous semble se situer entre une métaphore et une définition obscure. Nous comprenons sûrement le sens de chaque mot et ce que signifie le fait de prendre quelque chose à la place d'un autre à propos d'objets dont un remplacement ou une substitution est habituellement prédiqué ; mais qu'en est-il d'un remplacement ou d'une substitution entre une entité linguistique et une entité non linguistique ? Dans ce cas, notre compréhension des phénomènes semble un peu obscure. En utilisant ce qui nous est familier, nous essayons de représenter cette relation *per analogiam*, c'est-à-dire que nous représentons ce qui était censé être une relation entre un terme propositionnel et un objet, à l'aide d'une représentation que nous avons déjà, celui de la relation entre les objets physiques. Pour une définition qui relève de la logique, médiévale ou non, nous pouvons convenir qu'il n'est pas souhaitable de recourir à ce genre d'explications.

D'ailleurs, quand on va plus loin que les lignes explicites de *SL* et que l'on se demande quel est le but de cette théorie, dans quel contexte elle était était censée être utilisé, dans quel but, ou comment sous le même nom de 'logique' ou 'dialectique' ont été rassemblées des théories comme la syllogistique aristotélicienne et la supposition, une fois de plus, on se heurte à des difficultés. Malheureusement, l'auteur du *Summule* ne nous offre aucune clarification explicite.

En fait, nous avons considéré que la manière particulière dont la théorie de la *suppositio* est formulée est la source de nos problèmes pour la comprendre et l'expliquer, et implicitement la source de nombreux types d'approches différentes dans le recherche moderne. Le type et la limitation du langage utilisé, le manque de clarifications et de qualifications explicites ont ouvert les portes à de nombreuses tentatives différentes pour clarifier ce qu'est réellement la théorie médiévale de la supposition.

Mais concernant le caractère de la théorie de la supposition, de nombreuses expositions descriptives de la logique médiévale en général ou de la théorie de la supposition en particulier ont un rôle particulier dans la multiplicité et la diversité des interprétations ou explications modernes de la théorie. Depuis le tout début de la recherche moderne[53], presque toutes les études, et implicitement presque tous les efforts pour répondre à la question gênante « Qu'est-ce que la théorie de la supposition ? », sont faits d'un point de vue particulier concernant la logique. Par exemple, le Père Philothée Boehner en 1952 caractérise la logique médiévale par rapport à la logique moderne en la considérant comme formelle[54]. Le caractère formel attribué à la logique médiévale est tout à fait un leitmotiv dans les études de la théorie médiévale de la supposition. Mais souvent un aspect spécifique de ce point de vue a été omis, à savoir le degré dans lequel la logique médiévale est dite formelle. En 1956, I. M. Bochénski, dans son *Formale Logik*, après avoir insisté sur le même aspect formel, signale également certaines différences particulières concernant les logiques moderne et médiévale qui proviennent de la différence dans la langue qu'ils utilisent[55]. De toute évidence, il y a beaucoup plus de différences entre ces deux types de formalités, en plus du simple langage employé. Dès 1966, Ernest A. Moody nous donne une indication plus claire des différences entre logique médiévale et logique moderne en des termes qui peuvent être appréhendés comme relevant de la notion de formalité[56]. Mais pourquoi ces aspects sont-ils importants après tout ? Ils importent car si l'on ne fait pas très attention au degré

[53] Pour une brève histoire de la recherche sur *suppositio* limitée à l'interprétation référentielle voir DUTILH (2007a) p.10-12.

[54] BOEHNER (1952), p. xiv : « Among the elements shared in varying degrees by genuinely scholastic logic and modern logic, there is one particular that brings them in close proximity and facilitates a comparison. It is the character of formality. » p. xvi: « Let us make clear at the outset that logic as we understand it is *formal,* that is to say, it studies the form or structure of inferences and their elements. Hence, to speak of "formal logic" is, in scholastic terminology, a *nugatio* or tautology. To speak of "material logic" is a simple contradiction. In this we are in harmony with the scholastic logicians, for scholastic logic too is interested only in the formality or structure of discourse. Hence it does not recognize the distinction of formal logic and material logic. »

[55] BOCHÉNSKI (1961), p.173: « And this brings us back to the fundamental difference already remarked on between the two forms of formal logic; scholastic logic deal with ordinary language, contemporary logic develops an artificial one.[…] If we ask how the expression 'supposition' is to be rendered in modern terms, we have to admit that it cannot be. 'Supposition' covers numerous semiotic functions for which we now have no common name. »

[56] MOODY, « The Medieval Contribution to Logic » dans *Studium generale* vol. 19 (1966), p. 445-446: « Medieval logic, like ancient logic, was a quasi-empirical formulation of the logical structure of natural language and not, like modern logic, an axiomatic construction of a formal calculus expressed in artificial symbolism. As compared with Aristotelian logic, however, it had two new features. First, it was formulated metalinguistically throughout, by means of rules referring to language expressions, and it was not presented by means of formulas containing variables replaceable by object-language expressions. Secondly, it included the semantical as well as the syntactical dimensions of language analysis, and was developed in terms of the basic concepts of denotation, truth and consequence (or entailment). »

de formalité, on est condamné à un effet de pente glissante : la logique médiévale et implicitement la théorie de la supposition sont simplement dites formelles sans évaluation qualitative quant à leur formalité. Cela signifie que les mêmes outils et méthodes qui sont utilisés dans la logique moderne peuvent également être appliqués à la logique médiévale, malgré les différences entre elles. Mais, si nous évaluons le degré de formalité de la logique médiévale dans la bonne mesure, une nouvelle question peut se poser concernant les études modernes sur la théorie des suppositions : « La formalité est-elle vraiment une propriété de la théorie des suppositions (ou de la logique médiévale en général), ou une propriété imposée par les méthodes de son étude ? ». Si cette question semble légitime, la réponse jouera un rôle crucial dans notre enquête. Le degré de formalité que présente la théorie de la supposition devrait être un facteur important pour l'approche que nous choisissons pour l'étudier et par conséquent pour répondre à la question principale de notre étude.

Dans les trois chapitres de la deuxième section, *Section II : L'analyse systématique*, nous avons proposé une évaluation de la théorie de la supposition en rapport avec le caractère de la formalité et une analyse préalable de la doctrine de Pierre d'Espagne. Dans un premier temps, nous avons tenté d'éclaircir à l'aide de quelques travaux récents le concept de formalité et son équivoque. Deuxièmement, nous avons souligné certains aspects particuliers de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre qui nous ont permis d'argumenter en faveur de sa formalité générique ou de sa non-formalité générique. Troisièmement, nous avons essayé d'évaluer les différentes interprétations modernes de la théorie de la supposition.

Dans le premier chapitre consacré à l'analyse systématique, *2.1 Le concept de « formalité »*, nous avons essayé de mettre en place le cadre de base de notre enquête. Dans la première partie, nous avons expliqué que la définition de la supposition, notamment telle qu'elle est formulée par Pierre d'Espagne, semble être une explication d'un phénomène logico-linguistique qui tend à être compris à travers une relation physique de substitution, comme le montre l'histoire et l'analyse doctrinale. Comme tel, il s'explique plutôt par analogie et par le langage naturel, et non par des moyens logiques ou formels rigoureux. Cependant, nous avons montré que depuis le début de la recherche moderne, représentée par des figures telles que le Père Philotheus Boehner et I. M. Bochénski, la logique médiévale était considérée comme ayant plus de points communs avec la logique contemporaine que l'on pourrait le penser. La principale ressemblance s'exprimait au niveau de sa formalité. La logique médiévale était considérée comme formelle, assez souvent sans préciser dans quel sens particulier. Donc, notre analyse a tenté de comprendre à travers les travaux

de Sven Ove Hansson, John Gordon MacFarlane et Catarina Dutilh Novaes ce que le concept de formalité implique dans son utilisation. Tout d'abord, nous avons montré que l'origine de cette notion remonte à la théorie hylémorphique d'Aristote qui s'applique à presque toute sa philosophie. Là, la forme est le principe directeur et dominant qui est responsable du devenir de la matière tel qu'il est expliqué par toutes ses disciplines particulières. Bien que, dans sa logique, l'hylémorphisme ne soit pas directement appliqué mais seulement présupposé et exemplifié dans sa théorie des quatre causes, selon MacFarlane, la tradition qui le suit peut être considérée comme responsable de la caractérisation de la logique comme formelle, ou plus exactement de l'application des principes hylémorphiques à la logique. Deuxièmement, nous avons montré que la formalité ne doit pas être comprise seulement comme un concept statique ou une propriété qui peut être attribuée à un objet théorique, mais implique quelque chose de plus. La formalité est vue par Hansson et Dutilh comme ayant une dimension performative. Pour le premier, la formalité implique la formalisation, un processus d'abstraction progressive réalisé avec des ensembles d'outils différents allant des concepts philosophiques généraux et spécialisés aux notions logiques et mathématiques, qui peuvent être considérées en elles-mêmes comme formelles. Ainsi comprise, la formalisation peut être considérée comme une forme d'idéalisation. Pour le second, le cadre est beaucoup plus complexe. Quand on parle de formalité, il faut aborder les problèmes liés à l'action de formaliser, l'objet qui subit l'action de formaliser, les moyens par lesquels la formalisation est faite et le produit de la formalisation. Ainsi, ces quatre aspects, que réinterprète involontairement les quatre causes d'Aristote en mettant l'accent sur la forme, rendent la notion de formalité plus variable et flexible. Selon eux, nous avons établi certains critères selon lesquels un objet théorique peut être évalué afin d'évaluer sa formalité. Cependant, à ce stade, les notions de formel restent encore indéfinies. Afin de répondre à ce problème, dans une troisième étape, nous avons analysé les différents types de formalité. D'après les travaux de Dutilh et MacFarlane, nous avons vu que la formalité peut être comprise soit comme : indépendance par rapport à un domaine particulier d'application conceptuelle (M1), indépendance par rapport à des objets ou individus particuliers (M2), indépendance par rapport au contenu sémantique (M3), absence de référence au sens des expressions (M1*), des lois schématiques (M2*), des structures grammaticales (M3*) ; ou comme : enrégimentement (D1), raisonnement algorithmique (D2), structure et abstraction du contenu (D3), absence de sens (D4), variation (D5) et indifférence aux objets particuliers (D6). Mais les deux groupes sont réductibles l'un à l'autre comme il a été montré. De là, nous avons conclu que,

d'une manière générale, un objet théorique peut être considéré comme formel si : (a.) est construit au moyen de l'abstraction du sens réel des expressions ; (b.) il présente des schémas qui peuvent être représentés par des notations symboliques ou abstraites dans lesquelles différents objets peuvent varier sous des espaces réservés ; (c.) il est construit sur des notions structurelles, telles que la structure du raisonnement abstrait ou du langage, et non sur les notions sémantiques qui prennent en compte la relation au monde ; (d.) il est construit comme une abstraction des caractéristiques accidentelles ou particulières de l'objet qu'il considère ; et (e.) est construit avec des règles, un ensemble de normes ou de lois qui limitent sa formulation et appliquent un caractère normatif. Ce sont toutes des caractéristiques selon lesquelles la propriété d'être formel d'un objet théorique peut être évaluée. Entendu comme tel, le concept de formalité implique une phénoménologie logique d'un objet théorique. Il s'agit de la manière dont un objet théorique est donné dans son articulation initiale et des transformations qu'il subit à travers une action d'interprétation. Mais avant d'analyser les multiples interprétations ou formalisations de la supposition dans les études contemporaines, nous avons d'abord demandé si une formalité générique pouvait être attribuée à l'objet théorique en question. Donc, le chapitre suivant était consacré à la formalité dans la logique médiévale et surtout dans la théorie des suppositions.

Le deuxième chapitre de la section actuelle, *2.2. Formalité dans les théories des suppositions médiévales*, a tenté d'analyser la formalité générique de l'objet théorique en question. La formalité de la théorie de la supposition a été abordée avant de s'engager dans l'action d'interprétation ou de formalisation faite par la recherche actuelle. Dans un premier temps, nous avons montré que, concernant la logique médiévale en général, deux thèses peuvent être formulées. D'une part, ThMl1, selon laquelle la logique médiévale est aussi formelle que la logique contemporaine. De l'autre, ThMl2, qui affirme que la logique médiévale est fondamentalement différente de la logique et des théories contemporaines du langage car elle manque de formalité. Nous avons montré que ces deux positions peuvent être interprétées comme des extrêmes, et qu'une description plus précise de la logique médiévale peut provenir d'une position intermédiaire, retracée dans les travaux de Cesali, Parsons et autres. En conséquence, la logique médiévale n'utilise pas une simple langue latine naturelle, mais une version hautement conceptualisée et enrégimentée de celle-ci. Cet emploi est fait dans le but précis de construire des outils d'analyse de situations logico-linguistiques. Donc, on peut parler à la fois d'un aspect formel et d'un aspect matériel de la logique médiévale. Dans un deuxième temps, nous avons tenté d'évaluer le caractère

formel présent dans la théorie de la supposition à un niveau générique. Premièrement, nous avons montré qu'une distinction entre un niveau sémantique et syntaxique peut être faite sur la base de la différence de Pierre entre les éléments catégoriques et syncatégorématiques d'une proposition. En identifiant les éléments syncatégorématiques qui ne portent pas de contenu sémantique avec les types de termes dans un compte logico-grammatical, les logiciens médiévaux configurent une forme ou une structure logique d'une proposition. Deuxièmement, nous avons essayé de voir si un argument pour la formalité de la théorie des suppositions de Pierre d'Espagne peut être fait à partir de la façon dont les modes de supposition sont définis. Là, la conclusion était que les modes de supposition sont définis par une combinaison de conditions sémantiques et syntaxiques. Même dans le cas de la supposition déterminée et la supposition confuse et mobile, où les définitions sont proposées selon les éléments syntaxiques, c'est-à-dire les types de signes et les inférences descendantes, les conditions sémantiques sont là par héritage des modes supérieurs de supposition qui ont été divisés. L'absence d'une formalité stricte pour la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne a été une fois de plus démontrée par rapport à la doctrine d'Ockham. Il a été souligné que Pierre n'a pas une conception complète sur des propositions catégoriques dans sa théorie de la supposition. Un mode non personnel a été utilisé pour le prédicat de proposition de forme A qui est défini sémantiquement. Lorsque les extrêmes des propositions catégoriques étaient expliqués en termes d'inférences, ses exemples et son explication étaient incomplets et manquaient de formalité. En revanche, la position d'Ockham est plus formelle, puisque tous les extrêmes des formes propositionnelles catégoriques A, E, I, O sont expliqués par des suppositions personnelles et au moyen d'inférences schématiques qui ont abouti à des propositions disjonctives ou conjonctives ou à des propositions avec un extrême disjonctif. À partir de cette étape, nous avons montré que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne a un faible degré de formalité, comparée à d'autres constructions théoriques terministes. Ensuite, l'attention se porte sur la recherche des différentes manières dont la théorie médiévale de la supposition a été interprétée et ainsi formalisée selon le cadre conceptuel contemporain de la compréhension.

Le troisième chapitre de la deuxième section, *2.3. Interprétations contemporaines des théories des suppositions*, a été consacré à l'analyse des différentes interprétations de la théorie de la supposition que l'on pouvait trouver dans la recherche moderne. Nous avons vu ici que différentes réponses ont été données à la question relative à la nature de la supposition. À cet égard, la supposition était considérée comme : une théorie de référence, une théorie de la quantification,

une théorie herméneutique computationnelle, une théorie de l'inférence et une théorie de la notation conceptuelle. Dans presque tous les cas, la doctrine d'Ockham était le principal objet d'interprétation et non les versions moins matures de la théorie qui ont été élaborées au XIII^{e} siècle.

Dans le premier sous-chapitre, nous avons vu comment Peter Geach a appliqué la théorie de la dénotation de Russell afin de comprendre la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de référence mauvaise et défectueuse. Cet effort particulier a été fortement critiqué par des auteurs comme Catarina Dutilh Novaes et T. K. Scott Jr. Dans la deuxième partie, nous avons montré comment, à partir de Philotheus Boehner, la théorie des suppositions était considérée comme une analyse des expressions quantifiées. L'interprétation quantificationnelle a été attaquée par des auteurs comme Gareth B. Matthews et Corcoran, mais soutenue par d'autres. John J. Swiniarski, Spade, Priest, Read et Parsons ont soutenu à différents degrés la thèse quantification. Ce faisant, ils ont dû soit admettre certaines incohérences de l'approche quantificationnelle, soit proposer une solution artificielle à des problèmes étrangers au position d'Ockham afin de s'adapter à l'interprétation quantificationnelle. Donc, la thèse de l'équivalence, la règle de priorité, l'analyse complète de la proposition et le changement du prédicat de la proposition de la forme O étaient autant de solutions différentes proposées pour rendre cette interprétation viable. Le troisième sous-chapitre était consacré à l'interprétation herméneutique de Catarina Dutilh Novaes. Selon elle, la théorie de la supposition est une construction formelle telle qu'elle présente un ensemble de règles, sémantiques et quasi-syntaxiques, qui peuvent être appliquées mécaniquement ou computationnellement afin d'obtenir des lectures possibles des propositions. La quatrième interprétation, représentée par Elizabeth Karger, concevait la théorie de la supposition comme une théorie de l'inférence. Les modes de supposition peuvent être définis en termes de séquences de quantification. Selon le type de modes personnels qui varient dans deux propositions avec les mêmes termes, l'implication valide de l'un à l'autre peut être établie. En ce qui concerne cette thèse d'inférence, nous avons également vu les objections de Markosian concernant la façon dont les relations dans le carré d'opposition ne sont pas correctement préservées. Dans le cinquième sous-chapitre, nous avons expliqué l'interprétation par Perreiah de la supposition comme une notation conceptuelle. De ce point de vue, la supposition est conçue à partir des notions de substitution et de lieu, en connexion directe avec l'art de la mémoire. En conséquence, la supposition semble avoir pour rôle d'établir des schémas, qui peuvent être représentés formellement, pour la mise en correspondance des mots avec des objets en fonction du contexte propositionnel.

Concluant la partie consacrée aux interprétations contemporaines, nous avons soutenu que toutes les thèses susmentionnées concernant la supposition ont été proposées par diffèrents chercheurs au sein de la tradition systématique, une tradition qui semble plus riche que Dutilh pensait. Nous avons soutenu que cette tradition systématique semble présupposer et approuver le ThMl1, selon lequel les logiques médiévales et contemporaines sont similaires en ce qui concerne leur formalité. Cette formalité leur permet d'appliquer la structure formelle des théories de la référence, de la quantification, de l'inférence, de l'herméneutique computationnelle et de la notation conceptuelle à la théorie de la supposition dans un processus interprétatif. Outre les remarques critiques qui se sont formées au sein de leur propre tradition systématique, qui devraient suffire pour contester sinon rejeter telles interprétations, il existe d'autres problèmes génériques. Les thèses de la référence, de la quantification et de l'inférence n'abordent pas dans leur formalisation de la supposition l'ensemble de la construction théorique mais seulement des parties de celle-ci, notamment les modes de supposition personnelle. Les thèses de l'herméneutique computationnelle et de la notation conceptuelle méconnaissent l'objet de la construction théorique médiévale, puisqu'une application mécanique et une fonction mémorielle n'ont jamais été envisagées aux XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles. De plus, dans les cinq thèses susmentionnées, il semble y avoir une méthodologie commune qui remet en question toute leur démarche argumentative. Ils prennent des théories formelles de la logique contemporaine ou des théories du langage et les appliquent à la théorie de la supposition. Dans ce processus, la théorie de la supposition est détachée de son propre développement historique, de son cadre théorique et de sa propre finalité. En disant que la relation de supposition décrit la même chose que la référence, la quantification, l'inférence, le sens propositionnel ou la notation conceptuelle, notre objet d'interprétation est transformé, en raison des cadres conceptuels qui le rendent dans une construction plus formelle différente de l'objet initial.

Une fois exposées ces conceptions, nous avons considéré que la « tradition systématique » est problématique au cœur même de sa méthodologie et ne peut se suffire à elle-même dans une enquête sur la nature de la théorie médiévale de la supposition. Cependant, elle peut être considéré comme une étape nécessaire dans une analyse complète, qui commence par l'analyse historique et doctrinale et se termine par l'assimilation de l'analyse systématique dans une troisième étape synthétique. Au cours de l'analyse systématique, nous avons vu comment la théorie des suppositions s'articule selon différentes conditions qui peuvent être considérées comme

syntaxiques et sémantiques. Dans le cas de Pierre d'Espagne, ces conditions sont moins formelles que dans d'autres versions plus matures et plus tardives de la supposition. De plus, en comprenant la notion de formalité et la mécanique qu'elle implique, la supposition elle-même peut être considérée comme une sorte de formalisation. Dans son effort pour rendre compte de la relation entre le *supponens* et le *suppositum*, la supposition, dans la version de Pierre, peut être conçue comme une compréhension abstraite de la manière dont les mots sont liés aux objets en fonction du contexte propositionnel et des types de mots. Ce faisant, un ensemble de règles et de concepts logico-grammaticaux sont proposés en fonction des limites imposées par le langage dans lequel la théorie est exprimée et le stade de développement conceptuel de la pensée humaine. Dans la dernière section de notre travail, nous avons essayé de voir comment l'analyse historique et doctrinale ainsi que l'analyse systématique peuvent être combinées dans une évaluation appliquée de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne.

Jusqu'ici, dans le but d'expliquer la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne, nous avons mené deux types d'analyses. Dans la première partie de notre travail, nous avons essayé d'établir le cadre doctrinal dans lequel la position de Pierre a émergé. Tout d'abord, nous avons abordé une série de problèmes liés à l'auteur, au contexte et à la diffusion de *SL*. Puis nous avons proposé une description du contenu des travaux de Pierre qui a tenté de montrer la centralité de la théorie de la supposition dans le corpus logique. En fin de compte, nous avons discuté des problèmes liés aux origines de la théorie des suppositions et comment ces origines ont eu comme résultats différents produits théoriques au XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles. Cette première section se voulait une analyse historique et doctrinale, qui avait pour but de comprendre la théorie des suppositions dans les limites interprétatives imposées par son contexte et ses origines. Dans la deuxième partie de notre travail, nous avons tenté de pousser plus loin notre analyse. Au sein de l'analyse systématique, nous avons principalement essayé d'aborder le problème des interprétations modernes ou contemporaines de la théorie des suppositions à un niveau général. Nous avons soutenu que toutes ces interprétations exploitent certaines similitudes formelles partielles entre la théorie de la supposition et les théories modernes ou contemporaines de la logique et du langage. Nous avons d'abord tenté d'obtenir les outils d'analyse en recherchant différentes acceptions du concept de « formalité ». Ensuite, nous avons essayé de voir en quoi la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne peut être considérée comme formelle à un niveau générique. Enfin, nous avons

discuté la tradition systématique de la théorie de la supposition avec ses débats, ses lacunes et ses résultats d'interprétation.

Ces deux étapes précédentes ont été jugées insuffisantes pour apporter une réponse à notre question principale de recherche. La première section nous a seulement permis de voir les multiples couches conceptuelles qui ont fusionné dans le concept de *suppositio* et la diversité des théories de la supposition dans la tradition terministe. La seconde n'a fait que souligner l'interprétation possible des suppositions et les problèmes et défauts généraux qu'elles présupposaient. En conséquence, une troisième étape était nécessaire qui combinerait les deux analyses précédentes en une troisième. Ainsi, la troisième partie de notre travail avait pour objectif principal une analyse appliquée de la théorie des suppositions de Pierre d'Espagne qui tienne compte à la fois de ses limites doctrinales et des outils contemporains de compréhension. Ce que nous voulions obtenir dans cette partie était une évaluation de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne qui clarifierait quel est le but de sa doctrine et comment nous devons la comprendre.

Le premier chapitre de la troisième section, *3.1. La théorie de la supposition encore une fois*, a tenté dans un premier temps de revisiter la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne, dans un effort pour combiner les deux étapes précédentes de notre analyse. Premièrement, nous avons soutenu que Pierre utilise le concept de « suppositio » de différentes manières, de sorte que nous pouvons parler d'une multiplicité de significations. Deux usages différents ont été identifiés qui, à première vue, semblaient différer de la propriété terministe de la supposition. La première est une acception de la supposition qui peut être comprise comme une relation entre un supérieur et un ou plusieurs inférieurs. Nous avons montré que cette acception hiérarchique repose sur les relations représentées par l'arborescence porphyrienne, doublée de la notion de relatifs de supériorité et d'infériorité. La seconde est une acception dans laquelle la supposition est comprise comme sujet grammatical de la proposition, par opposition à la notion d'*appositio*. De plus, nous avons soutenu que ces deux notions entrent partiellement dans la structure de construction conceptuelle de la notion terministe de supposition. D'une part, la supposition, en tant que relation entre un *supponens* et un *suppositum*, est conçue sur le même schème conceptuel que les relatifs ; l'acceptation hiérarchique spécifique peut être vue dans le cas de la supposition distributive confuse, où le *supponens*, terme distribué et confus qui est explicitement considéré comme supérieur, est mis en relation avec ses inférieurs, les *supposita*, qui sont les individus contenus sous le terme commun. Par contre, dans une structure propositionnelle minimale, formée d'un sujet

et d'un prédicat, celui qui a la propriété terministe de supposition est le nom substantif, qui, dans la plupart des cas, correspond aux *supponens* pris grammaticalement ou au terme-sujet. Cependant, ce dernier chevauchement conceptuel n'est pas tout à fait correct, puisque presque toutes les parties du discours qui ont une forme substantielle peuvent avoir la propriété de supposition, qu'elles soient un sujet ou non, comme le montrent les nombreux exemples que nous avons fournis. Cependant, il est indéniable que les deux acceptions entrent dans la constitution de la théorie terministe de la supposition. La première, comme structure générale, dans la relation verticale entre *supponens* et *supposita* ou comme structure spécifique, dans la supposition confuse et distributive ; la seconde, seulement partiellement, comme relation horizontale, pour les cas où le terme supposant est identique au sujet propositionnel. Mais même pour l'acception grammaticale, il existe un autre lien avec l'acception terministe, à travers l'acception hiérarchique : les *supposita* ou les inférieurs d'un terme supposant sont des sujets logiques et grammaticaux par rapport à leur supérieur, qui est correctement leur prédicat.

Dans un deuxième temps, le deuxième sous-chapitre a abordé à nouveau les problèmes liés aux extrêmes des formes propositionnelles catégoriques A, E, I, O, dans une tentative d'esquisser une réponse concernant la nature et le but de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne. Premièrement, nous avons montré la dépendance de la supposition envers la notion de signification. Nous avons montré que, selon Pierre, la signification est une propriété pré-propositionnelle des mots pour représenter des objets de manière indéterminée. Il ne précise pas si l'objet représenté est un universel, un individu, un ensemble d'individus, tout ou partie, ou s'il représente toutes ces entités à la fois. En ce sens, la supposition vient comme un outil pour compléter cette fonction de clarification pour quel type d'entité ou de *res*, du domaine de la signification, un terme peut se situer dans un contexte propositionnel.

De plus, nous avons exploré comment la théorie des sophismes et celle des lieux peuvent contribuer à la clarification des concepts de supposition et au problème lié à la supposition des extrêmes dans les propositions catégoriques classiques. En conséquence, nous avons montré que, bien que la supposition simple, personnelle et, dans une certaine mesure, la supposition discrète semblent avoir un rôle dans la détermination du raisonnement fallacieux, comme le montre *SL*.VI à travers les règles *a pluribus determinatis ad unam determinatam* et *a simplici ad personalem*, la situation semble être différente. Dans le septième traité, Pierre ne considère pas en conclusion le passage d'un type de supposition dans les prémisses à un autre, ainsi que l'indiquent les deux règles,

comme une cause de raisonnement fallacieux, mais attribue cette position à d'autres. Ce fait empêche l'interprétation de la supposition comme une théorie qui ait des applications dans la théorie du raisonnement fallacieux, du moins dans le cas de Pierre.

En relation avec la théorie des lieux, nous avons argumenté comment la théorie du lieu à partir du tout en quantité, présentée dans le cinquième tract de *SL*., peut être utilisée pour compléter la théorie de la supposition personnelle confuse et le manque d'exemples explicites. Nous avons montré comment la théorie des lieux décrit des enthymèmes qui sont exactement les mêmes que les enthymèmes formés en descendant sous un terme supposant personnel, mobile et confus. La différence avec la théorie de la supposition est que la théorie des lieux n'offre pas seulement une méthode plus complète de descente sous le terme supposant, mais elle ajoute une méthode de remontée à la proposition originale à partir de la concaténation de propositions ou de la collection des inférieurs contenues par le terme supposant. De cette façon, un argument en faveur de la « thèse d'équivalence » peut être avancé, puisque nous avons une implication mutuelle.

Outre les clarifications apportées par la théorie des sophismes et surtout la théorie des lieux, la théorie de Pierre d'Espagne présente encore quelques défis par rapport à la supposition des prédicats dans les propositions de forme I et O. Pour tenter de les clarifier, nous avons montré que la position de Parsons selon laquelle tous les prédicats doivent avoir une supposition simple dans les formes catégoriques simples, ne peut être retenue. Une bien meilleure option a été identifiée dans la position de Swiniarski, selon laquelle le prédicat de la proposition de type I a une supposition simple, tandis que celui de la proposition de type O a une supposition confuse et distributive. Mais même dans cette position, le cas de la proposition de type O présente quelques problèmes. Pour qu'un terme ait une supposition confuse et distributive, il faut qu'il y ait une cause de confusion. Dans le cas de la proposition de type O, la seule cause peut être la négation. Mais Pierre rejette dans *SL.* XII.24 la possibilité pour la propriété de négation de confondre ou de diffuser le terme. Ce fait rend problématique l'attribution d'une supposition confuse et distribuée au prédicat de la proposition de type O ; de plus, cela pose la question de la supposition des extrêmes dans les propositions de type E.

En guise de conclusion pour le premier chapitre de la troisième section, nous avons indiqué que notre analyse expliquait la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'une manière plus complète, à travers l'évaluation des différentes occurrences du concept de « suppositio » et à travers ses liens avec la théorie de la signification, lieux et sophismes. Cependant, il a été souligné qu'il y a des

problèmes inhérents à la position de Pierre. Le rôle que joue la négation dans les propositions catégoriques simples n'est pas clair, car, dans certains cas, elle semble avoir le pouvoir de distribuer, mais dans d'autres, non. La même chose peut être dite en ce qui concerne son compte lié à l'utilisation de la supposition dans la théorie des sophismes. Ces aspects soulèvent la question de la cohérence doctrinale entre les différents traités qui offrent des positions différentes sur le même objet.

Le deuxième chapitre, *3.2. Orientation doctrinale*, a tenté de montrer les implications ontologiques de la doctrine de Pierre d'Espagne. Dans un premier temps, nous avons soutenu que ses doctrines logiques impliquent une explication réaliste des universaux. D'une part, la définition de l'universel comme objet défini par *esse* dans le traité des prédicables a été considérée comme un premier argument en faveur de l'engagement réaliste. De l'autre, la théorie de la signification qui entre dans la construction de la supposition simple, qui se définit comme une relation entre un terme et l'objet universel qu'il signifie, représente le second argument en faveur d'une telle position.

Dans un second temps, nous avons tenté d'évaluer dans quelle mesure Pierre d'Espagne peut être considéré comme un conceptualiste. Cette voie de raisonnement a été suggérée par Gyula Klima, qui, bien qu'ayant considéré la position de Pierre comme proche d'un « réalisme extrêmement extrême », a reconnu un domaine ontologique des « choses-comme-conçues et de leurs modes », ce qui adoucit l'engagement ontologique. À l'appui de son approche conceptuelle, nous avons expliqué la distinction de Pierre entre *via logicae* et *via nature* de *SL*. VI. Selon elle, la logique peut être conçue comme préoccupée du domaine conceptuel et non des entités matérielles, fait qui ne fait l'universel une entité existante et numériquement plurielle que selon les sciences qui étudient la matière et son mouvement, comme la physique. Cependant, cette position s'efface devant la doctrine de supposition de Pierre et surtout devant sa doctrine d'appellation. On affirme qu'un terme à simple supposition signifie, suppose et appelle le même objet, un universel existant. L'appellation étant définie comme la prise d'un terme pour un objet existant, l'engagement réaliste vis-à-vis de l'universel s'affirme une fois de plus sur des bases beaucoup plus stables.

Par conséquent, nous avons conclu que Pierre d'Espagne a une explication réaliste de la logique, bien que certaines petites portions de sa doctrine puissent impliquer une faible tendance au conceptualisme. Puisque le domaine des concepts et des réalités mentales est complètement absent de son cadre doctrinal, son engagement pour le réalisme peut être considéré comme naturel.

Le dernier chapitre de la troisième section de notre analyse, *3.3. La formalité de la théorie de supposition de Pierre de l'Espagne et son interprétation*, a tenté d'évaluer les différentes possibilités d'interprétation de la théorie de supposition de Pierre d'Espagne, à travers les options offertes par le recherche moderne. Il s'agissait d'un processus en trois étapes qui avait pour objectif de comprendre la doctrine de Pierre à l'intersection de l'analyse historique et systématique. Pour obtenir une telle compréhension, le problème du degré de formalité spécifique présent dans la position de Pierre a été abordé, en relation avec les versions du XIII^{e} siècle de la supposition, et avec les théories modernes du langage et de la logique.

Dans le premier sous-chapitre, nous avons soutenu que, bien que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre présente des caractéristiques communes avec les doctrines de Lambert et de Sherwood, le degré de formalité diffère. Alors que Lambert et Sherwood relient directement la définition de la supposition déterminée au processus de vérification de la véracité d'une proposition pour un certain *suppositum*, Pierre d'Espagne semble rejeter cette utilisation et ne considère pas la supposition comme ce qui rend vraie une proposition pour un certain individu. Alors que Lambert et Sherwood proposent des règles et des explications pour l'effet distributif des signes universels et la négation dans la définition de la supposition personnelle confuse et distributive, dans le cas de Pierre, elles font défaut. Alors que les deux logiciens médiévaux considèrent la supposition simple comme une relation entre un mot et un concept, c'est-à-dire un objet ou une forme d'objet telle qu'elle est conçue par l'intellect, et ils n'attribuent pas ce mode de supposition aux prédicats de formes propositionnelles catégoriques comme A et I, Pierre considère la supposition simple comme une relation entre un terme et un universel extérieur à l'âme et attribue ce mode de supposition aux formes propositionnelles catégoriques susmentionnées. Ces différences nous montrent une fois de plus que Pierre était plus attaché à une ontologie réaliste que Lambert et Sherwood, et que sa position sur la théorie de la supposition, peut être considérée comme moins formelle que les versions de Lambert et Sherwood.

Après avoir vu que le niveau de formalité générique de Pierre d'Espagne est faible, à la fois en comparaison avec celle d'Ockham[57] et même avec celles de Sherwood et de Lambert, nous avons essayé de souligner la manière spécifique dont il peut être qualifié de « formel ». En conséquence, nous avons appliqué les différents sens de la formalité identifiés dans la partie *2.1.3.*

[57] Voir *2.2.2 La formalité générique de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne*.

Types de formalité. Nous avons soutenu que nous pouvons identifier dans la doctrine de Pierre certains éléments qui ressemblent : le processus d'abstraction du sens d'une expression, la variation des objets considérés par la théorie sous des schémas, les structures syntaxiques, les objets qui ne sont pas considérés selon leur individualité ou accidents et un ensemble de règles ou de lois à caractère normatif. Cependant, ces aspects formels ne sont pas pleinement assumés et nous ne sommes autorisés à parler que d'une tendance à la formalité. La supposition considère en effet des types de termes avec leurs positions propositionnelles syntaxiques, des suppositions génériques et non des individus uniques et identifiables, des notions syntaxiques comme des éléments syncatégorématiques, un ensemble de règles pour les modes de supposition et pour les effets propositionnels des éléments syncatégorématiques. Toutes ces notions ne sont pas pleinement développées dans la théorie de la supposition proposée par Pierre. Au lieu des schémas nécessaires aux modes de supposition personnelle, nous avons des exemples problématiques. Au lieu de règles de descente et d'effet de signes et de négation, nous avons le silence. Au lieu d'un point de vue syntaxique sur la supposition, nous avons une notion sémantique, attaché à l'existence de l'universel en dehors de l'âme.

Le troisième sous-chapitre a tenté de voir si la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne peut être interprétée comme une théorie de : référence, quantification, inférence, herméneutique computationnelle ou notation conceptuelle. Nous avons soutenu que toutes ces options ne parviennent pas à saisir la nature de la théorie de la supposition, car leur principal cadre conceptuel n'est pas traçable dans la doctrine de Pierre d'Espagne.

Premièrement, nous avons soutenu que l'interprétation de référence ne peut pas être appliquée, puisque les inférences descendantes des prédicats des formes propositionnelles A et I sont bloquées par l'attribution pour elles d'une supposition simple et puisque la supposition ne peut pas identifier des individus uniques. Concernant l'interprétation de la quantification, nous avons montré que, bien que Pierre, à travers la théorie des lieux, puisse être dit accepter une inférence ascendante pour la supposition confuse et distributive, il n'en propose pas pour la supposition déterminée. De plus, les règles explicites et les exemples sur la manière dont la descente doit se dérouler font défaut. Ce fait, ainsi que l'utilisation de la supposition simple pour les propositions catégoriques affirmatives, rendent la compréhension de la supposition comme une théorie qui offre une analyse des expressions quantifiées non étayée. L'approche de l'herméneutique computationnelle semble également inapplicable à la position de Pierre, puisque les règles

nécessaires à la reconstruction formelle de Dutilh sont totalement absentes de la doctrine originale. En ce qui concerne l'interprétation inférentielle, nous avons soutenu que Pierre offre en effet quelques indices vers une tel approche. Il rattache explicitement la supposition à la théorie des sophismes et, implicitement, à la théorie des lieux. Cependant, le premier lien est alors explicitement rejeté dans son traitement du sophisme ; le second ne suffit pas pour une interprétation inférentielle. Pour Pierre, il n'y a pas d'exposé systématique pour montrer comment certaines modifications des modes de supposition dans une inférence peuvent garantir la justesse du processus inférentiel. L'interprétation de la supposition en tant que notation conceptuelle est bien une explication plausible, mais pas de la manière dont Perreiah l'articule, c'est-à-dire en tant qu'art de la mémoire. La supposition de Pierre d'Espagne peut être conçue comme une notation conceptuelle, c'est-à-dire comme un système particulier de formalisation, selon les outils disponibles à l'époque, de la relation sémantique entre termes et objets, à partir d'éléments propositionnels sémantiques et syntaxiques. Cependant, ce n'était pas un système de mémorisation des relations topologiques entre termes et objets à travers des schémas.

Donc, la troisième section de nos travaux a tenté de replacer la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne dans une nouvelle perspective, en croisant les résultats antérieurs obtenus à partir de l'analyse historique et doctrinale et de l'analyse systématique. Ce faisant, nous avons essayé d'offrir une réponse à notre question principale de recherche, à savoir « qu'est-ce que la théorie des suppositions ? ». Cette réponse a tenté d'assimiler les deux traditions d'interprétation de la théorie des suppositions et leurs méthodologies implicites, tout en essayant de rester fidèle au texte de Pierre. Donc, notre objectif était double : comprendre de manière plus systématique la doctrine de Pierre avec ses problèmes et solutions inhérents et évaluer dans quelle mesure les différentes interprétations proposées par le recherche moderne peuvent lui être appliquées. Pour arriver au deuxième point, il fallait d'abord une meilleure compréhension de la théorie des suppositions de Pierre. Ensuite, une remise en cause de la théorie en mettant l'accent sur la notion de formalité en lien à la fois avec les autres versions de supposition du XIII^{e} siècle et avec les interprétations modernes a été faite.

Au cours des trois sections de notre travail, nous avons essayé d'offrir une nouvelle compréhension de la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne, sinon de la supposition en général, en employant une méthodologie qui avait pour but de combler le fossé entre les deux manières de se rapporter aux doctrines logiques médiévales : la doctrine historique et systématique.

La nécessité de notre étude a été fondée sur le statut de la recherche contemporaine. En général, la supposition était considérée soit comme un concept explicite pouvant être saisi par la compréhension des doctrines logiques médiévales et de leur cadre historique, soit comme similaire à une théorie spécifique traçable dans la philosophie post-frégéenne du langage et de la logique : référence, quantification, inférence, herméneutique computationnelle/théorie du sens propositionnel ou notation conceptuelle. La variété des sources de la théorie des suppositions au Moyen Âge, les particularités doctrinales des logiciens terministes et les autorités invoquées, la particularité de la doctrine de Pierre d'Espagne et le manque d'études approfondies sur celle-ci, la variété des réponses offertes par la littérature moderne concernant la nature de supposition et le désaccord général dans la recherche concernant son statut, nous ont fait reconsidérer à la fois les solutions proposées jusqu'à présent et les méthodologies pour aborder ce sujet.

Notre tâche principale était de clarifier le concept de supposition en explorant les explications déjà existantes. Au cours de cet effort, nous avons essayé de proposer des réponses possibles à notre principale question de recherche liée à la nature et au statut de la théorie des suppositions, à savoir « qu'est-ce que la théorie des suppositions ? », à la fois au Moyen Âge et dans le cas particulier de Pierre de l'Espagne dans son *Résumés de logique*. Assez souvent, nous avons pu proposer des réponses négatives et ainsi montrer ce que n'est pas la théorie de la supposition. Cependant, la thèse que nous avons essayé de démontrer tout au long du processus était que la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne peut être mieux comprise dans ses propres termes, sans être assimilée à ses interprétations contemporaines ou à d'autres constructions théoriques médiévales ; une telle équation générera une série d'inadvertances doctrinales qui peuvent être mises en évidence à travers la notion de formalité. Une telle approche a été possible du fait que nous avons souscrit à une position intermédiaire entre ThMl1 et ThMl2, selon laquelle, la logique médiévale, et par conséquent la théorie de la supposition de Pierre d'Espagne, n'a pas les caractéristiques formelles des théories post-frégéennes du langage et logique, mais a une tendance, conditionnée par la langue latine, vers eux.

En conclusion, à la fin de notre étude, nous nous sommes demandé : comment la théorie de la supposition pourrait-elle être comprise en tenant compte de l'ensemble de l'analyse que nous avons faite ? Nous avons pensé qu'une réponse appropriée doit être offerte en fonction de l'évolution historique de la théorie de la supposition suivie par la lentille focale du concept de « formalité ».

Tout d'abord, nous ne pouvons pas parler d'une théorie médiévale de la supposition, mais d'une variété de constructions théoriques qui partagent des origines et des objectifs communs, malgré leurs différences doctrinales. On peut dire que l'histoire de l'évolution du concept de supposition pourrait commencer par la relation de substitution, une relation intuitive et physique exprimée par le langage commun. Ensuite, cette relation physique a été enrégimentée dans le cadre juridique du droit romain. De plus, le concept de *suppositio* a subi un processus d'abstraction de telle sorte que sa relation ne comprenait pas seulement des objets physiques. La tradition grammaticale initiée par Priscien, à ses tout débuts, la considérait de telle manière que le mot supposant remplacerait le sujet grammatical ou le sujet thématique de la proposition. La tradition logique considérait la supposition ce qui est subordonné, l'individu ou la substance. La tradition porrétaine considérait la supposition comme le substrat capable d'être porteur de forme. A proximité de l'arrivée de la logique terministe, toutes ces acceptions particulières se sont contaminées, de telle sorte que la tradition logique, grammaticale et théologique présupposait le chevauchement entre les concepts de substance, de subsistance, de sujet, de subordination et de supposition. Cela a fait la *suppositio* un concept avec des implications logiques, grammaticales et ontologiques. L'avènement de la logique terministe marque l'apparition d'un appareil formel qui intègre la notion de supposition dans un système de classifications et de définitions qui a une finalité héritée de la tradition grammaticale, théologique et surtout logique. On peut affirmer que son objectif était de clarifier l'entité pour laquelle un terme est mis en fonction des types de termes et du contexte propositionnel. Même au sein de la tradition terministe, on peut parler d'une évolution de la théorie de la supposition et d'un raffinement des outils logiques utilisés pour l'étudier. Le XIII^{e} siècle avait une position plus réaliste, bien que dans le cas de Sherwood et Lambert on puisse parler d'une position conceptualiste. Au XIV^{e} siècle, nous pouvons trouver une position nominaliste pleinement développée qui a intégré le langage mental dans la mécanique de la supposition. Dans les doctrines du XIIIe siècle, la supposition simple est d'abord conçue comme la propriété d'un terme qui est pris pour sa forme signifiée ou pour les objets contenus sous cette forme mais sans avoir avec eux un rapport déterminé. La doctrine de *SL* oppose cette position à un réalisme fort quant à l'existence des universaux. La supposition mobile confuse est conçue comme une propriété marquée par un signe distributif ; elle a lieu lorsque le terme est mis pour chacun de ses individus ou porteurs de forme contenus sous le terme ou sous la forme du terme suppositif. Un tel type de supposition ne s'explique que par la possibilité d'une inférence descendante du terme

supposant à chacune de ses suppositions. La manière dont cette descente s'effectue n'est pas entièrement et schématiquement précisée, en particulier dans le cas de Pierre. Les doctrines du XIV^{e} siècle étaient articulées plus rigoureusement en mettant l'accent sur le lien entre la propriété d'un terme d'être mis pur quelque chose et le fait que la ou les choses pour lesquelles les termes sont mis vérifient ou rendent la proposition vraie. Bien que ce lien avec la valeur de vérité de la proposition ait été affirmé dans les doctrines de Sherwood et Lambert, dans le cas de Pierre il semble être rejeté. Au XIV^{e} siècle, beaucoup plus d'attention a été accordée au rôle du logicien dans l'établissement du type de supposition que peut avoir un terme et sur les conditions dans lesquelles chaque mode de supposition est défini. Ils conçoivent ce que les logiciens du XIII^{e} siècle appelaient la « suppositio simplex », comme une propriété selon laquelle un terme est mis pour un concept ou une notion de l'âme, dépourvu de tout engagement ontologique dur. La supposition déterminée, la supposition simplement confuse et la supposition confuse s'expliquaient par des inférences à la fois ascendantes et descendantes qui ont été faites : disjonctivement, avec un extrême disjonctif ou conjonctivement, fait qui permet de parler d'une formalité schématique. Complétés par des règles de distribution beaucoup plus rigoureuses, les trois types de suppositions susmentionnés sont systématiquement expliqués à travers des types d'inférences possibles de la proposition originale qui contient le terme supposant, à une proposition ou une concaténation de propositions où le terme supposant est remplacé par ses inférieurs, et de ceux-ci, retour à l'original. D'une manière générale, on peut dire qu'à partir du XIV^{e} siècle, la supposition a été définie sur des bases plus syntaxiques ou formelles qu'au siècle précédent.

Cette chronologie spécifique de la « suppositio » nous fait croire que le concept a subi un processus d'abstraction à travers son développement. Son degré de formalité croît de façon exponentielle d'un concept exprimé dans un langage naturel qui implique une relation de substitution entre mot et un objet physique, à un concept intégré dans une théorie terministe et développé au sein d'une science du langage, qui implique une relation entre un terme et un type d'entité médiatisé ou non par le domaine du langage mental. Ainsi faite, la « suppositio » devient enrégimentée et formalisée selon les exigences de la logique médiévale et de son langage semi-formel. Des règles, des définitions et des classifications sont proposées afin d'expliquer les mécanismes de la supposition. Ce que cette théorie réussit à faire, c'est d'offrir les outils nécessaires pour analyser la relation entre le langage et les différents domaines de la réalité à travers l'étude de termes placés dans un contexte propositionnel. Ce que la théorie de Pierre d'Espagne accomplit,

c'est d'offrir les outils nécessaires, bien que souvent de manière incommode, pour analyser la relation entre la langue et le monde extra-mental et extralinguistique, à travers l'étude de termes placés dans des contextes propositionnels. La théorie des suppositions nous dit pour quel type d'entité un terme peut être mis dans un contexte propositionnel particulier. Comprise comme telle, la théorie des suppositions elle-même peut être considérée comme une formalisation, c'est-à-dire une compréhension abstraite, schématique ou idéalisée de la relation entre le langage et les différents domaines ontologiques, ou, plus précisément, entre les termes et leur(s) objet(s) générique(s). Assurément, cette formalisation est faite selon les outils formels des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles et est rendue dans une langue latine enrégimentée par des notions logiques et grammaticales et non de manière symbolique.

Deuxièmement, la théorie de la supposition, en général, et la version de Pierre d'Espagne, en particulier, ne doivent pas être comprises comme une théorie de la référence, de l'inférence, de la quantification, de l'herméneutique computationnelle ou de la notation conceptuelle, dans les acceptions spécifiques fournies par la recherche moderne. Toutes ces interprétations sont des formalisations qui changent l'objet de leurs interprétations, de telle sorte que le produit de la formalisation a plus de contenu théorique en commun avec les théories contemporaines du langage et de la logique qu'avec les théories médiévales. Ceci s'applique d'une manière plus large au cas de Pierre d'Espagne. L'*auctor summularum* n'offre pas de règles détaillées et d'exemples complets pour un certain nombre de points théoriques liés à la supposition, de sorte qu'une reconstruction moderne en termes des cinq options susmentionnées semble être problématique. Le degré de formalité et de cohérence interne de la théorie de Pierre est faible même pour l'exposé des suppositions des XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles. L'absence d'explication d'une manière systématique de descendre aux inférieurs du terme supposant, l'absence d'attribution d'une supposition pour le prédicat des formes propositionnelles I et O, l'attribution d'une supposition simple pour les prédicats de type A et peut-être les propositions de type I, l'orientation ontologique réaliste dure, le manque de règles pour les effets des signes distributifs et de la négation sur la supposition sont autant d'arguments pour considérer la position de Pierre comme problématique à bien des égards. Cependant, la théorie de la supposition partage des traits particuliers avec les cinq interprétations susmentionnées mais sans permettre une identification avec elles. Par la manière dont nous pouvons descendre du terme supposant à un certain individu ou ensemble d'individus, cela ressemble à la théorie de la référence. Par la manière dont la théorie de la supposition, à travers la

distribution, nous dit ce que signifie pour un terme avoir un signe distributif, elle ressemble à la théorie de la quantification. Du fait que les modes personnels de supposition soient définis par des inférences ascendantes et descendantes qui pourraient être considérées comme préservant la valeur de vérité, et puisque tout ce processus prend la forme d'un enthymème, il ressemble à la théorie de l'inférence. Puisque la supposition essaie de déterminer sur la base de règles, de définitions et de classification le type d'entité pour lequel un terme est mis, et donc le sens possible de la proposition, elle ressemble à la théorie du sens, comme le suggère Dutilh. Puisque la supposition formalise et rend ainsi une certaine relation entre la langue et le monde d'une manière plus abstraite, elle ressemble à la théorie de la notation conceptuelle, telle que proposée par Perreiah. Cependant, ces ressemblances ne suffisent pas pour déterminer ce qu'est la supposition. De toutes les options précédentes proposées par des diffèrent chercheurs, les plus adéquates semblent être les deux dernières. La théorie des suppositions semble en effet se préoccuper « de déterminer l'étendue des *supposita* possibles pour un terme ; [... pour] déterminer le(s) genre(s) ontologique(s) de *supposita* possibles d'un terme dans une proposition donnée, et combien d'entre eux sont nécessaires pour vérifier la proposition »[58]. Pourtant, nous ne sommes pas d'accord pour dire que la supposition présuppose un compte computationnel, selon lequel les règles sont censées être appliquées mécaniquement, et que la supposition est tellement centrée sur la valeur de vérité. Notre étude pointe vers un développement organique de la théorie des suppositions. À différents stades de son évolution, et en particulier dans le cas de Pierre, la propriété de supposition a été considérée comme indépendante du fait de rendre la proposition vraie. Ses règles étendues pour déterminer les types de supposition manquaient ou étaient formulées de manière moins systématique. Même dans le cas d'Ockham, nous ne pouvons pas trouver le degré de formalité présupposé par le compte computationnel. Concernant l'interprétation de la notation conceptuelle, la supposition semble bien être un outil conceptuel d'analyse des phénomènes logiques et linguistiques, mais pas au sens défendu par Perreiah. Loin d'être un système topologique de mémorisation des relations entre les termes et les objets, la théorie des suppositions peut être considérée comme une tentative d'offrir une notation conceptuelle en l'absence d'une notation conceptuelle appropriée. La logique médiévale ne dispose pas d'un *Begriffsschrift*, de notions symboliques et de langages pour rendre

[58] DUTILH (2018), p. 96: « to determine the range of possible supposita for a term; [... to] determine the ontological kind(s) of the possible supposita of a term in a given proposition, and how many of them are required in order to verify the proposition ».

ses théories d'une manière formelle appropriée. Elle n'a qu'une langue latine enrégimentée de notions logiques et grammaticales qui rend ses théories d'une manière discursive mais abstraite.

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